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Organizing Political Parties

Representation, Participation, and Power

edited by

Susan E. Scarrow, Paul D. Webb,
and Thomas Poguntke

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

ORGANIZING POLITICAL PARTIES

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

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Investigating Party Organization

Structures, Resources, and Representative Strategies

Susan E. Scarrow and Paul D. Webb

INTRODUCTION

Political parties' extra-legislative organizations have taken on important roles in the past century and a half of electoral democracy. In many countries they now routinely serve as key transmission channels for organizing representation, helping to translate popular demands into legislative initiatives, and acting as gatekeepers which determine which candidates have a chance of being elected. They often serve as vehicles for popular mobilization, and as actors with the capacity to selectively distribute resources and professional expertise; they can leverage all these assets to help politicians obtain and retain electoral offices. Because parties' choices are consequential for which interests and ideas get represented, parties' organizations can also be arenas for internal disputes, with different factions vying to select leaders, control party manifestos, or get their representatives on party executive boards. For all these reasons, understanding parties' extra-legislative organizations can offer valuable insights into the ways that parties channel political participation and affect representation. Yet political party organizations are far from uniform; moreover, parties change their internal constitutions much more frequently than countries alter their constitutions. Even in countries with similar political institutions and similar experiences with democracy, political parties use different procedures to make their most important decisions, and follow different approaches when attempting to mobilize their supporters. And in some countries, parties' extra-legislative structures are quite weak in comparison with their legislative parties, or with the resources at the disposal of individual politicians. What explains these differences? And what, if any, are the political consequences of these differences? These are the fundamental questions that we set out to answer in this volume.

The two decades before and after the start of the twenty-first century were a time of rapid and radical change for the institutions of partisan politics. In this period, the practice of multi-party electoral democracy spread widely, reaching areas of Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and even the Middle East, including countries that had until recently been governed by dominant-party or personalistic dictatorships. Paradoxically, this embrace of electoral democracy coincided with a growing ambivalence towards partisan electoral institutions in both established and newer democracies. While publics have remained committed to democracy as a concept, they are increasingly wary of the political parties that seem central to the operation of electoral democracies. This wariness is manifest both as an electoral rejection of traditional governing parties, and as a growing distaste for the premise of party-mediated politics. In established democracies, it has led to growing electoral volatility, which reflects a combination of eroding partisan identification, party switching, new party emergence, and electoral abstention (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000: part 1). In this unfriendly climate, parties in established democracies have seen their enrolled memberships decline (van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012). The more general disaffection with party-organized politics is illustrated by data taken from the recent (sixth) wave of the World Values Surveys (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). For a sample of twenty-one democratic countries from Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Oceania,¹ 81 per cent of respondents agreed that having a democratic system was a very good or fairly good thing, and over 75 per cent were neutral or positive when asked how democratically their country was being governed. In contrast, only 19.8 per cent expressed 'quite a lot' or 'a great deal' of confidence in political parties. As much as political scientists are fond of quoting the assertion by the American scholar E. E. Schattschneider, that 'democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties' (1942: 1), the truth is that many citizens think very differently about parties and about democracy. In keeping with this general mood, a number of political theorists and political activists have envisaged and promoted radical forms of participatory and deliberative democracy that are not party-centred at all (cf. Warren 2002; Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012; Steiner 2012).

One of the results of this disaffection with traditional parties is that during the economic crises of recent years, aggrieved citizens in emerging and established democracies have been at least as likely to take to the streets in non-partisan or cross-party protest movements as to turn to parties to represent their interests. This may be rooted in part in the often-repeated suspicion that traditional parties and party elites 'are all the same' (Linz 2002: 297–300). In the wake of the 2008 economic crises the popular movements that grabbed headlines and brought citizens out to the streets tended to be non-partisan ones, including the Indignados in Spain, Blockupy in Germany, other Occupy protests in New York and London financial districts, protests against austerity

in Greece, anti-government protests in Turkey, or anti-corruption protests in Brazil. All these examples come from countries with established parties and (previously) stable party systems, yet these protesters have—at least initially—looked beyond the established parties and normal electoral channels in their efforts to precipitate major changes in ‘politics as usual’.

These apartisan mass behaviours and rhetoric are seemingly at odds with institutional realities. Especially at the level of national legislatures and executives, representative government remains very much a partisan affair. Political parties control ballot access and coordinate legislative behaviour, and in many countries organized parties benefit from generous public subsidies. Thus, it is not surprising that the past decade has also brought the rise of new and newly-popular political parties which profit from disaffection with traditional parties, including the Italian Five Star Movement, the Swedish Democrats, the UK Independence Party, the Alternative for Germany, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece, and Podemos and Ciudadanos in Spain. Some of these parties have emerged directly from the very movements that started as non-party efforts to overturn politics as usual. The success of new party challengers has raised questions about the stability and viability of established representative structures, and in some cases has wiped out long-standing political parties. Perhaps paradoxically, however, even in countries where new parties enjoy eye-catching success, a significant sub-set of citizens continue to structure their voting behaviour along stable partisan lines, underscoring the continuing importance of parties (new and old) for representative government (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011; Kölln 2014).

Parties’ electoral organizations must inhabit and attempt to bridge this critical gap between popular disillusionment with parties and parties’ de facto political dominance. This is one reason that the study of party organization remains vital even in a period when some of these organizations are weak-looking compared with non-party movements. As long as parties remain dominant in legislatures and governments, their popular party organizations still play key roles in strengthening (or undermining) links between citizens and those who govern. Most parties give their extra-legislative associations privileged roles in transmitting ideas into party discussions, in recruiting political personnel (including their leaders), in communicating party visions and mobilizing supporters, and in providing legitimacy for party decisions. Critically, however, the ways in which they carry out these tasks vary widely.

Political parties in democracies are either private or semi-public associations (Epstein 1986; van Biezen 2004). In either case, they usually enjoy a great deal of latitude in how they structure their efforts to connect with supporters; their success in executing these strategies also varies widely. For instance, many parties enrol individual members, but even in countries where this is the norm, they may still differ sharply in the proportion of their voters who become party members. Similarly, many parties use elaborate representative

structures to make, or to ratify, important decisions, such as the selection of leader and candidates, but the details of these structures vary widely. At one extreme, some are overtly authoritarian, vesting control in a leader or leadership team; at the other extreme, some are avowedly plebiscitarian, opening decision-making to all members, or even to all registered voters. Some national parties are well-resourced and have large and professional staffs to tend to party business both during and between campaigns; others are quite poor. New parties often deliberately contribute to this organizational diversity by making their new organizational approaches a part of their popular appeal, be this the internet-based decision-making of twenty-first-century parties such as the German Pirates or the Italian Five Star Movement, or the grass-roots democracy ‘movement’ spirit of the German Greens in the 1980s or the Spanish Podemos party of the 2010s. Such parties promise that their new organizational styles will produce new and better political outcomes. These examples give just a glimpse of the diversity of organizational approaches that democratic parties adopt, and hint at their varied success in implementing such strategies.

This great variation begs a fundamental question: to what extent does party organization matter? In other words, how much do parties’ internal choices affect the quality of democratic life, or shape political outcomes? If parties’ organizational differences do affect their political performance, these differences might manifest themselves in multiple ways. For instance, different organizational approaches might make some parties better at mobilizing their supporters at election time, or at recruiting winning leaders. Certain types of organizational structure might lead parties to favour policies that are more or less in touch with their potential electorate. Certain combinations of resources might encourage parties to augment or ameliorate societal resource disparities. Answering such questions about the actual impact of parties’ internal organizations may help explain why established parties in some democracies have been better able to compete with the mobilization of new political actors, and may help to identify which of the new political parties are more likely to find longer-term electoral success. Research on the impact of specific organizational approaches may also provide inspiration for parties seeking new ideas about how to strengthen their own legitimacy and outreach.

The flip side of investigating the impact of parties’ organizational differences is asking why they show so much organizational diversity in the first place. In one of the best known debates in the party organizational literature, Leon Epstein (1967) pitted his own hypothesis of party organizational ‘contagion from the right’ against Maurice Duverger’s earlier prediction of ‘contagion from the left’. A half century after these debates there may indeed be more evidence of organizational contagion across ideological lines, but it is far from the case that democratic parties are organizationally identical, not even all parties in parliamentary democracies. This begs the question of why not—what are the limits on the organizational convergence that both Duverger and Epstein foresaw? More

specifically, what factors other than domestic electoral competition seem to steer parties' organizational choices and opportunities? Angelo Panebianco's (1988) answer to this was an explanatory framework that emphasizes how parties are constrained by their past organizational choices. Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda (1994) proposed a different approach, one that emphasizes the role of leadership change and of electoral circumstances. These and other researchers have thus offered competing explanations for the likely extent—and limits—of parties' organizational contagion and similarity, but the verdict is still out regarding the predictive power of any of these frameworks.

This book tackles some of these essential questions about the origins and impact of parties' organizational differences. The chapters that follow differ in whether they treat organizational differences as a dependent or independent variable, but all of them pursue a similar approach to the comparative study of political parties, leveraging cross-national variations in order to illuminate relations between political party organizations, political contexts, and political outcomes. The research presented here constitutes the first major effort to analyse the data collected in the Political Party Database (PPDB). This database, described more fully later in this chapter, is the fruit of an initiative that was launched in 2010 in response to a data gap that has hindered the cross-national study of party rules and structures. The aim of this endeavour, as of the chapters that follow, is to contribute towards building a more nuanced understanding of the political importance of parties' rules, and of their resource strengths and weaknesses.

Before introducing the PPDB, and the chapters that follow, we begin by presenting the framework that has guided our data collection efforts. In setting up this project, we hoped to avoid falling into the practice of just gathering facts for their own sake, or because they were available. Rather, we aimed to assemble information that could contribute to resolving ongoing debates. To this end, we divided political party organization into three main dimensions: structures, resources, and representative strategies. As we show, thinking in terms of these divisions facilitates the search for causal relationships between organization and outcomes, and therefore they have guided our choices about which data to include in our collection.

ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Some of the most enduring debates about political parties center on diagnosing perceived trends in parties' organizational development. In studies of established democracies, many of these debates have been framed in terms

of movement from or towards ideal type structures, whether mass, catchall, electoral professional, or cartel. Of course, there are important exceptions to this tendency, including the framework proposed by Harmel and Janda (1994) and debates which focus on the measurement and implications of party institutionalization (Randall and Svåsand 2002; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013). Our research project has been inspired by both approaches. We cautiously accept the ideal type shorthand that has dominated the study of party politics. However, we see the real-world fit of these labels as hypotheses that deserve to be tested; they should be regarded as heuristic devices that may usefully guide empirical research rather than lawlike statements that are worth keeping if it turns out that they bear little relation to actual circumstances. To be sure, those who initially wrote about these types tended to be quite clear about the limitations of their generalizations, but subsequent users of these categories have often ignored their original caveats. Yet when the classic overarching models of party organization are treated as empirical realities, or when expectations are based on assumptions about sequences of modal party types, these models may serve to obscure as much of the reality as they illuminate. The solution to this problem is not to altogether abandon the heuristics, but to view them as complex hypotheses. Indeed, this may be exactly what the authors intended. Thus, Katz and Mair were quite clear that they were laying out the cartel party *thesis*—a point they highlighted in the title of their restatement of the argument (2009)—even if many readers have employed their term in other ways. We will return to this theme in the concluding chapter, when we ask whether certain party characteristics group in the ways that the accepted party types seem to predict. In this chapter, however, our primary focus is on identifying major strands of middle-level theorizing about party organizations, and on describing the process for gathering the data that will be used throughout this book to contribute to debates about the origins and impacts of specific organizational aspects.

We begin our investigations by proposing criteria that divide parties' organizational capacity into three main dimensions: structures, resources, and representational strategies. As we show in the next section, each of these areas can be further broken down into a few sub-dimensions to map the distribution of influence within them, the nature and distribution of resources, and their openness to individual and group demands. We derive these dimensions and sub-dimensions from past discussions of party organizational change and party organizational impact.

One advantage of framing our research in terms of dimensions and sub-dimensions is that we do not assume symmetrical development in different areas of party life. Instead, our separate dimensions allow for the possibility that parties may develop differently in different areas, and that there may be trade-offs between dimensions. Another advantage of focusing on dimensions instead of on models associated with particular eras is that we can allow for

the possibility that developments are not uni-directional: parties might choose to return to older organizational practices if circumstances change in their favour; in addition, diverse organizational practices may co-exist.

Inspired by past research on party organization as a dependent and independent variable, we employ these dimensions to formulate specific hypotheses about the institutional circumstances that are associated with different forms of party organization, and about how party structures can affect patterns of political participation and representation. In doing so, we make a case for a study of party organizations that is more concerned with systematic testing of mid-level theories than with creating new labels or non-falsifiable ideal type maps.

Structures

A recurring question for scholars is the extent to which parties should be viewed as unitary actors. A common way to resolve this is to use the unitary actor assumption for some purposes, particularly those that involve cross-party interactions. Yet even for studies that do not delve into intra-party politics, it may be useful to be able to identify differences in the degree to which the unitary actor assumption applies: some parties are structured to act cohesively, others are clusters of politicians and local and regional groups which share a party label but not much else. The four structural sub-dimensions help to answer questions about the extent of organizational unity by showing the location of decision-making within the party, and at what level (if at all) these decisions are enforced.

1) *Leadership Autonomy—Restriction* This sub-dimension describes the extent to which a single party leader can act on behalf of the party. A leader's autonomy may be restrained by group leadership (a strong party executive board), by the party's extra-parliamentary organization (party membership and party bureaucracy), and/or by the party's (other) elected office-holders. Provisions for intra-party ballots on policy issues (including coalition agreements), and on leadership selection and de-selection, explicitly restrict a leader's autonomy. Conversely, to the extent that statutes do not establish alternative sources of authority within the party, leaders may be highly autonomous, independently able to define and redefine party policies and priorities.

2) *Centralization—Localization* Parties also differ in the extent to which different levels of the party can act autonomously from one another, with vertical autonomy being most limited in highly centralized parties. The degree of centralization is evident in important decisions, such as who controls the party label, who controls the selection of candidates, and the distribution of financial resources within the party. For example, franchise models (Party

2004) and stratarchical systems (Eldersveld 1964) both describe parties with a medium level of centralization, in which some decisions are centralized, but many other are left to subordinate levels.

3) *Coordination—Entropy* Coordination describes the extent of common action across different political levels and different arenas. It is related to, but conceptually distinct from, centralization, because it extends to horizontal as well as vertical relations. Strong factions are indicative of a higher degree of entropy. The extent of coordination may stem as much from shared understandings of what and how the party represents as from statutory provisions. For instance, in parties of notables, it may be acceptable for elected officials to act as independent trustees rather than to always follow a party leader. In mass parties, coordination is usually strengthened by shared loyalty to a group or ideology, sometimes embodied in an electoral programme that defines specific governing priorities.

4) *Territorial Concentration—Dispersion* This dimension describes the extent to which a party organizes throughout a country's various political units. At one extreme are regional parties with designated territorial heartlands: such parties may be completely absent outside these core areas (for instance, the Scottish Nationalist Party in the UK, which only contests elections within the boundaries of Scotland). Other parties may cater to constituents who live mostly in rural areas, and may be weakly organized elsewhere. Territorial dispersion affects the homogeneity of political competition within a country, as well as the extent to which regional and local elections serve to reinforce loyalties to particular parties (Caramani 2004; Harbers 2010).

These structural dimensions can be measured with information about rules on leadership selection and re-selection (formal accountability), about the de facto distribution of staff and monetary resources, about the leader's role in candidate selection and policy-making, and about a party's formal recognition of organized factions.

Resources

Another main area of variation among party organizations involves the extent and distribution of resources.

5) *Financial Strength—Weakness* Parties' financial strength is generally measured comparatively: compared with other parties with whom they compete, or to parties in other countries, or compared with other political actors (particularly individual candidates and legislators, and to the party leader, if s/he has separate funding sources). Parties possessing comparatively strong resources may have more leverage over candidates and elected representatives, because they are able to make a bigger contribution to candidates' future electoral success.

6) *Resource Diversification—Concentration* The diversification of a party's resource base may affect its political priorities and its autonomy. Parties that depend on a small number of funders may need to be highly attentive to their interests; parties that rely on more numerous but smaller donations, and/or ones that depend on volunteer labour, may need to work harder to generate broad enthusiasm and support.

7) *State Autonomy—Dependence* High dependence on state funding is a specific type of concentrated financing. The cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995) model depicts burgeoning state subsidies for parties as reducing parties' reliance on—and therefore concern for—the social groups and individuals who used to support them. High reliance on state funding could also prevail in some parties which have a clientelistic exchange relationship with voters, where voters expect to receive direct gifts from parties and candidates rather than to have resources flow in the other direction.

8) *Bureaucratic Strength—Weakness* Strong financial resources may be closely related to, but not necessarily synonymous with, professionalization of party staff. The bureaucratic strength of the extra-parliamentary organization may affect the frequency of party splits (what resources do rebels lose if they form a new party?), and the extent to which the party values short-term electoral victory over long-term organizational preservation (as described by Angelo Panebianco, 1988). Large professional staffs also may affect intra-party dynamics by reducing parties' need for volunteer labour.

9) *Volunteer Strength—Weakness* Grassroots support represents another type of resource that parties may be able to deploy. Despite well-documented declines in party membership in many established political parties (van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012), for many parties, formally enrolled party members constitute the biggest source of volunteers, and parties may mobilize members at election times as campaigners and as social-media multipliers (Scarrow 2015). Some parties alternately (or additionally) enlist non-member volunteers to help with campaign efforts. The online supporters' network assembled by the Obama presidential campaign in 2008 remains a notable example of how a campaign can profit from having strong volunteer resources; campaigners around the world were inspired by this example.

Resource dimensions can be studied using information about party membership, party staffing and budgets, and the sources of party funds.

Representative Strategies

The third broad area of party organizational differences concerns how organizations define whom they represent, and how they seek to strengthen their ties with these citizens and social interests.

10) *Individual Linkage: Integrated Identity—Consumer Choice* Parties vary widely in the extent of their efforts to create strong bonds of identity with individual supporters. At one end are parties which heavily invest in cultivating formal membership structures and party-related activities. For these parties, representation is about creating and reinforcing a shared political identity, not just about promoting candidates or policies. As Maurice Duverger said of the mass party, ‘The members are therefore the very substance of the party, the stuff of its activity. Without members, the party would be like a teacher without pupils’ (1959: 63). At the other end of the scale are parties of notables which have weak or non-existent structures for individual participation. Also close to this end are personalist and populist parties which approach representation as the task of marketing political ideas to citizen consumers. These parties place a relatively low premium on getting citizens to incorporate the party brand into their personal identity. The most extreme example of this is Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom in the Netherlands: this party’s sole member is its founder and leader.

11) *Group Linkage: Non-Party Group Ownership—Autonomy* This sub-dimension describes the strength of a party’s linkages to non-party groups, and the extent to which the party views politics as being about the representation of group interests (as opposed to individual interests). At the extreme, parties are created by extra-legislative interests and act as their representatives. This characterized the early phases of some trade-union sponsored socialist and labour parties. Parties rarely are completely subordinate to other groups, but many have strong connections with specific social interests; in some cases these links are formalized in party statutes. Statutory recognition may guarantee intra-party or legislative representation for privileged groups (for instance, trade unions), or for interests that are seen as socially important (for instance, women, youth, or ethnic or linguistic minorities).

We introduce these three dimensions and their sub-dimensions because we contend that researchers will find it fruitful to employ this or a similar kind of vocabulary, one that disaggregates key components of party organization. Conceptually separating these elements makes it easier to formulate and test precise hypotheses about the impact of specific organizational features. This approach also facilitates assessments of the interplay of structure and agency in matters of party organizational development and change. That is, how far do parties in apparently similar political systems develop similar organizational structures, rules and patterns, and how far do they differ? To the extent they evolve in a similar way, we can infer that they are being impelled by the logic of external structural forces in their environments; to the extent they continue to differ, however, we can conclude that local contingencies and agents matter.

Having a vocabulary that encourages thinking about party organizations in terms of cause and effect relations is only half the battle. It is equally important

to have sufficient and reliable data to test the existence and/or strength of the posited relationships, and to formulate hypotheses to explain empirically evident patterns. Obtaining such data poses its own set of challenges. Here, too, these three organizational dimensions provide useful guides for identifying the kinds of information that can help answer fundamental questions about relations between party organizations and their wider political world.

ADDRESSING THE DATA PROBLEM: THE POLITICAL PARTY DATABASE

Among the challenges that have hampered the comparative study of parties as organizational actors is the sheer difficulty of gathering information about their past and current practices. In past eras few parties were obliged to publish detailed annual reports. This obligation has become more common with the introduction of public subsidies for political parties, but even where it exists, there are big differences in the amount of information that parties must or do provide. Some parties do not even make their statutes readily available to the public. Parties also vary widely in their archiving practices, and in their willingness to open party archives to researchers. Few countries have devoted public resources to documenting the organizational life of political parties.

For all these reasons, finding reliable cross-national data on formal party organization and practices can be much more difficult than obtaining cross-national electoral or survey data, or data on legislative behaviour, cabinet appointments, or economic outcomes. For instance, whereas it is fairly easy to find out what candidate selection rules a given party is using for the current election, discovering details of the party's rules for a previous election often requires archival work. Doing this for many elections and many countries requires time and linguistic skills that few scholars possess. Similarly, although parties are increasingly using intra-party ballots to decide important questions (Pilet and Cross 2014; Sandri, Seddone, and Venturino 2015), there are no central or even national repositories which archive the rules and results for these contests—even though such 'private' elections can have major public consequences. This is one reason that much research on political parties has compared practices within a single country, or within a small number of parties—often chosen because of the researcher's linguistic skills as much as for any other reason. It also explains why party organizations are omitted in much of the broadly cross-national research on representation and elections.

The creation of the PPDB was a response to this data gap. In the first round of data collection, PPDB research teams gathered data on 122 political parties

in nineteen democracies, focusing on the period from 2011 to 2014. All the country experts who led the data collection teams were invited to collaborate on analytic chapters for this volume, and many of them accepted this additional challenge. (A full listing of PPDB project participants and country team contributors is found in Appendix A of this chapter.) Because this database is central to the analyses that follow, it is important to give a bit more background on the PPDB project and on the data it has collected.

The logic behind this effort has been to facilitate the collaborative collection of data that is likely to be widely useful in cross-national studies of political parties, but which would be impossibly time-consuming for solo researchers to assemble by themselves. Our choice of variables was largely guided by the dimensions and sub-dimensions presented at the beginning of this chapter. Table 1.1 summarizes some of the variables that we have

TABLE 1.1 *Organizational dimensions and sample variables*

Dimensions	Sample variables
Structures	
Leadership Autonomy-Restriction	Rules for leadership selection and re-selection. Rules for policy-making. Staff resources of individual legislators and leaders.
Centralization-Localization	Rules for candidate selection. Distribution of financial resources across levels.
Coordination-Entropy	Formal recognition of factions. Representation of regional parties in national party executive. Representation of legislative party in national party executive. Openness to candidates who are not party members.
Territorial Concentration-Dispersion	Number of basic organizational units. Self-identification as regional party.
Resources	
Financial Strength-Weakness	Party revenue. Party campaign spending.
Resource Diversification-Concentration	Proportion of party funding from public, party, and private sources.
State Autonomy-Dependence	Proportion of party funding from public sources.
Bureaucratic Strength-Weakness	Number of professional staff in extra-parliamentary organization and for parliamentary party.
Volunteer Strength-Weakness	Membership numbers. Use of web page to mobilize volunteer help.
Representative strategies	
Individual Linkage: Integrated Identity—Consumer Choice	Membership rules (dues rates, probationary periods, ease of joining). Roles for individuals (members or non-members) in party decisions.
Group Linkage: Non-Party Group Ownership—Autonomy	Statutory roles for group or sub-group representatives at party conferences and on party executive. Actual representation of sub-group members in party executive.

From Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al. (2016).

included as possible components of indexes that might be constructed to measure the various sub-dimensions. In the chapters that follow authors will discuss the specific variables in more detail as they are used.

The PPDB project has taken inspiration from, and has sought to build on, the efforts that produced what is commonly known as the *Party Organization Handbook* (Katz and Mair 1992a). Because of this, there is a deliberate overlap in terms of countries studied, in some of the variables included, and even in some of the personnel involved in the project, many of whom were either involved with the earlier project, or else who studied with those who were. In all these senses we are quite intentionally approaching our research field as a cumulative effort that builds across academic generations.

The initial round of data collection included ten of the eleven parliamentary democracies included in the *Party Organization Handbook*.² The additional cases are three non-European parliamentary democracies (Australia, Canada, and Israel), two third-wave south European democracies (Portugal and Spain), semi-presidential France, and three post-communist East European democracies which were not yet democratic when the Katz/Mair team began their work in the 1980s (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). The overlap of countries and variables is intended to facilitate assessments of what has changed in some countries in the two decades since the *Party Organization Handbook* was compiled; the addition of new cases should allow more confident generalizations about the impact of organizational practices. Data collection was limited to parties which were represented in the lower house of the national legislature,³ though in some countries data collection teams made pragmatic decisions to include or exclude very small or purely regional parties. Country teams carried out the first round of data collection in 2012 to 2014, with 2011 as the initial year for which data was gathered in most cases. This is the universe of data that is analysed in the chapters that follow; however, it should be noted that subsequent rounds of data collection will broaden the scope of the PPDB to include presidential democracies, and to include a broader set of established and newer democracies.

The PPDB also follows the lead of the Katz–Mair project in concentrating its attention on parties’ ‘official stories’ (Katz and Mair 1992b: 6–8). This choice was made in full knowledge that formal structures do not tell the complete story about actual power relations. The alternative would have been to collect expert judgments concerning these issues. We rejected this approach in part because it would have required us to enlist a far greater number of willing volunteers in a project that is already large, not to mention that expert surveys raise their own set of issues about validity, accuracy and comparability. Furthermore, formal rules represent crucial resources in internal party power relations as they can always be invoked in case of conflict. They represent the boundaries of internal power struggles. From

this perspective, they resemble constitutions of states which are certainly highly relevant for a country's political process even though they cannot tell us the entire story about the functioning of a political system. Having said this, we did in some cases also refer to the 'real story' in that we asked whether certain rules had actually applied, for example in the most recent leadership election. Official resource data, our second major body of evidence, also suffer from problems ranging from differences in accounting practices to willful inaccuracies. Yet, referring to official records is the best way of collecting large amounts of relevant cross-party evidence in a systematic and comparable manner. That said, in selecting variables to code and in figuring out coding alternatives we certainly profited from the insights of country experts who are part of this research team.⁴

This book is one of the first fruits of this collaborative project. All the team members who contributed to the initial data collection round were invited to use the data to conduct cross-nationally comparative analyses concerning the variations and impact in parties' structures and resources. Due to other commitments, some of our data collectors were unable to participate in the book project. Nevertheless, their efforts were essential to the project, and we want to publicly express our thanks to all who contributed to creating the PPDB as a public good. In this spirit, the PPDB data that inspires this book project were made public at the beginning of 2017, even before the publication of this book (see <https://www.politicalpartydb.org/>). Additional details about the database and the project can be found in Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al. 2016.⁵ It is our hope that the chapters that follow, and the advent of the new database, will have significant pay-offs in advancing a truly cross-national understanding of how political parties help to structure political activity.

EXPLAINING PARTIES' ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND EXPLORING THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

Having outlined an approach that disaggregates major aspects of party organizational variation, and having introduced the data that we have collected to study the extent and significance of such variation, we now introduce some of the specific questions that will be tackled by the chapters in this volume. These questions, which are taken from current scholarly debates, can be divided between those which take party organization as a dependent variable (Part I), and those which study it primarily as an independent variable (Part II).

*Party Organization as a Dependent Variable: Explaining
how Parties Organize*

Much of the classic literature on party organization treats it as a dependent variable, a thing in itself to be described and explained in terms of institutional structures, within-country contagion, or ideologically inspired approaches within party families. This is plainly true of the seminal archetypes which researchers habitually invoke—cadre, mass, catch-all, electoral-professional, cartel. While particular models have been inclined to attract specific criticisms (cf. Koole (1996) and Kitschelt (2000) on the cartel party), some commentators go beyond this to make the more general point that such ideal types place too much emphasis on the importance of environment (i.e., ‘structure’), and do not allow enough scope for the importance of local contingencies and individual agency. Thus, Hellmann (2011) argues that we should regard party organization as the outcome of strategic decisions taken by party elites within given contexts. These external contexts may well constrain and shape, but they do not *determine* the choices made by party actors. Choices reflect the outcomes of intra-party conflicts between different individuals, factions and coalitions who struggle for strategic control over parties. Different coalitions favour different strategies, and so outcomes are not inevitable. Hellmann illustrates the point by reference to various empirical examples (from South East Asia) which show that various parties operating in similar (or even identical) environments pursue different strategies. Harmel and Janda (1994) take a similar approach, de-emphasizing organizational determinants, and instead focusing on organizational change as a normal process through which parties respond to both internal (factional) and external (electoral) pressures.

A major theme of the chapters in Part I of this book is the extent to which we see evidence of the kind of structural or ideological determinism that these authors reject. Because the PPDB gives us information about a large number of parties in parliamentary democracies, our chapters adopt a most-similar-system design to test propositions concerning the relative explanatory power of party agency or contextual factors for explaining organizational differences. In concrete terms, this means that some chapters ask whether we find similar organizational outcomes under similar structural or ideological circumstances. Chapters in this first section of the book document and attempt to explain differences across various aspects of party organizations, including their resources (staff, finances, members), how they structure relations between the different organizational faces, and their provisions for member participation in party decisions.

Chapter 2 begins this exploration by investigating variations in the strength and nature of parties’ resources. In this chapter, Paul Webb and Dan Keith test the extent to which institutional context (country) or ideology (party

family) can explain resource differences, looking specifically at membership, money, staff and the distribution of territorial branches. They also rank parties in the database by constructing an index of party strength which takes into account both membership and finance as proportions of the national electorate.

The following chapter takes a longitudinal look at the development of party resources, focusing in particular on the relative distribution of resources between different faces of the party. Authors Luciano Bardi, Enrico Calossi, and Eugenio Pizzimenti empirically test one of the main hypotheses from Katz and Mair's cartel party argument (1995), the proposition that the party in public office (the PPO) has been steadily increasing in strength, to the point where it becomes the strongest organizational 'face' of many contemporary parties. They investigate whether this has, in fact, occurred by comparing changing resource patterns for parties within the ten countries that are included in both the 1992 *Party Organization Handbook* and in the PPDB.

Chapter 4 continues the examination of party resources, this time with a particular focus on national parties' income sources. Whereas Chapter 3 looked at changing relations between parliamentary parties and central party organizations, a second set of interlinked predictions made by the cartel party thesis (Katz and Mair 1995) was that central parties were becoming increasingly dependent on state revenues, and that this growing dependence would make them less interested in cultivating another traditional source of party funding—party members. In this chapter Ingrid van Biezen and Petr Kopecký assess funding strategies used by the PPDB parties, looking both at the extent to which they rely on state funding, and on the sources of their alternative funds. They examine which factors might account for different patterns, including ideology, party age, and age of the democracy in which they are operating. In addition, they examine the second part of the money/linkage hypothesis by asking whether there is a negative association between high levels of party funding and membership size.

In Chapter 5 Elin Haugsgjerd Allern and Tânia Verge consider the extent to which contemporary political parties use formal organizational structures as channels for connecting with social groups. Given the widespread finding that formerly important cleavages now play a diminished role in electoral choices, it is not surprising that many have diagnosed a weakening of parties' formal links with external interest groups, such as the special relations that once existed between some social democratic parties and trade unions (or party sub-groups for trade unionists) (Padgett and Paterson 1991; Thomas 2001). Nevertheless, other research suggests that parties still display a great deal of variation in how they structure their relationships with groups that speak for external interests or for social sub-groups (Poguntke 2006; Allern and Bale 2012), challenging claims that parties no longer use their formal structures to solidify party-group linkage. This chapter investigates how these relations

look within the PPDB set of parties, looking both at the formal status and the representation rights that parties grant to internal and external sub-groups.

Chapters 6 and 7 seek to explain variation in the ways that parties decide important questions, and also ask whether *how* parties decide affects the popularity of *what* they decide. In recent years many parties have been expanding opportunities for members and supporters to have a direct say in important party decisions. Scholars disagree about the likely effects of these changes on competition within and between parties. In regards to the impact on electoral competition, experience from U.S. primary elections (Maisel and Stone 2001), and the implications of theories such as the so-called ‘Law’ of Curvilinear Disparity (May 1973), both suggest that parties may become more removed from the preferences of their potential voters when intra-party democracy puts party decisions into the hands of party activists. On the other hand, parties that expand intra-party democracy often claim to do so in order to become more in touch with voters (Hazan and Rahat 2010). In addition to these debates about the impact of intra-party democracy on electoral competition, others have raised questions about its impact on power within parties. Thus, some argue that apparent increases in intra-party democracy are actually anti-democratic, because they reduce the power of activists and increase leadership autonomy (Katz and Mair 1995; Seyd 1999). Research has yet to settle these disputes, although a growing literature on IPD makes clear that democratizing rules are often employed in notably non-competitive intra-party elections (for instance, Kenig, Rahat, and Tuttnauer 2015). Even so, these changes hold the potential to alter power balances within parties, and to affect the ways that citizens view leaders who are chosen using apparently more inclusive rules. This makes it important to understand which parties are most likely to embrace inclusive rules.

Chapters 6 and 7 take up these questions. In Chapter 6 Benjamin von dem Berge and Thomas Poguntke begin the task by considering the best ways to compare rules for participation in parties’ decision-making processes. In doing so, they distinguish between assembly-based intra-party democracy (AIPD) and plebiscitary intra-party democracy (PIPD), with the former being characterized by processes which include opportunities for deliberation and amending of the alternatives. In this chapter they introduce indices of AIPD and PIPD, and show that this distinction holds empirically.

Chapter 7 bridges the divide between the two sections of the book, treating intra-party democracy as both a dependent and an independent variable. In this chapter Niklas Bolin, Nicholas Aylott, Benjamin von dem Berge, and Thomas Poguntke employ the indices introduced in Chapter 6 to try to explain variations in parties’ organizational choices. They test various explanations for differences in levels of intra-party democracy by constructing a multivariate model which includes national- and party-level factors which are often linked with decisions about expanding intra-party inclusiveness.

*Party Organization as an Independent Variable: Exploring
the Political Consequences of Organizational Differences*

Compared with the study of the origins and evolution of party organizations, cross-national studies have given much less attention to the political impact of party organizational differences and developments. Yet research in this area is arguably of greatest political and policy relevance, because it may have much to tell us about what party efforts are most effective in helping them to reconnect with disaffected citizens, and about how parties' organizational choices affect the quality of representation. The aim of chapters in Part II of this volume is to contribute to this field by investigating the impact of specific organizational features on political outcomes. These chapters ask whether and how parties' organizational choices can affect who participates in partisan politics, which programmatic options parties offer to voters, or the behaviour of their legislative representatives.

Chapter 8 returns to some of the predictions associated with the cartel party thesis. The identification of the cartel party as an emerging form of party organization was one of the major theoretical outputs of the Katz/Mair *Handbook* project (Katz and Mair 1995; Katz and Mair 2009), although this assessment has been challenged in whole or in part (for instance Koole 1996; Kitschelt 2000). Cartel parties are characterized by high dependence on a single, but relatively stable, source of funding: state subsidies; in the terms of our dimensions, they represent both resource concentration and high dependence on the state. Such a funding strategy is said to reduce parties' attentiveness to their strongest supporters, the ones whom they would need as dues-paying members and as donors if they did not have state funding (Katz and Mair 1995; van Biezen and Kopecký 2007; Roper and Ikstis 2008). While parties' reliance on public monies has indisputably increased in recent decades, there is little evidence of its actual effects on party responsiveness. Marina Costa Lobo and Isabella Razzuoli investigate these links in their chapter by combining cross-national survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data with parties' financial data from the PPDB. They test whether the extent of parties' financial dependency on the state shapes voters' feelings about parties' responsiveness to their supporters.

Changes to parties' rules can also affect who participates in partisan politics, a topic which the next two chapters investigate. In regards to parties' rules governing candidate selection, researchers have posited a tension between two types of democratic goods, namely, the expansion of participation in the selection process and the expansion of descriptive representation among those who are selected. They suggest that more open selection procedures may lead to a decline in the number of female or ethnic minority candidates, as well as in the number actually elected (Caul 1999; Krook 2007; Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008; Childs 2013). These effects may be mediated by other party characteristics,

including the use of quotas or the extent of women's participation and representation within the party. Such effects have been hard to identify due to the lack of cross-national information on the gender and ethnicity of candidate slates, and on female participation in intra-party bodies such as party executives. In Chapter 9, Scott Pruyers, William Cross, Anika Gauja, and Gideon Rahat use PPDB data to systematically test links between candidate selection rules, the status of women's groups within party organs, and the gender composition of party slates and party legislative delegations.

Party rules may also have an impact on who chooses to be active in parties in ways that are less visible and less demanding than standing as a candidate, including the act of formally enrolling. One of the best-documented and most-discussed of the recent organizational changes in political parties in established democracies has been the decline of membership enrolment (Scarrow 2000; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012). Political parties have reacted to these changes by experimenting with new ways to connect with supporters (Gauja 2015; Scarrow 2015). Evidence of the impact of these efforts has been limited, but what there is suggests that party efforts have not been very effective in engaging supporters' interest (Gibson and Ward 2009). In Chapter 10, Karina Kosiara-Pedersen, Susan Scarrow, and Emilie van Haute contribute to these investigations of whether parties' membership rules affect individual choices about whether and/or how to participate in partisan politics. This analysis combines PPDB data with data from party membership surveys and from the European Social Survey to assess the possible effects of parties' organizational experiments in these areas. In particular, it asks whether party initiatives that alter the relative costs of traditional membership are likely to change the willingness of supporters to become formal members, or the likelihood that those who do join will become active within the party.

The next two chapters look more specifically at the connections between parties' organizations and their policy outputs. In Chapter 11, Annika Hennl and Simon Franzmann explore how parties' policy-making procedures affect their electoral manifestos, asking in particular whether the inclusiveness of policy-making processes affects the stability of party policy priorities. These manifestos summarize party positions on multiple issues, and scholars often use manifestos as guides when comparing parties' policy priorities. Yet we know remarkably little about how such manifestos are compiled, or whether these processes affect the content of the documents. Past theories have suggested that party elites strive to enhance and preserve their autonomy in this area so that their parties can best adapt to changing electoral markets (cf. Panebianco 1988 and Carty 2004); under this logic, more inclusive processes hamper policy responsiveness, at least in part because the party member activists who participate in these processes are more ideologically committed (as a 'May's Law' view of party activists would suggest—May 1973). This chapter tests whether more inclusive rules do, in fact, lead to more stable

manifesto priorities even in losing parties—the ones which would seem to have greatest incentives to shift their priorities.

The next chapter focusses on the link between extra-legislative party organization and legislative behaviour, a different kind of policy output. Politician-centred theories of political party development stress the role of candidates' and legislators' career interests in building and maintaining stable party identities. These may be most stable when voters value party labels, and when parties have resources to offer to their candidates. Thus, Tavits found that legislative cohesiveness increases in proportion to the ability of parties to offer organizational support to party candidates (2011). In Chapter 12 Connor Little and David Farrell investigate whether this relationship is more broadly true, looking at the relationship between legislative cohesion and different types of party organizational strength (including the financial and bureaucratic strength of the national party, central party control over candidacies, and MPs' staff resources).

Finally, following Part II of the book, the editors conclude their contributions by returning to another major theme that we have briefly touched on here, namely, the utility of ideal types as heuristics for classifying and interpreting political developments in contemporary democracies. In this penultimate chapter we take up the challenge we posed earlier, namely, the need to treat ideal types as testable hypotheses: to what extent are they empirically useful shorthand labels which make politically relevant distinctions among contemporary political parties? In so far as these heuristics are intended to describe different eras of party organizing a null finding may be easily dismissed; on the other hand, we argue that it is important to note how difficult it is to fit parties into boxes defined by even a small number of characteristics which are supposedly associated with these ideal types. Even using rather low thresholds and generous definitions, the cases in the PPDB provide little support for the idea that we can usefully distinguish among the *realities* of contemporary party organizations using traditional labels. One alternative could be that parties' representational aims—that is, their ideologies—are better heuristics for predicting likely clusters of organizational choices than are the classic labels such as 'mass' and 'catchall'. However, in earlier chapters we have shown that party family patterns are relatively weak. Indeed, one message of the chapters in this book is the extent to which parties' organizational choices and organizational variation transcend the apparent boundaries associated with various categorical devices. We end this chapter with some thoughts on what the contributions in this book tell us about the extent and relevance of parties' organizational differences, and posit a few future steps for further developing party research in this area.

The book concludes with an Afterword by Richard Katz, a chapter in which he offers further reflections on approaches to the study of party organization. He provides his own assessment of what the preceding chapters have covered or neglected, and proposes an agenda for further research.

CONCLUSION

This introductory chapter has explained the rationale for this collaborative project on political party organizations in democratic polities, and has set out the analytical framework that has guided our data collection and analysis. As we have explained, we selected our organizational sub-dimensions because of their relevance to current debates about how party organization is changing, and about what this may mean. By focusing on them to guide our data collection and our analysis in this book, we aim to push forward an empirically-informed understanding of how specific party practices can help (or hinder) democratic representation and political stability. In the analyses that follow, our chapters attempt to shine a light on some of the important ‘middle-range’ theoretical questions about the origins of party organizations, and about the impact of their organizational capacities and decision-making rules. As these chapters will show, variations in parties’ organizations can significantly affect who participates in politics and which interests get represented. For this reason, the systematic and cross-national study of political party organizations has the potential to offer important general political insights, ones whose implications go far beyond the controversies of intra-party politics.

APPENDIX

TABLE A1.1 *Country teams and data coverage, PPDB round 1*

Countries	Data collection team	Parties	Full or partial coverage
Australia	Anika Gauja	Labor Party	2011–14
		Liberal Party	2011–14
		National Party	2011–14
		The Greens	2011–14
Austria	Wolfgang C. Müller Manès Weisskircher	Alliance for the Future	2008, 2011, 2013
		Freedom Party	2008, 2011, 2013
		People’s Party	2008, 2011, 2013
		Social Democratic Party	2008, 2011, 2013
		The Greens	2008, 2011, 2013
Belgium	Kris Deschouwer Emilie van Haute	Christian-Democrat and Flemish	2011–12, 2014
		Democrat Humanist Centre	2009, 2011–12, 2014
		Ecolo	2011–12, 2014
		Federalists, Democrats,	2009, 2011–12, 2014
		Francophone	
		Flemish Interest	2008, 2011–12, 2014
		Green	2011–12, 2014
		Libertarian, Direct, Democratic	2011–12
		New Flemish Alliance	2011–12, 2014
		Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	2011–12, 2014
		Reform Movement	2011–12, 2014

(continued)

TABLE A1.1 *Continued*

Countries	Data collection team	Parties	Full or partial coverage
Canada	William P. Cross Scott Pruysers	Socialist Party	2011–12, 2014
		Socialist Party Alternative	2011–12, 2014
		Bloc Québécois	2004, 2011–14
		Conservative Party	2011–14
		Green Party	2006, 2011–14
		Liberal Party	2011–14
		New Democratic Party	2011–14
Czech Republic	Petr Kopecký	Social Democratic Party	2011, 2012–14
		Christian Democratic Union	2011–14
		Civic Democratic Party	2011–14
		Communist Party	2011–14
		Social Democrats	2005, 2011–14
Denmark	Karina Kosiara-Pedersen	TOP 09	2011–14
		Conservatives	2011–14
		Danish People's Party	2011–14
		Liberal Alliance	2009, 2011–14
		Liberals	2011–14
		Red-Green Alliance	2011–14
		Social Liberal Party	2007, 2011–14
France	Elodie Fabre	Socialist People's Party	2010–14
		Socialist Party	2012
		Union for a Popular Movement	2012
Germany	Thomas Poguntke Sophie Karow Jan Kette	Alliance '90/The Greens	2011–14
		Christian Democratic Union	2011–14
		Christian Social Union	2011–14
		Free Democratic Party	2011–14
		Pirate Party	2011–14
		Social Democratic Party	2011–14
Hungary	Zsolt Enyedi	The Left	2011–14
		Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance	2010–14
		Jobbik	2010–14
		Politics Can Be Different	2010–14
Ireland	David M. Farrell Conor Little	Socialist Party	2009–14
		Fianna Fáil	2011–14
		Fine Gael	2002, 2011–14
		Green Party	2011–14
		Labour Party	2011–14
Israel	Gideon Rahat Alona Dolinsky	Sinn Féin	2011–14
		Agudat Yisrael	2011–14
		Balad	2011–14
		Hadash	2011–14
		Kadima	2011–14
		Labor Party	2011–14
		Likud	2011–14

TABLE A1.1 *Continued*

Countries	Data collection team	Parties	Full or partial coverage
Italy	Luciano Bardi Enrico Calossi Eugenio Pizzimenti	Meretz	2011–14
		Shas	2011–14
		Yisrael Beiteinu	2011–14
		National Religious Party	2011–14
		Democratic Party	2011–14
		Italy of Values	2011–14
		Northern League	2011–14
		The People of Freedom	2011–14
		Union of the Centre	2011–14
Netherlands	Ruud Koole Marijn Nagtzaam	Christian Democratic Appeal	2011–14
		Christian Union	2011–14
		Democrats 66	2011–14
		50PLUS	2011–14
		GreenLeft	2011–14
		Labour Party	2011–14
		Party for Freedom	2011–14
		Party for the Animals	2011–14
		People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	2011–14
		Reformed Political Party	2011–14
		Socialist Party	2011–14
Norway	Elin H. Allern	Centre Party	2011–14
		Christian Democratic Party	2011–14
		Conservative Party	2011–14
		Labour Party	2011–14
		Liberal Party	2011–14
		Progress Party	2011–14
		Socialist Left Party	2011–14
Poland	Aleks Szczerbiak Anna Mikulska	Civic Platform	2011–13
		Democratic Left Alliance	2011–13
		Law and Justice	2011–13
		Palikot's Movement	2011–13
		Polish People's Party	2011–13
		United Poland	2011–13
Portugal	Marina Costa Lobo Isabella Razzuoli	Communist Party	2011–14
		Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	2011–14
		Left Bloc	2011–14
		People's Party	2011–14
		Social Democratic Party	2011–14
		Socialist Party	2011–14
Spain	Tània Verge	Basque Nationalist Party	2011–14
		Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	2011–14
		People's Party	2011–14
		Socialist Party	2011–14
		United Left	2011–14

(continued)

TABLE A1.1 *Continued*

Countries	Data collection team	Parties	Full or partial coverage
Sweden	Nicholas Aylott Niklas Bolin	Centre Party	2011–14
		Christian Democrats	2011–14
		Green Party	2011–14
		Left Party	2011–14
		Liberal People’s Party	2011–14
		Moderate Party	2011–14
		Social Democrats	2011–14
		Sweden Democrats	2011–14
United Kingdom	Paul D. Webb Annika Hennl Dan Keith	Conservative Party	2005, 2010–14
		Green Party	2010–14
		Labour Party	2010–14
		Liberal Democrats	2007, 2011–14
		Plaid Cymru	2010–14
		Scottish National Party	2010–14
		UK Independence Party	2010–14

NOTES

1. The countries in question are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. All countries were surveyed between 2010 and 2014.
2. We are missing Finland.
3. With the exception of the German Pirates Party.
4. For more detail about the scope and methods of the PPDB, see Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al. (2016).
5. Throughout the current volume this work is cited as ‘Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al. 2016’ for ease of recognition. Those who use PPDB data for their own research should cite this article, which explains how the data were collected, and which acknowledges those who worked hard to create this public database.

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Part 1

How Parties Organize

Assessing the Strength of Party Organizational Resources

A Survey of the Evidence from the Political Party Database

Paul D. Webb and Dan Keith

Organization is the sine qua non of political mobilization: as Samuel Barnes once said, ‘no idea has ever made much headway without an organization behind it [...] wherever ideologies seem important in politics they have a firm organizational basis’ (Barnes 1966: 522). It is perhaps all too easy to overlook the significance of this point for the development of European party systems: while the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan explained how history generated social group conflicts that came to shape party systems, they were aware of the importance of organizational effort. Rokkan in particular took pains to stress that the differences between social groups did not simply translate into party politics without conscious organizational activity. For a socio-economic cleavage to form it required agency in the shape of political ‘entrepreneurs’ who would create organizations that sought to mobilize group consciousness and support for political ideas and demands (Rokkan 1977).

Organizations require resources. Chapter 1 set out an analytical framework that included the architecture and forms of representative and participatory linkage that party organizations embody, but first and foremost they need resources. An organization without human and financial resources is an empty shell, a hollow device lacking the means of political action. This chapter therefore seeks to assess the strength of contemporary party organizations across the democratic world through a survey of their resources, the first of the dimensions of party organization established in the opening chapter. It does so by focusing on four different types of resources: members, money, staff and local branches. These may be thought of as sub-dimensions in terms of our analytical framework. This tour of the data takes in 122 parties from nineteen different countries for which we have data (although inevitably there are missing cases on each of the organizational

sub-dimensions), and describes the situation across nations and party families. Variables are reported in terms of absolute values, and relative to the size of national electorates or other appropriate benchmarks. We conclude by proposing a composite index of party strength which takes into account both membership and finance as proportions of the national electorate. This index enables us to construct a rank-ordering of 112 parties according to their overall organizational strength. This Party Strength Index (PSI) is not only intrinsically interesting, but is also a useful independent variable in engaging with various research questions; an example of this is provided by Little and Farrell in Chapter 12 of this book where they use PSI as a predictor of legislative party cohesion.

THE FIRST SUB-DIMENSION OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES: MEMBERSHIP

As explained in Chapter 1, party members represent an important organizational resource for political parties. They constitute a source of volunteer labour, especially during election campaigns, and in many cases remain a significant font of financial support. They also act as ‘ambassadors in the community’ who may help disseminate the values and defend the policies of their parties (Scarrow 1994). So while the paid professional employees of a party are obviously (and perhaps increasingly) important to party activity, the role of the membership should not be underestimated. The literature on party membership has grown considerably over the past two decades, seemingly in inverse relationship to the actual subject under investigation (Katz et al. 1992; Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Heidar 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994; Scarrow 1994, 1996, 2000, 2015; Widfeldt 1999; Mair and van Biezen 2001; Weldon 2006; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2011; van Haute 2011; Whiteley 2011; van Haute and Carty 2012; van Haute and Gauja 2015). The evidence on the decline of party membership numbers across the democratic world is overwhelming (Katz et al. 1992; Mair and van Biezen 2001; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2011). In Table 2.1, we update the story of individual party membership trends by reporting a number of things: the aggregate membership across all parties for each country is noted, along with the size of the registered national electorate at the nearest national election, and the consequent membership/electorate ratio. Here and throughout this chapter readings are averaged for each party so that there is just one data point per party; in this way we avoid giving undue weight to those parties for which we have data for more than one year.

TABLE 2.1 *Party membership, by country*

Country	Year	Electorate	Total party membership	Total membership as % of national electorate (ME)
Australia	2013	14,722,754	231,000	1.57*
Austria	2006	6,107,892	1,054,600	17.27
	2011	6,333,109	853,518	13.48*
Belgium	2007	7,720,796	426,053	5.52
	2012	8,008,892	385,729	4.82
Canada	2011	24,257,592	201,000	0.83
Czech Republic	2006	8,333,305	165,425	1.99
	2011	8,415,892	147,000	1.75±
Denmark	2007	4,022,920	166,300	4.13
	2011	4,079,910	149,640	3.67
Germany	2005	61,870,711	1,423,284	2.30
	2013	61,946,900	1,317,550	2.13
Hungary	2006	8,043,961	123,932	1.54
	2011	8,034,394	86,120	1.07
Ireland	2007	3,110,914	63,000	2.03
	2014	3,245,348	69,653	2.15
Israel	2011	5,278,985	351,672	6.67±
Italy	2006	47,098,181	2,623,304	5.57
	2011	47,126,326	2,106,025	4.47±
Netherlands	2006	12,264,503	304,469	2.48
	2013	12,689,810	308,846	2.43
Norway	2005	3,421,741	172,359	5.04
	2012	3,641,753	161,811	4.44
Poland	2007	30,615,471	304,465	0.99
	2013	30,762,931	241,544	0.79±
Portugal	2005	8,944,508	341,721	3.82
	2011	9,624,425	281,307	2.92±
Spain	2008	35,073,179	1,530,803	4.36
	2011	35,779,491	1,494,001	4.18±
Sweden	2006	6,892,009	266,991	3.87
	2010	7,123,651	252,632	3.55±
UK	2005	44,245,939	534,664	1.21
	2015	46,502,545	559,457	1.20
Mean: earliest reading		19,184,399 (15)	633,425	4.14
Mean: latest reading ^a		19,554,355 (15)	549,360	3.53
Mean: latest reading ^b		18,754,147 (18)	501,337	3.45
Eta squared: latest reading ^b			0.408***	0.268**

Note: Data for all but the most recent readings are from van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke (2011). ± indicates that period of comparison is approximate because data come from various years (e.g., data for some parties in a given country are for 2011, while for others they might be for 2010 or 2012). No data from earlier years are available for Australia, Canada, or Israel. France has been excluded because membership data are only available for two parties, which is too few from which to calculate a meaningful national total or M/E ratio. Mean for latest reading^a is based only on the fifteen countries for which we have consistent data across both periods; mean for latest reading^b is based on all eighteen countries for which we have PPDB data. *** = $p < .01$, ** = $p < .05$, * = $p < .10$.

The downward trend, which has so often been observed, remains apparent in our data. Here we only present data for the two most recent known periods—the mid to late 2000s, as reported in van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke (2011) and the PPDB round 1 (2011–14). A more detailed longitudinal time-series covering the period since the early 1970s is presented in Bardi, Calossi, and Pizzimenti's contribution to this book (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1). The mean aggregate membership figure for the fifteen countries for which we have data since the mid to late 2000s was 633,425, but dropped to 549,360 in 2011–14. Indeed, if we include the three further countries that are part of the PPDB but were not in the van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke study (Australia, Canada, and Israel), the national average falls to just 501,337. Not surprisingly, the picture is similar even after controlling for the size of electorates; the average membership/electorate ratio (ME) for the original fifteen countries was 4.14 by the mid-2000s (which was of course already a notable drop from earlier periods), and the PPDB shows that it now stands at 3.53 (or 3.45 if you include Australia, Canada, and Israel). The only country in which the ME ratio has not declined in recent years is Ireland, which appears to have experienced a modest increase from 2.03 to 2.15 in the five years following 2008.

What is the picture if we break down the analysis party family? Table 2.2 sheds some light on this question. The pattern revealed is not surprising: the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats have the largest average memberships of any party family, and the highest average ME ratios. These well-established party families have of course dominated much of Europe's post-war history as governing parties. Some of the smaller parties (Far Right and Left Socialists) have surprisingly high ME ratios where they are successful, but this is only in a limited number of countries. The Eta squared statistics in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 suggest greater variation by country than by party family, which can be read as a simple indication that country effects are

TABLE 2.2 *Average individual membership, by party family*

Party family	Mean party membership	Mean ME ratio per party
Christian Democrats/Conservatives	158,094 (29)	0.93 (27)
Social Democrats	130,727 (24)	0.76 (23)
Liberals	35,634 (21)	0.37 (20)
Greens	14,141 (13)	0.11 (13)
Left Socialists	30,353 (10)	0.24 (10)
Far Right	36,171 (14)	0.42 (12)
Overall mean	85,263 (111)	0.56 (105)
Eta squared	0.134***	0.083

Note: Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by party family differences. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties. ***= $p < .01$, **= $p < .05$, *= $p < .10$.

stronger than party family effects in explaining patterns of party membership. This is, of course, only preliminary evidence: multivariate modelling would be required to draw conclusions that are more definitive (see Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al. 2016 for multivariate analysis which confirms the consistently greater explanatory impact of country effects). Nevertheless, it points to the likelihood that patterns of party membership converge around national models more than they do around typical party family models. Furthermore, the fact that *both* inter-country and inter-party family differences are statistically significant across all of these indicators undermines the notion that there is any generally ‘typical’ model of party organization. Party organizations appear to vary considerably by both country and party family.¹

THE SECOND SUB-DIMENSION OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES: MONEY

The second, and perhaps most important, resource on which parties rely is, of course, money. Money buys staff, pays for headquarters and other buildings, conferences, travel, advertising and campaign expertise, and so on. It is the most liquid resource and can be turned to many uses, so it is of obvious importance when examining the organizational resources that parties have at their disposal. To facilitate comparison, Tables 2.3a and 2.3b report national patterns in three ways: average party income, average party income relative to the size of national economy, and average income relative to the size of the electorate. The first of these indicators tells us which countries have the richest and poorest parties in absolute terms; inevitably, however, these things can be expected to reflect to a considerable extent the relative size and wealth of each country, which is why it is also interesting to examine the other indicators. Once again, for parties for which we have more than one year’s worth of data (which is most of the dataset), we use the mean score of all available measures; for others we are only able to draw on a single year of data. While Table 2.3a reports results for those parties in PPDB for which we only have income for national head offices (n=46 across eight countries), Table 2.3b presents results for parties for which we have overall national party income, incorporating head office and other levels of the organization (n=72 across thirteen countries).

If we consider the picture for those parties for which we only have *head office income* (Table 2.3a) we find that the Canadians, Austrians, and Swedes lead the way in absolute terms, with the Hungarians, Irish, and Danes propping up the rest; the Austrians and Swedes are also well off relative to GDP and the size of the electorate, while British parties turn out to be

TABLE 2.3A *National party head office income, by country*

Country	Mean income of national party head offices	Mean party income per billion euros of GDP	Mean party income per registered voter
Austria (5)	12,521,560	40,165	1.96
Canada (5)	15,152,621	11,200	0.62
Denmark (8)	3,501,990	13,934	0.86
Hungary (4)	2,378,244	23,844	0.29
Ireland (4)	3,178,000	18,065	0.99
Netherlands (8)	4,164,806	6,463	0.33
Sweden (7)	10,378,283	24,526	1.42
UK (5)	9,772,265	4,813	0.21
Mean (46)	7,466,077	17,030	0.84
Eta squared	0.313**	0.433***	0.438***

Note: All amounts are expressed in Euros and refer to income of national head offices only. Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by country differences. *** = $p < 0.01$, ** = $p < 0.05$, * = $p < 0.10$. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

TABLE 2.3B *National overall party income, by country*

Country	Mean income of national party head offices + other levels	Mean party income per billion euros of GDP	Mean party income per registered voter
Australia (4)	17,510,742	15,757	1.19
Belgium (12)	6,919,590	17,687	0.86
Czech Republic (5)	8,016,845	50,390	0.95
France (2)	60,888,527	28,987	1.41
Germany (7)	60,701,745	21,764	0.98
Israel (10)	2,494,406	11,986	0.44
Italy (5)	28,827,778	17,739	0.61
Netherlands (2)	5,884,135	9,131	0.46
Norway (7)	10,072,069	26,812	2.77
Poland (5)	5,324,045	13,566	0.17
Portugal (6)	7,102,583	41,164	0.35
Spain (5)	45,787,541	43,220	1.28
UK (2)	20,078,291	9,887	0.44
Mean (72)	18,465,863	23,649	0.94
Eta squared	0.434***	0.461*	0.384***

Note: All amounts are expressed in Euros and refer to income of national head offices plus other levels of party organization. Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by country differences. *** = $p < 0.01$, ** = $p < 0.05$, * = $p < 0.10$. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

especially poorly funded in these terms. If we turn to parties for which we have *overall* income data, it is plain from the first column in Table 2.3b that in absolute terms the German, French and Spanish parties are much wealthier than those of any other country on average, while the Italians also receive well above the overall average of 18.4 million euros per year. In saying this, we should take note of the fact that we only have data for the two largest parties in France, which probably inflates the country's position relative to others in this table.² The Israeli, Dutch, and Polish parties feature among the poorest in these terms. When we control for the size of the national economy, we see that a rather different pattern emerges, in that the Czech, Spanish, and Portuguese parties enjoy most income relative to gross domestic product (GDP), while the British (for which we only have data on two parties) and Dutch are poorest. If we correct for the number of registered electors—the size of the body politic, as it were—we find that the Portuguese are the most impecunious, their parties only attracting 17 cents per registered elector. At the other end of the scale, the Norwegians stand out as being in a league of their own, earning 2.77 euros per elector. Germany, which is at the top of the table for the first measure, is only in the middle of the pack when income is standardized by the size of the national economy or the number of voters. While countries vary widely in the per-voter sums available to their parties, we might reasonably reflect that even two or three euros per elector is not such a high price to pay for one's democracy: arguably, the world's parliamentary democracies get their party politics on the cheap.

What of the different party families? Tables 2.4a and 2.4b reveal a straightforward and not particularly surprising story when the data are broken down this way.³ The wealthiest parties are the Social Democrats and the Christian

TABLE 2.4A *National head office income, by party family*

Party family (n)	Mean income of national party head offices	Mean party income per billion euros of GDP	Party income per registered voter
Christian Democrats/Conservatives (11)	11,200,305	22,731	1.06
Social Democrats (9)	10,458,212	26,577	1.31
Liberals (8)	7,741,800	14,020	0.81
Greens (8)	3,184,904	8,255	0.40
Left Socialists (4)	3,639,540	8,575	0.47
Far Right (5)	4,769,268	16,238	0.70
Overall mean (45)	7,466,077	17,398	0.86
Eta squared	0.168	0.185	0.150

Note: All amounts are expressed in Euros and refer to income of national head offices only. Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by party family differences.

TABLE 2.4B *National overall party income, by party family*

Party family (n)	Mean income of national party head offices + other levels	Mean party income per billion euros of GDP	Party income per registered voter
Christian Democrats/ Conservatives (19)	27,283,014	32,760	1.18
Social Democrats (15)	34,637,367	38,575	1.60
Liberals (13)	8,334,462	11,845	0.55
Greens (5)	9,824,797	9,290	0.45
Left Socialists (7)	8,736,517	20,530	0.50
Far Right (7)	8,917,312	17,647	0.89
Overall mean (66)	19,984,645	25,284	0.99
Eta squared	0.134	0.198**	0.141*

Note: All amounts are expressed in Euros and refer to income of national head offices plus other levels of party organization. Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by party family differences. *** = $p < 0.01$, ** = $p < 0.05$, * = $p < 0.10$. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

Democrats. All other party families have lower, but relatively similar, average income levels. The ‘big two’ are well above the overall mean income in both tables, while for the most part the others are considerably below it. This pattern remains broadly true, no matter how you look at it—in raw currency values, relative to national income, or per registered elector. This clearly reflects the long-established electoral dominance of these families in post-war European politics. The Social Democrats do best in each of these regards, while the Green parties fare poorest. Analysis of variance suggests once again that differences between countries explain more of the variance in party income than differences between party families, in so far as Eta squared is always higher for the inter-country variations in Tables 2.3a and 2.3b than for the inter-family variations in Tables 2.4a and 2.4b.

An alternative measure of financial resource is expenditure, and in particular expenditure on election campaigns. It is frequently the case that political parties spend most in election years, for obvious reasons. Modern election campaigns can be extremely expensive given the costs of hiring public relations, advertising, marketing and opinion research consultants, making election broadcasts and other kinds of publicity material, hiring extra campaign staff for a fixed term, and so on. Some countries have taken steps to limit the development of an ‘arms race’ in campaign expenditure by imposing legal upper limits on what parties can spend nationally and locally, the UK being a case in point (Webb 2000: ch.7). However, vote-maximizing and office-seeking organizations will inevitably direct as much of their financial resources as possible (and sometimes more) into paying for electoral efforts. Campaign expenditure is therefore a valid measure of organizational strength.

TABLE 2.5 Mean party election campaign expenditure, by country

Country	Average total spend	Spend per billion euros of GDP	Spend per registered elector
Australia	13,996,620 (4)	12,595 (4)	0.95 (4)
Canada	16,548,324 (5)	12,232 (5)	0.68 (5)
Czech Republic	46,321 (5)	291 (5)	0.01 (5)
Denmark	2,297,976 (8)	9,143 (8)	0.56 (8)
Germany	10,276,740 (7)	3,684 (7)	0.17 (7)
Hungary	927,722 (4)	9,301 (4)	0.11 (4)
Ireland	1,857,993 (3)	10,561 (3)	0.58 (3)
Israel	3,993,846 (10)	19,191 (10)	0.71 (10)
Italy	9,514,652 (5)	5,855 (5)	0.20 (5)
Netherlands	1,383,815 (8)	2,147 (8)	0.11 (8)
Norway	1,425,449 (6)	3,794 (6)	0.39 (6)
Poland	4,614,814 (5)	11,759 (5)	0.15 (5)
Portugal	1,757,778 (6)	10,188 (6)	0.09 (6)
Spain	10,848,704 (5)	10,240 (5)	0.30 (5)
UK	9,404,002 (7)	4,631 (7)	0.21 (7)
Mean	5,674,918 (88)	8,471 (88)	0.35 (88)
Eta squared	0.391***	0.355***	0.409***

Note: All amounts are expressed in euros. In most cases figures are based on combined total expenditures of national parties and their candidates in election campaigns; in some cases, only national party or candidate expenditure is available. Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by party family differences. ***= $p < 0.01$, **= $p < 0.05$, *= $p < 0.10$. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

Table 2.5 reports key features of party election campaign expenditure by country. The first thing to note is that parties appear to spend a relatively modest amount of their overall income on election campaigning. If we compare Tables 2.3a and 2.5, we see that, while the mean party head office income for these eight countries is 7.5 million euros, the mean campaign expenditure across the PPDB dataset is just 5.7 million euros; if we compare Tables 2.3b and 2.5, the gap between overall party income and campaign expenditure appears to be even larger, since the former averages 18.5 million euros. There might be a number of explanations for this, but two obvious ones occur to us: first, parties must dedicate substantial proportions of their resources to regular non-campaign expenditure items connected with running their organizations, servicing their memberships, and so on. Second, as we have already said, a number of countries impose legal limits on local and central election campaign expenditure. The upshot, then, appears to be that on average parties only appear able to commit a limited part of their national income to direct campaign expenditure. In terms of raw figures, average campaign spends are highest in Canada, Spain, Britain, and Germany. Czech parties spend much the least—on average only around 46,000 euros per party—on their campaigns. Neither do Hungarian parties appear to spend much. When we correct for size of the enfranchised body politic, we find that Australian

TABLE 2.6 *Mean party election campaign expenditure, by party family*

Party family	Average total spend	Spend per billion euros of GDP	Spend per registered elector
Christian Democrats/Conservatives	8,280,992 (23)	9,572 (23)	0.40 (23)
Social Democrats	8,259,045 (19)	10,978 (19)	0.45 (19)
Liberals	5,403,133 (14)	8,449 (14)	0.41 (14)
Greens	2,009,046 (9)	2,900 (9)	0.13 (9)
Left Socialists	1,906,732 (10)	3,246 (10)	0.11 (10)
Far Right	4,146,198 (7)	13,255 (7)	0.43 (7)
Overall mean	5,965,862 (82)	8,517 (82)	0.35 (82)
Eta squared	0.107	0.132*	0.092

Note: Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by party family differences. *** = $p < 0.01$, ** = $p < 0.05$, * = $p < 0.10$. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

parties actually spend most per elector (95 euros a head), followed by the Israelis, Canadians, and Irish. The Czechs, Hungarians, Portuguese, and Dutch are most parsimonious in these terms, all spending 11 cents or less per elector on campaigning. Relative to GDP a similar pattern holds, with the Israeli, Australian and Canadian parties devoting the greatest proportions of national income to their campaign expenditure, and the Czechs the least.⁴

Table 2.6 examines the breakdown of campaign expenditure by party families, and once again reveals a familiar picture: the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats/Conservatives spend most, with the Greens and Left Socialists holding up the rear. This general pattern holds even when one regards campaign expenditure relative to GDP or in terms of spending per elector. Once again, a simple comparison of Eta squared statistics in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 suggests that country effects are probably stronger than party family effects in explaining patterns of campaign expenditure.

In summary, the German and Spanish parties seem to be the richest in terms of absolute levels of funding, but when we correct for the size of national economies and electorates, we find that parties in several other countries are as strong or indeed stronger (Austria and Norway being good examples). Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Conservative parties fare prominently in all of the financial tables.

THE THIRD SUB-DIMENSION OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES: STAFF

One of the most under-researched fields in the study of political parties is that of party employees. This is curious given how much we now know about most

other significant aspects of party life, including developments in party ideology and policy; the role, powers, and social background of party members and leaders; the recruitment and sociology of legislators and candidates; and the marketing of parties. By contrast, relatively little is known of the men and women on the organizational payroll who run the day-to-day operations of parties. This is a significant oversight, which leaves us with a deficient understanding of an important aspect of party organizational development.

This is particularly so since payroll staff may now be more important than ever. In part, this is because the modern age of election campaigning and political marketing makes certain types of professional expertise all the more pertinent. In addition (and relatedly), it is likely that parties have come to rely increasingly on paid professionals in the context of the overwhelming evidence of party membership decline which we have already visited in this chapter, a problem that may be exacerbated by the phenomenon of membership 'de-energization' (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994).

What evidence does our database provide for this supposed substitution of paid for voluntary labour? It is important to note that, in investigating this issue, we immediately become aware of one of the main reasons for the relative lack of research into party employees: the sheer difficulty of getting the relevant data. For whatever reason, many parties tend to be reluctant to provide data on the number of payroll employees that they have. The PPDB also suffers from the same reluctance. That said, we believe that we have sufficient information to generate a meaningful picture. We have central party staffing data for fifteen countries, and legislative party staffing data for twelve countries, giving us a total of sixty to sixty-three parties for the various staffing measures we report here.⁵ A further complication is that snapshot comparisons of party payroll figures could be misleading if the data comes from different points in the electoral cycle, because many parties hire more staff in election than non-election years. As it happens, most of the PPDB staffing data comes from non-election years, with the exception being the parties in Denmark, Ireland (for Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil) and Portugal. This means that the particular snapshot we have can be regarded as largely representative of parties' 'normal' mode of operation in non-election years.

What do we find, then? Table 2.7 shows that the Spanish and British parties have the most head office staff, when measured in absolute terms. (Germany also shows a high score, but we have staffing data for only one German party, so we cannot be sure if this is misleading). We should perhaps be wary of taking some of the very low national averages too literally, because they are either based on very few cases (e.g., Portugal, Hungary, Israel) or key data are missing for large parties (e.g., the Danish Social Democrats). Subject to these same caveats, the Hungarian and Danish parties appear to have most head office employees per party member. Table 2.7's figures on legislative party

TABLE 2.7 *Number of full-time party staff, by country*

Country	Average number of full-time paid staff in head office	Average number of head office staff per 1,000 party members	Average number of full-time paid staff in legislative party	Number of legislative staff per MP
Australia	21.0 (3)	0.04 (3)	—	—
Belgium	30.5 (10)	0.12 (10)	11.9 (8)	1.0 (8)
Czech Republic	28.3 (4)	0.17 (4)	2.8 (4)	0.1 (3)
Denmark	9.0 (4)	0.80 (4)	23.3 (4)	1.6 (4)
Germany	77.0 (1)	0.12 (1)	726.8 (6)	7.0 (5)
Hungary	12.0 (1)	1.50 (1)	57.8 (4)	1.1 (4)
Ireland	27.0 (3)	0.15 (2)	32.1 (5)	1.9 (4)
Israel	12.5 (2)	0.60 (2)	24.3 (3)	3.7 (3)
Italy	64.0 (4)	0.01 (4)	—	—
Netherlands	44.5 (2)	0.12 (2)	—	—
Norway	19.4 (7)	0.10 (7)	24.5 (7)	1.7 (7)
Portugal	1.0 (1)	0.02 (1)	38.0 (6)	2.3 (6)
Spain	105.6 (5)	0.09 (5)	37.7 (5)	0.8 (5)
Sweden	35.8 (8)	0.12 (8)	37.3 (6)	1.1 (6)
United Kingdom	93.1 (7)	0.12 (7)	3.2 (5)	1.2 (5)
Overall mean	42.9 (62)	0.12 (60)	92.9 (63)	2.0 (61)
Eta squared	0.287	0.908***	0.750***	0.783***

Note: Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by country differences. ***= $p < 0.01$, **= $p < 0.05$, *= $p < 0.10$. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

staff are distorted by an obvious outlier—Germany, whose parties appear to employ quite extraordinarily high numbers of parliamentary staff. These party staff are in fact formally employees of the state; however, they have a number of functions, some of which are party-related, so we think that it is justified to regard them as a party resource.⁶ Excluding the German parties, the average number of legislative party employees is just 26.2, which is perhaps a more generally representative figure of the database countries as a whole. (This is confirmed by the median score for this indicator, which is very similar at 24.0.) Comparing the figures in the first and third columns of Table 2.7, we see that parties in countries such as Hungary, Portugal, Israel and Ireland apparently place their human resources more in Parliament than in the national headquarters, while parties in other countries (including Spain, Britain, and the Czech Republic) tend to opt for the opposite approach. Of course, the number of staff that parties employ to service their MPs might reasonably be expected to reflect the number of legislators that they return to Parliament, so it is also useful to control for the size of parliamentary parties in assessing staffing establishments. Hence, Table 2.7 also reports the mean number of legislative employees per MP that parties maintain in each country. Overall, this produces a rather modest figure: the German parties are, of course, substantially higher than any others, being able to call on the support

of nearly seven staff members for each MP, but in most other countries the norm is only about one or two. Again, reference to the median for this indicator is helpful, since it negates the distorting effect of the German outlier: this stands at just 1.1 members of staff per MP. By a similar logic, when evaluating the number of central party staff as a resource it is interesting to control for the numbers of party members whom they might need to serve. This shows relatively little variation across country, there being only slightly more than one employee for every thousand members across the dataset as a whole; the Danish, Hungarian and Israeli parties would appear to enjoy the highest central staff/membership ratios, but the latter two in particular are based on very few cases, so should be regarded with great caution.

The staff/membership ratio is useful in trying to evaluate the hypothesis that there might have been a process of substituting paid for voluntary labour over time. It is difficult to say anything authoritative about longitudinal trends given the dearth of earlier studies on party staff, but some data are available from the Katz–Mair project on party organization (Katz and Mair 1992) with which we can offer limited comparisons. There are eight countries for which we have data on head office staffing levels in both the Katz–Mair study and our own party organization database: Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. Given the fact that we only have data for one German party—and not one of the major ones at that, given that it is the Left Party, even the inclusion of Germany in a longitudinal comparison is questionable. Nevertheless, bearing this caveat in mind, we can report that the average number of head office staff in these eight countries has risen only slightly from 42.4 ($n=46$) in 1985–9 to 44.8 ($n=36$) in 2011–14. Interestingly, however, given the downward trend in party membership over time, it is not surprising to find that the number of staff relative to the number of members has increased quite markedly, from 0.03 to 0.12, which is to say, from three to twelve for every 10,000 members.⁷ Thus, we might tentatively surmise that in general terms the level of party staffing has been at least sustained even as the quantity of members has fallen, which implies that the ratio of paid professional labour to voluntary labour has increased.

What of patterns by party family? The figures in Table 2.8 report these, but deliberately exclude German parties, which are such outliers on legislative party staffing that they tend to distort general patterns that would otherwise be apparent. We see a pattern that is broadly familiar from the analysis of financial data in so far as the major parties of the Christian Democratic/Conservative and Social Democratic families predominate in terms of absolute staffing establishments, both inside and outside parliament. That said, the Greens and Left Socialists employ high quantities of staff relative to their individual memberships and numbers of MPs. Again, we should note that the Eta squared coefficients generally suggest stronger country effects than party family effects in respect of party staffing.

TABLE 2.8 *Number of full-time party staff, by party family*

Party family	Average number of full-time paid staff in head office	Average head office staff as % of party members	Number of full-time paid staff in legislative party	Number of legislative staff per MP
Christian Democrats/ Conservatives	56.9 (15)	0.10 (15)	40.8 (12)	0.9 (11)
Social Democrats	80.3 (13)	0.08 (13)	31.6 (11)	1.5 (11)
Liberals	31.6 (12)	0.11 (12)	15.6 (11)	1.3 (11)
Greens	11.6 (10)	0.26 (9)	15.4 (8)	2.4 (7)
Left Socialists	19.8 (3)	0.14 (3)	26.2 (7)	2.1 (7)
Far Right	18.1 (6)	0.10 (6)	23.2 (6)	0.8 (6)
Overall mean	43.4 (59)	0.13 (58)	26.4 (55)	1.4 (53)
Eta squared	0.189**	0.097	0.157	0.179*

NB: This table deliberately excludes German parties as outliers that distort the general pattern. See text for further details. Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by party family differences. ***= $p < 0.01$, **= $p < 0.05$, *= $p < 0.10$. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

At this point, it is interesting to ask about the relationship between the three resource dimensions that we have examined so far: money, members and staff. The simplest pattern we might expect to find here is that each correlates clearly and positively with the other, for a party which is big in one organizational dimension might well be big in the others, and vice versa. Certainly, a party needs money to hire staff, so it seems logical to expect a fairly strong and significant direct relationship between party income and staffing levels; however, it is perhaps less clear that we should expect an equally simple relationship between the number of staff that parties hire and the number of members they recruit. On the one hand, the more members they have, the more staff they might need to provide services for those members, and the more income from members they might generate with which to hire staff; on the other hand, the labour substitution hypothesis suggests that the correlation between staff and members would be inverse.

Simple bivariate correlations do in fact suggest that the three resource dimensions all intercorrelate positively and significantly with one another. The total number of party employees (i.e., whether based in head office or parliament), correlates positively and significantly (indeed, strongly) with *both* income and membership numbers, while the correlation between income and membership is also significant and positive, if a little less strong (see Table 2.9). In essence, then, this basic analysis suggests that the more income and members that parties have, the more they are able to hire staff. It is interesting that, in an era in which parties depend more on the state than on members for their income (see Chapter 4, by van Biezen and Kopecký, in this volume), the absolute number of staff they employ should still correlate significantly with the latter. Note, however, that Table 2.9 reveals that the

TABLE 2.9 *Bivariate correlations between resource dimensions*

	Party income	Party members	Share of revenue from members
HQ staff	$r=0.76^{***}$ (60)	$r=0.61^{***}$ (60)	$r=0.06$ (55)
Legislative staff	$r=0.79^{***}$ (61)	$r=0.51^{***}$ (61)	$r=0.58^{***}$ (58)
Party income	—	$r=0.43^{***}$ (112)	—

***= $p<0.01$, **= $p<0.05$, *= $p<0.10$ (2-tailed). Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

share of income parties earn from members only correlates significantly with the number of legislative staff that they employ, but not the number of central party staff. The connection may be entirely spurious, of course, but if it is in any way causal, then it seems that income from members is not invested in recruiting staff who might tend the membership's needs, but rather, in servicing the parties' legislators.

THE FOURTH SUB-DIMENSION OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES: BASIC UNITS

The final aspect of party organizational resources that we survey here is the number of basic units that each party has. To the extent that a party spreads its organization throughout the national territory, it is putting itself in a position to campaign, disseminate its message, raise funds and mobilize support widely. These things are all central to any party that aims to establish and sustain its political presence. Margit Tavits (2013), in her recent study of parties in East Central Europe, has demonstrated that the degree to which a party extends its network of branches throughout the country is one of three factors (along with investment in membership recruitment and central office staffing) that enables parties to survive, succeed electorally, and act cohesively in legislatures. These are important claims about the continuing relevance of party organization as an independent variable, although our focus here is limited to describing the data on party branches. The database includes a question on the number of 'basic units' that a party has throughout the national territory, and this enables us to gain some insight into the presence across their respective countries of each party organization. We have data for ninety-eight parties across all eighteen countries on this variable.

Comparability can be achieved by standardizing the basic units measure relative to various things—the number of seats in the lower house of the

national legislature, the size of the electorate, and the size of the party membership. Each tells us something important about a party's organizational diffusion throughout the national territory and political system. The number of basic units (or branches) for every seat in the lower house provides a sense of how extensive a party's organizational tentacles are on the ground relative to the country's system of political representation. In a slightly different way, the number of registered electors covered by each party branch does a similar thing; it shows how much organizational effort a party is making to penetrate the electorate by having a presence which is local to as many voters as possible. Measuring the average number of party members for each branch provides insight into something else; this is not so much about penetration of the electorate as a whole as it is about the type of party. A party with a smaller average number of members for each branch could reasonably be assumed to be a party that makes serious efforts to provide organizational presence and activity for its members—that is, to mobilize and energize its grassroots membership—rather than settling for remote communication from a distant centre. Of course, there are numerators and denominators in each of these measures, so we should take some care in interpreting our results: a high number of party basic units per seat in the legislature could primarily be caused by the fact that its organization is genuinely widespread throughout the territory, or more prosaically, it might owe much to the simple fact that the country has a relatively small number of legislative seats; similarly, a low number of electors per basic unit could reflect the fact that a party has many branches or simply that the national electorate is comparatively small, and a low number of party members per branch could be influenced either by the high number of branches or the small size of the party's membership. But these measures do afford a degree of comparability across parties and countries and offer helpful insights about the extensiveness of party organization on the ground. Table 2.10 reports our findings in these terms.

The parties in our sample have an average of around three basic units per parliamentary seat. Austria and Germany feature as the countries that generally have the highest number of organizational units per seat, averaging more than ten such bodies for every national legislative seat. The Czech Republic, Ireland and Australia are above average too, but several countries appear to have less than one basic unit per seat, including Canada, Denmark, France, Israel, and the UK. This implies that parties are not generally present across the entire territory in these countries; the extreme case at the bottom end of the scale appears to be Italy, with just 0.14 units per constituency. Indeed, Italy is such an extreme outlier that it distorts the overall sample mean quite seriously:⁸ with Italy included, each basic unit covers more than 4 million voters, but with the country excluded, the average unit covers just 150,000. There is quite considerable variation around the mean here—from 4,000 in Ireland and 6,000 in Austria to 800,000 in the Netherlands and over half a

TABLE 2.10 *Territorial extensiveness of party organization as measured by basic units, per country*

Country	Basic units per seat in lower house	Number of registered electors per basic unit	Number of party members per basic unit
Australia	7.84 (4)	34,299 (4)	59 (4)
Austria	14.06 (3)	6,084 (3)	77 (3)
Belgium	1.59 (11)	49,576 (11)	137 (11)
Canada	0.82 (5)	127,693 (5)	254 (4)
Czech Republic	9.41 (3)	11,728 (4)	17 (4)
Denmark	0.81 (8)	39,403 (8)	163 (8)
France	0.59 (2)	249,395 (2)	1,093 (2)
Germany	10.3 (4)	196,450 (4)	53 (4)
Hungary	1.64 (4)	68,383 (4)	33 (4)
Ireland	7.92 (3)	4,257 (3)	22 (3)
Israel	0.82 (5)	105,552 (5)	920 (4)
Italy	0.14 (5)	5,057,078 (5)	25,412 (5)
Netherlands	1.67 (11)	822,878 (11)	271 (11)
Norway	2.25 (7)	9,701 (7)	59 (7)
Portugal	2.07 (5)	91,748 (5)	148 (5)
Spain	4.77 (3)	66,804 (3)	106 (3)
Sweden	1.86 (8)	21,708 (8)	66 (8)
United Kingdom	0.84 (6)	157,868 (6)	142 (6)
Overall mean (inc. Italy)	2.95 (97)	4,007,934 (98)	1,495 (96)
Eta squared	0.543***	0.207	0.252
Overall mean (exc. Italy)	3.10 (92)	150,456 (93)	181 (91)
Eta squared	0.533***	0.141	0.333***

***= $p < 0.01$, **= $p < 0.05$, *= $p < 0.10$. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

million in Italy. On average, each basic unit serves nearly 1,500 individual party members if the Italian parties are included, but fewer than 200 if they are excluded.⁹ Again, the range is large: from just seventeen members per unit in the Czech Republic to a mind-boggling 25,000 in Italy. France is the only other country that produces a mean figure over 1,000, but this is based on just two parties, of course: in most countries, the average is below 200.

In summary, the countries that feature consistently towards the higher end of these three indicators of country-wide organizational presence are Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Ireland. It is interesting that three of these four are smaller states by population, which suggests there is something about size that matters here: presumably, it is logistically easier to organize throughout smaller territories—and perhaps essential to do so if these are countries in which local politics matters. Germany is, of course, far larger, but is a federal state in which much power is devolved to the

TABLE 2.11 *Territorial extensiveness of party organization as measured by basic units, per party family*

Party family	Basic units per seat in lower house	Number of registered electors per basic unit	Number of party members per basic unit
Christian Democrats/Conservatives	3.98 (26)	914,879 (27)	4,692 (26)
Social Democrats	4.12 (21)	105,953 (21)	466 (21)
Liberals	2.16 (19)	66,592 (19)	125 (19)
Greens	1.04 (11)	192,684 (11)	161 (11)
Left Socialists	3.96 (8)	56,473 (8)	80 (8)
Far Right	0.93 (9)	821,775 (9)	695 (9)
Overall mean (inc. Italy)	3.00 (94)	4,016,767 (95)	1,519 (94)
Eta squared	0.075	0.024	0.030
Overall mean (exc. Italy)	3.17 (89)	143,043 (90)	177 (89)
Eta squared	0.204	0.108*	0.069

***= $p < 0.01$, **= $p < 0.05$, *= $p < 0.10$. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

sub-national level—again, an obvious incentive for parties to decentralize their organizations and make sure that they have many branches on the ground.

Table 2.11 shows that party family effects are not great with respect to the territorial diffusion of party organizations. As usual, the two major party families do best in terms of the number of units per parliamentary seat, although the Left Socialists are not far behind. While Table 2.11 appears to show that the average Christian Democratic party basic unit has to cover far more electors than that of any other party family (915,000), this figure is heavily distorted by the presence in the data of the Italian parties; once these are excluded, the average figure is 32,910. The most notable feature of this table is that, absent the Italian parties, the figure for the Social Democrats is relatively high at 94,000 voters per basic unit, which is in fact somewhat higher than the figures for the Liberal parties (51,409) and Left Socialists (56,473). Without the Italian parties, the Greens (192,684) and Far Right (834,294) still lag well behind the other party families. When we consider the number of basic organizational units relative to the number of party members, then the Liberals and Left Socialists appear to have the most diffuse spreads, with only eighty and 125 members per unit respectively. However, once we exclude the Italian parties, we find that they are joined by the Christian Democrats/Conservatives, who only have 120 members per branch. Indeed, the overall mean for the PPDB then drops to 177, and no family has more than 430 members per branch (the Far Right). Overall, it is clear once again from the analysis of variance statistics that party families account for less organizational variation than countries in these terms.

RANKING THE OVERALL STRENGTH OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

What do the various measures reviewed so far tell us about the overall strength of party organizations in terms of resources? What is a 'strong' or well-resourced party organization? The answer to this question will depend on the position of any given party in its particular national context, but even so, it would be helpful to have a reliable indicator of overall organizational strength. Such a measure would not only be intrinsically interesting, but could also be of use as an independent or control variable when trying to understand the effects of party organization. How can the various resources that we have reviewed in this chapter—money, members, staff and territorial presence—be used to construct a measure of this type? Ideally, we would find a way of employing each of these sub-dimensions of organizational strength to construct a composite index. To explore this possibility, we start by examining the simple bivariate correlations between these four aspects of party organizational resourcing (see Table 2.12).

In Table 2.9, we have already reported similar correlations relating to the various dimensions of party resources, but those reported in Table 2.12 differ in so far as each measure employed is stated relative to the size of the polity—that is, the number of registered voters. In this way we seek to take account of the relative strength of each party organization within its national context. We immediately see that, conceived in such terms, the four measures we have looked at so far are all positively and significantly correlated with one another. This supports the notion that they all connect with a single underlying dimension of organizational strength, a view further confirmed by a simple principal components analysis of the four measures which shows that they all load strongly onto a single dimension.¹⁰ On the face of it, then, there would seem to be a good *prima facie* case for constructing an index of overall organizational strength that adds together all four of these indicators. However, there is a practical problem with doing this, even if it seems appropriate in

TABLE 2.12 *Bivariate correlations between sub-dimensions of organizational strength*

Correlated variables	Pearson's r (n)
Central party income per voter/members per voter	r=0.44*** (107)
Central party income per voter/staff per 100,000 voters	r=0.65*** (60)
Central party income per voter/basic units per 100,000 voters	r=0.37*** (97)
Members per voter/staff per 100,000 voters	r=0.54*** (60)
Members per voter/basic units per 100,000 voters	r=0.52*** (97)
Staff per 100,000 voters/basic units per 100,000 voters	r=0.61*** (55)

***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.10 (2-tailed). Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

principle, which is simply one of data availability. An additive index which combines all of these indicators—the ratios of members, money, staff and basic units to the number of electors—falls short in numerical terms, producing a valid sample of just fifty-three cases from our database. This is insufficient for any kind of useful ranking. If we drop the staffing component, we can boost the number of parties in the analysis to ninety-five, which is a considerable improvement, although it still leaves more than twenty parties unranked. However, by dropping the basic units element as well, we can create a simple additive index (which we will call the Party Strength Index, or PSI) that takes in almost all of the parties in the PPDB ($n=112$). Furthermore, the correlations between this simple two-item version of the index and three- or four-item versions of the PSI that include basic units and staff are all very high, which suggests that the simple two-item variant succeeds in capturing most of what constitutes organizational strength in resource terms.¹¹ In any case, we would argue that the two-item index makes good sense intuitively, because it is based on two elements—party income and members—that complement each other in important ways when regarded as aspects of organizational resourcing. Money is the most obvious and most flexible type of resource in that it can be exploited for many purposes, including—crucially—the hiring of pay-roll and professional staff, while members are the major source of unpaid voluntary labour. Thus, in effect, both types of labour resources are captured by the two-item PSI.

When we standardize the number of members a party has and its income against the size of the national electorate, we are able to generate a rank-order for 112 parties (see Table 2.13).¹² The PSI score is a composite index created by adding the standardized z-scores of the members/electorate ratio and income/electorate ratio for each party. The distribution for each of these components therefore has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, so that they share common scales and can be easily added together. These scores do not constitute an absolute measure with a fixed meaning because the process of standardization means that we are gauging the relative positions of parties on this index within this particular sample of 112 cases. Should further cases be added to the sample we would have to re-calculate. However, the method is a simple but effective way of summarizing the relative organizational strength of the PPDB parties.

This system of ranking shows that the Austrian People's Party is the best resourced party in the database (scoring 10.56), relative to the size of its national electorate, closely followed by the Norwegian Labour Party (7.09). At the opposite end of the scale come the Polish Palikot's Movement (-1.40) and Plaid Cymru (-1.39) from the UK. Indeed, the Austrian and Norwegian parties generally fare strongly in this league table of organizational strength, as Table 2.14 confirms: relative to the size of their respective national electorates, they are the strongest parties in our dataset. The Spanish parties also

TABLE 2.13 *Party Strength Index rankings in descending order, by party*

Rank	Party	Country	PSI score
1	People's Party	Austria	10.56
2	Labour Party	Norway	7.09
3	Social Democratic Party	Austria	5.24
4	People's Party	Spain	3.83
5	Social Democrats	Sweden	3.72
6	Conservative Party	Norway	3.43
7	Socialist Party	Spain	2.53
8	Likud	Israel	2.25
9	Progress Party	Norway	1.88
10	Social Democratic Party	Germany	1.77
11	The People of Freedom	Italy	1.75
12	Christian Democratic Union	Germany	1.58
13	Fine Gael	Ireland	1.44
14	Moderate Party	Sweden	1.38
15	Socialist Party	Belgium	1.34
16	Liberal Party	Australia	1.31
17	Democratic Party	Italy	1.22
18	Social Democrats	Denmark	1.20
19	Liberals	Denmark	1.06
20	Labor Party	Australia	0.95
21	Christian Democratic Party	Norway	0.90
22	Kadima	Israel	0.88
23	Civic Democratic Party	Czech Republic	0.85
24	Freedom Party	Austria	0.69
25	Christian-Democrat and Flemish	Belgium	0.61
26	Labor Party	Israel	0.58
27	Union for a Popular Movement	France	0.56
28	Social Democratic Party	Czech Republic	0.49
29	Centre Party	Sweden	0.45
30	Socialist Party	France	0.43
31	Centre Party	Norway	0.41
32	Socialist Party Alternative	Belgium	0.32
33	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	Belgium	0.19
34	Socialist Left Party	Norway	0.16
35	Conservatives	Denmark	0.11
36	New Flemish Alliance	Belgium	0.09
37	Reform Movement	Belgium	0.00
38	Fianna Fáil	Ireland	-0.15
39	Labour Party	United Kingdom	-0.15
40	Social Democratic Party	Portugal	-0.16
41	Alliance for the Future	Austria	-0.18
42	Communist Party	Czech Republic	-0.19
43	Labour Party	Ireland	-0.21
44	Liberal Party	Canada	-0.24
45	Labour Party	Netherlands	-0.24
46	Liberal Party	Norway	-0.27

(continued)

TABLE 2.13 *Continued*

Rank	Party	Country	PSI score
47	The Greens	Austria	-0.31
48	National Religious Party	Israel	-0.34
49	Socialist People's Party	Denmark	-0.38
50	Northern League	Italy	-0.41
51	Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance	Hungary	-0.42
52	Socialist Party	Netherlands	-0.43
53	National Party	Australia	-0.44
54	Flemish Interest	Belgium	-0.44
55	Ecolo	Belgium	-0.45
56	New Democratic Party	Canada	-0.45
57	Green Party	Sweden	-0.46
58	Democrat Humanist Centre	Belgium	-0.47
59	Socialist Party	Portugal	-0.47
60	Conservative Party	United Kingdom	-0.50
61	Christian Democratic Appeal	Netherlands	-0.51
62	People's Party for Freedom & Democracy	Netherlands	-0.53
63	Liberal People's Party	Sweden	-0.55
64	Liberal Alliance	Denmark	-0.57
65	Christian Democrats	Sweden	-0.57
66	Communist Party	Portugal	-0.59
67	Danish People's Party	Denmark	-0.60
68	Christian Social Union	Germany	-0.61
69	Sinn Féin	Ireland	-0.67
70	Socialist Party	Hungary	-0.70
71	Christian Democratic Union	Czech Republic	-0.73
72	Left Party	Sweden	-0.76
73	Green	Belgium	-0.77
74	Free Democratic Party	Germany	-0.78
75	Alliance '90/The Greens	Germany	-0.78
76	Social Liberal Party	Denmark	-0.81
77	The Left	Germany	-0.86
78	Basque Nationalist Party	Spain	-0.88
79	GreenLeft	Netherlands	-0.88
80	Yisrael Beiteinu	Israel	-0.92
81	Polish People's Party	Poland	-0.92
82	Democratic Left Alliance	Poland	-0.94
83	Red-Green Alliance	Denmark	-0.94
84	Democrats 66	Netherlands	-0.94
85	Union of the Centre	Italy	-0.95
86	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	Spain	-1.00
87	Christian Union	Netherlands	-1.03
88	Civic Platform	Poland	-1.06
89	Reformed Political Party	Netherlands	-1.08
90	Jobbik	Hungary	-1.08
91	TOP 09	Czech Republic	-1.09
92	Liberal Democrats	United Kingdom	-1.09
93	United Left	Spain	-1.10

TABLE 2.13 *Continued*

Rank	Party	Country	PSI score
94	The Greens	Australia	-1.15
95	Bloc Québécois	Canada	-1.16
96	People's Party	Portugal	-1.16
97	Law and Justice	Poland	-1.18
98	Italy of Values	Italy	-1.18
99	Meretz	Israel	-1.20
100	Green Party	Canada	-1.25
101	Party for the Animals	Netherlands	-1.27
102	UK Independence Party	United Kingdom	-1.27
103	Left Bloc	Portugal	-1.27
104	Scottish National Party	United Kingdom	-1.28
105	Federalists, Democrats, Francophone	Belgium	-1.28
106	Politics Can Be Different	Hungary	-1.30
107	50PLUS	Netherlands	-1.34
108	Pirate Party	Germany	-1.36
109	Green Party	United Kingdom	-1.37
110	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	Portugal	-1.39
111	Plaid Cymru	United Kingdom	-1.39
112	Palikot's Movement	Poland	-1.40

Note: The PSI score is a composite index created by adding the standardized z-scores of the members/electorate ratio and income/electorate ratio for each party. The distribution for each of these components therefore has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, which means they share common scales and can be added together.

TABLE 2.14 *Party Strength Index in descending order, by country*

Rank	Country	Mean Party Strength Index score	Difference between top two parties	Range between top and bottom parties
1	Austria	3.20 (5)	5.32	10.87
2	Norway	1.94 (7)	3.66	7.36
3	Spain	0.68 (5)	1.33	4.93
4	Sweden	0.46 (7)	2.34	4.48
5	Israel	0.21 (6)	1.37	3.45
6	Australia	0.17 (4)	0.36	2.46
7	Ireland	0.10 (4)	1.59	2.11
8	Italy	0.09 (5)	0.53	2.93
9	Belgium	-0.08 (11)	0.73	2.62
10	Denmark	-0.12 (8)	0.14	2.14
11	Czech Republic	-0.13 (5)	0.36	1.94
12	Germany	-0.15 (7)	0.19	3.13
13	Canada	-0.77 (4)	0.21	1.01
14	Netherlands	-0.82 (10)	0.19	1.10
15	Portugal	-0.84 (6)	0.31	1.23
16	Hungary	-0.88 (4)	0.28	0.88
17	UK	-1.01 (7)	0.35	1.24
18	Poland	-1.10 (5)	0.02	0.48
	Overall Mean	0.04 (112)	1.07	3.02
	Eta squared	0.342***		

Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

TABLE 2.15 *Party Strength Index in descending order, by party family*

Party family	Mean Party Strength Index score
1 Social Democrats	0.78 (24)
2 Christian Democrats/Conservatives	0.57 (29)
3 Far Right	-0.11 (11)
4 Liberals	-0.43 (21)
5 Left Socialists	-0.67 (10)
6 Greens	-0.91 (13)
Overall mean	0.06 (108)
Eta squared	0.132**

Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties.

rank highly—perhaps surprisingly for a country that has experienced severe economic problems in recent years—as do the Swedes. At the bottom of the table come the Poles and the British. We also see a marked tendency for the countries with the strongest parties to be the most unequal in organizational terms; the PSI gaps between the top two parties and between the top and bottom parties in these countries are generally larger than in countries which do not figure so high on the PSI table.

Table 2.15 reveals a by now familiar pattern; when we look at party organizational strength in terms of party families, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats lead the way, with the Greens bringing up the rear, although the Far Right fare relatively well in these terms. Comparison of analysis of variance statistics confirm that, as ever, country effects appear to be stronger than party family effects.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

To summarize some of the major findings from our survey of the organizational resources at the disposal of the 122 parties in our database: we have found, first, that membership/electorate ratios continue to fall in almost all democratic countries for which we have data, such that little more than 3 per cent of the electorate now join political parties across the democratic world; that German and Spanish parties seem to be the richest in terms of absolute levels of funding, but parties in countries such as Austria and Norway are even stronger relative to the size of their economies or electorates; that party staffing levels are generally quite modest (though probably not falling) in most countries, but are extraordinarily high in Germany, especially in respect of legislative party organizations; and that countries where there is an emphasis

on what is local, either because they are small or because their political systems are decentralized, tend to have the highest relative concentrations of party branches across national territory. Moreover, we have discovered that country differences consistently seem to outweigh party family differences in explaining patterns of variation in party organizational resources.

The various types of party organizational resources we have explored correlate positively and significantly with one another, and we have therefore devised a simple index of party organizational strength based on the members and financial resources that each party has relative to the size of its registered national electorate. While the rank-ordering of parties this generates is intrinsically interesting, we believe that this index is also a useful measurement that can be deployed in investigating some of the issues concerning the effects of party organization that will be addressed elsewhere in this book. Such an index offers a way of operationalizing party organization as an independent variable that could be valuable in addressing a variety of empirical questions. To take a simple example, the bivariate correlation between the PSI and the percentage of seats that parties have in the lower houses of their national parliaments is clearly significant and positive ($r = .502$, $n = 112$), which is consistent with the intuitive hypothesis that electoral success depends at least in part upon organizational inputs. Alternatively, it might be that party subsidies are related to electoral success, so it could be that votes are driving resources rather than vice versa. Either way, however, the PSI should prove a useful tool for addressing various questions pertaining to the importance of party organization for political support and stability (as Chapter 12 of this book illustrates).

This completes our initial survey of the organizational resources available to political parties in democratic polities. In Chapters 3 and 4 we proceed to examine certain aspects of these resources and the relationships between them in greater detail.

APPENDIX

TABLE A2.1 *Party families in the PPDB*

Party families and parties	Country
<i>Christian Democratic & Conservative parties</i>	
Liberal Party	Australia
National Party	Australia
People's Party	Austria
Christian-Democrat and Flemish	Belgium
Democrat Humanist Centre	Belgium
Conservative Party	Canada
Civic Democratic Party	Czech Republic
Top09	Czech Republic
Christian Democratic Union	Czech Republic

(continued)

TABLE A2.1 *Continued*

Party families and parties	Country
Conservatives	Denmark
Union for a Popular Movement	France
Christian Democratic Union	Germany
Christian Social Union	Germany
Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance	Hungary
Fine Gael	Ireland
The People of Freedom	Italy
Union of the Centre	Italy
Christian Democratic Appeal	Netherlands
Christian Union	Netherlands
Reformed Political Party	Netherlands
Conservative Party	Norway
Christian Democratic Party	Norway
Civic Platform	Poland
Polish People's Party	Poland
Social Democratic Party	Portugal
People's Party	Portugal
People's Party	Spain
Christian Democrats	Sweden
Moderates	Sweden
Conservative Party	United Kingdom
<i>Social Democratic parties</i>	
Labor Party	Australia
Social Democratic Party	Austria
Socialist Party	Belgium
Socialist Party Alternative	Belgium
Bloc Québécois	Canada
New Democratic Party	Canada
Social Democratic Party	Czech Republic
Social Democrats	Denmark
Socialist Party	France
Social Democratic Party	Germany
Socialist Party	Hungary
Labour Party	Ireland
Labor Party	Israel
Meretz	Israel
Democratic Party	Italy
Labour Party	Netherlands
Labour Party	Norway
Democratic Left Alliance	Poland
Socialist Party	Portugal
Socialist Party	Spain
Social Democrats	Sweden
Labour Party	United Kingdom
Scottish National Party	United Kingdom
Plaid Cymru	United Kingdom

TABLE A2.1 *Continued*

Party families and parties	Country
<i>Liberal parties</i>	
New Flemish Alliance	Belgium
Federalists, Democrats, Francophone	Belgium
Reform Movement	Belgium
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	Belgium
Liberal Party	Canada
Social Liberal Party	Denmark
Liberal Alliance	Denmark
Liberals	Denmark
Free Democratic Party	Germany
Fianna Fáil	Ireland
Kadima	Israel
Italy of Values	Italy
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	Netherlands
Democrats 66	Netherlands
Liberal Party	Norway
Palikot's Movement	Poland
Basque Nationalist Party	Spain
Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	Spain
Centre Party	Sweden
Liberal People's Party	Sweden
Liberal Democrats	United Kingdom
<i>Green parties</i>	
The Greens	Australia
The Greens	Austria
Ecolo	Belgium
Green	Belgium
Green Party	Canada
Socialist People's Party	Denmark
Alliance '90/The Greens	Germany
Politics Can Be Different	Hungary
Green Party	Ireland
GreenLeft	Netherlands
Party for the Animals	Netherlands
Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	Portugal
Green Party	Sweden
Green Party	United Kingdom
<i>Left Socialist parties</i>	
Communist Party	Czech Republic
Red-Green Alliance	Denmark
The Left	Germany
Sinn Féin	Ireland
Hadash	Israel
Socialist Party	Netherlands
Socialist Left Party	Norway
Left Bloc	Portugal
Communist Party	Portugal

(continued)

TABLE A2.1 *Continued*

Party families and parties	Country
United Left	Spain
Left Party	Sweden
<i>Far Right parties</i>	
Freedom Party	Austria
Alliance for the Future	Austria
Flemish Interest	Belgium
Libertarian, Direct, Democratic	Belgium
Danish People's Party	Denmark
Jobbik	Hungary
Likud	Israel
Yisrael Beiteinu	Israel
Northern League	Italy
Party for Freedom	Netherlands
Progress Party	Norway
Law and Justice	Poland
United Poland	Poland
Sweden Democrats	Sweden
UK Independence Party	United Kingdom
<i>Unclassified parties</i>	
Pirate Party	Germany
Shas	Israel
Agudat Yisrael	Israel
National Religious Party	Israel
Balad	Israel
50PLUS	Netherlands
Centre Party	Norway

NOTES

1. Note that the PPDB does not include all minor parties in national party systems, which means that ME is slightly underestimated in all cases. Hence, the strength of country effects vis-à-vis party effects is actually probably a little greater than our analysis here suggests.
2. In addition, our results may be distorted somewhat in that they include data on election years for seven of our 19 countries.
3. The parties have been categorized on the basis of their membership in supranational party bodies and expert judgements. The appendix to this chapter lists all parties in the PPDB by party family.
4. It is worth emphasizing that these figures reflect the 'official stories' released by parties, and public disclosure rules do differ by country. Some differences may thus reflect different reporting rules, rather than different practices—but this is very hard to uncover in each and every case. The best available option is therefore to stick with the 'official story'.

5. Unfortunately, there are rather fewer cases for which we have both central and legislative party staffing data—only approximately one-third of the total number of parties, which we feel is too few to gain a clear picture, so we do not report those figures here.
6. The extraordinary number of staff employed by parliamentary parties in Germany owes something to the difficulty of attracting state funding beyond a fixed ‘absolute ceiling’ which limits the overall sum of money that can go from the state to political parties. This ceiling did not change for many years until the *Bundestag* introduced indexation in 2013. The way around this for the parties was to increase the number of their parliamentary staff, all of whom are paid for by the state. According to German legal doctrine, their work pertains to the sphere of the state rather than the parties, since formally the parliamentary parties are not supposed to do things that directly benefit the extra-parliamentary party. The reality, however, is that these personnel split their time between working for MPs as personal assistants and working for the parliamentary (and sometimes extra-parliamentary) parties. In this way they clearly constitute a resource of the party, then; however, it does render the German situation somewhat unique, so readers may prefer to exclude the German figures when reflecting on the overall averages for parliamentary party staff.
7. The relevant data in Katz and Mair (1992) can be summarized as follows: Denmark: total number of central party staff = 92, total number of members for these same parties = 166,488 (n=8 parties); Germany: total number of central party staff = 300, total number of members for these same parties = 1,621,983 (n=3 parties); Ireland: total number of central party staff = 15, total number of members for these same parties = 166,488 (n=3 parties); Italy: total number of central party staff = 871.4, total number of members for these same parties = 4,150,072 (n=8 parties); Netherlands: total number of central party staff = 147.5, total number of members for these same parties = 320,510 (n=7 parties); Norway: total number of central party staff = 101, total number of members for these same parties = 256,641 (n=7 parties); Sweden: total number of central party staff = 210, total number of members for these same parties = 1,231,502 (n=6 parties); UK: total number of central party staff = 196, total number of members for these same parties = 1,125,723 (n=3 parties). Note that a more detailed analysis of change over time in party staff numbers can be found in Chapter 3.
8. In part, this reflects the regionalization of the Italian party system, given the fact that Lega Nord only organizes in the north of the country, and in part it reflects the fact that the very small Italia dei Valori party (which only has two basic units) influences the national mean figure for Italy in the PPDB. More generally, there are two other factors to bear in mind about Italy. First, registers of members and local units for its parties are often incomplete (Bardi, Ignazi and Massari 2013). Secondly, there is little doubt that the steady personalization of politics in Italy since the 1990s (think of the way in which Silvio Berlusconi, Antonio di Pietro and Pierferdinando Casini have built parties as vehicles to serve their own personal

- political ambitions) has created highly centralized organizations with weak party presence on the ground (see Calise 2007; Bardi, Ignazi, and Massari 2007).
9. Given the distorting effect of the Italian data, it is also useful to examine the median scores for the indicators reported in Table 2.10. These are 1.34 basic units per seat, 34,112 voters per basic unit, and 85 members per basic unit. These figures are quite considerably different from the overall sample means, which confirms the impact of the Italian outlier.
 10. The factor loadings onto the single component that is extracted are as follows: number of basic units = .669; number of staff = .892; number of members = .757; party income = .808. Total variance accounted for this component = 61.725.
 11. We created four variants of the PSI. The first is based on two items (membership/electorate ratio + income per elector); two were based on three items (the first = members per elector + income per elector + basic units per elector, while the second = members per elector + income per elector + staff per elector); and one was based on four items (members per elector + income per elector + basic units per elector + staff per elector). The bivariate correlations were as follows: two-item index/first variant of three item index, $r = .94^{***}$ ($n=95$); two-item index/second variant of three item index, $r = .95^{***}$ ($n=59$); two-item index/four item index, $r = .88^{***}$ ($n=53$).
 12. Cronbach's Alpha for this scale is .617, which is high for an additive scale constructed of only two items.

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Which Face Comes First? The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office

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INTRODUCTION

A quarter of a century after the publication of Katz and Mair's handbook (1992), a conspicuous number of scholars worldwide are still committed to the study of party organizations.¹ The demise of the archetypal mass integration party model and the rapid succession of several new ones (*catch-all*, *electoral-professional*, *cartel*, *franchise*) have been at the centre of two different trends in the recent literature. On the one hand, a number of studies have focused on individual parties' organizational structures, in search of (alleged) new models; on the other, party scholars have extensively analysed parties' single organizational characteristics (membership size; candidate and/or leader selection; campaign and staff professionalization; centralization vs. stratarchization; party resources, etc.). All these contributions are extremely useful in depicting 'the state of the art' and/or the complexity of party organizations and party politics. They also confirm the relevance of Katz and Mair's (1993) analytic approach by alternatively stressing the respective relative importance of the three faces of party organization.

In the last few decades, students of European parties have come to agree that organizational power has been concentrating in the hands of the party in public office (PPO), especially of the parliamentary party, whose particular interests and objectives shape those of the party at large (Katz and Mair 1993, 1995; Farrell and Webb 2002; Gunther, Montero, and Linz 2002; Luther and Müller-Rommel 2002; Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2011). Following Katz and Mair, the ascendancy of the party in public office could be attributed to the progressive 'parliamentarization' of the party leadership and, at the same time, to its increasing ability to control the financial resources that come from the rank and file and, above all, from state subsidies. This hypothesized process of autonomization of the party in public office goes hand in hand with that of

party penetration of the state (Katz and Mair 1995; van Biezen 2004; Katz and Mair 2009) and with a corresponding decline of party presence within civil society (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002).

According to the theoretical argument concerning the cartel party, the laws and rules affecting parties and public party funding schemes are drafted and approved by the parties themselves, as public office holders (albeit subject to the constraints of constitutional law and judicial review in some countries). In organizational terms, tensions among the ‘three faces’ of the party could emerge as the PPO increases its relative organizational power at the expense of both the party on the ground (POG) and the party in central office (PCO). The PPO, in its role of lawmaker, ‘may push for the introduction or expansion of state subventions for the parties in parliament, and so build up its own independent resources and bureaucracy’ (Katz and Mair 1993). Thus, by relying heavily on state resources, contemporary parties would be less dependent on members and grassroots contributions; party activists and the POG would be disempowered in favour of paid professional staff, better equipped to conduct centralized and capital-intensive electoral campaigning. Overall and at the same time, the PCO would experience a reduction of its role in the decision-making process, following a growth of the PPO.²

The conceptual and theoretical propositions concerning the evolution of party organizations and the relationships among their components that have developed in the literature since Katz and Mair’s ‘three faces’ have never been rigorously tested empirically. The aim of this chapter is therefore to test empirically Katz and Mair’s main hypothesis that the PPO has increasingly become the strongest party organizational ‘face’. We are also interested in investigating whether the degree of ascendancy of the PPO varies 1) across parties and 2) across countries. To this end we analyse persistence and change in party organizations across ten European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom),³ from the 1970s to 2010.

HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In the analysis, we use data from the Political Party Database Project and comparable data from the *Party Organizations Data Handbook* (Katz and Mair 1992). The chapter’s analytical framework will be based on two sets of variables. The first set consists of variables pertaining to elements of change in party organizations. The second group of variables includes country and classifying characteristics of party.

A. Organizational Variables:

- 1) party membership
- 2) party staff
- 3) party finance

B. Country and party specific variables:

- 1) country
- 2) party family
- 3) party age

Although the theory is not sufficiently developed for us to formulate specific testable hypotheses based on theoretically sound causal relationships, we can say that those in Group A are clearly our dependent variables, the main objects, that is, of our empirical investigation whose variation is per se of interest for our analysis. Although it may be too ambitious to designate those in the other group as our independent variables, also because of the theory's limits, they will serve the purpose of directing our analysis across countries and across parties with the aim of identifying patterns and regularities. In the course of this analysis, we will necessarily revisit some of the ground already covered in Chapter 2 of this book; however, we will extend the review of party organizational resources reported there both by adding a dynamic analysis of change over time, and by investigating the relative strengths of the three faces of party organization implied by this change.

The variables in Group A were chosen as those that are most obviously relevant for the study of party organizations, as indicated by all models, from the mass party model onwards. In particular, the very structure of the mass party rests on a strong membership, whose political and financial role is fundamental for party success and even survival. The role of professionally competent staff was stressed in the formulation of the catch-all party model, whereas the cartel party model is essentially built on the identification of new organizational solutions devised by parties to secure alternative source of funding to supplement—or outright replace—declining revenue from membership.⁴ As for the variables in Group B, they are typically used to guide data analysis in a systematic and manageable way even if it may be improper to characterize them as factors of change. We will thus analyse persistence and change in party organizations by focusing on three dependent variables (party membership, party staff, and party finance), measured from the 1970s to the 2010s. According to the ascendancy of the PPO hypothesis, parties are shifting towards organizational settings characterized by a decreasing number of members and revenues from membership; an increasing number of parliamentary party staff, especially vis-à-vis other staff, particularly the PCOs; and an increasing reliance on state funds. The existence of these trends will be tested empirically in the next sections.

PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Party membership change has always been considered important in the study of party change. Often it was used by political scientists as an indicator of the fortunes of individual political parties (references on this are far too numerous to even attempt a selection) and party families (Bartolini 1983); or as an element in the birth or the demise of a given party model (Duverger 1954; Kirchheimer 1966). Crucial in determining this use of party membership were the debate and the literature on party decline that overlapped with the debate and literature on party change for almost thirty years. In turn, party decline has often been identified, at least in operational terms, with membership decline (Katz and Mair 1995). Transformations in the environment, the argument goes, have changed the nature of mass-membership and have been causing, at least since the 1960s 'counter-organizational tendencies', and, inevitably, party decline and party membership numerical decline (Epstein 1967). Political scientists' operational concerns have subsequently produced a simplification of the initial formulation: environmental changes are causing party decline which can be assessed in terms of membership size decline. Implicit in all of these formulations is the notion that the standard against which membership trends must be measured and assessed is the mass-party model in Maurice Duverger's (1954) classic conception. But Katz and Mair (1995) have pointed out that, while the mass or even the catch-all party models may no longer be dominant, elements from more than one party model coexist in party systems or even individual parties at any given time. Moreover, discussions of other party models (Panebianco 1988; Koole 1994; Katz and Mair 2009) seem to indicate that membership change can be assessed both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Any conclusion on the observation of membership trends must take into account criteria, which may vary from party model to party model, and even from party to party, for determining optimal membership size (Bardi 1994).

In this chapter, we take a slightly different approach, in that we consider *quantitative* changes in membership trends that reflect *qualitative* changes in the internal organization of parties. Both result from party responses to pressures posed by the external environment of parties. Increased party reliance on the State and the parallel/consequent drawing away from society are considered as important causes of the sharp decline in party membership. Direct and indirect subsidies, provided by public funding schemes, have significantly diminished parties' dependence on membership fees and voluntary activism. At the same time, party presence within civil society has declined. Centralized campaigning and fund raising by professionals have effectively exposed the inadequacy of the old-fashioned model based on local branches. Seen in this light, party membership decline and the shift

TABLE 3.1 *Party membership change per country (1970–2010)*

Country	1970		1990		2010		Change (%)		
	N	Members	N	Members	N	Members	1970–90	1990–2010	1970–2010
Austria	3	1,387,802	4	1,220,839	5	853,518	–12	–30	–38
Belgium	7	572,326	10	637,610	11	374,196	+11	–41	–35
Denmark	5	484,481	5	236,514	8	149,647	–51	–37	–69
Germany	4	1,282,627	5	1,873,053	7	1,341,468	+46	–28	+5
Ireland	3	25,461	6	115,628	4	69,653	+354	–40	+173
Italy	7	4,479,774	7	4,219,266	5	2,106,025	–6	–50	–53
Netherlands	8	364,341	7	320,283	11	315,758	–12	1	–13
Norway	4	204,401	7	349,697	7	161,811	+71	–54	–21
Sweden	5	1,103,520	6	1,230,586	8	252,632	+12	–79	–77
United Kingdom	3	2,370,191	3	1,125,720	7	446,949	–53	–60	–81
Total	49	12,274,924	60	11,329,199	73	6,071,657	–8	–46	–51

from member-based to public financing and professional fund-raising appear as a clear qualitative organizational change that reflects a decline of the POG vis-à-vis the other two faces.

Our data clearly confirms other findings in the literature. Table 3.1 reports aggregate party membership trends in the ten countries included in our panel, distinguishing between three time periods: the early 1970s, 1990, and the PPDB data collected in 2011–13. In eight of them we register a decline in total membership figures over the forty-year period we consider, with a much sharper dip between 1990 and 2010. The only two countries that show positive trends are Germany and Ireland, but even these two cases do not represent significant deviations from the overall trend. In Germany the increase can be easily explained by the re-unification between the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the consequent increase in the country’s total population. In fact, the membership/ electorate ratio (M/E) declines in Germany as well (Figure 3.1). As for Ireland, the increase occurred entirely in the 1970–90 period, during which membership trends presented contrasting patterns in different countries and were not clearly defined as yet (Katz and Mair 1992).

Overall, the average membership decline across the ten countries was 51 per cent between 1970 and 2010, with peaks in the UK (81 per cent) and Sweden (where the decline is due in part to the removal of trade union affiliated membership (Scarrow 2015)), as well as Denmark. The change in party model that is implicit in membership decline is even more evident if one considers that the total number of parties in our panel increased by 14 units (a 28.6 per cent change). As a result, average individual party membership per country dropped from about 261,000 to 83,000 (–68.1 per cent).




FIGURE 3.1 Membership/electorate ratios, by country (1970–2010)

The general significance of our analysis is confirmed if we look at membership/electorate ratios (M/E), a measure that allows for the parameterization of those polities, especially Germany, where there have been relevant increases in terms of population in the last forty years. Figure 3.1 shows a constant decline in the average M/E ratio in all countries for the whole period, with the exceptions between the 1970s and 1990s of Norway (due to the membership increase of the Progress Party) and Ireland (where Fianna Fáil introduced a centralized individual membership only in the 1970s). Both countries, however, experienced a downward trend similar to the rest of our panel between 1990 and 2010. As already noted, M/E indicates that Germany, whose absolute membership figures increased over the forty-year period, falls within the norm once the population growth effect is parameterized.

Naturally, general trends are confirmed by the data in Table 3.2, as the total membership figures are the same as in Table 3.1. But looking at them in terms of distribution across party families allows for some additional analytical observations. Membership decline is evident for all traditional party families with downward trends comparable to those observed by country. Conversely, far right and Green parties display respectively sharp and massive increases (the 2010 figures being thirty-seven times higher than the 1970 ones for the Greens!). This phenomenon can be explained by the increase of the number of parties in both families. In the 1970s Green parties were still in their infancy whereas by the 2010s they had developed and become completely institutionalized with the

TABLE 3.2 Party membership change per party family (1970–2010)

Party family	1970		1990		2010		Change (%)		
	Members	N	Members	N	Members	N	1970–90	1990–2010	1970–2010
Christian	4,977,989	15	4,450,380	13	2,952,487	17	–10.60	–33.66	–40.69
Democrats/ Conservatives									
Social Democrats	4,317,949	10	4,115,067	12	1,919,356	13	–4.7	–53.36	–55.55
Liberals	1,080,357	14	896,677	16	527,064	16	–17	–41.22	–51.21
Greens	4,152	1	74,613	8	157,815	9	+1697	+111.51	+3701
Left Socialists	1,607,686	6	1,519,896	7	151,035	6	–5.46	–90.06	–90.61
Far Right	216,791	2	225,449	3	281,952	8	+3.99	+25.06	+30.06
Total	12,274,924	49	11,329,199	60	6,071,657	73	–7.7	–46.41	–50.54

TABLE 3.3 Party membership change per party age (1970–2010)

Party age	1970		1990		2010	
	Members	N	Members	N	Members	N
New	47,954	4	151,310	13	2,548,666	28
Old	12,226,970	45	11,177,889	47	3,522,991	45
Total	12,274,924	49	11,329,199	60	6,071,657	73

spread of the effects of the ‘silent revolution’ (Inglehart 1977) to most of the Katz–Mair and PPDB countries (Norway excluded). Similarly, far right parties were revitalized and in some countries created by the ‘silent counter-revolution’ that manifested itself more or less simultaneously (Ignazi 1992).

Both ‘new’ party families (see Table 3.3) display levels of membership that are much lower than those still maintained by the largest traditional ones (about 17,000 for the Greens and 35,000 for the Far Right as opposed to 173,500 and 148,000 respectively for the Christian and Social Democrats),⁵ which of course reflects the fact that they are generally weaker electorally. These differences seem to indicate that whilst members are still of at least some value, not only to the longer established parties but also to the more recently created ones, now there must be qualitative differences in the different parties’ approach to membership. In the case of the established parties, the transition from a bottom-heavy POG based model to a new prevalence of the other two faces is contrasted by a cultural resistance to a wholesale relinquishment of membership, which appears to be declining mostly by attrition. The newly created parties, especially those of the non-traditional party families, seem from the outset to adopt a more centralized and PCO/PPO oriented organizational structure. This appears to be the case empirically, notwithstanding that it seems to run counter to the organizational philosophy of the Greens, at least.

Overall, our analysis of membership trends is consistent with the hypothesis that the POG is losing relevance and importance to the advantage of the other two faces. Our analysis of party staff and finances should help us shed some light on whether this is more to the advantage of the PCO or the PPO.

THE DEPENDENCE ON STATE SUBSIDIES

One of the most important aspects of party organizations concerns how they finance themselves. It is also one of the most controversial aspects of intra-party life (Fisher and Eisenstadt 2004; Pizzimenti and Ignazi 2011). Even though broad theoretical reflections are still scarce (Scarrow 2007) and country data is often incomplete, a general consensus emerges in the literature on the existence of a growing dependence on public subsidies by political parties and on the fact that this reliance is producing organizational change. The relationship between party financing and party organizational development is rather complex. The introduction of state subventions is supposed to have caused an increasing disequilibrium with other sources of party income, namely grass-roots revenues and other voluntary contributions. At the same time, the resort to public funding can be seen as a reaction to an already projected decline in membership and activism caused by changing economic and societal conditions (Katz and Mair 1995). For our purposes, however, the provenance and modalities of party financing are first and foremost important indicators of the (re)distribution of power among the three organizational faces.

In Europe, funding regimes differ across countries and were introduced at different points in time (see Chapter 4). Most countries originally granted state support to parliamentary groups (usually provided to cover secretarial support) except for Germany, where funds to central organizations were introduced in 1967, and Italy, where no clear rules were set, although party parliamentary groups received money from the budgets of both Houses.⁶

Most countries introduced and directed public funds to the PCO between the mid-1970s (Austria, Italy, Norway, Sweden) and the end of the 1990s (Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands). Currently public funds are assigned to PCOs and PPOs in all countries, with the partial exception of the UK, where, similarly to the Irish case, the so called 'Short money' is granted only to opposition parliamentary parties and, prospectively, Italy, where direct funding was abolished in 2014 (Law 13/2014) with full effect from 2017 (Pizzimenti 2014).

Cross-national data confirms the hypothesis of party dependence on the State. Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 by van Biezen and Kopecký shows that there has

been a palpable growth in party financial dependence on the state, and a corresponding decline in dependence on the membership, in most countries since 1990. On average, state funding has increased from around 40 per cent to over 50 per cent in the ten countries for which we have longitudinal data, while the proportion of income emanating from the membership has roughly halved from just under 30 per cent to 15 per cent. The only country that shows a positive trend is Germany, which can be in part explained by the effects of re-unification between the former FDR and GDR, and even more importantly by those of various reforms (1983, 1988, 1994) aimed at encouraging more self-financing by regulating party funding through state financing with matching funds. Overall, the ratio between membership fees and total party income declines across the ten countries by 17.8 per cent between 1970 and 2010, with much of the fall happening after 1990.

Contrary to what might be expected, however, the data does not show evidence of statistically significant correlations between the absolute numbers of party members and the ratio of public funding to total party income ($r=-.09$, $p=.268$, $n=140$), nor between the net changes in these variables over the period 1970 to 2010 ($r=.10$, $p=.451$, $n=60$). Substituting the M/E ratio for the absolute number of members does nothing to make these relationships significant either; $r=.04$ ($p=.677$, $n=140$) for the former and $r=.01$ ($p=.931$, $n=61$) for the latter. Thus at the level of the individual party, we do not find a significant connection between declining membership (i.e., a shrinking POG) and the growing incidence of public funding (which is most likely to benefit the PCO and/or the PPO).

Even so, all these findings confirm a decreasing organizational relevance of the POG, and even if the discussed processes here are disconnected, they should still produce an increase in the role of the other two faces. From our viewpoint, however, the most interesting data concerns the relative incidence of the funds assigned to the PPO out of parties' total state subventions (Table 3.4). Unfortunately, the data is not ideal for assessing the rise or the decline of the PPO, as funding schemes were in several countries initially aimed at financing parties precisely through their parliamentary components. This was the situation in 1970 when—apart from Germany, Ireland and Sweden—public funds were directed exclusively at the PPO. Although subsequently other forms of party financing were introduced in most countries, the sums assigned to the parliamentary groups continued to predominate in 1990 in most cases. Only in Austria did the proportion of funds allocated to the PPO decline sharply, while in Denmark, Germany and Ireland the data shows increasing values, indicating a sufficiently persistent relevance of the PPO vis-à-vis not only the POG, but the PCO as well.

Before the introduction of public funding schemes party organizations depended mainly on private contributions, which varied across party families: Socialist and Social Democratic parties relied on fees paid by their members

TABLE 3.4 *The proportion of public funds directed to PPOs, by country (1970–90)*

Country	1970 %	1990 %	1970–90 %
Austria	100	17.7	–82.3
Belgium	100	69.7	–30.3
Denmark	100	60.2	–39.8
Germany	10.5	13.7	3.2
Ireland	88.5	89.1	0.6
Italy	NA	NA	NA
Netherlands	94.4	81.8	–12.6
Norway	NA	NA	NA
Sweden	5.8	43.7	37.9
United Kingdom	NA	100	100

TABLE 3.5 *The proportion of party incomes from public subsidies, by party family (1990–2010)*

Party family	1990 %	2010 %	1990–2010 %
Christian Democrats/Conservatives	36.04	50.45	14.4
Social Democrats	35.06	50.34	15.3
Liberals	37.84	50.95	13.1
Greens	36.93	51.21	14.3
Left Socialists	39.13	54.95	15.8
Far Right	71.53	83.44	11.9

and transfers coming from ancillary organizations; Liberals and Conservatives survived thanks to donations from private businesses and wealthy individual donors. These differences were considered as explanatory factors of differences in the organizational models of parties with different ideological and sociological orientations.

In the last twenty years, parties belonging to different party families have shown similar tendencies in terms of their growing dependence on public funds (Table 3.5), and their corresponding losses of membership fees. Since 1990 all the major party families have significantly increased their reliance on state subventions, including far right parties, which were already dependent on public funds for more than two-thirds of their income in 1990, and the Greens, despite their massive membership increase between 1990 and 2010. Similarly, all party families have experienced drops in the proportions of income generated by membership fees (Table 3.6). Parties deriving from the mass-integration organizational tradition show the most negative scores between 1970 and 2010. The Social Democrats, in particular, show the greatest

TABLE 3.6 *The proportion of party incomes from membership fees, by party family (1970–2010)*

Party family	1970 %	1990 %	2010 %	1970–90 %	1990–2010 %	1990–2010 %
Christian Democrats/ Conservatives	31.5	30.3	21.3	–1.2	–9	–10.2
Social Democrats	48.5	34.7	19.9	–13.8	–14.8	–28.6
Liberals	21.9	32.2	20.8	10.3	–11.6	–1.1
Greens	NA	29.6	27.7	NA	–1.9	NA
Left Socialists	32	20.1	25.6	–11.9	5.5	–6.4
Far Right	NA	3.6	5.5	NA	1.9	NA

Note: Missing data for Belgian and Italian Parties.

TABLE 3.7 *The proportion of party income from public funds, by party age (1990–2010)*

Party age	1990 %	2010 %	2010–1990 %
New	35.74	54.23	18.5
Old	39.99	54.12	14.1

loss, followed by the Christian Democrats/Conservatives. That said, the Liberals' did experience a growth in income coming from membership revenues between 1970 and 1990 (+10 per cent), while Left Socialists and Right-wing parties had positive trends between 1990 and 2010. It would thus appear that the analysis of the data across party families does not reveal significant variance in terms of change across time.

Similar conclusions can be drawn by looking at the data according to party age (Table 3.7). We would expect that parties with a long-standing organizational tradition can benefit from their entrenchment within society that gives them a wider set of revenue sources, whereas new parties are less embedded in society and might be expected to be more dependent on public funds. However, as public funding spread throughout Europe, the need to conform to a set of shared norms and requisites in order to gain access to public resources (or other kinds of benefits) should have favoured organizational convergence. In fact, differences between old and new parties are almost imperceptible, both in 1990 and 2010, consistent with the view that the established financing schemes suited their general and organizational needs. The need to conform to environmental pressures to access public resources may have also pushed the new parties to adopt similar organizational strategies, no longer relying on grass-roots revenues and/or private revenues. Overall, our analysis of party finance confirms the decline of the POG, but

does not shed too much light as to which of the other two faces has benefitted more. Party staff data analysis appears to be more promising.

PARTY STAFF

According to several studies (Katz and Mair 1995; van Biezen 2003; Katz and Mair 2009), shifts in intra-party power can also be assessed in terms of the distribution of party staff between the PCO and the PPO. If the PPO ascendancy hypothesis is correct, we should expect that increases in party staff figures should primarily benefit the PPO, in particular the parliamentary party group. Indeed, as a consequence of the growing costs of politics (especially due to centralized and professionalized electoral campaigning) political parties, in their role as policy-makers (Katz and Mair 2009), introduced or increased state allowances to parliamentary party groups to hire their own staff in all ten countries between 1960 (Germany) and 1975 (UK and Ireland). Since PPBD and Katz and Mair project data exist for both central headquarters staff and parliamentary group staff, we can gauge how far it is the case that the staff available to the PCO and the PPO have changed over time.

Table 3.8 indicates that between 1970 and 2010, central party headquarters staff increased by over 20 per cent on average. This is consistent with the hypothesis of the increasing professionalization of parties and, to an extent, of a growth of the PCO. The net changes of PCO staff are positively correlated with the net changes in membership ($r=0.50$, $p=0.01$). This can be interpreted as indicative of a positive linkage between the presence of parties with bigger (or smaller) memberships, and the necessity of having stronger (or smaller) central party staffs. This is in line with the classic mass party model, and is quite logical: as parties gain members, they gain staff, and conversely, as they lose members, they lose staff.

In other respects, our data are unfortunately incomplete and rather contradictory. Not only do the five countries for which we have complete data present contrasting trends, but they also exhibit quite pronounced divergences in the pattern of change from 1970 to 2010 (positive ones of about 60 per cent in Italy, Norway and Sweden and negative ones of about 60 per cent in the UK and 40 per cent in Denmark).

Moreover, there are evident changes in the number of parties from one time period to the next. For 1970, we have data for 34 parties in eight countries. The total central party staff was 1,093, a number that increased considerably to 2,071 in 1990. In part this was due to the increase in the number of parties (to 44), but a positive trend was still apparent as the average number of staff per party increased from 32.1 to 47.1. The 2010 data, however, shows a

TABLE 3.8 *Staff of the party in central office, by country (1970–2010)*

Country	1970		1990		2010		Change (%)		
	PCO Staff	N	PCO Staff	N	PCO Staff	N	1970–90	1990–2010	1970–2010
Austria	131	3	191	4	NA		+45.8	NA	NA
Belgium	NA		NA		300	10	NA	NA	NA
Denmark	59	5	71	5	36	4	+20.34	–49.30	–38.98
Germany	205	2	300	3	77	1	*	*	*
Ireland	NA		18	2	80	3	*	*	*
Italy	158	3	846	8	256	4	+435.44	–69.74	+62.03
Netherlands	124	7	139	6	89	2	+12.1	*	*
Norway	85	6	101	7	136	7	+18.82	+34.65	+60
Sweden	174	5	209	6	285	8	+20.11	+36.36	+63.79
United Kingdom	157	3	196	3	64	4	+24.84	–67.35	–59.24
Total	1,093	34	2,071	44	1,323	43	+89.48	–36.12	+21.04

* When the number of parties is = or < 2 analysis is not reliable.

TABLE 3.9 *Staff of the party in central office, by party age*

Party Age	1970		1990		2010		Change (%)		
	PCO Staff	N	PCO Staff	N	PCO Staff	N	1970–90	1990–2010	1970–2010
New	6	2	96	10	561	17	*	+484.38	*
Old	1,087	32	1,975	34	762	26	+81.69	–61.42	–29.9
Total	1,093	34	2,071	44	1,323	43	+89.48	–36.12	+21.04

* When the number of parties is = or < 2 analysis are not consistent.

reversal of the trend with a drop to 1,323 units; more importantly, the average staff per party dropped to 30.8, a level that is lower than the corresponding 1970s and 1990s figures. Of the parties for which we have 1990 and 2010 data, seven experienced a decrease in central staff and ten experienced an increase. Overall, the data do not present clear and unequivocal trends and do not confirm the initial impression of a growth of the PCO. Furthermore, this conclusion might even be reversed if we consider the data in terms of party age. Almost by definition, the ‘new’ parties category has constantly grown and so has the total number of staff for this group: from six to a whopping 561 between 1970 and 2010 (Table 3.9).

This is not a significant finding per se, as the number of new parties has undergone an eight-fold increase. What is interesting, however, is that the average staff per party has also increased constantly for this group, from three in 1970, to 9.6 in 1990 and 33 in 2010. ‘Old’ parties on the other hand display a

TABLE 3.10 *Staff of the party in public office, by country*

Country	1970		1990		2010		Change (%)		
	PPO Staff	N	PPO Staff	N	1990–2010	N	1970–90	1990–2010	1970–2010
Austria	38	3	79	4	NA		+107.9	NA	NA
Belgium	NA		NA		95	8	NA	NA	NA
Denmark	18	4	118	5	93	4	+555.6	–21.2	+416.66
Germany	1,007	4	2,671	5	4,372	7	+165.2	+63.7	+334.16
Ireland	0	3	14	2	160	5	*	*	*
Italy	1	1	22	3	NA		*	NA	NA
Netherlands	50.5	5	274	6	NA		+442.6	NA	NA
Norway	34	6	52	6	171	7	+52.9	+228.8	+402.94
Sweden	55	5	129	6	224	6	+134.5	+73.6	+307.27
United Kingdom	2	1	10	1	13	4	*	*	*
Total	1,205	32	3,369	38	5,128	41	+179.6	+52.2	+325.56

* When the number of parties is = or < 2 analysis are not consistent.

pattern that is similar to that already observed across countries, with an increase between 1970 and 1990 (81.7 per cent) and a decrease in 2010 (–61.4 per cent). In this case, the decline in the final period of our analysis is slightly more pronounced than across countries if we look at party averages: 32.1 in 1970; 47 in 1990; 30.8 in 2010. The small decline in party staff of those parties that we could expect to be more closely tied to the top-heavy structuring typical of the mass and catch-all party models, seems to indicate a levelling off of the organizational relevance of the PCO at what might be an optimal level, now reached by the ‘new’ parties as well.

The analysis appears to be less ambiguous for the PPO. We consider the size of the PPO staff as an indicator of its organizational strength. Therefore, the growth of the parliamentary staff (Table 3.10) is consistent with the hypothesis of the ascendancy of the PPO and does not seem to be in competition with the net changes of the PCO staff, as the two trends are positively correlated ($r=.36$, $p=0.05$). The number of PPO staff is also positively correlated with the ratio of public funds/total party income ($r=.36$, $p=0.05$), which allows for the possible interpretation that the growth of public subsidies permits the growth of staffing numbers in a way that might not otherwise occur. This seems particularly plausible since we know that in several cases (such as the UK), subsidies are directed specifically at the PPO. Finally, we register a negative correlation between PPO staff values and the M/E ratio ($r=-.27$, $p=0.01$). This is consistent with the cartel party hypothesis of a progressive penetration by parties of the state and a simultaneous reduction of the direct linkage between parties and society.

However, we have to be very careful in drawing general conclusions because of the enormous impact of the German data, which accounts

TABLE 3.11 *Staff of the party in public office, by party family (1970–2010)*

Party family	1970		1990		2010		Change (%)		
	PPO staff	N	PPO staff	N	PPO staff	N	1970–90	1990–2010	1970–2010
Christian Democrats/Conservatives	726	9	1,505	8	1,988	7	+107.3	+32.1	+173.82
Social Democrats	324	6	1,142	7	1,111	7	+252.5	–2.7	+242.9
Liberals	128.5	11	437	10	764	9	+240.1	+74.8	+494.55
Greens	1	1	237	6	525	7	*	+121.5	*
Left Socialists	14	3	24	4	637	4	+71.4	+2,554.2	+4,450
Far Right	8	1	17	2	89	4	*	*	*
Total	1,205	32	3,369	38	5,128	41	+179.6	+52.2	325.56.00

* When the number of parties is = or < 2 analysis are not consistent.

respectively for 83.5 per cent, 79.3 per cent, and 85.3 per cent of the total in the three time periods (Table 3.10).⁷ Even if parliamentary staffs expanded in all countries across time, the overall increase across our cases is largely determined by that of German parties. In total, German parliamentary staff increased by more than four times the levels of 1970 from 1,007 to 4,372. Even so, it is still a fact that between 1970 and 2010, all five countries for which we have complete data registered huge increases. Moreover, the increase was constant across time. In 1970, there were 1,205.5 PPO staff for 32 parties (an average of 37.7 per party) as opposed to 3,369 for 38 parties (88.6 on average) in 1990 and 5,128 units (125.1 per party) in 2010. If we exclude the German parties we have the following results: 198.5 PPO staff (7 units per party) in 1970; 698 PPO staff (21 units per party) in 1990; 756 PPO staff (22 units per party) in 2010. Only two individual parties reduced their parliamentary staff between 1970 and 1990, whereas 23 experienced an increase. A similar pattern occurred between 1990 and 2010, with 18 increases and only one party decrease.

The German data is also responsible for distorting the analysis by party family, whose variance, rather than being influenced by the positioning of party families on the left-right continuum, is strongly affected by their inclusion of German parties (Table 3.11). German parties are present in all party families except the Far Right. The CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP contribute to the large parliamentary staffs of their respective families throughout the 1970–2010 period, whereas the growth of the Green family in 1990 and of the Left Socialists in 2010 is clearly due to the new contributions coming respectively from the German Grünen and Linke-PDS. The latter drives an increase of the Left Socialists' parliamentary staff by 26 times!

As for party age (Table 3.12), in contrast with what we have observed for central party staffs, in 2010 the total number of parliamentary staff of 'old'

TABLE 3.12 *Staff of the party in public office, by party age*

Party age	1970		1990		2010		Change (%)		
	PPO staff	N	PPO staff	N	PPO staff	N	1970–1990	1990–2010	1970–2010
New	3,5	1	257	10	1,120	14	*	+335.8	*
Old	1,202	31	3,112	28	4,008	27	+158.9	+28.8	+233.44
Total	1,205	32	3,369	38	5,128	41	+179.6	+52.2	+325.56

* When the number of parties is = or < 2 analysis are not consistent.

TABLE 3.13 *A comparison between the relative numbers of PCO and PPO staff*

Year	Only PCO staff	PCO staff > PPO staff	PCO staff = PPO staff	PCO staff < PPO staff
	Number of parties	Number of parties	Number of parties	Number of parties
1970	4	19	2	5
1990	–	19	2	15
2010	1	11	–	20

parties was four times larger than that of ‘new’ parties. This may reflect the fact that the older parties are generally still better represented in parliaments than new parties, and public funding of PPOs is often linked to the number of legislators that parties have.

We have seen that there has been a huge overall increase of the staff of parliamentary groups, accompanied by a reduction of central staffs (at least since 1990). How significant these changes are in terms of the relative organizational strength of the PCO and of the PPO within parties can be best measured through the ratio of PPO to total party staff (PS/TPS) (Katz and Mair 1993). Ratio values higher than 0.5 indicate that the staff of the PPO is bigger than the staff of the national headquarters (PCO), and vice versa for values under 0.5.

Table 3.13 indicates that between 1970 and 2010 the number of parties for which the PCO staff was larger than the PPO staff dropped from twenty-three to twelve (including those that only report having PCO staff), whereas those with a larger parliamentary party rose from five to twenty.

This trend is confirmed if we look at the data by country, which shows that the PS/TPS ratio has generally increased across the period in most countries (Figure 3.2). In 1970, parliamentary staffs were bigger than central staffs only in Germany. In 1990, Denmark and the Netherlands joined Germany in having larger parliamentary staffs, while five other countries still had larger central staffs. In 2010, we have an even distribution, with three countries on one side and three on the other. Overall, comparing 1970 with 2010 we observe that the PS/TPS ratio has increased in four countries and decreased in none.




FIGURE 3.2 Ratio between PPO staff and total party staff, by country

Note: Differences are calculated only between categories for which N is larger than 2.

Looking at party families, in 1970 all of them had central staffs larger than their parliamentary staffs (Figure 3.3). The situation had completely changed forty years later, with Christian Democrats, Left Socialists, Liberals and the far right parties possessing parliamentary staffs larger than those of their national headquarters. It is particularly telling that this shift in resources is evident even in the far right party family, the only one whose mean is not heavily conditioned by the inclusion of a German party. Only the Social Democrats conformed to the old pattern, showing their continued pursuit of the mass/catch-all party organizational configuration.

Data on party age also shows a progressive consolidation of the PPO in 'old' parties (Figure 3.4). But 'new' parties (a category in which the Green family has significant weight) present the opposite tendency. The organizational change in 'old' parties towards the prominence of parliamentary staff over the central staff can be explained by their consolidated presence in public institutions (parliaments and governments) and can also be seen as empirical evidence of the PPO ascendancy hypothesis. This latter conclusion however cannot be extended to the new parties, which are not affected by past organizational legacies, and must simply be seen as part of the adaptive transition from obsolete party models.




FIGURE 3.3 Ratio between PPO staff and total party staff, by party family

Note: Differences are calculated only between categories for which N is larger than 2.




FIGURE 3.4 Ratio between PPO staff and total party staff, by party age

Note: Differences are calculated only between categories for which N is larger than 2.

CONCLUSIONS

The main objective of this chapter was to assess the evolution of the respective positioning of the ‘three faces’ of party organizations. In particular, we attempted to find empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the PPO, especially its parliamentary component, has been gaining ground at the expense of the PCO and, above all, of the POG. To accomplish this we have looked at party membership, party finance, and party staff trends over a forty year period (1970–2010). Unfortunately, the need to use comparable data has reduced the number of cases (parties) and countries in our panel of observations. Even so, our analysis has produced some generalizations, albeit partial.

As could be expected, the most solid evidence to emerge from our investigation is that of an evident decline of the POG. Negative membership trends, in absolute numbers and even more clearly as measured by M/E ratios, as well as a decreasing importance of membership fees as sources of parties’ revenue are consistent indicators of this phenomenon. At the same, we can infer parallel increases in the role and relevance of the other two faces, the PCO and the PPO. This appears to be particularly true of newly created parties that, more clearly than the changing traditional ones, have built from the outset more centralized and PCO/PPO-oriented organizational structures.

Party finance data confirms these findings as the incidence of membership fees declines sharply and state funding goes up over time. It is true that the data reveals no correlations between absolute membership figures and the ratio of public funds/total party income, but the sheer decline of the POG can only imply a parallel increase in the role of PCO and PPO. Unfortunately, the financial data does not permit any conclusion as to the relationship between these two. The only additional consideration permitted by finance data analysis concerns the possible organizational convergence of all parties, irrespective of age, on a model oriented towards public funding.

Further confirmatory evidence emerges from our analysis of party staff. The growth of the parliamentary component of the PPO’s staff is quite pronounced and positively correlated with the increasing incidence of public funding. This is consistent with the hypothesis of the ascendancy of the PPO, as parties move away from society and towards the state, even if it is not evident that this is at the expense of the PCO as the trends in both components of party staff are positively correlated. Moreover, the negative correlation between PPO staff values and the M/E ratio is consistent with the cartel party hypothesis of a progressive penetration by parties of the state as they become detached from civil society.

Summing up, although our data confirms the existence of some of the conditions that are necessary for the ascendancy of the PPO, there is only

clear evidence that this is happening at the expense of the POG. There is no sufficiently compelling evidence that the PPO's growth is paralleled by a decline or even by a slower growth of the PCO. This appears to be mostly due to the limited availability of suitable data. Although our dataset has proven adequate for testing some of the more general hypotheses on which we focused our analysis, it does not appear sufficient to test the more specific ones. It does indicate, however, that systematic data gathering across time could provide a solid basis for the testing of the more sophisticated hypotheses that emerge from the literature on party change. As such, it confirms the validity of the PPDB project's approach and mission.

NOTES

1. The PPDB study cannot be used for a diachronic study of party organizations at this stage as it includes all the necessary variables but only at the current point in time. In this chapter, we have added a time dimension through the analysis of comparable data from the original Katz and Mair project (1992).
2. Katz and Mair's conceptualization of the 'three faces' was developed long before the importance of multi-level structuring of party and other political organizations appeared in the literature. As a result, it does not capture the actual complexity of contemporary multi-level party organizations. It still represents, however, an adequate conceptual/theoretical basis for the testing of some general hypotheses of party organizational change. It goes without saying that further theoretical refinement and more empirical studies comparative or single-country studies (see for example Ignazi, Bardi, and Massari 2013) of party organizations are needed. Note too that the empirical analysis offered focuses on the organizational resources enjoyed by the three faces of party organization; problems of data compatibility mean that we are unable to investigate changes in the relative decision-making powers of these faces over time.
3. The countries included in the panel are those for which we have comparable PPDB and Katz and Mair (1992) project data. The data in all subsequent tables refers, for each of the three selected decade markers (1970, 1990, 2010), to the closest year for which we have comparable data. As such our choice of years is no doubt arbitrary but it appears to be sufficiently representative of the two universes.
4. Other variables are useful for the assessment of the relationships among the 'three faces of party organization': composition of candidate selectorates, composition of party executive bodies etc. are certainly relevant. These variables are analysed in other chapters of this volume.
5. For purposes of this analysis, all parties founded after 1951 are considered 'new' and all parties founded before that date are considered 'old'.

6. However, once introduced in 1974 state subventions were formally paid to the party parliamentary group, which was in charge of allocating funds to the PCO, the 'informal' beneficiary of the contributions.
7. The relationship between the staff of the PPO and that of the PCO is significant even when eliminating data on Germany ($r=0.39$, $p=0.05$).

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The Paradox of Party Funding

The Limited Impact of State Subsidies on Party Membership

Ingrid van Biezen and Petr Kopecký

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores patterns of party finances in contemporary democracies. The financing of political parties has been an enduring concern in much of the party literature (see, e.g., Alexander 1989; Scarrow 2007; Nassmacher 2009), with money being widely considered as one of the crucial resources enabling political parties to emerge and perform. Studies of the financing of electoral campaigns are a prime example of the attention accorded to the role of money in party politics (see, e.g., Nassmacher 1993; Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). Studies examining the trends in party organizational development are another example of the responsiveness of party scholars to the issues of financial resources, with each ideal-type of party organization mooted by the literature—that is, cadre, mass, catch-all, electoral professional and cartel—being associated with a particular pattern of party financing (Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1995). For example, while cadre parties were associated with campaign-centred donations from wealthy benefactors, the finances of mass parties are generally seen as based on dues from mass membership.

However, it is especially the theorizing about the emergence of the cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; see also Mair 1994) that has brought the questions about party finance and its impact on party politics to the fore, with special attention now being devoted to the role of public funding in the organizational transformation of political parties. The argument here is well known: the introduction of public subsidies has made political parties less dependent on the traditional sources of income, such as membership contributions or other forms of grassroots funding which, in turn, has decreased incentives for parties to maintain their strong presence on the ground.

The burgeoning state subsidies might have helped to level the playing field by decreasing the reliance of parties on corporate donations but, at the same time, state funding is also viewed as one of the chief factors contributing to the erosion of parties' linkages with society. In addition, state subventions to political parties may serve to consolidate the status quo, and therefore contribute to the cartelisation of the party system, by penalizing smaller parties and making it difficult for newcomers to enter the system (see van Biezen and Rashkova 2014).

The importance attributed to the role of state funding in party life means that the practices of state subsidies for parties, or indeed party finances more generally, have now begun to be relatively well documented and analysed (e.g., Nassmacher 2009; Koss 2010). However, systematic explorations of the patterns of party funding have always been seriously hindered by the lack of suitable cross-national data, and especially the data on the relative importance of various sources of funding in total party revenues. Based on the new data obtained from the Political Party Database (PPDB), our chapter aims to contribute to the wider debates about party finances in general, and the role of public funding in party politics in particular. We focus mainly on European democracies, but also report figures for two non-European established democracies—Canada and Israel. We have two specific aims in this chapter. First, using the PPDB data, we want to re-examine a range of existing findings about the importance of state subsidies for the party life. We specifically examine the extent to which parties depend on public funding, as opposed to private donations and membership fees, as their source of income. We also explore the differences in patterns of party funding between party families, between old and new parties, between parties in government and parties in opposition, and between parties in old and new European democracies. Second, we probe the association between parties' dependence on state subsidies and how parties organize. In particular, we examine the relationship between public monies and the size of parties' membership organizations. Unlike our first exploration, which largely confirms most existing conclusions about the patterns of party financing, the findings from our second exploration are more surprising: contrary to usual expectations, state funding does not necessarily undermine party membership.

PATTERNS OF PARTY FINANCING

As indicated in the introduction, the first part of our chapter examines patterns of party financing in contemporary democracies. We start this examination with the exploration of different sources of party income. For the purpose of

this analysis we concentrate on three major sources of party income: membership dues, private donations, and direct public subsidies, with a fourth residual category of unspecified other income. What interests us especially is the relative importance of these various sources of total party income.

Dependence on Public Funding

We know from previous scholarly accounts that state subsidies are now available to political parties in nearly every European democracy (see, e.g., van Biezen and Kopecký 2007, 2014). The only countries where political parties at the national level do not have access to regular public subsidies are Malta, Switzerland, and the UK. Earlier analyses have suggested that, as a result of the introduction of public funding to parties, the importance of state subsidies to their overall income has grown considerably over time (e.g., Nassmacher 2009). However, systematic scholarly explorations of the patterns of party funding have always been seriously hampered by the lack of suitable cross-national data. In a previous analysis (van Biezen and Kopecký 2014) we therefore relied on empirical evidence gathered by GRECO—the Group of States against Corruption established by the Council of Europe—in their third evaluation round (2007–12). While these offered what was at the time probably the best comparative evidence available, they provided only rough estimates about the parties' financial dependence on the state.

This time, we make use of the PPDB data. Compiled by country experts on the basis of official documentation, these data should provide a more accurate picture of the state of the parties' finances. However, the PPDB data are not without problems: for example, for most countries in the database, the reported income figures represent a snapshot of one year (between 2011 and 2013), but sometimes also a figure for more years, including election and non-election years. It is therefore all the more important to examine the correspondence of the findings based on two different databases in order to provide some validity check on the party funding data, and especially the new data coming from the PPDB.

Table 4.1 shows a first breakdown by country, displaying the relative importance of the three main sources of income. It is important to note, in the first place, that the figures reported in Table 4.1 largely correspond to the evidence we presented in our 2014 study, although in a few cases the overall level of financial dependence on the state appears to deviate from the GRECO-based estimates. For example, while according to GRECO estimates, financial dependence on the state for parties in the Czech Republic amounts to some 65–85 per cent, the PPDB data suggest that state subsidies contribute only to some 40 per cent of total party income. Similarly, in Denmark, the GRECO estimates (around 75 per cent) are substantially higher

TABLE 4.1 Sources of party income by country (1990–2012)

Country	Membership fees		State subsidies		Private donations		Total income	No. of parties	Year(s)
	€M	%	€M	%	€M	%	€M		
Austria	7.61	12.2	46.22	73.8	1.56	2.5	62.61	5	2010
Belgium	2.65	3.1	64.76	76.8	0.45	0.5	84.29	12	2012
Canada	31.90	41.0	21.11	27.1	–	–	77.82	5	2011
Czech Rep.	2.65	6.3	16.98	40.3	5.75	13.7	42.13	5	2011
Denmark	2.98	10.6	12.95	46.1	10.66	38.0	28.08	8	2011
France	15.87	13.0	53.06	43.6	28.79	23.6	121.78	2	2012
Germany	181.37	41.7	137.57	31.6	53.55	12.3	434.92	7	2011
Hungary	0.75	8.0	7.48	79.3	0.90	9.6	9.44	4	2011
Ireland	0.75	5.9	9.31	73.2	2.57	20.2	12.71	5	2010–12
Israel	0.04	0.1	18.60	75.7	–	–	24.56	10	2011
Italy	30.47	21.1	107.04	74.3	3.95	2.7	144.14	5	2011
Netherlands	19.63	42.9	13.36	29.2	0.80	1.8	45.74	11	2012
Norway	7.94	10.2	53.33	68.3	6.28	8.0	78.08	7	2011
Poland	1.09	3.9	16.17	58.3	0.94	3.4	27.71	6	2011
Portugal	14.09	33.1	28.53	66.9	–	–	42.62	6	2011
Spain	35.85	13.5	211.28	79.8	5.23	2.0	264.92	5	2011
Sweden	2.12	3.0	47.08	64.6	1.95	2.7	72.93	8	2010–11
UK	13.24	14.9	10.09	11.3	39.13	44.0	88.97	7	2012–13
Mean		15.8		56.5		9.4		N=118	

Note: Reported are the most recent figures (2011–13) from the PPDB database, expressed both in absolute numbers (million euros) and as a percentage of total party income. ‘Other’ sources of income are not reported separately but are included in the ‘total income’. It should be noted that, in the cases of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK the PPDB data relates to income for the national head office party only, and in all other cases to total income, including sub-national parts of the organization.

than reported by the PPDB (46.1 per cent). Conversely, in Hungary, the actual level of state support (nearly 80 per cent) appears to have been underestimated by GRECO (roughly 60 per cent). However, overall, the figures from PPDB are not very different from the earlier estimates provided by GRECO.

Importantly, the picture emerging from Table 4.1 largely confirms earlier empirical conclusions: in the majority of countries, the relative importance of state subsidies to the total party income is clearly quite pronounced. On average, the state contributes more than half of total party income. Located at the high end of the scale are countries such as Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, and Spain, where the state reportedly contributes between 70 and 80 per cent of total party income. In Norway, Portugal, and Sweden, the parties on aggregate derive between 60 and 70 per cent of their income from the state, in Poland between 50 and 60 per cent, and in Denmark, France, and the Czech Republic between 40 and 50 per cent. The state contributes a little over 30 per cent of party income in Germany and Italy, and between 20 to

30 per cent in Canada and the Netherlands. The UK is situated at the low end of the scale. While regular state subsidies are not available as in other countries, the state does provide so-called policy development grants to parties with at least two parliamentary seats, and 'Short Money' to opposition parliamentary parties in the House of Commons.¹ As a result of its rather austere public funding provisions, in the UK the state plays a comparatively minor role in party financing, contributing to a little over 10 per cent to party income.

Naturally, as a consequence of the predominance of state subsidies in party financing, other sources of income tend to be relatively insignificant for most parties. On average, parties derive some 16 per cent of their total income from membership subscriptions. In nine out of eighteen countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Israel, Ireland, Norway, Poland, and Sweden), the relative share of membership fees falls below, or is only just a little over, 10 per cent. Where state subsidies play a comparatively smaller role, membership fees are usually larger, as in Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands, where membership organizations contribute around 40 per cent of party income. Outliers to this picture are Italy and Portugal, where the share of membership contributions is equally high (over 30 per cent), even with relatively high levels of public subsidies. Spain shows a similar pattern, albeit at lower levels of membership fees (20 per cent). The UK constitutes another exception, where it is not membership fees but private donations that constitute the bulk of party income (43.9 per cent) in the face of relatively low levels of state funding. Denmark is one of the few countries with similarly high levels of private donations (38 per cent).

To be sure, and notwithstanding the ideal-typical (and sometimes idealized) mass party model, the regular dues from party members have hardly ever been the largest source of party income (see Krouwel 1999; Scarrow 2015). However, our analysis of the trends over time unequivocally demonstrates the increased importance of public subsidies and the corresponding decline of the financial relevance of the membership organization. For this purpose, we have compared the recent figures with those reported in Katz and Mair (1992). Table 4.2 displays the longitudinal developments, demonstrating that in nearly all countries the share of public funds shows an upward trajectory and that of the membership fees a downward trend. While parties in the late 1980s received almost 30 per cent of their income from membership fees, thirty years later this figure has nearly halved. Conversely, the share from state subsidies now contributes more than half of total party income, against 30 per cent three decades ago. The relative importance of the membership organization has thus indeed decreased, on average by 13 per cent, while the relevance of state subsidies has grown, at what appears to be a much higher rate (22.2 per cent).² The evidence for private donations is somewhat more mixed, with most countries showing a small increase, the UK and Denmark a considerable increase, and only Ireland a substantial decline. In Belgium and

TABLE 4.2 Sources of income by country (1990–2012) (€)

Country	Membership fees			State subsidies			Private donations		
	t_0	t_1	t_1-t_0	t_0	t_1	t_1-t_0	t_0	t_1	t_1-t_0
Austria	27.5	12.2	–15.3	38.2	73.8	+35.6	–	2.5	+2.5
Denmark	57.5	10.6	–46.9	22.0	46.1	+24.1	3.0	38.0	+35.0
Germany	16.3	41.7	+25.4	73.6	31.6	–41.9	7.2	12.3	+5.1
Ireland	29.2	5.9	–23.3	5.0	73.2	+68.3	58.7	20.2	–38.5
Italy	48.6	21.1	–27.5	37.2	74.3	+37.1	–	2.7	+2.7
Netherlands	56.8	42.9	–13.9	1.2	29.2	+28.0	–	1.8	+1.8
Norway	20.0	10.2	–9.8	51.4	68.3	+16.9	–	8.0	+8.0
Sweden	6.8	3.0	–3.8	43.2	64.6	+21.4	–	2.7	+2.7
UK	17.9	14.9	–3.0	–	11.3	+11.3	–	44.0	+44.0
Mean	31.2	18.0	–13.1	30.2	52.5	+22.3	nla	14.7	nla

Note: Figures for t_0 and t_1 denote percentages of total income.

Sources: For t_1 , see Table 1. The figures for t_0 refer to the most recent data (1989–90) reported in Katz and Mair (1992).

Italy, both the share of membership fees and of state subsidies has gone down. While Germany appears to constitute an outlier here in that—contrary to the trends observed elsewhere—the relative importance of the state has in fact decreased over time, while the financial importance of the membership organization has increased in importance, this discrepancy is likely to be caused by the different types of data sources (see Note 2, this chapter).

If we consider the parties' income in absolute terms (see Table 4.1), and standardize for cross-country comparisons by the size of the national electorates, it becomes clear that parties in Norway are the best resourced. As can be seen from Table 4.3, the annual income of Norwegian parties amounts to 21.4 euros per registered voter, almost more than twice as high as the countries ranked second and third, that is, Belgium and Sweden (with an income of 10.5 and 9.95 euros per voter respectively); well above the average across all countries considered, which stands at a mere 6 euros per voter.³ Parties in post-communist Poland are the most poorly resourced, averaging less than one euro of income per voter per annum. The Norwegian state is also the one providing the most generous sums of public money, amounting to a total of 14.7 euros per voter per year, against 3.9 euros per voter on average. The state is also a relatively big spender in Austria, Belgium, and Sweden (between 6.4 and 8.1 euros per voter). In Canada, Hungary, or Poland, on the other hand, the amount of public money awarded per voter stands at less than the equivalent of one euro; France and the Netherlands spend a little over 1 euro per voter. The UK sits at the bottom of the list, with the state spending only 0.2 euro per year per voter on political parties.

A longitudinal comparison of parties' resources, computed for the countries included in Katz and Mair (1992), yields interesting insights. First of all,

TABLE 4.3 *Party resources per voter (1990–2012) (€)*

Country	Income per voter				Subsidies per voter			
	t_0	t_1	t_1^*	$t_1^*-t_0$ (%)	t_0	t_1	t_1^*	$t_1^*-t_0$ (%)
Austria	6.79	9.81	6.45	-5.0	2.60	7.24	4.76	+83.4
Belgium	n/a	10.52		n/a	n/a	8.09		n/a
Canada	n/a	3.21		n/a	n/a	0.87		n/a
Czech Rep.	n/a	5.00		n/a	n/a	2.02		n/a
Denmark	1.71	6.88	3.70	+116.4	0.38	3.17	1.71	+354.1
France	n/a	2.82		n/a	n/a	1.23		n/a
Germany	1.84	7.03	6.89	+274.3	1.35	2.22	2.18	+60.9
Hungary	n/a	1.15		n/a	n/a	0.91		n/a
Ireland	1.22	3.97	2.36	+93.7	0.06	2.91	1.73	+2,742.4
Israel	n/a	4.34		n/a	n/a	3.29		n/a
Italy	3.19	3.07	1.68	-47.4	1.19	2.28	1.25	+4.9
Netherlands	1.16	3.60	2.27	+95.4	0.01	1.05	0.66	+4,778.4
Norway	3.36	21.44	13.74	+309.0	1.73	14.65	9.39	+443.3
Poland	n/a	0.90		n/a	n/a	0.53		n/a
Portugal	n/a	4.43		n/a	n/a	2.96		n/a
Spain	n/a	7.40		n/a	n/a	5.91		n/a
Sweden	4.65	9.95	6.63	+42.6	2.01	6.42	4.28	+113.4
UK	0.41	1.95	1.13	+176.7	0	0.22	0.13	n/a
Mean	2.5	6.4	5.0		1.0	3.9	2.9	

* t_1 corrected for inflation.

Source: World Bank.

it can be observed that parties today clearly are considerably better resourced than they were at the end of the 1980s. In all countries for which data are available, party income per voter has gone up, and in virtually all cases considerably so.⁴ As Table 4.3 shows, for example, Irish and Dutch parties now receive nearly twice as much money per voter, while parties in Germany have more than 3.5 times more income at their disposal than they did thirty years ago. The income of Norwegian parties has more than quadrupled, recording the most spectacular proportional increase among the countries for which the data was available. On the other hand, while total party income in Austria has gone up in absolute terms, correcting for inflation yields an actual decrease in real terms by more than 5 per cent. Only in Italy have state subsidies been reduced in both absolute and in real terms. Several rounds of party finance reform have reduced the overall income per voter of Italian parties by nearly a half.

The development of the amount of subsidies per voter shows a similar, and even more striking pattern. Italy is the only country that shows a decrease, while in all other countries the amount of public money injected into the system has grown considerably. The Netherlands and Ireland record rather spectacular increases in the total amounts of public funds available to parties

(amounting to 4,778 and 2,742 per cent respectively), although this upsurge should be qualified by noting that they both took off from a rather low point of departure and that in both countries the actual amount of state subsidies remains well below average. Importantly, in nearly all countries except Germany, the growth in subsidies exceeds the growth of party income and in many countries considerably so. This is most notable in Scandinavia, where the rise in public subsidies exceeds the increase of party income by a factor 1.4 (Norway), 2.7 (Sweden), and 3.0 (Denmark). These ratios suggest that parties' expanding resources can in large part be explained by the increasing amounts of public subsidies available to parties.

Public Funding and the Age of Democracy

We continue our analysis with an exploration of the differences between old and new democracies. The latter category includes those countries that democratized as part of the so-called 'third wave', that is, after 1974, and includes Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), as well as the post-communist democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on previous research in this area, we would expect to find a particularly pronounced dependence of parties on the state in these new European democracies. In the recently democratized polities of Southern and Eastern Europe, party membership has tended to remain at comparatively low levels (see van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012; Tavits 2013), with noticeable consequences for the parties' capacity to generate resources from their own party organizations. In addition, state support for political parties was generally introduced at an early stage of the transition to democracy, not only turning the state into a predominant player in the financing of parties virtually from the outset of democratisation but potentially also removing a key incentive for the parties to establish other structural linkages and mechanisms for raising funds, especially those with societal organizations.

As can be seen from Figure 4.1, the differences between parties in new and old democracies are quite substantial for all three categories of income. Parties in the more recently established democracies obtain on average 65.2 per cent of their income from the state, against only 54.7 per cent in the old democracies. Conversely, for parties in the longer established democracies the financial importance of the membership organization is much higher, contributing on average 19.2 per cent to the total party income, against 12.5 in the newer democracies. Parties in the older democracies are also somewhat better able to tap into other financial resources, such as those from private contributors (13.9 versus 10.8 per cent). These striking patterns thus clearly substantiate earlier findings on the differences in the nature of party organizations in old and new democracies (e.g., van Biezen 2003).




FIGURE 4.1 Sources of party income: old vs. new democracies

Public Funding and the Age of a Party

A similar pattern to the one observed in the previous section obtains when we compare old with new parties, with old parties being defined here as those established before 1990, and new parties as those established thereafter.⁵ The distinction between old and new parties is different from the one between old and new democracies because, obviously, not all parties in new democracies are necessarily new, and neither are all parties in the old democracies necessarily old in these terms.⁶ The distinction between old and new parties is in itself theoretically important because the 'old' category includes many organizations with mass party history and heritage. Such parties generally have larger membership organizations and more developed organizational networks. We would therefore expect that old parties should, in comparative terms, display lesser dependence on public funds while the opposite should be true for the new parties.

Figure 4.2 shows that old parties, in both old and new democracies, are better able to raise income from their members (18.7 per cent against 14.6 for new parties). New parties, on the other hand, rely much more heavily on the state (65.2 versus 54.7 per cent for old parties). Interestingly, new parties are seemingly more able to raise money from private donations than old parties (17.6 versus 11.8 per cent). Although the difference is not that large, we would have expected to find the opposite. The reason is that old parties have an




FIGURE 4.2 Sources of party income: old vs. new parties

organizational heritage in the form of their comparatively stronger links with organized interests and economic groups, which should make fund-raising from private donors an easier task than in the case of parties lacking such a heritage. However, the category of new parties also includes many organizations with one or more experiences in government, including both Civic and Social Democrats in the Czech Republic or Fidesz in Hungary. Their popularity among private donors may thus have less to do with established organizational networks and more to do with access to the state and to policy decisions that such parties can provide, the subject to which we turn now.

Public Funding and Government Parties

Indeed, the literature dealing with political finance alludes to the importance of parties' governing status or governing potential as one of the factors contributing to their (better) capacity to raise funds from private and/or corporate donors. The scholarly accounts of political corruption are an example here (see, e.g., Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; Della Porta and Vannucci 1999), pointing to the exchanges between parties in power on the one hand and private firms on the other whereby (potential) public decisions are traded for campaign and other party funds. Related accounts, concerned with political patronage, point to the collusion between government parties or parties with government potential on the one hand, and wealthy individuals




FIGURE 4.3 Sources of party income: government vs. opposition parties

on the other, whereby campaign funds or private donations are secured on the basis of a promise of honours or lucrative public offices (e.g., Lewis 2008, Grindle 2012). All these academic accounts suggest that it is worthwhile probing the relative dependence of parties on public funds in relation to their government status, with a clear expectation that due to their potential attractiveness for private donors, government parties should be less dependent on public funding than opposition parties.

The data in Figure 4.3 represent a preliminary test of this expectation. It shows that the differences between government and opposition parties are actually not very pronounced. For government parties the financial relevance of the membership organization is marginally smaller than for opposition parties (16.8 versus 18.7 per cent). Surprisingly, moreover, government parties show a somewhat higher financial dependence on the state than opposition parties (58.8 versus 55.3 per cent). However, and most importantly, government parties derive less of their income from private donations than opposition parties (11.2 versus 13.5 per cent). This might suggest that, contrary to perception, government parties are not necessarily more attractive for private donors than opposition parties.

However, it should be noted that the category of ‘private donations’ does not distinguish between individual donations and contributions from private companies, which upon closer scrutiny might yield significantly different preferences for governing and opposition parties. This is one of the drawbacks of the reporting of party income in PPDB. Another weakness of PPDB in the context of a distinction between government and opposition parties is that our data are

essentially a synchronic snap shot. Given that virtually all parties now have coalition potential and few of them are permanently excluded from office (Mair 2007), such an assessment that does not incorporate factors such as the duration or frequency in office may well be unsuitable for the purpose of our analysis. Although it is outside the scope of analysis in this chapter, we believe for example that, at the individual party level, private donations might constitute a significantly higher proportion of income for parties that are frequently part of governing coalitions. In any case, however, to the extent that there are significant differences in this regard, it should be observed that, on aggregate, private donations contribute only to a small portion of the parties' income.

Public Funding and Party Families

The final part of our overview explores the differences and similarities in the sources of party income between different party families. In a vein similar to our distinction between old and new parties, we should expect that parties belonging to some traditional party families will derive higher shares of their income from membership dues and hence will be less dependent on the state for their income. The parties of the political left (Social Democrats and Communists) are an obvious case in point, as are the parties of the Christian Democratic family, most of which have a mass party tradition. The opposite should be true for the Conservatives and Liberals, most of which have a cadre party tradition, and have historically often eschewed large scale fund-raising via membership dues. The least likely case for a substantial income from membership dues are the new party families, such as the Greens or Far Right, which emerged in an era already characterized by widespread availability of public funding.

Figure 4.4 reports a breakdown of the sources of party income by party family. As can be seen, parties of the (centre-) left, as well as the Christian Democrats/Conservatives, appear somewhat better resourced by their membership organizations. However, any expectations that the classic mass party families would fare substantially better in this regard are not quite borne out by the evidence. This is especially true for the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats.⁷ Only the family of the Left Socialists, which includes some Communist and ex-Communist parties, comes close to our expectations by showing the highest proportion of membership dues (22.6 per cent). Even that figure is, however, closely followed by a new party family—the Greens—with 20.5 per cent of income raised from the membership dues. These findings contradict what seems to be predicted by the general literature on the origins of parties and party families. However, it is in line with most recent empirical research in this area (see Krouwel 1999; Nassmacher 2009), which has concluded that historical differences in the role of membership dues in party income have disappeared, in part due to the decline of membership of




FIGURE 4.4 Sources of party income, by party family

traditional parties, as well as because of the convergence of parties within individual countries driven by uniform party finance regimes.

Interestingly, there is also little variation between party families with regard to the capacity to raise funds from private donors, with the notable exception of the Far Right, which show a noticeably low share of private donations in their income (just 2.1 per cent). The share of state subsidies hovers between 45 and 60 per cent for most party families, except on the Far Right of the political spectrum: on average, state subsidies contribute to a staggering 85 per cent of total party income for the Far Right.⁸ The disproportionately lower capacity to raise money from private donations might not be so surprising for this particular group of parties considering that, in most cases, they lack government potential and hence attraction for larger corporate donors. However, the near complete dependence of the extreme right and right-wing populist parties on the public funding is, if not surprising, then at least very ironic, for two reasons. First, it is exactly these parties that fuel their popular appeal with fierce anti-establishment rhetoric, often singling out the collusion of established parties with the state as a source of political peril. Second, as

our data shows, it is very unlikely that the far right parties would be able to survive and perform without the state. The state subsidies, seen by some as responsible for the cartel-like closure of party systems (e.g., Katz and Mair 1995; but see Scarrow 2006 for a different view), can also be a springboard for party system challenge. For it seems that the parties that are most helped by the state subsidies are also the ones that the established parties dislike or fear most. Indeed, recent research suggests that, more generally, state subsidies are an important factor in the survival of parties that fall just below the threshold for parliamentary representation (see Casal Bertoa and Spirova 2013).

STATE SUBSIDIES AND PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

In the final part of our analysis we investigate the relationship between public subsidies and party membership. Specifically, we ask ourselves the question whether the level of state subsidies has any relationship with the size of the party membership organizations. Based on much of the theorizing about party organizational development in recent decades (e.g., Katz and Mair 1995, 2009), we anticipate a negative relationship between the public subsidies and party membership. There are several reasons for this expectation. First of all, at the party level, the availability of public money is likely to reduce the incentives for parties to tap into alternative sources of income. As parties come to rely on financial support from the state, they become less dependent on other sources of income, decreasing the incentive of leaders to invest in grass roots organization and activities, traditionally a key source of income, especially for the leftist parties. In other words, state subsidies reduce the financial relevance of the membership organization, and by implication also diminish the importance of the party membership. We expect to see this reflected in a negative correlation between the dependence on public subsidies, on the one hand, and the size of the membership organization, on the other, at the level of individual parties. For this purpose, we examine the share of state subsidies in the total income of the parties (SUBSIDY-P) and assess its relationship with the size of the membership organization (M).

However, and secondly, it is also possible that the causal relationship works in the opposite direction, and that state subsidies serve to compensate for the parties' dwindling resources, most notably as a result of declining membership levels. After all, for many established democracies, the downward trend in party membership commenced well before the introduction of state funding, while in the newer democracies of Southern and Eastern Europe, state subventions were introduced at early stages of the democratic transition and party institutionalization, when membership levels were generally low

(Mair and van Biezen 2001). If state support is introduced (and increased) in order to compensate for the lack of alternative financial resources, we are likely to find a negative correlation between the levels of state subsidies and party membership at the country level. At the country level, we thus assess the relationship between the level of state support, measured as the total amount of public subsidies per voter (SUBSIDY/VOTER), and the level of party membership expressed as a percentage of the electorate (M/E). In addition, we examine the relationship between the share of state subsidies a country's parties depend on for their income (SUBSIDY-C) and the level of party membership (M/E).

Hence, in order to probe these expectations derived from the recent literature on party organizational change and development, we examine the relationship between the relevance of public subsidies, expressed as a percentage of both total national and individual party income, and the size of the membership organization, expressed as both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the electorate. We carry out our assessment at both the country and the party level, at different points in time as well as longitudinally, comparing the recent data from the new Political Party Database with those reported in Katz and Mair (1992).

Table 4.4 summarizes the findings of the statistical tests. First of all, we tested our hypotheses at the country level by examining the relationship between the aggregate share of party income constituted by state subsidies and the level of party membership (SUBSIDY-C * M/E). We do so for 18 countries in the PPDB database (t_1) and nine countries which also feature in the 1992 Katz and Mair handbook (t_0). In addition, we also assess the relationship between the level of change in these variables (t_1 - t_0). While we anticipated

TABLE 4.4 *State subsidies, income, and party membership*

	Relationship	Spearman's ρ	Significance	Sample size (N)
COUNTRY-LEVEL	SUBSIDY-C * M/E (t_0)	0.450	0.224	9
	SUBSIDY-C * M/E (t_1)	0.610	0.007*	18
	SUBSIDY-C * M/E (t_1 - t_0)	-0.017	0.966	9
COUNTRY-LEVEL	SUBSIDY/VOTER * M/E (t_0)	0.683	0.042*	9
	SUBSIDY/VOTER * M/E (t_1)	0.876	0.000**	18
	SUBSIDY/VOTER * M/E (t_1 - t_0) †	0.033	0.932	9
PARTY-LEVEL	SUBSIDY-P * M (t_0)	0.174	0.309	36
	SUBSIDY-P * M (t_1)	-0.077	0.423	111
	SUBSIDY-P * M (t_1 - t_0)	0.444	0.007*	36

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

† t_1 corrected for inflation

Note: SUBSIDY-C = the share of state subsidies in the total party income nationally; SUBSIDY-P = the share of state subsidies in individual party income; SUBSIDY/VOTER = total amount of state subsidies per voter; M = party membership; M/E = party membership as a percentage of the electorate.

that the share of state subsidies would be inversely related to the level of membership, the results do not corroborate our expectations: we find that the relationship between the share of state subsidies in total party income and the level of party membership is significant only at t_1 . However, the relationship is not in the expected direction. When we examine the levels of change (t_1-t_0), the relationship has a negative sign, as expected, but is not significant.

Similar results appear from a second set of tests, where we examine the relationship between the level of state subsidies per voter and party membership (SUBSIDY/VOTER * M/E) at country level. We anticipate that countries with relatively low levels of party affiliation within their respective countries will feature higher levels of public subsidies. However, this expectation is not borne out by the evidence either. While we find a significant relationship between the level of state subsidies per voter and party membership at both t_1 and t_0 , this relationship is positive rather than negative; the larger a country's party membership relative to the size of the national electorate, the more financially dependent its parties are on the state, and vice versa. When we examine the levels of change (t_1-t_0), we find that the relationship is positive and not statistically significant.

Finally, we assess the relationship between state subsidies and membership at the level of the individual party (SUBSIDY * M), including all parties from the PPDB database for which relevant data were available (t_1), and 36 of those parties at t_0 which are also included in Katz and Mair (1992), as well as the changes over time for this latter group. At the party level, the relationship appears insignificant at both t_0 and t_1 , while only at t_0 does it work in the expected direction. We do find a significant outcome, however, for our longitudinal analysis, suggesting that the greater a party's membership has grown over time, the more it has come to depend on state subsidies and vice versa. These findings are rather counterintuitive and contradict many of the expectations and assumptions found in the literature, that a higher dependence on public money would somehow serve to undermine the strength of the party organization on the ground. Overall, this relationship does not appear to exist, at either the level of the country or the individual party.⁹

CONCLUSION

The state has come to play a crucial role in the financing of political parties in contemporary (European) democracies. Our contribution to this volume shows that state subsidies represent a substantial share of total party income in nearly all countries that we have examined, and especially so in the more recently established democracies of Southern and Eastern Europe.

A comparison over time endorses these findings: in nearly all countries for which we performed a longitudinal analysis, the share of total party income constituted by public funds shows an upward trajectory. Interestingly, there are few substantial differences in this respect among the party families: whether Social Democratic, Green or Christian Democratic/Conservative, the state is, relative to other sources of income, a significant contributor to party coffers. Indeed, some party families, like the Far Right, would be unlikely to survive and perform without state money.

The state also appears to be the chief driving force behind the increased resource endowment of contemporary European political parties. With the data at hand it is hard to ascertain whether political parties are financially stronger in comparison to other crucial political actors; it might well be that the state has also empowered and endowed individual candidates and legislators, which would place in wider perspective what otherwise appears to be the strong position of political parties. However, our analysis clearly shows that the absolute level of party income per voter has gone up in all but two countries which we examined. Importantly, this increase in party resources has largely been driven by state subsidies, the growth of which, in most countries, exceeds the growth of total party income. If parties get richer, they do so mainly because of the generous hand of the state.

In view of all this, it is somewhat surprising that such a highly concentrated form of party financing appears to have only modest impact on party organization. Contrary to what most literature on contemporary party organizations suggests or assumes, our analysis shows that a high financial dependence on the state does not necessarily lead to a lower party presence on the ground. Interestingly, it is also not the case that countries and parties with low levels of party membership affiliation necessarily enjoy higher levels of dependence on the state for funding. Indeed, whether measured at the country or the party level, the size of party membership seems to be affected by the high level of state subsidies, but not in the direction that is generally predicted. Rather than being negative, we find a positive relationship between state subsidies and party membership.

All this seems to suggest that we need to reconsider our strong assumptions about the negative impact of state subsidies on party activities on the ground: while political parties might not need, or no longer need, party members to meet their financial needs, this does not automatically imply that they will no longer be interested in their membership organization. As Scarrow reminds us, members are also useful for things other than fund-raising and their value for party leaderships might be relevant also in contemporary political circumstances characterized by intensive media-driven electoral campaigns, the availability of new forms of communication and mobilization, and a wide availability of all these modern means to political parties (see Scarrow 1996). Indeed, precisely because parties are now so well-endowed by the state in

financial terms, it might be that they make, or are in the position to make, investments that keep their membership organizations afloat. In other words, public funding of parties could in fact be a good investment to preserve citizen engagement in party politics.

This also implies that there is not necessarily a zero-sum relationship between state funding and the party on the ground, as posited by Katz and Mair (1995). A high dependence on the state for financial resources, coupled with a very limited party membership, is a combination characterizing cartel parties. The exact opposite combination is characteristic of the classic mass parties, which drew most of their resources from their membership organizations in an era where state subsidies did not exist. Our findings suggest that developments on these two dimensions can be independent of each other and that we specifically need to account for empirical cases in which both the dependence on the state *and* on the membership organization are important for parties. At the individual party level, it may signify the existence of a much larger variation of party organizational types and party institutionalization than is routinely considered in the literature (see, e.g., Gunther and Diamond 2003; Carty 2004; Bolleyer 2013). At the level of the political system, and although our findings do not imply that the qualitative importance of party membership is also retained, they may signify that the increased importance of the financial linkages between political parties and the state does not necessarily undermine the importance of their societal anchoring.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A4.1 *Old and new parties*

	Old parties	New parties
Austria	Social Democratic Party, People's Party, Freedom Party, Greens	Alliance for the Future
Belgium	Socialist Party, Christian Democrat and Flemish, Reform Movement, Socialist Party Alternative, Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats, Democrat Humanist Centre, Ecolo, Greens	New Flemish Alliance, Flemish Interest, Federalists Democrats Francophone, Libertarian Direct Democratic

(continued)

TABLE A4.1 *Continued*

	Old parties	New parties
Canada	Liberal Party, New Democratic Party, Conservative Party, Green Party	Bloc Québécois
Czech Republic	Communist Party, Christian Democratic Union	Social Democratic Party, Civic Democratic Party, TOP 09
Denmark	Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, Socialist People's Party, Red-Green Alliance, Conservatives, Liberals	Danish People's Party, Liberal Alliance
France	Socialist Party, Union for a Popular Movement	—
Germany	Christian Democratic Union, Social Democratic Party, Free Democratic Party, The Left, Alliance '90/ The Greens, Christian Social Union	Pirate Party
Hungary	Socialist Party	Fidesz/Hungarian Civic Alliance, Jobbik, Politics Can Be Different
Ireland	Fine Gael, Labour Party, Fianna Fail, Sinn Féin, Green Party	—
Israel	Likud, Labor Party, Shas, Agudat Yisrael, Hadash, Meretz, National Religious Party	Kadima, Yisrael Beitenu, Balad
Italy	Northern League	People of Freedom, Union of the Centre, Italy of Values
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom, Labour Party, Socialist Party, Christian Democratic Party, Democrats66, Christian Union, GreenLeft, Reformed Political Party	Party for the Animals, 50PLUS
Norway	Labour Party, Progress Party, Conservative Party, Socialist Left Party, Centre Party, Christian Democratic Party, Liberal Party	—
Poland	Polish People's Party, Democratic Left Alliance	Civic Platform, Law & Justice, Palikot's Movement, United Poland
Portugal	Social Democratic Party, Socialist Party, People's Party, Communist Party, Greens	(Left Block)
Spain	People's Party, Socialist Party, United Left, Basque Nationalist Party, Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	
Sweden	Social Democrats, Left Party, Green Party, Centre Party, Liberal People's Party, Christian Democrats, Moderate Party	Sweden Democrats
United Kingdom	Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Green Party	UK Independence Party

Note: Shaded=new democracies (post-1974); new parties are those founded after 1990.

NOTES

1. In the House of Lords, the counterpart is 'Cranborne money'.
2. Strictly speaking, the two data points are not entirely comparable, in that the data in the Katz and Mair handbook (1992) report party head office income, while some of the PPDB data report total party income. In the cases of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK the PPDB data relate to income for the national head office party only, and in all other cases to total income, including sub-national parts of the organization. Presumably, this leads to an underreporting of the changing share of membership fees in the cases for which we only have head office figures, as these fees may be collected at the lower echelons of the organization. Because state subsidies tend to be allocated to the party head office, the bias in reporting for this category is likely to be less pronounced.
3. Note that our figures are different from seemingly similar data reported by Webb and Keith in Chapter 2 of this volume. This is because for each country included in the PPDB we report the *aggregate* income for all parties taken together whereas Webb and Keith report *average* figures per party in each country. For example, Table 2.3a reports the average income per voter for the five Austrian party head offices as 1.96 euros; when one multiplies this figure by five it amounts to the national aggregate figure of 9.81 euros per voter reported here in Table 4.3.
4. The data for early years are taken from the category 'income of party headquarters' in the Katz and Mair handbook (see Katz and Mair 1992).
5. We use 1990 as the cutoff point because (a) it helps to distinguish old and new parties in post-communist Europe and, at the same time, (b) separates new left and new populist right from the more established parties in all other countries.
6. For an overview of our categorization, see Appendix, Table A4.1.
7. It should be noted that our analysis here is complicated by the fact that the PPDB locates Christian Democrats and Conservatives together in the same party family.
8. The far right and right-wing populist party families have been grouped together in Figure 4.4.
9. Taking into consideration the difference between election and non-election years does not substantially alter the results.

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Still Connecting with Society?

Political Parties' Formal Links with Social Groups in the Twenty-First Century

Elin Haugsgjerd Allern and Tània Verge

INTRODUCTION

The extent to which party organizations connect to social groups is a key indicator both of parties' willingness to identify relevant societal interests and of parties' capacity to link with various segments of society between elections. According to Scarrow and Webb (see Chapter 1), party-group relationships are an important aspect of parties' 'representative strategies'. Indeed, structured interaction around and within the party organization was one of the methods used by old mass parties to anchor themselves in society. Therefore, for decades, a key question in the literature on party organizational change has been whether political parties continue to use formal measures to connect with social groups and, more specifically, whether the general development towards increasingly professionalized and elite-dominated parties has led to increasing abandonment of these measures (Kirchheimer 1966; Katz and Mair 1995; 2009).

So far, most attention has been paid to documenting the general downward trend in party membership (see Scarrow 2000; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012). However, in recent years, significant attention has also been devoted to parties' connections with social groups (Poguntke 2002; Allern and Bale 2012a). It is widely agreed that the old class parties today seek voters from different social segments and that parties' links with external interest groups, such as those between Social Democratic parties and trade unions, have weakened (Padgett and Paterson 1991: 177; Thomas 2001). Nonetheless, research also suggests that a good deal of variation in party-interest group relationships exists both across and within countries and that the connections with external organizations and via parties' internal sub-organizations have not eroded across the board (Poguntke 2006: 403; Allern

and Bale 2012b; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012), challenging the claims of the general disintegration of party–group linkage.

This chapter contributes to this debate by mapping and analysing variation in contemporary parties' use of formal measures to link with social groups. More specifically, we investigate the extent to which political parties still seek to connect with social groups by giving them formal status within the party and rights to access decision-making bodies. By 'social groups', we refer to organized interests which may be either independent of a political party but formally affiliated with it or created by the party itself and consequently enjoy formal party status (Poguntke 2002: 53). Although previous work has clustered these two types of groups together under the term 'formal collateral organizations' and emphasized the extent to which their membership overlaps with party membership (see Poguntke 2002, 2006), we distinguish between *external interest groups (non-party organizations)* and *party sub-organizations (party organizational units)* for operationalization purposes. Note that these two linkage mechanisms are not necessarily mutually exclusive but might be seen by parties as alternatives. For example, a party with links to an external interest group, such as a farmers' union, might be less likely to create a farmers' party organizational unit.

Our analysis centres on parties' use of formal rules governing affiliation and representation to link with externally organized interests and parties' establishment of sub-organizations with representation rights within the party. To conceptualize and measure these connections, we distinguish between the number of groups that enjoy formal status by being affiliated with the party or by being established as party sub-organizations and the type(s) of formal representation rights these groups enjoy in access to parties' main decision-making bodies—by *ex officio* representation (Poguntke 1998, 2002). The larger the number of groups with formal status is, and the more extensive their representation rights are, the stronger a party's (formal) social connections are. In addition, we examine whether formal status and representation rights shape parties' ability to represent descriptively the associated latent social interests. For example, formalized links with women's groups have been found to increase the likelihood that parties will achieve gender balance in electoral lists (descriptive representation) and pay attention to gender equality issues in policy proposals (substantive representation) (Kittilson 2011). Therefore, we also ask and explore whether there is an association between the presence of sub-organizations for women and ethnic minorities and the use of quotas for these social groups in party decision-making bodies and electoral lists.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we put linkage mechanisms into a historical perspective. Secondly, building on the existing research on how parties approach social groups, we develop several hypotheses concerning cross- and within-country sources of variation in formal linkage. After discussing the data and methods used, we perform a

cross-sectional mapping of the strength of contemporary societal connections across parties and countries building on the Political Party Database (PPDB). To get a picture of the extent to which such links have evolved over time, we also take stock of Poguntke's (2000) codings of Katz and Mair's (1992) data handbook on party organizations in western democracies (1960–90). Next, we explore the sources of variation and assess the effects on group representation produced by linkage mechanisms. Finally, we discuss the main findings and highlight several avenues for further research.

LINKAGE MECHANISMS IN AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Formal affiliation with non-party organizations has existed since the establishment of mass parties in the nineteenth century and has been most common among traditional left parties (Labour, Socialist, and Social Democratic parties). The strongest links to organized workers have been found in parties whose members were collectively affiliated through trade unions, such as the early British Labour Party (Duverger 1954/1972: 5–7; Panebianco 1988: 89). Affiliated trade unionists attended parties' annual conferences, had votes proportional to their financial contributions (Koelble 1987: 255), significantly populated parties' executive bodies (Padgett and Paterson 1991: 182; Jordan and Maloney 2001: 30f.; Quinn 2002) and played decisive roles in candidate selection (Denver 1988: 52–3). A similar relationship has been found in Australia, New Zealand, and Scandinavia (Epstein 1967: 148; Truman 1980; Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). Weaker links or even the absence of such links characterized countries with more fragmented trade union movements, as in predominantly catholic countries, such as France and Italy (Padgett and Paterson 1991, 184).

Other party families had similar societal connections in the early twentieth century. Catholic parties not only depended on the church and religious organizations but also emerged as federations of catholic workers' unions and co-operatives and associations of peasants, industrialists, and others (Rawson 1969: 313). The organizational network of Agrarian parties was comparatively moderate and composed primarily of farmers' unions and agricultural co-operatives (Duverger 1954/1972: 6). Christian Democratic parties established in Europe after the Second World War also avoided any indirect, class-based structure (von Beyme 1985: 194). In political systems with universal suffrage, bourgeois cadre parties were also motivated to follow the example of mass parties to retain influence (Duverger 1954/1972: xxvii). In the absence of strong extra-parliamentary organizations, Liberal and Conservative parties sought to connect with society through peasants' associations, lodges, and similar groups,

although a looser form of affiliation with no formal representation in party bodies was preferred (von Beyme 1985: 191).

However, in the 1960s, Kirchheimer (1966) already argued that the future lay in weaker, less exclusive links between parties and interest groups due to eroding class identity and the increasingly influential mass media. In describing the transformation from the heyday of the mass party to the era of the catch-all party, the abolition of statutory links, such as a guaranteed presence in the party's national executive, was taken a key indicator: both parties and organized groups aimed to become formally autonomous. Three decades later, Katz and Mair (1995, 2002) argued that the increased availability of public subsidies, among other developments, had encouraged parties to further weaken their social connections. Presumably, formal connections to social groups are no longer needed as a major instrument for communicating with parties' constituencies.

Katz and Mair's (1992) analysis of party organizational data from 1960 to 1989 led Poguntke (1998: 176–8) to conclude that external collateral organizations had become less relevant over time, with declining double membership and weakened access to parties' decision-making bodies. The most well-known example of such decline is the British Labour Party (Webb 1994: 114–15; Hopkin 2001; Jordan and Maloney 2001), though similar examples are found in Scandinavia (Sundberg 2003), Australia and New Zealand (Katz 2001: 73–4). Yet not all strongly formalized links have become extinct. Some left-of-centre (traditional mass parties) in Western Europe still relied on such connections in the early 2000s (Thomas 2001; Allern and Bale 2012a).

Simultaneously, while affiliated non-party organizations gradually became less relevant, party-created internal organizations—most commonly targeting women and youth but also seniors, occupational groups, and small business owners—increased at roughly similar rates. These party sub-organizations often enjoy *ex officio* representation in party decision-making bodies (Poguntke 2006: 400–3). By the 1990s, elite parties had even stronger ties to party sub-organizations than the original mass parties, although the former connected to fewer organizations (Poguntke 2000: 157, 184). For example, party sub-organizations targeting trade union members have been quite common since the 1960s (Poguntke 2000: 154).

CONTEMPORARY FORMAL LINKAGE MECHANISMS: THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

As outlined in the introduction, existing research suggests that parties tend to have weaker formal connections with organized interests than in the past. However, case studies of party relationships with external interest groups at least indicate that parties' use of formal linkage mechanisms varies at both the

country level and the party level (Allern and Bale 2012b). Therefore, we formulate several hypotheses to account for differences in the strength of formal linkage mechanisms. For the sake of simplicity, we lay aside the issue of representation rights and focus exclusively on the quantitative aspect: what factors are likely to explain the number of social groups formally connected to parties, whether affiliated non-party organizations or party sub-organizations? We assume that what happens—and perhaps what has happened previously—at the party level is crucial for how parties choose to organize their relationships with social groups. Parties are autonomous, power-seeking actors that choose to organize in ways that help them efficiently achieve their goals. We concentrate here, however, on the external environment in which political parties compete, and we then move onto parties' enduring organizational features, particularly historical legacies and ideational norms as these are the factors that so far have received the most attention in the debate on parties and formal linkage mechanisms (Scarrow 1994; Müller 1997; van Biezen 2003).

Country-level Factors

Party organization scholars have maintained that, when organizing, parties reflect contemporary institutional and structural circumstances (e.g., Katz and Mair 1995). In recent decades, the degree of parties' dependence on external funding sources has received considerable attention in connection with the need for stronger or weaker social linkage. The seminal cartel party thesis is based on the assumption that modern parties have turned to the state as an income source, which has made them less interested in ties with interest groups (Katz and Mair 1995). Accordingly, contemporary parties might have fewer incentives and thus be less willing to maintain or establish formal connections to organized social groups, whether external or internal. However, we also know that the level of state funding varies across countries. Accordingly, we hypothesize that:

H1: The more generous public funding is, the lower the number of formally affiliated non-party organizations and party sub-organizations is.

The influence of context may also be rooted in the cleavage structure of each country. In deeply divided societies often termed 'consociational democracies', such as the Netherlands and Belgium, organized pillars developed between major parties and organizations sharing the same subcultural identities (Kitschelt 1989: 28). In these countries, parties established an especially high number of party sub-organizations to maximize the loyalty of 'their' segment (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 15–16; Luther 1999: 4, 8; Poguntke 2006: 396). Even if pillars in these countries have weakened over time (e.g., Luther

and Deschouwer 1999), the general argument remains valid and straightforward: social fragmentation nurtures stronger party–group linkage, with both cleavages and pillars presupposing an organizational element. More specifically, we expect that:

H2: The more socially divided polities are, the higher the number of formally affiliated non-party organizations and party sub-organizations is.

Alternatively, the age of a given democracy might well account for country differences in parties' societal strategies. In newer democracies, particularly the regimes in Southern and Central Eastern Europe which democratized in the late twentieth century, parties have generally been depicted as weaker vehicles for social linkage than those operating in older democracies (van Biezen 2005; Allern and Bale 2012b; Verge 2012a). Several factors support this characterization, such as higher dependence on state subsidies, weaker traditional political cleavages and weaker civil society (van Biezen 2005). Also, in newer democracies, most (if not all) parties were established under conditions facilitating the development of catch-all or cartel political competition, so the legacy of old mass parties is diluted in these polities. Therefore, we posit that:

H3: Parties in newer democracies tend to have fewer formally affiliated non-party organizations and party sub-organizations than parties in old democracies.

Party-level Factors

At the party level, the type of parties' main constituencies and the amount of material resources and votes affiliated organizations and party sub-organizations might provide are likely to shape the incentives for using formal linkage mechanisms (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). As noted, exploring parties' goal-seeking and resource exchange is beyond the scope of this chapter, but we can survey whether access to and dependency on state subventions decrease parties' incentives to keep or establish formal linkage mechanisms. The dependency might vary across individual parties within a national party system. Some parties might rely primarily on members' fees and other private funding for their operations, while others might use the state as their main revenue source. In line with the logic of the cartel party thesis (Katz and Mair 1995), we hypothesize that:

H4: The higher a party's level of dependence on state subsidies, the fewer its formally affiliated non-party organizations and party sub-organizations are.

Other party-specific factors that might affect social linkage are parties' organizational and ideological traits. Given that formal affiliation historically has

been a fairly rare phenomenon, formalized links to non-party organizations are expected to be less common among newer than older parties. Newer parties are freer to choose their organizational strategies as they are less dependent on historical paths. Moreover, some New Left, Green, and right-wing populist parties ideologically oppose the bureaucratic mass party model, while new social movements prefer formal independence from political parties. Indeed, existing research suggests that parties established since the 1940s tend to have rather weak formal ties to other organizations (Poguntke 2002: 54–6; Allern 2013). Accordingly, we expect that:

H5: Old parties (established before the 1950s) have more formally affiliated non-party organizations and party sub-organizations than newer parties.

Finally, the historical background of parties' formal links has been argued to play a relevant role. Research on Social Democratic parties and trade unions has suggested that variations in organizational legacies might shed light on deviations from what would be regarded as a rational course today (see Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). In some parties, old arrangements, such as the collective affiliation of trade unions, have become firmly rooted routines which might be difficult to abolish, even if they no longer seem rational under the leadership's external goal-seeking strategy. Conversely, those parties that did not build such links might see formal neutrality as part of their core ideology, as do some Conservative and Liberal parties (Allern 2010). In today's context of increasingly pluralist electorates and mass media, parties without a history of formally affiliated non-party organizations are less likely to rely on such links than archetypal mass parties. Likewise, historical patterns of the number of internal groups (party sub-organizations) may persist over time (Poguntke 2000: 157; Poguntke 2002: 55). The effects of organizational roots and ideological core values are not easy to distinguish empirically; therefore, we use party family as a proxy variable to capture both elements. Accordingly, we posit that:

H6: Parties that have a relatively strong tradition as mass parties—mostly Social Democratic, Agrarian, and Christian Democrat parties—tend to have more formally affiliated organizations and party sub-organizations than parties without such roots.

THE SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS OF FORMAL LINKAGE MECHANISMS

We have thus far discussed our expectations concerning the patterns of formal linkage mechanisms and turn now to their substantive effects. Theoretically,

formal linkage mechanisms should affect parties' ability to represent their associated social interests, particularly in electoral lists (descriptive representation) and policy programmes (substantive representation). However, we cannot take for granted that formal linkage has a notable impact on the way political parties work as channels for representation: granting specific organized interests privileged access to party decision-making might have mostly symbolic value. Therefore, in what follows, we delve into the relationship between formal linkage mechanisms and parties' attempts to secure descriptive representation. We focus on two groups that have received significant attention in the literature on quotas: women and ethnic minorities. Whereas the former have been a focal point for years, the latter have not received much attention in scholarly debate until recently.

Historically, women's party sub-organizations have played a crucial role in recruiting female party members, but their main focus has shifted to lobbying parties for greater representation of women and influencing parties' platforms (Kolinsky 1993; Kittilson 2006, 2011; Verge 2012b; Freidenvall 2013). Similarly, formal status might lead a given group to make representational claims, especially if they resonate with broader societal claims about the need to increase the political presence of traditionally under-represented social groups. Selecting candidates who possess key social characteristics (descriptive representation), such as gender, has long been presented as an issue of justice with further implications for the quality of representation: how representatives 'act for' (substantive representation) and 'stand for' (symbolic representation) others (Phillips 1995; Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). According to Lovenduski (1993: 14), 'there is no party in which efforts to nominate more women have occurred without an intervention by women making claims'. Most commonly, these increases have been made through the adoption of quotas. These measures can be considered a reform of the traditionally male-centred political recruitment and gender-biased 'rules of the game' (Lovenduski 2005: 27). Simultaneously, the presence of party women's organizations is one factor that explains the emphasis on social justice in party manifestos and mediates the effect of women members of parliament on the salience of welfare state expansion in party electoral manifestos (Kittilson 2011).

While women have a record of formal representation in parties, ethnic minorities constitute social groups that only recently have received considerable political attention in many countries. Ethnic minorities and migrants have become an emerging political force in many West European countries, and political parties have increasingly paid attention to them (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011; Sobolewska 2013). Some parties have set up structures to integrate ethnic minorities and migrant groups, especially community activists, into the party organization (Odmalm 2004). These structures do not usually take the form of party sub-organizations but, rather, looser ties,

such as networks or platforms for discussing minority issues (Niessen 2012). Also, very few parties use formalized quotas for ethnic and religious minorities (Htun 2004), but to the extent that such quotas do exist, the question is whether their use is correlated to the existence of party sub-organizations for ethnic, linguistic or religious groups.

The analysis of substantive representation (mapping policy positions) and its relation to linkage patterns is beyond the scope of this chapter, but we investigate whether there is any significant association between the existence of party sub-organizations for women and ethnic minorities and formal measures for their descriptive representation. Specifically, we focus on whether parties have sought to increase descriptive representation through party quotas for traditionally underrepresented groups. Arguably, gender and ethnic minority quotas are more likely to be found in political parties which have established one or more sub-organizations for such groups. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

H7: Parties with women's, ethnic minorities' or migrants' party sub-organizations tend to use formal gender, ethnic minority or migrant quotas in national decision-making bodies and electoral lists more frequently than parties without such sub-organizations.

As well, the effect of party sub-organizations on quota adoption may be mediated by party ideology. Indeed, whereas parties across ideological boundaries have established women's organizations, the use of quotas is not ideologically neutral, with Left parties leading the adoption of such measures (Kittilson 2006). Gender quotas were initially applied to recruitment processes for both public (electoral lists) and party office by some West European Socialist and Social Democratic parties in the early 1970s and were subsequently embraced by Green parties. Conservative and Liberal parties, as well as far right parties, tend to be more reluctant to adopt quotas. Firstly, Left parties, which support equality of results, are more sensitive to the exclusion of social groups (Dahlerup 2007). Quotas have a poorer fit with Liberal and Conservative ideologies which emphasize individuals and their merits rather than groups. Secondly, Left parties traditionally have been closer to the feminist movement, and women's agency is usually stronger within their ranks (Sainsbury 1993; Jensen 1995). In addition, left-wing parties are generally more sensitive towards the demands of ethnic minorities and migrants and more open to accommodating their representation claims than Liberal and Conservative parties (Mügge 2016). Therefore, we posit that:

H8: Left-of-centre and Green parties are more likely to use quotas for traditionally underrepresented groups (e.g., women, ethnic minorities) than other parties.

OPERATIONALIZATION, DATA, AND METHODS

To determine the extent to which contemporary parties rely on formalized measures to connect to social groups and survey both cross-country and cross-party variation, we build on the PPDB Project. The PPDB includes 122 political parties with different ideological profiles, ages, and size of membership base and electoral support in nineteen democracies spanning three continents. Old democracies dominate the sample, but some newer democracies from Southern and Central and Eastern Europe are also included (see Chapter 2 for details).

To describe parties' societal connections, we not only look at the number of social groups with which parties have established formal rules for affiliation and representation but also investigate to which decision-making bodies social groups are granted access. This access includes sending delegates to party conferences and having *ex officio* (or reserved) seats on the party's executive body(ies). The types of social groups and the formal rights granted by political parties under examination are pre-defined by the PPDB, as shown in Table 5.1. Although some groups and connection types might be left out from this investigation, we believe that the most relevant and common ones are included. The social groups coded in the PPDB can be regarded as most likely cases: if these groups lack connections with parties, parties probably do not have other formally recognized groups. As explained, we distinguish between (external) affiliated non-party organizations and party sub-organizations. The category of affiliated non-party organizations consists of trade unions and business associations, while party sub-organizations include those representing demographic groups (e.g., women, youth) or economic or

TABLE 5.1 *Specification of formal linkage mechanisms*

Type of linkage	Social groups	Representation rights
Non-party organizations (formally affiliated)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trade unions • Business organizations 	Access to decision-making bodies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party conferences • Highest executive body
Party sub-organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demographic: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Women ◦ Youth ◦ Seniors • Economic-functional: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Small business owners ◦ Farmers • Identity: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Ethnic/linguistic groups ◦ Religious groups 	Access to decision-making bodies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Party conferences • Highest executive body

functional interests (e.g., small business owners), as well as identity groups (e.g., ethnic or migrant groups). Groups based on economic-functional interests and/or religious identity are rooted in the old cleavage structure, whereas those based on gender or ethnicity¹ represent newer identity-based political demands founded on inclusion (Young 2000) through the ‘politics of recognition’ (Taylor 1992) or the ‘politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995). Women’s and youth organizations represent basic demographic characteristics but can also be seen as politicized and identity-based groups. In addition, to trace change over time, we look at the commonality of different *types* of sub-organizations and compare PPDB data with the Katz and Mair data coded by Poguntke (2000) on the most common party sub-organizations.

As noted, we focus on the quantitative aspect—the number of organizations formally linked to parties—in the explanatory analysis. In the case of affiliated non-party organizations, a quantitative analysis is impossible due to the lack of accurate historical data and the low number of cases. In the case of societal connections through party sub-organizations, we compute an additive index ranging from zero to seven that counts how many such units political parties have created, using the sub-organizations listed in Table 5.1.² We use this additive index as the dependent variable in the statistical analysis. Multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is run to account for the existing cross-country and within-country variance in the total number of sub-organizations. Building on our hypotheses, the independent variables are as follows:

- *Public funding*: No country in the sample relies exclusively on a private funding scheme. This variable takes the value of one for countries where the state subsidizes elections and campaigns as well as parties’ non-election work and zero if only one of the two areas is funded.
- *Social fragmentation*: We use three different variables of fractionalization (ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity) extracted from Alesina et al. (2003).
- *Age of democracy*: Based on Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), this numerical variable counts the number of years a country has been a democracy without interruption.
- *Public share of income*: This variable records the percentage of parties’ income acquired from public funding.
- *Newer party*: This dichotomous variable captures whether a political party was created before 1951 (0) or in 1951 or later (1).
- *Mass party tradition*: This categorical variable is operationalized using the party family variable from the PPDB dataset, which distinguishes between Social Democrats, Christian Democrats/Conservatives (including a few Agrarian parties), Liberals, Greens, Left Socialists and the Far Right (including both right-wing populists and far right parties). Therefore, most attention is paid to the mass party par excellence: the Social Democrats.

Finally, regarding the use of quotas in the drafting of electoral lists and the composition of parties' national decision-making bodies, our analysis is limited to written rules codified in party statutes that establish quotas based on gender and ethnic/migrant backgrounds. However, we acknowledge that some political parties might use informal targets or recommendations to increase the presence of these groups, so-called 'soft' quotas (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009: 784). Formal quotas can be more or less generous regarding the representation of traditionally excluded groups (for example, reserving 25 per cent of seats for women versus gender-neutral dispositions fixing 50 per cent representation for the two sexes). For the sake of simplicity, we produce a dichotomous variable identifying whether parties have adopted such measures (1) or not (0).

MAPPING FORMAL LINKAGE MECHANISMS

The first step in the empirical survey is to map linkage mechanisms at the aggregate level. We start by looking at affiliated non-party organizations but also include some party- and country-specific references due to the limited number of cases which rely on this type of mechanism. Affiliated non-party organizations are found in only five of the 19 countries studied (Australia, Hungary, Israel, Ireland, and the United Kingdom), and within these countries, only one or two parties have such links, with the exceptions of Hungary (three parties) and Israel (four parties). With regards to type of external groups, Table 5.2 shows that only 8.4 per cent of parties have affiliated non-party trade unions, and 3.3 per cent have affiliated business peak associations. Among the parties with connections to affiliated trade unions, most parties (seven of ten parties) have established linkage with just one or two external organizations. Only two parties (both Hungarian) are affiliated with both trade unions and business organizations.

Does this weak spread of affiliated non-party organizations indicate a significant decline over time? According to Poguntke's analysis (2000) of Katz and Mair's (1992) 1960–89 data covering Western Europe, only Social Democratic parties in Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland had affiliated trade unions. At the beginning of the 2010s, this linkage mechanism with unions existed only in the British and Irish Labour Parties, according to the PPDB data. Affiliated non-party organizations are also found in Australia, Israel, and Hungary. Thus, use of this formal linkage mechanism has declined in some cases, but it should be noted that it has always been a rare phenomenon.

TABLE 5.2 *Affiliated non-party organizations (%)*

Number	Trade unions	Business peak associations
None	91.5 (108)	96.7 (116)
1–2 organizations	5.9 (7)	3.3 (4)
> 10 organizations	2.5 (3)	0.0 (0)
N (parties)	118	120

Note: The number of parties is shown in parentheses.

How strong in qualitative terms are these rare connections which exist today? Among the ten parties with affiliated trade unions, only three give unions reserved seats on their highest executive bodies (Likud, Labor Party, and Meretz in Israel), and two allow unions to send delegates to party conferences (UK Labour Party and Irish Labour Party). Only one party grants affiliated unions both rights (Scottish National Party), whereas four parties do not provide unions any of these rights (Australian Labor Party, Jobbik, and Politics Can Be Different in Hungary, and Agudat in Israel). The even smaller group of parties with affiliated business peak associations relies on weaker connections (Fidesz, Politics Can Be Different, and Jobbik in Hungary and the Liberal Democrats in the UK). No business peak organization has reserved seats on a party's highest executive bodies, and only one of the four parties allows business groups to send delegates to the party conference (Fidesz in Hungary). Hence, only a small minority of parties has a truly strong formal party connection to external groups as defined here.

What about the second type of linkage mechanism? Have parties turned to the establishment of sub-organizations? As shown in Figure 5.1, the distribution of the additive index is highly skewed, and the scores in practice range from zero to six. About 80 per cent of the parties studied have established one or more party sub-organizations (seventy of 122 parties). This mechanism is much more widespread than affiliation with non-party organizations, as found in previous studies, but the median score of the additive index is 1.52—a rather low figure—with a standard deviation of 1.234. Indeed, only twenty-four parties (approximately 20 per cent) mention more than two party sub-organizations in their statutes. Thus, despite the lack of decline—and, to some extent, the general increase—of linkage through sub-organizations between 1960 and 1990 found by Poguntke (2006), very few parties seem to have *numerous* party sub-organizations today. While we are on fairly safe grounds to assume that our data cover the most common party sub-organizations (as discussed), these figures should be interpreted with some caution as our analysis relies only on those groups coded in the PPDB. Answers to an opened-ended question in the data base indicate that other sub-organizations, such as those targeting students and trade union members, also exist but are not very widespread. Alternative party sub groups




FIGURE 5.1 Number of (non-territorial) party sub-organizations

TABLE 5.3 *Type of party sub-organizations (%)*

Demographic			Economic/functional interests		Identity	
Women	Youth	Seniors	Small business owners	Farmers	Ethnic/linguistic groups	Religious groups
41.0 (50)	77.9 (95)	17.2 (21)	1.6 (2)	5.7 (7)	5.7 (7)	3.3 (4)

Notes: The number of parties is shown in parentheses (total N = 122).

organized along non-economic or demographic lines, such as issue based groups, have not flourished. Overall, most parties are not organized as federations of party-based interest groups.

What kind of sub-organizations can be found in contemporary political parties? As shown in Table 5.3, the most common ones organize demographic groups, particularly youth and women. More specifically, approximately 78 per cent of parties included in the PPDB have a youth organization, and 41 per cent have a women's organization. Only few parties have




FIGURE 5.2 Share of parties with a demographic sub-organization (women/youth) in ten Western European countries (1960–2012) (%)

Note: The 1960–98 data are based on Poguntke's (2000) coding of party statutes data presented in Katz and Mair's (1992) data handbook. The countries included are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The 2012 is based on the most recent PPDB data (2012–13). For the sake of longitudinal consistency, splits and mergers from the file provided by Poguntke (2000) are excluded.

sub-organizations for economic or functional groups, such as small business owners (1.6 per cent) and farmers (5.7 per cent), or internally organize identity groups based on ethnic/linguistic (5.7 per cent) or religious (3.3 per cent) affiliation.

Does this reflect a pattern of stability or change? For those countries included in Poguntke's study (2000) and the PPDB, we calculate a time series to survey the evolution of West European parties' linkage with women's and youth's party sub-organizations. With a note of caution due to possible differences in coding procedures and party samples, the results are presented in Figure 5.2. The share of parties with women's sub-organizations was fairly stable between 1960 and 1989 but seems to have declined slightly thereafter. While some old parties might have abolished their women's sub-groups (for example, the Norwegian Labour Party has replaced the sub-organization with a women's network), the main explanation for this decrease is the much lower frequency of women's sub-organizations in newer parties (31.2 per cent, compared to 57.8 per cent in older parties created before 1951), especially

TABLE 5.4 *Representation rights of party sub-organizations (%)*

	Demographic			Economic/ functional interests		Identity	
	Women	Youth	Seniors	Small business owners	Farmers	Ethnic/ linguistic groups	Religious groups
Send delegates to party conferences	12.0	17.6	19.0	0.0	28.6	28.6	25.0
Reserved seats in the highest executive body	10.0	19.8	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Both rights	30.0	31.9	23.8	0.0	28.6	28.6	0.0
None of these rights	48.0	30.8	47.6	100	42.9	42.9	75.0
N	50	95	21	2	7	7	4

those in the Green party family (21.4 per cent) and the Left Socialists (0 per cent). In contrast, the share of parties with a youth sub-organization has increased over time since 1989.

What formal rights do sub-organizations have in contemporary parties? Table 5.4 shows that many do not enjoy any rights at all. The strength of this linkage in rights varies across group types. No small-business owners or religious groups have access to parties' reserved seats in parties' highest executive bodies, but between a third and half of the remaining party sub-organizations have such rights. Sub-organizations' ability to send delegates to party conferences differs to a greater extent. Women's and youth organizations enjoy both rights in about a third of cases. The presence of youth organizations in party conferences is more common than women's organizations (49.5 per cent compared with 42 per cent). Likewise, youth organizations are more frequently represented in parties' highest executive bodies than women's organizations (51.7 per cent versus 40 per cent).

EXAMINING VARIATIONS IN LINKAGE MECHANISMS

The next step of the analysis explores the extent to which contemporary formal linkage mechanisms vary and whether the variation matches the patterns proposed by our hypotheses concerning country-level and party-level factors. We concentrate on *the number of organizations* formally linked to parties. Regarding external organizations, as pointed out in the previous

section, only in a few cases do parties have affiliated trade unions and business associations, which precludes any statistical analysis, but it is worth highlighting that no clear pattern seems to prevail. This linkage mechanism operates in countries with various public funding schemes, in both rather homogenous and socially divided countries, in old and newer democracies and in both long-established and newer parties. Moreover, this linkage extends beyond Social Democratic parties. Centre-right parties (e.g., Likud in Israel, Liberal Democrats in the UK) are among the few cases relying on formal affiliation with non-party organizations.

The mechanism of social linkage through party sub-organizations is much more widespread across all countries studied. We start by simply looking at the degree of variation across and within countries. The country averages for the additive index are concentrated in the lower values, but there is still significant cross-national variance, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Political parties in the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and Spain have an average of less than one sub-organization, whereas in Hungary and Italy, the average is close to three. The remaining countries range in between, and most have a value of around two. Given that mean values can mask important differences, we turn to a more nuanced depiction of variance.

The box-plot displayed in Figure 5.4 presents both cross- and within-country information. Across countries, the median value of sub-organizations of parties included in the PPDB Project varies from zero to 2.5. In the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, we observe a median value of 0, with only one party having a sub-organization. The median value for parties in Austria, Denmark, France, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom is one, with most parties having a youth organization. At the other end of the spectrum, we find cases with a median score of two or higher, including parties in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, and Sweden. The degree of variation within some countries is also significant. Spain, France, Italy, and the Czech Republic display little or no cross-party variation, but other countries present significant variation, including Australia, Belgium, Germany, Israel, Sweden, and especially Austria, Hungary, and Israel.

Overall, this initial examination of the number of sub-organizations suggests that both party and context matter and that, in general, we see less variance in newer democracies, with the exception of Hungary. We next examine in greater detail the two sets of hypotheses regarding the number of party sub-organizations. Model 1 in Table 5.5 shows the results of the multivariate OLS regression using the number of sub-organizations as the dependent variable.³ Starting with country-level factors, to what extent does public funding deter parties from establishing or maintaining linkage mechanisms? Public funding exists in all countries included in the PPDB Project, but not all governments offer subsidies of both non-election work and




FIGURE 5.3 Parties' average number of sub-organizations by country (additive index)




FIGURE 5.4 Distribution of number of party sub-organizations: parties by country (additive index)

TABLE 5.5 *Multivariate regression model: country-level and party-level factors*

	M1	M2
<i>Country-level factors</i>		
Public funding	-0.789 ⁺ (0.588)	-0.545 (0.551)
Social division		
Ethnic fractionalization	0.714 (1.396)	0.585 (1.269)
Religious fractionalization	-1.187 (.986)	-0.685 (1.077)
Linguistic fractionalization	-0.267 (1.238)	-0.591 (1.351)
Age of democracy	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.000)
<i>Party-level factors</i>		
Public share of income	-0.0004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Newer party	-0.711** (0.277)	
Party family (ref. category Social Democrats)		
Christian Democrats/Conservatives		-0.212 (0.387)
Liberals		-0.476 (0.392)
Greens		-1.071** (0.331)
Left Socialists		-1.629*** (0.321)
Far Right		-1.165* (.498)
Constant	3.450** (0.911)	2.917** (0.861)
Observations	122	107
R-squared	0.148	0.249

OLS regressions. Errors clustered on country.

DV: Additive index of party sub-organizations (range 0–7).

Standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

campaigns. The statistically significant, positive coefficient of this variable indicates that more generous public funding is associated with fewer party sub-organizations. Thus, H1 is confirmed regarding sub-organizations.

Does the degree of social fragmentation matter? Deep sociocultural divisions might incentivise political parties to create sub-organizations to ensure the loyalty of specific social segments. Thus, we examine the relationship between the number of party sub-organizations and three fractionalization indexes: ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization. In this case, no clear

pattern exists, and none of the three indexes achieves statistical significance, so this part of H2 is not supported. When considering the age of democracies, the sign of the coefficient contradicts H3 as it indicates that political parties in old democracies have created fewer sub-organizations than parties in newer democracies. This finding might largely reflect the Hungarian case, but again, the coefficient is extremely small and not significant.

We next turn to party-level factors. Public funding is available to all parties in the sample, but each party might depend on it to a different degree and have greater or lesser access to private sources of funding, such as members' fees or private donations. Despite the expectation that parties relying more on state subventions might be less interested in using sub-organizations as a linkage mechanism, we see that, in practice, the share of income derived from public funding does not significantly affect this societal connection, although the coefficient points in the negative direction. Therefore, we cannot accept H4 regarding the impact of dependence on state subsidies on the number of party sub-organizations. If we compare long-standing parties with those created since 1950, the difference in the number of party sub-organizations is statistically significant, as expected in H5. Newer parties (those created since 1950) tend to create fewer sub-organizations.

The differences are much larger and statistically significant across party families, especially in the case of the newer party families (Greens, Left Socialists, and Far Right), which less frequently use this linkage mechanism compared to the Social Democrats. Given that party age and party family present multicollinearity, both variables cannot be included in the same model. Model 2 in Table 5.5 was run substituting the dummy variable of newer party by party family. Social Democrats have the highest average number of sub-organizations, so they are used as the reference category in the regression. As also shown in Figure 5.5, Social Democrats have the highest ranking on the additive index (2.21), and Christian Democrats/Conservatives⁴ come in second (1.97), followed by the Liberals (1.62). Non-traditional party families, such as the Far Right (1.07), Greens (0.93), and Left Socialists (0.45), have the lowest scores. Thus, H6 concerning the positive relationship between the strength of mass party tradition and the number of sub-organizations is empirically supported.

THE EFFECTS OF FORMAL MEASURES

Does the presence of formally affiliated interest groups and party sub-organizations matter in determining what interests parties prioritize on electoral lists and the composition of party decision-making bodies? Formal




FIGURE 5.5 Parties' average number of sub-organizations by party family

quotas are a policy measure enabling representation of latent social interests and provide a simple way to measure whether giving social groups formal party status results in substantive effects. The PPDB data allow seeing whether there is an association between the existence of sub-organizations for women and ethnic minorities and the use of quotas for these social groups in both party decision-making bodies and electoral lists. Before proceeding to this examination, we first survey how widespread the use of quotas is among the sampled countries and parties (see also Chapter 9).

As shown in Table 5.6, 56.6 per cent of the parties covered by the PPDB employ formal quotas using at least one of these measures, and 11.5 per cent of parties do so for ethnic groups (including religious and linguistic groups). All parties that grant a formal status to ethnic groups do so also for women. Approximately a third of parties stipulate specifications for the representation of gender in the process of selecting members of party conferences (30.3 per cent) and for the representation of women on their highest executive bodies (36.9 per cent).⁵ However, less than 5 per cent of parties use quotas in party decision-making bodies for other minority groups (ethnic, religious, or linguistic), and around 7 per cent of parties apply affirmative action for their

TABLE 5.6 *Party quotas for women and minority groups (%)*

	Women	Ethnic/linguistic/religious groups
Selection to party conference	30.3 (37)	4.9 (6)
Selection to the highest executive body	36.9 (45)	4.9 (6)
Electoral lists	36.9 (45)	7.4 (9)
All instances	14.8 (18)	0.8 (1)
At least one instance	56.6 (69)	11.5 (14)

Notes: The number of parties is shown in parentheses.

TABLE 5.7 *Quota type by existence of a party sub-organization (%)*

	Women		Ethnic/linguistic/religious Groups	
	Does not exist	Exists	Does not exist	Exists
Party conference	37.8 (14)	62.1 (23)**	50.0 (3)	50.0 (3)
Party executive	42.2 (19)	57.8 (26)**	66.7 (2)	33.7 (1)
Electoral lists	46.7 (21)	53.3 (24) ⁺	88.9 (8)	11.1 (1)

Notes: The number of parties is shown in parentheses. Statistical significance (Chi-square p -value): ** 0.01 ⁺ 0.1.

electoral tickets for minorities. Thus, the use of quotas is far more widespread for gender than ethnic minorities and migrants, just as party sub-organizations are more common for the former than the latter. Does this mean that having related sub-organizations increases the likelihood of quota adoption?

Table 5.7 shows that parties which have women's sub-organizations do grant women stronger representation rights and tend to use formal (gender) quotas more frequently: the percentage of parties using quotas in the selection of party conference delegates rises from 37.8 per cent to 62.1 per cent, and the proportion of parties using quotas for party executives increases from 42.2 per cent to 57.8 per cent. Similarly, parties with women's sub-organizations adopt gender quotas for electoral lists more frequently than parties without such structures (53.3 per cent versus 46.7 per cent). While these results confirm H7, it should be noted that more fluid and less structured women's organizations with no formally recognized status sometimes serve as 'functional equivalents' to party sub-organizations (Kittilson 2011: 72). This might explain why women's agency and increased representation through quota adoption still produce noteworthy results in the absence of a formalized structure. Regarding ethnic minorities, caution is needed in the interpretation of the results due to the limited number of parties using such quotas. The few observations in the sample suggest that the internal organization of ethnic minorities does not affect their likelihood of obtaining representation rights in party bodies and electoral lists.




FIGURE 5.6 Parties' use of electoral gender quotas by party family (%)

As noted in the gender and politics literature, the use of quotas is not ideologically neutral. While parties have established women's sub-organizations across ideological boundaries, the adoption of quotas is mediated by ideational constraints and policy-seeking concerns. Focusing on electoral gender quotas, we can see in Figure 5.6 that, as posited in H8, this measure is most frequently used among Left parties: 91 per cent of Social Democratic parties and 54 per cent of Greens apply gender quotas for candidate selection processes. Furthermore, many Green and Left Socialist parties have soft quotas, which our data do not identify. Very few Centre-right, Right, or Liberal parties use quotas, and no Far Right parties do so.

CONCLUSIONS

The empirical mapping of the number and types of social groups that have formal status and the array of formal representation rights they enjoy generally confirms what previous empirical research has suggested: formalized (statutory) connections to social groups still exist but tend to be relatively weak. Contemporary political parties are not federations of organized social interests. Connections through formally affiliated external interest groups (non-party organizations), such as trade unions and business groups, are found in very few parties, and trade unions tend to have a stronger connection through representation rights in party decision-making bodies than business peak organizations. This formal linkage mechanism has weakened since the 1960s in Western Europe, but the decline has been moderate as this type of societal connection has never been common. As only five countries have parties with affiliated non-party organizations today we are unable to draw

clear conclusions regarding explanatory factors even though no clear pattern of variation seems to prevail.

Party sub-organizations are more widely used as a linkage mechanism. However, party sub-organizations do not generally reach a large number of social groups (women and youth are the most common). As well, not all sub-organizations enjoy statutory representation rights in party decision-making bodies. An inner, narrow circle of groups seems to exist, and one may wonder how much societal connections this actually represents. These limitations, though, do not necessarily mean that the use of sub-organizations has declined in recent years. Poguntke (2000) concluded that the number of party-created internal organizations (of which those targeting women and youth are the most widespread) increased from the 1960s to 1989. Re-examining and comparing such data to the PPDB data we see that the share of Western European parties with youth organizations has increased over time, whereas the share of parties with women's organizations seems to have slightly decreased in recent years due to the low frequency of such sub-party units in newer parties.

Variations in the number of party sub-organizations are seemingly explained by both country- and party-level factors. Thus, some hypotheses on sub-organizations were supported by the data. In the case of contextual factors, we can see that more generous public funding schemes seem to reduce parties' incentives to create sub-organizations, whereas the cleavage structure and the age of democracy do not shape this decision. It should be noted that we find less within-country variance in newer democracies, with the exception of Hungary, but we cannot rule out that the country composition of the PPDB sample leads to this result.

Turning to party-level factors, the effect of the share of party income derived from public funding goes in the expected negative direction but is not statistically significant. In contrast, party age is a strong explanatory variable: newer parties established after the Second World War have created fewer internal organizations than pre-Second World War parties. Similarly, party families which score lower values in the index of party sub-organizations are the Greens, Left Socialists, and the Far Right. They tend to be newer than the well-established Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. This suggests that parties which historically have had a relatively high number of sub-organizations have tended to keep them while newer parties have been less likely to create them.

When testing whether formal linkage mechanisms produce substantive effects, the empirical analysis shows that the establishment of sub-organizations is positively associated with the adoption of quotas to guarantee the presence of group members in party bodies and electoral lists. However, this is only the case for women's party sub-organizations. Where such units exist, gender quotas are more likely to be used for drafting candidates' lists and

determining the composition of parties' decision-making bodies. In addition to women's agency, left-wing ideology seems to be a strong driver of quota adoption. This measure is most widely used by Social Democratic and Green parties, in line with existing research. In contrast, very few parties have established sub-organizations for ethnic minority groups or used quotas to guarantee minorities' representation in party bodies or electoral lists. Moreover, it is worth noting that formal electoral quotas do *not* exist for all the groups gathered in formal collateral organizations.

Our analysis points towards several interesting avenues for future research. Firstly, to provide a more fine-grained examination of parties' anchorage in society and to draw stronger conclusions, the data need to be expanded both cross-sectionally to further explore the effect of country-level variables and longitudinally to assess the degree of the stability or decline of linkage mechanisms. Secondly, we call upon scholars to further examine the factors that shape parties' specific incentives structures beyond the general dependence on public funding. Formal links to different social groups might benefit some parties more than others. Parties relying on such mechanisms could have good reasons to keep (or build) them. Thirdly, another key challenge is to move beyond the party family variable to distinguish empirically whether linkage mechanisms are dictated by organizational traditions or by the pursuit of vote, office or policy-seeking goals. Lastly, we also call on scholars to look beyond strongly formalized connections and pay attention to more informal, less-structured forms of linkage that might not appear in party statutes but still have substantial value.

That said, this chapter takes us a significant step forward by measuring the extent to which parties still use formal linkage mechanisms to connect with social groups. We see that statutory connections tend, by and large, to be relatively weak and do not generally reach a large number of social groups, but we have also learned that parties use such measures to different degrees. Variation seems to exist both at the country-level and the party-level and is likely to increase and be less skewed if we expand our analysis to less formalized connections. Thus, this chapter shows that there are still arguments to be had over the character and shaping factors of contemporary parties' connections with society, both in old and newer democracies.

NOTES

1. While ethnicity and more broadly cultural differences have been traditionally included in the centre-periphery cleavage, we refer here mostly to migrant groups, whose political claims may present a new type of identity conflict within the host society. Indeed, as Kastoryano and Schader (2014: 246) note, migrant groups and ethnic minorities 'are often still discover[ed] as "new" voters'.

2. Missing cases for any of these sub-organizations is assigned a zero value.
3. A multi-level analysis might be more adequate as context also shapes party-level factors, but the available N is not large enough to run such an analysis. However, we run our regression model using clustered errors on country as we have more than one observation per country, so the country-level factors are constant for various units of observation. Also, note that country weights are not applied to correct for the dissimilar number of parties per country included in the PPDB. The distribution of the dependent variable is highly skewed (see Figure 5.1), so the regression models were also run applying a logarithmic transformation to the additive index. We obtained identical results for the coefficient signs and statistical significance of all explanatory variables.
4. It should be noted that Christian Democrats are clustered with Conservative parties which followed the old mass parties' example in the nineteenth century (Poguntke 2002). The few Agrarian parties have not been assigned with a separate party-family value in the PPDB database but also fall in this category.
5. Regarding gender quotas, cross-party variation is significant. Some parties require that the highest executive body reserve a third or even less of seats for women, but most parties have responded to international calls to set parity at a minimum of 40 per cent of positions. Indeed, several parties have issued gender-neutral quotas as party rules stipulating that no sex shall be represented by either less than or higher than 40 per cent–50 per cent. Additionally, some parties do not fix percentages for representation of gender but reserve seats for women. In contrast, ethnic minorities and linguistic and religious groups rarely enjoy specific representation rights in party bodies; only six parties use quotas for these categories.

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Varieties of Intra-Party Democracy

Conceptualization and Index Construction

Benjamin von dem Berge and Thomas Poguntke

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Robert Michels wrote his sobering study on the quality of intra-party democracy (IPD) in the Wilhelmine Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), political activists and political scientists alike have been concerned with the quality and feasibility of democracy within parties. The literature on this topic is almost endless, and we will not attempt to do justice to it beyond a brief summary of the major strands of the debate in order to lay the foundations for this chapter. Essentially, we pursue three aims here: first, we propose the conceptualization of different variants of IPD; this is followed by the presentation and discussion of valid measurements, before we turn finally to a review of the empirical evidence, as revealed by the application of our IPD indices to the Political Party Database Project (PPDB) data.

Despite widespread attention to democracy within parties it is by no means certain that IPD is an essential element of the democratic order. Adherents of a strictly competitive model of democracy, first and most forcefully suggested by Schumpeter (1950), might even argue that democracy within parties represents an unwelcome obstacle to the efficient competition of political elites for power. At the very minimum, they would regard it as largely superfluous (Allern and Pedersen 2007: 72). Significantly, this disregard for IPD has been reflected in many European constitutions for many years. At the time of writing, less than half of Europe's party laws contain requirements that parties should be internally democratic, even though this has become more widespread in recent years (van Biezen and Piccio 2013: 47f.).

To be sure, many others took contrasting views even though the concern with IPD has probably never been at the core of theorizing on liberal democracy: to this day, liberal democracies struggle with the in-built tension between the free mandate of parliamentarians and the systemic requirements

of party democracy. Arguably, Leibholz's theory of the *Parteienstaat* that was very influential in post-war Germany is an exception in that it regards parties, and IPD, as essential elements of popular sovereignty (Stöss 2001).

More ubiquitous were debates among practitioners and party scholars about the limitations and potential of IPD per se, that is, without explicit reference to the quality of democracy. Traditional left-wing parties, the proverbial externally created mass parties, regarded their parliamentary parties as instruments of the party outside parliament; these were part of a wider social movement based on cleavages that structured the (emerging) age of mass politics. Democratic control of the elites by the mass organization was the essence of this model of party democracy, and Michels' study was inspired by deep disappointment with the deficiencies of IPD (Neumann 1956; Michels 1989; LaPalombara and Weiner 1990). Debates about IPD re-emerged in the wake of the emergence of new left parties in the late 1960s and early 1970s and gained powerful momentum when Green parties (partially) reinvented the wheel—this time IPD was called grassroots democracy (e.g., Poguntke 1987; Kitschelt 1988). Last but not least, some right-wing populist parties discovered IPD as a lever to challenge established parties who were criticized for their alleged elitism. Most recently, the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) has not only used this rhetoric but has also copied some organizational features from the Greens, like dual leadership and the possibility of holding party conferences open to all members. From this perspective, to paraphrase Schattschneider's famous dictum, democracy is unthinkable save in terms of internally democratic parties.

This chapter does not seek to decide the normative debate. Instead, we propose ways of measuring IPD that will facilitate the empirical study of the impact of different variants of IPD on the quality of democracy. We will be able to investigate, for example, whether specific adjustments of IPD may be able to slow down or even stop the widespread erosion of party membership. Likewise, IPD may support the electoral success of parties or encourage a democratic political culture or stimulate political participation (Scarrow 1999; Amundsen 2016). Most importantly, however, we show that theoretically and empirically, IPD is two-dimensional in that assembly-based and plebiscitary modes of decision-making follow different logics.

CONCEPTUALIZING IPD

Identifying Dimensions of IPD

Democracy within parties might have different faces and can be achieved differently by different parties. There are authors who speak about 'specific

variants' or 'versions' of IPD (Young and Cross 2002; Saglie and Heidar 2004; Cross and Katz 2013b). Yet, democratic theory offers us a simple, albeit fundamental distinction between two modes of democratic decision-making that can be fruitfully applied to IPD. Essentially, democratic decision-making follows two fundamentally different logics, namely either direct (plebiscitary) or representative (assembly-based) decision-making (Held 1996; Kriesi 2005). *Assembly-based* decision-making means that those who eventually cast their vote on a certain issue deliberate, exchange ideas and negotiate over alternative options within an assembly or forum. *Plebiscitary* decision-making, on the contrary, disconnects the act of voting from the discussion over the alternatives that are put to a vote. To be sure, there may be a substantial public debate over the substance of a plebiscite but this debate cannot change the alternatives that are put to a vote. In other words, decision-making comes down to an 'either/or'. Of course, any kind of compromise may be achieved in the process that precedes the actual plebiscite, when the alternative options are formulated. But the final decision is dichotomous. Moreover, it is taken by the membership or polity at large in a mass ballot, rather than by those engaged in debate in a particular forum or assembly. Therefore, we identify two main dimensions of IPD: assembly-based IPD and plebiscitary IPD.

From the perspective of intra-party politics, the plebiscitary mode can be subdivided depending on whether the boundaries of the organization are relevant for the definition of the party 'demos' (Cross and Katz 2013b: 4). Some parties have opened up major decisions (frequently over personnel) to anyone who claims to be broadly supportive of the party's general goals, thereby following the model of many US primaries. This calls into question the traditional concept of a political party as a membership-based organization with clear organizational boundaries between those who belong to the organization and those who remain outside. In the case of such parties, the right to participate in certain intra-party decisions is tied to membership status, mostly documented through a regular financial contribution to the party.¹

The Various Aspects of IPD

The discussion above suggests that there cannot be a universally agreed definition of IPD because it is essentially two-dimensional. Consequently, Cross and Katz argue that 'IPD cannot be measured in a way that permits a "scientific" conclusion that one party is more democratic than the other' (Cross and Katz 2013b: 6). To reinforce this argument, the authors compare IPD with democracy at the nation-state level and conclude that '[r]ankings of how democratic various countries are depend on the definition they ascribe to democracy and the same is true for IPD' (ibid.). Nevertheless, there are

several well developed and widely recognized democracy indices which are constructed to measure levels of democracy at the nation state level.² These indices are theoretically derived by defining factors (also called ‘dimensions’ or ‘indicators’) which are considered necessary for democratic political systems. Our way of conceptualizing IPD follows a comparable approach in that we attempt to find the common denominator in the relevant literature that allows us to propose simple yet valid conceptualizations of what we consider to be the principal modes of IPD. The following quote by Cross and Katz represents a suitable point of departure for our conceptual endeavour because it summarizes all central points of the pertinent debates:

Like democracy itself, the definition of IPD is essentially contestable. [a] Is it primarily about participation, inclusiveness, centralization, accountability, or something else altogether? [b] Should the emphasis be on outcomes or on process? For example, if inclusiveness is a key consideration, in terms of candidate selection is the concern about the inclusiveness of the selectorate (those who choose the candidates), or is it about the diversity of the group of candidates ultimately selected? [c] And, who is either group meant to be inclusive of – party members, party supporters in the electorate, the electorate generally? (Cross and Katz 2013b: 2; letters added)

a) The central role of inclusiveness. First, we need to decide what constitutes IPD. To follow Cross and Katz, ‘is it primarily about participation, inclusiveness, (de-)centralization, accountability, or something else altogether?’ For several reasons, in our conceptualization IPD equals *inclusiveness*. This is mainly because we maintain that the relevant elements of the other aspects are logically sub-categories of inclusiveness.

According to Scarrow (2005: 6), inclusiveness refers to the question of ‘how wide the circle of party decision makers is’. In exclusive parties, the main decisions like candidate selection, leadership selection and decisions on the manifesto are made by a small number of party actors, that is, the party leadership (a single leader or a small group of leaders). In contrast, in inclusive parties, a large number of party members make decisions on the central issues of the party. From this perspective, inclusiveness is the most important aspect when evaluating how democratic intra-party decision-making processes are (see, e.g., Cross 2008; Kenig 2008, 2009; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Cross and Blais 2012; Gauja 2013; Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan 2013).

This definition of inclusiveness incorporates the important aspects of ‘participation’, ‘centralization’ and—in a wider sense—‘accountability’. The degree of inclusiveness in decision-making on the main party issues like candidate selection, leadership selection and the decision on the manifesto is directly related to the extent of *participation*. The degree of *centralization* is also relevant to IPD, but here the situation is more complex. In *centralized* parties, the main ‘decisions are made by a single group or decision body’ (Scarrow 2005: 6; see

also Bille 2001) at the national level, and are ‘accepted at all levels of the party’, while in decentralized parties the different party layers are represented in national bodies in order to influence decisions at the national party level (von dem Berge et al. 2013). Therefore, decentralization can be seen as an aspect of IPD (Cross 2008: 598f.). But its incorporation into the concept of IPD is at least questionable (see also Rahat and Shapira 2016). First of all, a party can be highly centralized but still have an internally democratic (inclusive) structure. Second, a decentralized (federalized) party can be highly undemocratic (exclusive) within each of its federal components—this would be a stratarchically organized party with exclusive decision-making processes in each of its different vertical layers. However, there is one important difference between a centralized and a decentralized party regarding IPD (inclusiveness): An undemocratic (exclusive) centralized party has only one power centre while an undemocratic (exclusive) decentralized party has several or even many power centres. This means that in a decentralized party there are more party members involved in making decisions simply because there are more power centres. From this perspective a decentralized party is necessarily somewhat more democratic because it is necessarily somewhat more inclusive. Therefore, we argue that our conceptualization of inclusiveness covers the ‘democratic’ aspects of decentralization.

Moreover, our conceptualization of inclusiveness pertains to the most important aspect of *accountability*, namely whether the party leader is accountable to other bodies like the congress. As all other party bodies are more inclusive than the party leader, their decision-making rights automatically mean that they can exert a degree of control over the leader. In the same vein, to the extent that the leader has power over the other party bodies, this has to be seen as exclusive, because the party leader is the most exclusive ‘party body’.

To sum up, we maintain that IPD equals inclusiveness defined in the following terms: (i) the higher the number of party members involved in intra-party decision-making (relative to party size), (ii) the more open the election and composition of party organs (e.g., absence of ex officio seats), and (iii) the more the party leader shares power with other, more inclusive party organs or actors, the more inclusive (and therefore the more ‘democratic’) a party is.

b) Process or outcome. The second question Cross and Katz (2013b: 2) raise is whether the emphasis should be on processes or on outcomes. They ask ‘if inclusiveness is a key consideration, in terms of candidate selection is the concern about the inclusiveness of the selectorate (those who choose the candidates), or is it about the diversity of the group of candidates ultimately selected?’ (Cross and Katz 2013b: 2). In a way, their question contains the answer. When conceptualizing IPD, the focus should be on ‘the inclusiveness of the selectorate’ (process) rather than on the inclusiveness of ‘the group of candidates ultimately selected’ (outcome). After all, we are concerned with

IPD, and this is where the process is, *within* the party. To be sure, the outcome (the selected group of candidates) is also at the party level, but the ‘democratic relevance’ of the outcome is primarily attributable to the nation-state rather than the party. This becomes apparent in another statement of the authors: ‘highly participatory [i.e., inclusive] party decision-making, in areas such as candidate selection, may lead to less inclusive *legislatures*’ (Katz and Cross 2013: 172; specification in bracket and emphasis added). This means that the ‘democratic problem’ of less inclusive legislatures resides primarily at the level of the nation-state rather than the party level. As outlined above, our aim is to measure *IPD* and not to contribute to the normative debate whether *IPD* is good or necessary for a democratic political system at the nation-state level. Therefore, the conclusion that an inclusive (democratic) process of candidate selection may lead to less inclusive legislatures is irrelevant for the concept of *IPD* itself. From a strictly analytical point of view, *IPD* at the party-level and democracy at the nation-state level are two distinct concepts. Therefore, in contrast to Hazan and Rahat (2010), we follow a narrow understanding of *IPD* and thus do not consider the effects of *IPD*-procedures on the quality of democracy at the state level.³

c) The demos. The third relevant aspect for the conceptualization of *IPD* concerns the *demos*: should party members, party supporters or the entire electorate of a country be considered when judging the inclusiveness of a party organization (Cross and Katz 2013b: 4)? The answer is that, strictly speaking, the focus should lie on the (traditional) members, because—again—we are concerned with *IPD* and therefore it might be considered ‘undemocratic’ if someone outside of the party can decide what happens within the party (Indriðason and Kristinnsson 2015: 569, 574). However, as we are aware of the changing nature of party membership (Gauja 2015; Scarrow 2015) our conceptualization of *IPD* also considers open primaries in which the entire electorate may participate as a special case.

Identifying Specific Components of IPD

The preceding discussion makes clear that we need to develop a conceptualization of *IPD* which focuses on the inclusiveness of intra-party politics. Furthermore, we will limit it to the process of *IPD* and disregard potential effects on outcome. Hence our measurement of *IPD* is based on three theoretically derived components (see Figure 6.1) which largely correspond to von dem Berge et al. (2013). These three components are ‘Decision-Making: Programme’, ‘Decision-Making: Personnel’ and ‘Organizational Structure’. This is consistent with the notion in research that decision-making is the most crucial element of *IPD* (e.g., Hazan and Rahat 2010; Cross and Katz 2013a; Rahat and Shapira 2016: 11).




FIGURE 6.1 IPD and its components

(1) *Decision-making: programme.* The development, formulation and implementation of policies is one of the most important functions of political parties. It is a core element in the process of interest aggregation and plays an essential role for the linkages that parties provide to the citizenry (see Hennl and Franzmann, Chapter 11 in this volume). Manifestos are the billboards of parties which they use to attract voters. Therefore, the question of who actually decides on the manifesto of a party is an important aspect of IPD. In contrast to the personnel aspects of intra-party decision-making, previous research has largely neglected the democratic quality of manifesto decision-making.⁴ The theoretical relevance for IPD is straightforward—as Gauja (2013: 117) writes, it ‘can be conceptualized as simply allowing or enabling party members to “have their say” when it comes to formulating party policy.’ This refers to the inclusiveness of the decision-making process and can be realized by plebiscitary or assembly-based means (Gauja 2013: 118).

(2) *Decision-making: personnel.* Within the component ‘personnel’ two intra-party processes are relevant: leadership selection and candidate selection (e.g., Niedermayer 1989: 15–17). To start with the first, by definition, the party leader usually is the most important person within a political party because he or she plays a major role in guiding the party, and because he or she is the key figure ‘both in the electoral and organizational activities of parties and in the legislative and executive spheres’ (Cross and Blais 2012: 145). Furthermore, as the position of the party leader usually serves as a gatekeeper to the leading executive office in a state (because a person seeking this position most often first has to become a party leader)⁵ the method by which the leader is selected is a crucial political process (Kenig 2008: 241). Therefore, the selection of the party leader is clearly one of the most important decision-making processes within a political party (Cross and Blais 2012: 145).

Similarly, there can be little doubt that candidate selection is one of the most important aspects of intra-party politics. It has even been designated as

‘one of the central defining functions of a political party in a democracy’ (Katz 2001: 278). For both processes, candidate and leadership selection, it holds that the inclusiveness of the selectorate (the body who selects the leaders and candidates) may be regarded as the most important aspect from the perspective of IPD (e.g., Cross 2008: 598; Kenig 2009: 434; Hazan and Rahat 2010: 33; Cross and Blais 2012; Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan 2013: 7).

(3) *Organizational structure*: This component of IPD deals with the formal distribution of power within a party. The party congress plays an important role here, because it is usually the main rule-making body in an inclusive party (usually also in parties with plebiscitary elements). For example, who is able to vote in the congress is clearly important: local delegates, regional delegates or all party members? Another important question is how often a congress is held (Rudzio 2006: 148). Clearly, a party that holds frequent party congresses provides for more grass roots involvement and hence for more inclusive intra-party decision-making compared to a party holding infrequent party congresses. In addition, the prerogatives and accountability of the party leader are important features of IPD (von dem Berge et al. 2013: 10f.). For example, it is an indication of exclusiveness if the party leader has great power over the other party bodies.

With respect to the decision-making components, we are interested in who has the final say (or the final vote), be it on the manifesto, on the selection of candidates or on the selection of the party leader. Of course, other questions are important, for example, who is in charge of writing the party manifesto. But in order not to overload the concept and our measurement, we focus only on the most important aspect of intra-party decision-making and this is who votes last.⁶ This corresponds to positions on IPD taken by others. Carty, for example, argues that the core question regarding IPD is who has the real basic power when hard decisions are to be taken, the members or the elites (Carty 2013: 25). Similarly, according to Cross and Katz (2013b: 10), the ultimate questions regarding IPD are ‘to what extent, how, and in which aspects of party life the members are able to control what their party does’; the final decisions define the outcomes of such processes. This is basically what we mean with inclusiveness, and it can happen via representative bodies like a party congress or through plebiscitary means.

MEASURING INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY

Three Indices of Intra-party Democracy

As we have argued above, there are two fundamentally different logics of decision-making based on assemblies or plebiscites, which result in two

theoretically distinct dimensions of IPD. Furthermore, we need to consider the possibility that plebiscitary decision-making may be open to non-party members. This leads us to three indices of IPD which we will briefly describe here before we turn to details of the index construction (see also Appendix A6.1–3).

a) The assembly-based IPD index (AIPD). The AIPD index measures inclusiveness for the three essential components of IPD, namely decision-making over programme, personnel selection (leaders and candidates) and organizational structure. In a nutshell, the AIPD index measures the inclusiveness of decision-making inside parties that is based on discussions within party bodies and assemblies. In other words, it combines two aspects, namely the maintenance of organizational boundaries and decision-making based on the exchange of arguments within designated party bodies. It also includes assemblies of all members (e.g., at the constituency level). Hence it is not confined to representative decision-making, but it requires the temporal coincidence of discussion and decision. A higher index score indicates that a more inclusive assembly or party body has the final say on decisions over personnel and policy, and intra-organizational power is less top-heavy.

b) The plebiscitary IPD index (PIPD). The PIPD index measures the degree to which parties allow for decision-making concerning programme writing and personnel selection based on the plebiscitary logic of one-member-one-vote.⁷ Plebiscitary decision-making disconnects the process of discussion and deliberation from the actual decision which is eventually taken by the lone party member at his or her desk or computer screen. We contend that this is a fundamentally different logic as there is no way to deliberate and reach compromise (frequently through repeated rounds of voting). It is the politics of ‘either/or’. Even though formally the members decide, it is dichotomous politics which arguably gives a lot of power to the leaders (Katz and Mair 1995: 21). On the other hand, it may also be used as a leadership-challenging device. What counts for us is that it follows an inherently different logic compared to assembly-based decision-making (Cross and Katz 2013b: 6).

c) The open plebiscitary IPD index (OPIPD). The OPIPD index also includes non-party members in decision-making. This is a special variant of PIPD which is, strictly speaking, no longer IPD because it transcends the boundaries of IPD. There is no longer an ‘intra’ because everybody is allowed to participate.

Patterns of Intra-party Democracy

Both assembly-based and plebiscitary variants of IPD can be distinguished as regards their levels of inclusiveness. Naturally, the variance is larger for

assembly-based IPD because decision-making may be restricted to the higher echelons of the party hierarchy or it may be devolved to grassroots assemblies. Plebiscitary IPD, by its very nature, tends to be dichotomous. In other words, decision-making is either plebiscitary or not. Yet, the types of decisions that are taken by plebiscites can vary in that they may be applicable to all, few or very selective kinds of decision the party has to take. As all parties, with very few exceptions, have an organization that includes one or more layers of executive committees and conferences, a certain portion of their organizational decisions will be made by more or less inclusive groups of people following the logic of assembly-based IPD. This means that virtually all parties will have a score on the AIPD index even if they have shifted all personnel and programmatic decisions to plebiscites. In other words, saving some conspicuous exceptions such as the Italian Five-Star Movement, parties always have an element of assembly-based IPD. In contrast, many parties have no plebiscitary provisions (much less open plebiscites). Hence, the democratic quality of assembly-based organizational decision-making is the core of IPD and the other variants are modifications. However, these variants are not simply 'add-ons', because they transform the nature of intra-party decision-making.

If we disregard the case of the open plebiscitary mode of IPD, which represents an empirically rare special case of plebiscitary IPD (see also Cross and Pilet 2015), we can distinguish between four different modes of IPD (see Figure 6.2). As all plebiscites require some kind assembly-based intra-party decision-making in order to decide about the substance of the plebiscite, the latter can be combined with more or less inclusive assembly-based decision-making. In other words, plebiscites can be the result of relatively exclusive decisions made by a small circle of party leaders or they can be initiated by the party on the ground. While the elite-driven version is likely to empower the party elites (Katz and Mair 1995: 21), the grassroots plebiscitary initiative is likely to have the opposite effect. Figure 6.2 shows that we can theoretically expect four combinations of the degree of plebiscitary and assembly-based IPD: The upper left quadrant (I) would largely correspond to the traditional mass party characterized by a (at least formally) high degree of assembly-based IPD and few opportunities for plebiscitary decision-making. Moving clockwise to the upper right side (II), we find parties which combine a high degree of intra-organizational, representative democracy with many provisions for party plebiscites. The lower right-hand quadrant (III) depicts the cartel party as described by Katz and Mair, who maintained that this party type would be characterized by a strong party elite and the marginalization of party activists through plebiscites. Finally, the lower left side (IV) echoes the traditional cadre party characterized by low degrees of AIPD and PIPD. To be sure, we should not read too much into Figure 6.2 as we focus on one aspect of party organization and this is certainly insufficient to




FIGURE 6.2 Patterns of intra-party democracy

embark on a discussion of possible party types.⁸ However, it shows that different combinations of these two principal variants of IPD are possible. It remains an empirical question to what degree they can be found in modern parties. Hence, we need valid measurements of both variants of IPD. This will be our task in the subsequent sections.

Data and Item Selection

For the measurement of our three IPD indices we draw on the PPDB Project, which collected data on 122 party organizations across 19 modern democracies. We regard IPD as a continuum (Saglie and Heidar 2004: 388). Our IPD indices consist of items covering the ‘official story’ and the ‘real story’ (Katz and Mair 1992). The official story is captured by items which focus on party statutes and the real story by items focusing on processes going on in real life party events. We include both because some processes are not regulated in party statutes, which is why the PPDB project includes, as far as possible, items capturing the real story. Where we have data on the official and the real story, we use the real story items because it is closer to reality (Rahat and Shapira 2016: 13). Otherwise, we use the official story as a good estimate.

The selection of relevant PPDB items is largely based on theoretical considerations following von dem Berge et al. (2013). Each relevant PPDB item is assigned to one of the three IPD components as illustrated in Figure 6.1

(see also Appendices 6.1–3). A document explaining the index construction is also available on the PPDB website (<<https://www.politicalpartydb.org/>>), where we explain in detail the theoretical rationale of the item selection and the assignment of scores to individual items. The general logic of this quantification is described in the following sub-section.

Quantification

Our AIPD index is based on relevant PPDB variables which were recoded according to their bearing on the inclusiveness of intra-party decision-making. As a rule, we coded variable items as 0.00 or 0.25 if they indicate that a given party has no or a modest level of inclusiveness on this specific aspect of IPD; 0.50 was allocated for a medium level and 0.75 and 1.00 for high levels of inclusiveness. In some cases, this involved ranking party arenas first according to their inclusiveness. Table 6.1 illustrates the logic: a party where the party congress has a final vote on the manifesto has the highest score on this particular aspect while a party where the leader has the final word is considered to be least inclusive.⁹

The AIPD index is made up of three components (i.e., manifesto writing, personnel-selection, and organizational structure) for which we have a different number of variables. In order to weigh them equally, we have first calculated a score for each component; the final AIPD index-value is then the arithmetic mean of the three components. Table A6.1 in the appendix shows all items that have been used. As it is impossible to document all coding rules in this appendix, please refer to the PPDB website for a detailed documentation. The construction of the PIDP and the OIPD indices is less complex because we have fewer variables and they are dichotomous in that they measure whether or not all party members or supporters have a final vote on party matters. The values of the final index scores are simply the arithmetic means of all included IPD variables (see Appendix A6.2 and A6.3 for details).

TABLE 6.1 *Ranking and quantification of the IPD variable 'manifesto vote' (AIPD-Index)*

PPDB item	IPD value	Effect on IPD
Party congress	1.00	Pro IPD
—	0.75	
Party legislators	0.50	Not explicitly pro/contra IPD
Executive committee	0.25	
Party leader	0.00	Contra IPD

Question: 'Who has a vote on adopting the final manifesto?'

Further Considerations: Defining the Indices more Precisely

Our IPD measures represent ‘indices’ rather than ‘scales’ because they are composed of indicators (or groups of indicators) which measure different characteristics (dimensions) of the underlying theoretical construct while scales use multiple indicators related to the same dimension (Andreß 2001; Latcheva and Davidov 2014: 745–7). In our IPD indices these different dimensions are the three components presented in Figure 6.1.

The quantification method presented above is in fact an example of an additive-cumulative index based on mean values of the individual indicators.¹⁰ Thus, our indices are *formative indices* rather than *reflective* ones (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; Coltman et al. 2008; Diamantopoulos, Riefler, and Roth 2008: 1204). While in a reflective model the latent construct exists independently of the measures, in a formative model, the latent construct is a combination of its measures and is formed by the scholar on the basis of theoretical justifications (Coltman et al. 2008: 1251). This means that individual measures of a reflective index must correlate while this is not a requirement for a formative index (Diamantopoulos, Riefler, and Roth 2008: 1205). If one of the component-values of a formative index increases, the overall index-value also increases; but if the overall index-value increases, this is not necessarily accompanied by an increase in each of the individual component-values (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001: 270f.). Thus, regarding the overall index-value, a low value of Component A can be balanced by a higher value of Component B. In the end, the sum of the measures represents the latent variable. The PPDB items are combined to form IPD variables, which are further combined to tap one of the IPD components. Therefore, the final AIPD score is the sum of all these components, which can vary independently of each other.¹¹

INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY IN THE REAL WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW

We will return to these measures in Chapter 7, where we analyse causes and consequences of AIPD and provide a detailed breakdown of AIPD and PIPD scores for all parties included in our study. However, the preceding theoretical discussion, conceptualization, and development of empirical measurements would be incomplete without an initial empirical exploration into the territory of IPD. Our first result is somewhat surprising. Even though open primaries regularly attract widespread attention, they have so far remained a rare exception. In the period we examine, only four out of 122 parties had rules that facilitate the participation of non-members in decisions over the party

manifesto, individual policies or the elections of leaders.¹² In other words, when it comes to participating in relevant decisions, most parties still regard their dues-paying membership as the relevant demos. Arguably the two most conspicuous cases, namely the election of Matteo Renzi as leader of the Italian Democrats and Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the UK Labour Party, happened after our study was in the field, and have thus not been included here.

Hence, we will now focus on the two variants of IPD which are *intra-party* in the traditional sense in that they adhere to the boundary of the membership organization as the basis of participation rights in decisions over party affairs (AIPD and PIPD). At the current stage, we can use the PPDB data only for cross-sectional analyses, drawing on data that has been collected for round 1 of the project covering one or more years between 2011 and 2014. In order to reduce missing data, we have always used the most recent data available (usually 2014). Furthermore, despite our argument that the indices are formative rather than reflective, we found it empirically justifiable to include parties for which the AIPD values are only based on two of the three components; the component ‘decision-making: programme’ produced a large number of missing values.¹³ This problem will gradually reduce with subsequent waves of data collection.

Figure 6.3 shows the frequency distributions of our two indices. As we have argued above, the AIPD index taps into the core of intra-party decision-making. All parties except the Dutch Freedom Party have a valid score on this dimension of IPD, and all of them have a minimum of AIPD—which comes as little surprise given that we are analysing parties in democratic countries. The results for the plebiscitary IPD index also conform to our expectation in that almost half of the parties (42.7 per cent) have a PIPD value of zero meaning that they have not (yet) introduced plebiscitary methods of decision-making.




FIGURE 6.3 Frequency distributions of AIPD and PIPD indices




FIGURE 6.4 Patterns of intra-party democracy

Furthermore, the distribution is discontinuous (in that not all possible values actually occur empirically), which is a result of the relatively small number of variables that compose this index (see Appendix A6.2).

The empirical results also confirm our argument that AIPD and PIPD *are* distinct dimensions of IPD which can be combined in different ways. Figure 6.4 adds data to our conceptualization of the dimensionality of IPD that was set out in Figure 6.2. This makes clear that parties choose different combinations of AIPD and PIPD. We have adjusted the scales to account for the fact that no party has an AIPD value below 0.26. Few parties combine low AIPD with high PIPD (quadrant III), which would be our ideal typical case of a cartel party. Instead, we find that many parties with medium to high assembly-based IPD combine this with plebiscitary measures (quadrant II). This is probably a more realistic empirical manifestation of trends towards the marginalization of party activists as was predicted by Katz and Mair. After all, it is unlikely that such parties would reduce or even abolish their traditional assembly-based decision procedures and substitute them with plebiscitary means. Instead, they simply seem to complement (or even bypass) AIPD with PIPD procedures. At the same time, we find a fairly large number of parties combining low AIPD and PIPD scores, which would conform to the traditional cadre party model (quadrant IV). Also, the traditional mass party model with a formally democratic party organization based on internal assembly-based democracy is empirically clearly identifiable (quadrant I).

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have presented an integrated approach to measuring the level of IPD by using data of the Political Party Database Project (PPDB). In this respect, our main goal has been to make a contribution to the empirical measurement of IPD rather than to the normative discussion about whether IPD is desirable or not for political parties and democratic political systems. But of course, the data we presented in this chapter can be used to contribute to this normative debate. Furthermore, compared to the few existing measures of IPD, our concept and measurement includes an important innovation: the distinction between different conceptual dimensions of IPD which result empirically in different IPD indices. Most important is the distinction between an assembly-based variant of IPD and a plebiscitary variant of IPD.

Some scholars argue that party elites may implement plebiscitary methods of intra-party decision-making processes in order to reduce the power of rank-and-file activists and increase their own control by empowering the docile and passive members (Marsh 1993; Mair 1994; Katz 2002; Rahat 2013). This is most apparent in the cartel thesis, which interprets the introduction of membership ballots as 'enhanced leadership autonomy' because such plebiscites can easily 'be manipulated by oligarchic elites' (Saglie and Heidar 2004). On this reading the implementation of (open) primaries might lead to a more oligarchic party leadership (Saglie and Heidar 2004). In the same vein, primaries have been seen as a means of providing national party elites with the opportunity to lower the power of intermediate party structures and thereby increase their own power (Hopkin 2001). While this is all convincing, our results indicate that plebiscitary intra-party decision-making may be combined in several ways with traditional, assembly-based IPD. When high levels of AIPD and PIPD are combined this does not necessarily empower party leaders. On the contrary, it is more plausible that plebiscitary measures may also be used as a tool of the party rank and file to challenge the power of the leadership. After all, the combination of high levels of AIPD and PIPD introduces two competing logics of legitimacy into intra-party politics, namely legitimization by a more or less inclusive assembly and by the membership (or supporters) at large. It is easy to envisage political constellations where these two logics clash, for example, when a coalition deal is put to a ballot after it has been agreed by the parliamentary party and the party leadership, or when a parliamentary party vote favours one candidate for leadership while the membership chooses another. These scenarios show that the political effects of specific formal power constellations are highly dependent on the political context.

APPENDIX: THE INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY INDICES

TABLE A 6.1 *Composition of assembly-based IPD index (AIPD)*

IPD Component	Decision-making: <i>Programme</i>	Decision-making: <i>Personnel</i>	Organizational structure
IPD variables (PPDB items)	Who has the final vote on the manifesto?	(1a) Are rules for the selection of the party leader existent? (1b) Who has the final vote in the party leader selection process? (1c) Was there a vote at the most inclusive stage of the party leader selection process? (1d) Who was eligible to participate in this vote (referring to previous question)? (2) Who has the final vote in the candidate selection process?	Who is eligible to vote at the party congress? How frequently must a party congress be held? Who has ex officio seats with full voting rights in the party's highest executive body? Prerogatives and accountability of the party leader?
IPD score component	Variable score = component score	Arithmetic mean of (1) 'party leader selection variables' and (2) 'candidate selection variable'	Arithmetic mean of all 'organizational structure variables'
AIPD score final	Arithmetic mean of the components 'DM: programme', 'DM: personnel' and 'organizational structure'		

Note: 1b and d partially overlap. We have decided to keep both variables to improve precision. For a detailed explanation of the index construction see the explanatory document on the PPDB website <<https://www.politicalpartydb.org/>>. For the AIPD and PIPD index values of each party see appendix of Ch. 7 and PPDB website.

TABLE A6.2 *Composition of plebiscitary IPD index (PIPD)*

IPD component	IPD variables (PPDB items)
Decision-making: <i>Programme and issues</i>	Do all party members have a vote on the manifesto? Are there intra-party policy ballots in which all party members vote on policy issues?
Decision-making: <i>Personnel</i>	Do all party members have a vote in the party leader selection process? Do all party members have the final vote in the candidate selection process?
Organizational structure	No items/variables
PIPD score	Arithmetic mean of all variables

TABLE A6.3 *Composition of open plebiscitary IPD index (OPIPD)*

IPD component	IPD variables (PPDB items)
Decision-making: <i>Programme and issues</i>	Do non-member party supporters have a vote on adopting the final manifesto? Are there policy ballots in which non-member party supporters vote in decisions on policy issues?
Decision-making: <i>Personnel</i>	Do non-member party supporters have a vote in the party leader selection process? No items/variables on candidate selection
Organizational structure	No items/variables
OPIPD score	Arithmetic mean of all variables

NOTES

1. To be sure, the British Labour Party model operated on a modified principle by allowing for collective membership which meant that membership was only indirect and trade union leaders exercised political rights within the party on behalf of their membership (traditionally without asking them for their position).
2. Just to name a few of them: Democracy Barometer, Polity IV Database, Combined Index of Democracy (CID), Freedom in the World Database, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
3. The following statement of Hazan and Rahat (2010) makes this point even clearer: ‘the questions “which is the most democratic candidate selection method?” and “which is the best candidate selection method for democracy?” are not identical, and could be answered differently based on how one perceives democracy. If democracy is equivalent to inclusive participation, then the answer to the first question is clearly the most inclusive candidate selection method – but this is not necessarily the correct answer to the second question.’
4. Exceptions are von dem Berge et al. 2013, Gauja 2013, and Rahat and Shapira 2016.
5. This is different in some presidential systems.
6. Therefore, whenever the phrasing in the PPDB questionnaire allowed for it, we included in the indices which party body has the ‘final’ vote. When the phrasing in

the questionnaire only included the term 'vote' (and not 'final vote'), then we had to be satisfied with this.

7. Note that the component 'organizational structure' is not relevant for plebiscitary IPD (see next section).
8. Party typologies usually draw on considerations of resource distribution, the relationship between the three faces of party organization or the size of the membership.
9. The value 0.75 is not assigned for this variable, because there is no PPDB-item corresponding to this IPD value. A theoretically possible item for the 0.75-value would be 'party sub-units' having a vote on the manifesto, because there would be more party members involved than in the case of 'party legislators' decisions and fewer party members than in 'party congress' decisions.
10. 'Cumulative' because some variables are generated on the basis of rankings, which can be defined as 'sub-indices'. A cumulative index is defined as an index consisting of multiple sub-indices (Croissant and Thiery 2000: 106).
11. The definition of the particular form of index is not only of abstract theoretical importance; it also has empirical consequences. For instance, in contrast to formative indices, reflective indices can be constructed by factor analyses. Also, the conventional procedures to measure validity and reliability cannot be applied to formative indices. Thus, internal consistency is not a quality criterion for formative indices because (as mentioned above) the individual components do not have to correlate with each other. Instead, the quality of a formative index is largely defined by the quality of the theoretical concept on which the index is based. Concerning this matter, a formative index should consist of all theoretically relevant components which measure the latent variable (Bollen 1989: 222; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001: 271ff.). A change in the components leads to a change in the latent variable (Coltman et al. 2008: 1252 ff.). To be sure, the PPDB group integrated as many relevant items as possible but an ideal data set for measuring our variants of IPD might well include more variables.
12. Liberal Party, Federalists, Democrats, Francophones (Belgium); United Left (Spain); Liberal Party (Canada). The first round of the PPDB project did not include an item on candidate selection open to non-members.
13. Excluding all parties with a missing value on the component 'manifesto' would have reduced the number of cases to sixty-one. We have decided to include cases with missing values on one component as the correlation between the two versions of the AIPD index is 0.843.

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Patterns of Intra-Party Democracy across the World

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INTRODUCTION

The relevance of political parties for political systems, especially for democratic systems, is broadly discussed and described by numerous scholars. In addition, the importance of intra-party democracy (IPD) for various outcomes inside and outside the parties themselves has attracted much scholarly attention (e.g., Scarrow 2005; Cross and Katz 2013; von dem Berge et al. 2013). IPD is seen as a part of the connection between state and society, as one of the principal tracks of citizen influence. It is also understood as a payoff to citizens for their engagement in political parties (Katz and Cross 2013: 174). Besides this, IPD fulfils several functions. It allows party members to deliberate and form preferences; it realizes the aggregation of these preferences within the party; and it is a source of legitimacy for major intra-party decisions about recruitment (to party and public offices) and policy development (Teorell 1999; Allern and Pedersen 2007).

Despite the widespread recognition of the relevance of IPD, there has been a lamentable scarcity of empirical data suitable for large-N cross-sectional comparative analysis. This has changed with the Political Party Database Project (PPDB) project. While Chapter 6 discusses in detail conceptualization and measurement of different variants of IPD, this chapter sheds some light on the current state of IPD within political parties around the world. The main questions that we answer are about whether and how IPD varies systematically according to criteria such as party family, country or group of countries, age, size, and other variables, including those directly related to the functioning of democracy. To answer these questions, we begin with some theoretical considerations, consisting of a brief outline of the normative debate on IPD and a discussion of hypotheses that can be tested through empirical analysis.

NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

If democracy means the rule of the people, usually taken to mean the adult citizens of a given polity, then IPD must mean the rule of the equivalent basic constituents of a given party, which must be its members (and, in some cases, supporters, too). Why, then, should IPD be of interest to scholars and, indeed, to politics in general? The question is worth asking at this early stage, for it is not obvious that democratic decision-making and power structures within parties are a normatively positive attribute.

Of course, not all organizations are internally democratic, yet their very existence may still enhance democracy, and the constraint of power, in a broader context. Very few private companies are internally democratic; some may not be very open or tolerant environments either. However, their existence can very well contribute to consumer satisfaction if they make products that people can choose to buy—or, crucially, that they choose not to buy and perhaps instead buy some other company's product. In the political market, consumers—that is, citizens and electors—can communicate their preferences about the direction of public policy by voting for a party that is entirely non-democratic internally, as long as they choose freely to do so, and as long as they retain the freedom to switch their preference at a future election. The communication of preferences and the constraints of power are thus facilitated through competition between parties at the level of the polity, not by competition within a party or parties.

This amounts to what Allern and Pedersen (2007) identify as the 'competitive' view of democracy, associated perhaps most strongly with Schumpeter (1942). Democracy demands that parties are responsive to voters, not to members. In some forms, the competitive view may regard IPD as not only unnecessary for polity-level democracy, but even detrimental to it (Katz and Cross 2013: 171ff.). Internal forces may push a party away from the electorate's preferences, although that need only be a problem if there is a dearth of other parties that can fill the gap. A greater difficulty may sometimes be generated if IPD reveals or even promotes intra-party disunity. A party's collective preferences may then become unclear to voters. That makes the consequence of voting for it less predictable, which, in turn, disempowers the principal—the voter—in this act of delegation (see Downs 1957: 24–7; Sjöblom 1968: 87).

Still, this is not the prevalent view among more normatively inclined observers. Most contributors to the discussion tend to regard IPD as, on balance, a plus for democracy. Perhaps the most straightforward argument in favour of IPD, at least on the surface, is that it provides citizens with an additional means of monitoring and controlling the people to whom they delegate political authority. Inter-party competition is indispensable, but, on top of that, IPD permits further checks on the powers that be. Müller (2000),

for example, observes that parliamentarians, despite being elected to public office by the electorate at large, are only in a position to be elected (at least in the vast majority of elections in parliamentary democracies) because of prior endorsement by a party. This means, Müller argues (2000: 319), that ‘party representatives in public office ultimately remain the agents of the extra-parliamentary party organization’. If the party’s procedure for selecting its candidates for public elections is democratic, it is the members—who are, of course, also (nearly always) citizens—who exercise this additional control function. Similarly, holders of executive office, especially prime ministers, nearly always become contenders for the position by dint of the status accorded them by their respective parties—usually that of party leader.

In sum, then, IPD provides citizens with further means of holding power to account. But that is not the only argument for it. Two other broad arguments, both of even more normative character, are closely related to each other. Allern and Pedersen (2007) refer to them as the ‘participatory’ and ‘deliberative’ views of democracy. What these views posit is that IPD in itself promotes consequences that, though essentially by-products, are nevertheless good for democracy. Parties structure the vote, mobilizing engagement in and support for democratic processes. This engagement increases the pool from which capable public officials can be recruited. Intra-party discussion also has an educating property. By arriving at policy positions through democratic procedures, the party’s members can actually acquire more informed preferences (Teorell 1999).

Finally, the party leadership might also find it desirable to safeguard IPD. Sjöblom (1968: 183–4), for example, argues that parties’ main objective in the internal arena is to be coherent. Certainly, one way to achieve that is by having an internally democratic order. Moreover, in some parties, member-orientated processes are deemed important in their own right. Specifically, Green parties formed not only to promote environmental issues but also as a protest against the highly centralized workings of the parties in power (Poguntke 1987; Harmel and Janda 1994: 269; Kitschelt and McGann 1995: 71).

Clearly, then, IPD matters. Much has been written about it, in academic literature and elsewhere. But how does IPD look in the real world of politics? How much of it is there, and what kind? In this chapter, we are interested in the degree of empirical variation in IPD, and in some potential causes and consequences of that variation. Before we turn to the discussion of relevant hypotheses, however, we need to discuss what exactly we mean by IPD. Elsewhere in this volume, it has been shown that IPD is essentially a two-dimensional concept, in that we should distinguish between plebiscitary and assembly-based variants of intra-party democracy (see Chapter 6). The essential difference is that plebiscitary IPD (PIPD) disconnects discussion and decision while assembly-based IPD (AIPD) means that the actual decision is

coupled with a discussion about the substance of the decision, which takes place in an assembly. This may be an assembly of delegates or simply a meeting of party members. The essence is the same, namely, that the act of voting on a proposal is preceded by an exchange of arguments and, normally, by the possibility to amend the proposal. This may not be the case for some personnel decisions which may require previous nomination, yet the possibility for the candidates to present their views to the audience can be regarded as a functional equivalent: they have the possibility to correct the perception the audience may have had of them prior to the meeting.

A sub-category of plebiscitary IPD is open plebiscitary intra-party democracy (OPIPD) which allows for the participation of non-members in intra-party decision-making. This variant of IPD represents an important departure from the dominant concept of political party as an organization with clearly defined boundaries, in that it blurs the distinction between members and supporters (even though sometimes a nominal fee is required to participate in a decision).

Conceptually, and this is important for the following hypotheses, we define the degree of IPD by the inclusiveness of key procedures. We consider IPD to be higher if a larger number of party members is involved in decisions over policy and personnel, and if party decision-making structures are not dominated by exclusive elite circles (see Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion).

Empirically, OPIPD has remained a rare exception, despite the widespread attention some conspicuous cases like the Italian Democrats or the British Labour Party have attracted. PIPD is more widespread empirically: more than 55 per cent of the parties in our study allow for plebiscitary decision-making. However, all parties, except the Dutch Freedom Party of Geert Wilders, register a valid AIPD score. This makes sense, as it is theoretically almost inconceivable that a party operates entirely without an element of assembly-based decision-making. In other words, AIPD still represents the base of intra-party decision-making, and this is why we will focus most of our analyses on this variant of IPD.

REASONING ABOUT HYPOTHESES

In this sub-section, we discuss some expectations about the variation in levels of IPD. When formulating our hypotheses, we refer to intra-party democracy (IPD) in general, but we will discuss the empirical results for the assembly-based and plebiscitary variants separately, as they represent separate versions of IPD. In the multivariate analysis we concentrate exclusively on AIPD, because it is the prevalent mode of IPD. An analysis of the reasons why some parties have chosen to adopt plebiscitary measures while others have not

would have been beyond the scope of this chapter. This discussion acknowledges not only the exciting opportunities presented by the establishment of the PPDB, but also its current limitations. Above all, we do not have cross-temporal data. For now, the database comprises cross-sectional recent snapshots of party organization. So we can certainly discuss what, according to theory, could be the causes of greater or lesser degrees of IPD (that is, using IPD as the dependent variable). We can also discuss the possible effects of greater or lesser degrees of IPD (using IPD as an independent variable). But it is more difficult to trace sequences in our data—that is, what came first, cause or effect—which forces us to take a cautious approach in interpreting the direction of causality. Future iterations of the database will permit greater ambition in this respect.

In the following hypotheses, then, IPD is treated mainly as a dependent variable—that is, something that we assume is influenced by something else. Subsequently, however, we also assess IPD as an independent variable—that is, as something that influences something else. In that procedure, one of the dependent variables for which we test for correlation with IPD is one that we have previously used as independent variable. This is the size of party membership. Two other dependent variables, the degree of women's representation and the degree of manifesto change, are not used as independent variables, as it seems less plausible that women's representation or manifesto change induces change in IPD, rather than the other way round. These models are explained more fully later in this chapter.

Independent Variables: National Level

What explains how parties organize their decision-making processes and intra-party structures? There are many variables that we could conceivably check for relationships with IPD. The obvious place to start is at the level of the different countries in which political parties operate.

Is it reasonable to expect that the more democratic the country, the greater the level of IPD in its main political parties? The debate in the literature sketched in the previous section might suggest that the answer to that question is: probably, but not definitely. Perhaps a *democratic national context* promotes IPD. Party change theory suggests as much, because parties are assumed to adapt to their environments (Harmel and Janda 1994). Therefore, the trend towards more or less democracy at the nation-state level can be expected to have a parallel impact on the party organizations in these countries and thus contribute to an increase or decrease of IPD levels. Alternatively, perhaps IPD promotes a democratic national context, or perhaps the two are quite independent of each other. However, irrespective of the causality, we can generate the following hypothesis.

H1: Higher levels of democracy in a country are associated with higher levels of IPD.

Furthermore, IPD might be associated with different types of democracy. In his seminal work, Lijphart (2012) distinguishes between *majoritarian and consensus democracies*, and between *centralized and federal states*. In general, we might expect consensus-orientated democracy, in which elite bargaining requires relatively coherent social groups in order to make compromises stick, to promote mass-party types; such parties are often thought to have relatively democratic internal structures. At least as possible, though, is that elite bargaining might actually be associated with a lack of IPD, to allow those elites the autonomy needed to bargain with authority.

H2a: In consensus democracies, parties tend to have lower levels of IPD.

While we certainly see no necessary conflict between unitary (and even centralized) political structures and democracy, we also reason that federalism requires a culture of democratic decision-making, so that vertical power relations can be conducted in an orderly fashion. Furthermore, intra-party decision making should be more ‘inclusive’ (and therefore more democratic) in federal states. ‘Inclusiveness’ is here defined as involvement: the higher the number of members involved in internal decision-making, the more inclusive a party is. In federal countries, parties usually have strong sub-national branches, which exercise significant influence on decisions at the national party level. This means that in a federal party, more members are involved in making decisions than in a centralized party, simply because there are more power centres.

H2b: Parties in federal states have higher levels of IPD than parties in centralized states.

Continuing with institutional variables, but moving on to those that reflect aspects of public policy rather than constitutional structures, a national factor that may directly affect the level of IPD is *party law*—that is, whether there is a legal framework that explicitly regulates internal party life. The degree of legal requirements of IPD varies across countries and might be reflected in the way that parties are organized internally. More precisely, the mere existence of a party law might influence the IPD levels of parties (Obert and von dem Berge 2017: 4). In fact, almost 50 per cent of the party laws in Europe refer to IPD (van Biezen and Piccio 2013: 47). Furthermore, van Biezen and Piccio (2013: 48) conclude that ‘IPD constitutes a significant and increasing area of national regulation’. And most importantly, if party laws interfere in intra-party politics, this is usually done to promote IPD (van Biezen and Piccio 2013).

H3: The existence of party laws is associated with higher levels of IPD.

Democracy is not just about institutions, but also about behaviour. So we also test behavioural, attitudinal and socio-economic variables. One such variable is social capital. If Putnam's famous (1993) theory of social capital holds, we might expect inter-personal trust to correlate positively with IPD. Perhaps IPD encourages citizens to join parties, and thereafter to join other organizations, which, in turn, encourages them to trust each other; or perhaps high levels of trust encourage people to join parties and demand that they practice internal democracy. Similarly, a comfortable standard of living might be a factor that favours something as non-material as IPD (Inglehart and Welzel 2005); or it might be that effective democracy promotes economic growth, at least in the long run. While we cannot test the direction of causality with our data we are able to investigate whether or not such associations exist at all.

H4a: Higher levels of trust in political institutions and in political parties in a country are associated with higher levels of IPD.

H4b: A higher standard of living in a country is associated with higher levels of IPD.

Independent Variables: Party Level

Party organization has a competitive and a learning component. Successful models of party organizations create incentives for other parties within the same party system to adapt to that model (Duverger 1964; Poguntke 2000). Thus, we expect a fairly high degree of similarity between parties in a particular polity; and, concomitantly, the between-country variation may be more interesting even on some of the party-level variables.

Robert Michels, in his classic (1962 [1915]) case study of the German Social Democratic Party at the beginning of the twentieth century, concluded that IPD was a façade. He argued that if even that party, with its ostensibly democratic internal organization, was oligarchic in its character, then oligarchy within all parties amounted to a 'sociological law'. While modern social scientists would not call this a law, the thesis—that elites dominate, regardless of parties' various rules and procedures—has endured. In our analysis, it certainly engenders several testable propositions.

For a start, the oligarchy thesis might be used in order to suggest that party ideology has no bearing on IPD. In other words, different party families should not vary systematically in their IPD levels. Given Michels' conclusions, we might expect that Social Democratic parties, for all their initial emphasis on mass membership and participation, actually have no higher levels of IPD than Conservative parties, which were often created by groups of elites from within existing political institutions. Much of the literature about ideal-type party models, which has generally suggested that parties of

different origins have converged organizationally over time, would support such an inference (for a review in relation to IPD, see Carty 2013).

H5a: Belonging to a certain party family does not influence a party's level of IPD.

H5b: The position of a party on the socio-economic left-right dimension does not influence its level of IPD.

On the other hand, it could be that Michels was not correct, and that ideology is indeed reflected in organization. If so, we would expect left-of-centre parties, including Social Democratic ones, to have higher levels of IPD. Indeed, Green and 'new-left' parties (often called Left Socialist parties), which were commonly formed around the 1970s and which explicitly emphasized their internal democracy, might be expected to have higher levels of IPD than other party families have. By contrast, far right-wing parties might be expected to exhibit lower levels of IPD, as a result of their often very centralized party organization (Mudde 2007: 270). Therefore, we can formulate two counter-hypotheses:

H5c: Belonging to a certain party family does influence a party's level of IPD.

H5d: The position of a party on the socio-economic left-right dimension does have an influence on its IPD-level.

Time is also a crucial factor in Michels' thinking and, indeed, in contemporary theories of party change (Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel 2002). In a nutshell, the development of oligarchies takes time and solidifies as parties become more institutionalized over time. We might, therefore, argue that newer party families will be less susceptible to the iron law. Green and new-left parties, which were commonly formed around the 1970s or later, might be expected to have higher levels of IPD than other party families have; and so might many far right-wing parties. We thus test the relevance of *party age*.

H6: Younger parties will have higher levels of IPD.

There is also reason to think that proximity to government office might affect IPD. For parties that are more or less permanently in opposition, the motivation for individuals to become party members will be largely ideological. If so, then the ability of those members to pull the party in their preferred ideological directions will presumably be attractive to them, which implies a preference for higher levels of IPD in their parties (Strøm and Müller 1999: 16–18). Members of parties that are frequently in government, by contrast, may have a different, or at least an additional, motivation. That motivation is potential access to the selective benefits of public office—public-sector jobs, among others. Furthermore, there is the possibility that involvement in executive procedures such as those of the European Union, which affect

government parties much more than non-government parties, might impinge upon IPD (Aylott et al. 2007: 198–208).

H7: Parties in opposition tend to have higher levels of IPD than parties in government.

An alternative interpretation of Michels' conclusions is that size is actually a relevant variable. Perhaps the oligarchical tendencies that he identified are more prevalent in larger organizations, in which the need for large-scale bureaucracy is more pressing. By the same token, IPD may be easier to implement in smaller parties.

H8: Parties with a larger membership will have lower levels of IPD.

TURNING THE TABLES: IPD AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Apart from normative considerations about the desirability of IPD, there is a very simple yet highly relevant question, namely: does it matter? In other words, we are concerned with IPD as an independent variable which leaves a mark on other relevant aspects of party politics.

First, we examine the possible relationship between IPD and women's representation in party positions, such as parliamentary groups. There is considerable debate in the literature about whether more inclusive procedures, especially concerning candidate selection, favour women (see Hazan and Rahat 2010: 16–23; Lilliefeldt 2011: 23–6; see also Chapter 9). We may be able to shed some light on that debate.

H9: Higher levels of IPD lead to a larger proportion of women on a party's election list.

Second, there is also an argument within the party organization literature that regards the introduction of more democratic procedures to be a way to stop, or even reverse, membership loss. There is also rather uniform empirical support to substantiate that key aspects of intra-party politics, in general, have become more inclusive than in the past. We know, for instance, that both candidate selection processes (e.g., Hazan and Rahat 2010) and leader selection processes (Cross and Blais 2012) involve members to an increasing extent, either by congress decisions or even membership votes. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that parties that lose members would be more inclined to introduce more IPD. As our dataset is cross-sectional, however, we can only

assess the association between IPD and party size, which results in the inverse hypothesis as formulated in H8.

H10: Higher levels of IPD are associated with lower levels of membership.

Finally, we also assess whether IPD has consequences for a third key aspect of intra-party politics, namely on policy formulation. More specifically we evaluate whether there is a negative relation between IPD and the degree to which parties change their manifestos. This follows the rationale of Hennl and Franzmann who argue in Chapter 11 that party elites may be prone to change manifestos more frequently for electoral reasons whereas the party rank-and-file act as guardians of the party creed. While Hennl and Franzmann test this proposition with indicators specifically related to the process of manifesto writing, we take a broader view here and simply investigate whether the overall levels of IPD have a similar effect.

H11: Higher levels of IPD lead to lower degree of manifesto change.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF ADDITIONAL VARIABLES

Against the background of hypothesis H1, we use the ‘Combined Index of Democracy’ (CID) of Lauth and Kauff (2012) for measuring the *degree of democracy* on the national level. The CID combines data from Freedom House, Polity and the Governance Indicators collected by the World Bank. The *type of democracy* (Westminster versus consensus democracy and centralized versus federal states) included in hypotheses H2a and H2b is measured according to Lijphart (2012). In order to determine the influence *party laws* on IPD, illustrated in hypothesis H3, a dummy variable is constructed based on the Party Law in Modern Europe Database (van Biezen 2015). Regarding hypothesis H4a, we use data from the European Values Study (EVS 2011) and World Values Survey (WVS 2014a, 2014b) to measure *trust in political institutions and parties*. For gross domestic product (GDP) *per capita*, we draw on data provided by the World Bank (World Bank 2015) to test hypothesis H4b.

The measurement of *party family* (hypotheses H5a and H5c) and *position of a party on the socio-economic left-right dimension* (hypotheses H5b and H5d) is a more challenging endeavour. Arguably, the most unambiguous approach to party family classification is to use membership of international party federations and/or Europarties as a proxy. Most national parties in Europe affiliate to Europarties (Bardi 2005), which themselves are often associated with transnational party groups in the European Parliament. This, then, is the approach we take. We construct and test a *party family* variable based on membership of ‘transnational party organizations’.¹

As regards relationships between IPD and a party's position on the economic left-right dimension, we use data from a measure of ideological range based on manifesto data (MARPOR), developed by Franzmann (2010; also Franzmann and Kaiser 2006).

Three further variables required decisions about operationalization. To capture the influence of party age on IPD, as formulated in hypothesis H6, we create the dummy variable *new party*. Here, all parties formed since 1960 are considered 'new', because they are not organizationally related to the old cleavage politics of the pre-Second World War era. Empirically, most new parties were founded after the early 1970s (Poguntke 2000: 88–90). Hypothesis H7 requires a test for correlations between IPD and the party's propensity to be in government or opposition (variable *government experience*). We do this by using a composite indicator of whether a party held government office for at least half of each year in 1999–2014, using data from the ParlGov database.² Regarding party size, discussed in hypotheses H8 and H10, the most obvious indicator in an organizational sense is levels of *individual membership*. This data is taken from van Biezen and Poguntke (2014). The measurement of *women candidates* (women as a proportion of a party's election candidates) in the context of hypothesis H9 is realized by drawing on data of the PPDB. Finally, data on programmatic change, to evaluate hypothesis H11, is taken from the MARPOR project (see Franzmann 2014).

THE EMPIRICAL REALITY OF IPD

Our IPD indices consist of items covering the 'official story' and the 'real story' of intra-party politics. The official story is captured by items that focus on party statutes and the real story by items that focus on processes in real-life party events. We include both because some processes are not regulated in party statutes; hence the PPDB project also asks for the real story. The PPDB database contains observations from 2011 to 2014. In order to reduce missing data, we have always used the most recent data available (usually 2014). Even so, there is still a problem with missing data, which is why we have permitted missing data on one component of the AIPD index (see Chapter 6 for details).

As we have mentioned, our empirical analysis will concentrate on the assembly-based variant of IPD (AIPD). However, before we turn to multivariate analysis, we will address variations across party families and countries, and this can be done for both AIPD and PIPD. The empirical analysis is completed with the specification of eight different multivariate models that address variation in AIPD and its consequences.

TABLE 7.1 Descriptive statistics IPD index scores

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. deviation
AIPD (assembly-based)	121	0.26	0.97	0.62	0.17
PIPD (plebiscitary)	117	0.00	1.00	0.31	0.32

Source: PPDB Data Set I.

*Assembly-based and Plebiscitary IPD Indices:
General Descriptive Statistics*

First, we analyse our two distinct variants of IPD by way of bivariate correlation analysis. While they are significantly related, a correlation of 0.37 indicates that, nevertheless, the indices do measure separate dimensions. Both indices have a theoretical minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. Table 7.1 presents basic descriptive statistics and shows substantial differences between our two measures. The results for the AIPD index show that all but one of the 122 parties included in our study have internal structures that satisfy a minimum level of internal democracy. The exception is the one-man Dutch Freedom Party of Geert Wilders, which has no party members and hence no internal structure to speak of. It has therefore been coded as missing for our IPD indices. The assembly-based IPD shows a rather large variation. While no party is very close to the minimum value of our index, the actual scores range from 0.26 to 0.97 (see Appendix Table A7.1).

The Dutch Party for the Animals is the party with the highest AIPD score. The Italian Northern League has the lowest. While some of the rank-order positions may be intuitively surprising, the overall pattern seems broadly to correspond to expectations generated by knowledge of party political traditions and national conditions. Because cases are dispersed rather evenly along the whole index range, we argue that Michels's theory—that, eventually, all parties end up as oligarchies, with similarly closed power structures—finds little or no support. Inferences from the plebiscitary IPD index are somewhat different, though. About 45 per cent of the parties have not institutionalized any plebiscitary mechanisms at all, while about ten parties reach our maximum value of 1.0. This indicates that even though plebiscitary modes of decision-making have become relatively widespread, assembly-based decision-making is still the modal method of intra-party decision-making.

Comparing Party Families

As our initial inspection of the dispersion of our IPD scores gave us reasons to reject the claim that all parties end up as oligarchies, the alternative hypothesis (H5c), arguing party family matters, might be more valid. Arguably,

TABLE 7.2 *Comparing party families (IPD score means)*

Party family	AIPD index	Standard deviation	PIPD index	Standard deviation
Christian Democrats/ Conservatives	0.59	0.15	0.26	0.35
Social Democrats	0.67	0.15	0.45	0.28
Liberals	0.63	0.16	0.35	0.36
Greens	0.73	0.18	0.32	0.26
Left Socialists	0.60	0.16	0.12	0.18
Far Right	0.55	0.18	0.22	0.31
Eta squared	0.11*		0.09*	

Note: Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by party family differences.

***= $p < 0.01$, **= $p < 0.05$, *= $p < 0.10$.

ideological convictions should leave some traces in the way parties organize internally, although, of course, other factors might offset such influence. To assess whether party family does matter, Table 7.2 presents data on the average levels of IPD in six different families.

The mean AIPD scores suggest that Greens tend to be the most democratically organized parties followed by the Social Democrats. Liberals, the Left Socialists and Christian Democrats/Conservatives are somewhat less democratically organized. As expected, the Far Right scores lowest. Again, though, the plebiscitary IPD index tells us somewhat different story. While Social Democrats again score highly, Greens score about average.

We expected that populist parties might demonstrate higher levels of plebiscitary internal democracy, so our results, in that respect, are surprising. Certainly, not all parties in the Far Right and Left Socialist families, which have the lowest levels of plebiscitary IPD, could be called populists; but such parties are probably overrepresented in those categories. However, while there are significant differences between the party families, the low Eta squared values in both indices indicate that party family affiliation has only a minor influence on each type of IPD.

Comparing Countries

As suggested in hypotheses H1-4, there are several reasons to expect that there are cross-country differences in the level of IPD. Indeed, Table 7.3 shows rather significant differences in this respect. Looking first at the AIPD index, we find that countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Belgium and Germany generally score highly and well above the sample mean of 0.62, whereas primarily Spain, France, Austria, Poland, and Italy have low scores. A relatively high Eta square value also suggests that the

TABLE 7.3 Comparing countries (IPD scores means)

Country	AIPD index	Standard deviation	PIPD index	Standard deviation
Australia	0.64	0.05	0.38	0.28
Austria	0.46	0.16	0.00	0
Belgium	0.71	0.14	0.60	0.24
Canada	0.68	0.03	0.57	0.15
Czech Rep.	0.64	0.12	0.00	0
Denmark	0.57	0.17	0.15	0.21
France	0.41	0.13	0.50	0
Germany	0.71	0.14	0.25	0.14
Hungary	0.68	0.12	0.06	0.13
Ireland	0.72	0.14	0.13	0.30
Israel	0.56	0.19	0.39	0.49
Italy	0.49	0.19	0.67	0.31
Netherlands	0.77	0.11	0.45	0.36
Norway	0.75	0.02	0.18	0.19
Poland	0.48	0.07	0.00	0
Portugal	0.44	0.05	0.25	0.27
Spain	0.39	0.03	0.07	0.15
Sweden	0.62	0.08	0.09	0.13
United Kingdom	0.78	0.13	0.63	0.13
Eta squared	0.52***		0.49***	

Note: Eta squared refers to the between-groups variance explained by party family differences. ***= $p < 0.01$, **= $p < 0.05$, ***= $p < 0.10$.

differences between countries explain more of the variance in levels of AIPD than differences between party families.

We also see that, in contrast to comparison of party families, the level of dispersion within countries varies. While parties in countries such as Norway, Canada, Spain, Australia, and Portugal have very low levels of within-country variation (standard deviation < 0.06), there are significant differences within Israel, Italy, Denmark, and Austria (standard deviation > 0.15).

For example, while two Israeli parties, Likud and Labour, are among the most internally democratic, with AIPD index scores above 0.8, we find that Shas and Hadash are at the bottom of the ranking, with scores lower than 0.4 (see Appendix 1). However, while this suggests that national-level contextual factors may not be of overriding importance, other findings indicate precisely the opposite. The most remarkable example is Norway, where all parties included in the survey score within a range of 0.05. Taken together, this first round of bivariate analysis suggests that differences between countries are more important than differences between party families in explaining levels of IPD. Still, the fact that some countries show substantial within-country variation reveals that the relations might be more complex and that we cannot rule out that specific party-level factors might also be of real importance.

In addition, and as with variation between party families, we find that high levels of assembly-based IPD do not necessarily go hand in hand with high levels of plebiscitary IPD. For instance, while the UK and Belgium score relatively high on both indices, Norway and Ireland show notably higher levels of AIPD than of PIPD. Italy’s performance is the reverse. It does seem, then, that these two types of IPD do indeed reflect distinct concepts.

Causes and Consequences of AIPD

Earlier in this chapter, we discussed a number of hypotheses about what might explain varying levels of IPD. In this section, we offer a first empirical assessment of these propositions. By means of regression analysis, we thus draw preliminary inferences about why some parties demonstrate more member-orientated practice than others do. In Table 7.4, we present four

TABLE 7.4 *OLS regression (dependent variable: AIPD index)*

	Model 1: Country level	Model 2: Country level + party family dummies	Model 3: Party level	Model 4: Full model
Constant	−1.693** (0.730)	−1.616** (0.709)	0.732*** (0.058)	−0.534 (0.740)
Combined index of democracy	0.082 (0.050)	0.069 (0.048)		−0.017 (0.052)
Majoritarian-Consensus	−0.070* (0.036)	−0.048 (0.035)		−0.037 (0.038)
Federal-Unitary	0.033 (0.024)	0.028 (0.023)		0.044* (0.022)
Party law	0.152*** (0.051)	0.145*** (0.049)		0.129** (0.049)
Trust in institutions and parties	0.405** (0.164)	0.441*** (0.158)		0.353** (0.161)
GDP per capita	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)		0.006*** (0.002)
Left-Right			−0.023*** (0.009)	−0.025** (0.010)
New party			−0.018 (0.031)	−0.015 (0.040)
Government experience			0.159** (0.061)	0.107 (0.068)
Individual membership			−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.001)
Party family dummies	No	Yes	No	No
N	87	87	104	79
Adjusted R ²	0.195	0.294	0.138	0.288

Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level.

TABLE 7.5 OLS regression (*AIPD* index as main independent variable)

	Model 5: DV: women candidates	Model 6: DV: Individual membership	Model 7: DV: programmatic change
Constant	204.643*** (55.343)	99.805 (78.436)	235.897*** (56.605)
AIPD index	4.970 (9.413)	-34.583*** (12.252)	-24.426** (10.123)
Combined index of democracy	-12.824*** (4.016)	-15.155*** (5.285)	-7.195 (4.438)
Majoritarian- Consensus	2.425 (2.866)	0.045 (4.073)	1.562 (3.162)
Federal-Unitary	1.124 (2.426)	3.054 (2.438)	-3.436 (2.854)
Party law	-6.368 (3.900)	1.140 (5.520)	-0.797 (3.722)
Trust in institutions and parties	-13.558 (12.410)	18.802 (17.673)	-43.591*** (13.893)
GDP per capita	0.189 (0.132)	0.294 (0.185)	-0.181 (0.130)
Left-Right	-2.665*** (0.794)	-1.004 (1.095)	0.117 (0.737)
New party	-4.720 (3.136)	0.232 (4.328)	2.042 (2.952)
Government experience	10.105* (5.297)	24.132*** (6.840)	-2.715 (5.477)
Individual membership	-0.130 (0.089)		-0.129 (0.126)
Party family dummies	No	No	No
N	72	79	60
Adjusted R ²	0.227	0.334	0.374

Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level.

OLS models where AIPD is the dependent variable.³ Following this, in Table 7.5, we present three additional models where AIPD is the main independent variable that is, it is specified in order to allow us to make some preliminary observations in regard to the consequences of IPD. In all these models, we restrict our analysis to assembly-based IPD. Partly this is because, in light of the findings reported in the previous section, it seems to be the most robust measure of IPD. It is also because, in this index, we have valid data for all parties (except the Dutch Party of Freedom).

In Model 1, we regress the country-level variables on our AIPD index score, while Model 2, in additionally includes party family dummies in order to control for party-level characteristics not captured by the other independent variables. Model 3 tests the explanatory powers of the party-level variables. Finally, we also run one full model (Model 4) in which country- and party-level variables are included.

We cannot reasonably expect to fully capture what explains the variation in the dependent variable. After all, our variables cannot capture specific contextual and historical influences that bear on each party. However, if we keep

this in mind, our models perform rather well, explaining between 14 and 29 per cent of the variance. Furthermore, our four models of AIPD reveal interesting findings which, to a great extent, are in line with our expectations.

Our initial finding from the bivariate analysis, showing that country-level factors are more important than party family affiliation, is largely confirmed in the multivariate analysis. The fact that the explained variation is larger in Model 1 than in Model 3, and the inspection of the individual predictors, both suggest that variation in country-level factors outperforms variation in party-level factors. Still, as will become evident later in this chapter, party characteristics are also important.

In general, we note that most of our predictors related to AIPD are in the expected direction. Let us start with assessing the first set of hypotheses, pertaining to the country level. Overall, the analysis gives poor support for the first constitutional hypothesis, H1, as the variable measuring the degree of democracy fails to reach the level of significance in all models. Neither do our hypotheses about different types of democracy get strong support. While both the first Lijphart dimension of democracy (pertaining to consensus democracy) and the second Lijphart dimension of democracy (measuring federalism) are associated with AIPD in the expected direction, they only reach statistical significance in one model each.

In general, though, other country-level factors are of greater importance. The existence of a party law is highly significant in all models. Hence, this first systematic analysis supports the notion that legally binding requirements are indeed an effective way to promote IPD. In addition, levels of trust in institutions and parties and the level of affluence, as measured by GDP per capita, are highly significant predictors of IPD. Hence, hypotheses H3 and H4 are supported.

We now turn to the party-level hypotheses. As might be expected from the bivariate analysis, the party-level factors, in general, are less important than the country-level factors. Still, as we also indicated in the previous section, party-level factors are not unimportant. This is partly inferred from the fact that the addition of party family dummies to our country-level factors in Model 2 makes the model perform somewhat better than Model 1, as the explained variance increases from about 20 per cent to about 29 per cent. Moreover, while some party family dummies are insignificant, being a Far Right party, a Left Socialist party or a Christian Democrat/Conservative is significantly related with lower levels of AIPD.

The individual party-level predictors in Model 3-4 also show some impact. Most consistently, the results show that, in line with H8, larger memberships lower the level of AIPD. We also find some support for the claim that having a left-leaning ideology is positively related to AIPD. This effect shows up in both Model 3 and Model 4.⁴ We can therefore conclude that H5c and H5d, suggesting that family affiliation and position on the socio-economic left-right

dimension influence AIPD, get stronger support than the alternative hypotheses, H5a and H5b, arguing no correlation should be present. Finally, our analyses find no support for the hypotheses that party newness (H6) and more opposition experience (H7) influence AIPD. Not only are these relationships statistically insignificant, but the signs are not even in the expected direction.

As statistically significant effects are not the same as politically substantial effects, we also inquire what these findings suggest about actual impact on AIPD. Based on the results from our full model, Model 4, we can see that the existence of a party law is associated with a 0.13 increase in the corresponding level of AIPD. This seems to be a rather substantial effect. In comparison, the difference in mean between the most internally democratic party family, the Greens, and the least internally democratic family, the Far Right, is 0.18. Similarly, we find the effect of trust in institutions and parties to be substantial: a one-step change in the trust index (on a four-step scale from a 'great deal of confidence' to 'no confidence at all') is associated with an increase in AIPD score of as much as 0.35. Finally, we can also infer that the third predictor that reaches significance throughout our analysis, GDP per capita, has a substantial effect. A one standard deviation increase in GDP is associated with a 0.12 increase in the AIPD score.

Because the first version of the PPDB dataset lacks time-series data, caution is needed when assessing causality. Specifically, some of the included predictors might actually be the effect rather than the cause of AIPD. In order to control for this possibility, we have also conducted reversed-models analysis, in which the AIPD index is modelled as an independent variable (Freitag and Kirchner 2011; Loxbo and Bolin 2016). More specifically, to test the robustness of our results from Models 1–4, we have checked whether AIPD, besides being a consequence of, also is a cause for those factors that turned out to be most important predictors of AIPD. These robustness checks show indeed that several of the predictors in Model 1–4 are also well predicted by the level of AIPD.

In fact, trust in institutions and parties as well as GDP per capita are significantly predicted by our AIPD measure. Of course, this relationship between trust in institutions, including parties, and AIPD raises potentially interesting questions about causality. As we discussed earlier in the chapter, AIPD could be a product of a high-trust society; or it could conceivably be a cause of a high-trust society; or there might be some third causal variable affecting both AIPD and trust in institutions. Future iterations of the AIPD index should give us more scope to explore these intriguing avenues of research. For now, though, we must interpret our main results with caution.

Besides these robustness check models we also have theoretically informed reasons to run a number of analyses with AIPD as the main independent variable. In Table 7.5 we, therefore, turn from assessing the causes of AIPD to its potential consequences. In H9, we suggested one potential consequence of higher levels of AIPD, namely that this should lead to parties being more

prone to include women as election candidates.⁵ This claim is tested in Model 5. However, while the AIPD predictor is positively related to the share of women candidates, it does not reach the level of significance. This ties in well with the analyses presented in Chapter 9 which also show that more inclusive selectorates alone may lead to fewer women candidates.

In our second hypothesis regarding consequences of AIPD, we propose that higher levels of AIPD are associated with lower levels of membership. Indeed, we gain empirical support for this claim. As we can see in Model 6 there is a strongly significant negative relationship between AIPD and membership numbers. Moreover, this suggests that there is a complex reciprocal relationship between party size and AIPD, as our analyses in Models 3-4 found that decreasing membership numbers drive AIPD. Importantly, however, this is only preliminary support for our theoretical reasoning about the consequence of IPD on levels of membership, as our main proposition posits that it is the change rather than the level of IPD that reasonably impacts on an individual's inclination to enrol for party membership. Finally, we also expected that higher levels of AIPD would impact on parties' inclination to make changes in their political stance as measured by our variable on manifesto change. As expected, Model 8 shows that there is a significant and negative relation between IPD and manifesto change, suggesting that the more internally democratic parties less frequently change their programmes. This corroborates the findings by Hennl and Franzmann (Chapter 11), who use a more fine-tuned measure of how manifestos are written.

CONCLUSIONS

IPD as a general phenomenon has been at the core of party research for well over a century. Early classics such as those written by Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels (1962) touched upon this subject. However, despite being discussed and theorized for such a long time, systematic comparative empirical research has largely been absent. Our objective in this chapter has been to begin filling this gap in the literature. By mapping the variation in levels of AIPD and PIPD between countries, party families and individual parties, we have contributed a first assessment of how inclusiveness in decision-making differs between parties around the world. In addition we have also tested some of the most obvious explanatory factors for AIPD as well as assessed what consequences varying levels of AIPD might have for a number of outcomes.

Although our results must be interpreted with caution, we believe the empirical analysis has largely confirmed our expectations. While the overall fit of our models is modest, and we therefore conclude that there are omitted

variables of importance, we also find relatively broad support for a number of our hypotheses. We find that country-level factors, in general, are more important than party-level factors. Most importantly, our analysis suggests that the existence of a party law and higher levels of trust and affluence are associated with higher levels of AIPD. However, we also find some party-level characteristics to be of importance. Most consistently, our results reveal that smaller parties, in terms of membership size, are associated with higher levels of AIPD.

To sum up, this empirical assessment of variation in IPD has increased our understanding of how inclusiveness varies both across party families and countries. Moreover, we believe the formulation and empirical testing of explicit hypotheses is a first step towards re-framing the scholarly debate on IPD. While much has been said about what is normatively desirable, we have taken a step forward by adding a discussion about causes and consequences of variations in IPD. In this sense we think our contribution may lay the foundation for future studies. While the lack of time-series data has required caution regarding causal inference, some findings hint at potential political consequences of different ways of organizing political parties. Higher levels of AIPD obstruct programmatic change, which may undermine a party's responsiveness to the electorate at large. Also, trust may indeed be a consequence of higher levels of AIPD—yet the causality could also run the other way.

In order to not overstate our conclusions, we have also employed methodological tools to test the robustness of our initial findings. Indeed, our reversed-models analysis reveals that there is a pressing need to further test these initial results. Yet, the importance of those country-related factors reminds us that parties adapt organizationally to their national competitors and their national environments rather than to abstract ideological creeds.

APPENDIX

TABLE A7.1 *Party ranking sorted by AIPD*

	Party name	Country	AIPD index	PIPD index
1	Party for the Animals	Netherlands	0.97	0.5
2	Green Party	United Kingdom	0.96	0.75
3	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	Belgium	0.94	1
4	Socialist Party	Belgium	0.92	0.67
5	Green Party	Ireland	0.91	0
	Plaid Cymru	United Kingdom	0.91	0.67
6	Christian Democratic Appeal	Netherlands	0.89	0.33

(continued)

TABLE A7.1 *Continued*

	Party name	Country	AIPD index	PIPD index
7	Likud	Israel	0.88	1
	Liberal Democrats	United Kingdom	0.88	0.67
8	Ecolo	Belgium	0.84	0.25
	The Left	Germany	0.84	0.25
	Alliance '90/The Greens	Germany	0.84	0.25
9	Labor Party	Israel	0.83	1
10	Christian Union	Netherlands	0.82	0
11	Free Democratic Party	Germany	0.81	0.25
	Labour Party	Ireland	0.81	0.67
12	Labour Party	Netherlands	0.79	0.75
	Green Party	Sweden	0.79	0.25
13	Social Democratic Party	Germany	0.78	0.25
	Democrats 66	Netherlands	0.78	1
	Green Left	Netherlands	0.78	0.67
	Progress Party	Norway	0.78	0.25
	Red-Green Alliance	Denmark	0.78	0.33
	Socialist Party	Hungary	0.78	0.25
	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	Netherlands	0.78	0.75
14	Conservative Party	Norway	0.77	0
	Liberal Party	Norway	0.77	0.25
	Social Democratic Party	Czech Rep.	0.77	0
	Jobbik	Hungary	0.77	0
16	Democrat Humanist Centre	Belgium	0.76	1
	Labour Party	Norway	0.76	0.25
17	Conservative Party	United Kingdom	0.75	0.67
18	Social Democratic Party	Austria	0.74	0
	Socialist Left Party	Norway	0.74	0.5
19	Centre Party	Norway	0.73	0
	Christian Democratic Party	Norway	0.73	0
	Communist Party	Czech Rep.	0.73	0
20	Socialist People's Party	Denmark	0.72	0.5
	50PLUS	Netherlands	0.72	0.5
	Labour Party	United Kingdom	0.72	0.67
21	The Greens	Australia	0.71	0.5
	Conservative Party	Canada	0.71	0.5
	Conservatives	Denmark	0.71	0
	Democratic Party	Italy	0.71	0.5
22	Flemish Interest	Belgium	0.7	0.67
23	Socialist Party Alternative	Belgium	0.69	0.5
	Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance	Hungary	0.69	0
	Liberal Party	Canada	0.69	0.67
	New Democratic Party	Canada	0.69	0.67
24	Fine Gael	Ireland	0.68	0
25	Civic Democratic Party	Czech Rep.	0.67	0
	Green Party	Canada	0.67	0.33
	Christian-Democrat and Flemish Green	Belgium	0.67	0.67
		Belgium	0.67	0.5

TABLE A7.1 *Continued*

	Party name	Country	AIPD index	PIPD index
26	Italy of Values	Italy	0.66	0.5
	Socialist Party	Netherlands	0.66	0
27	Bloc Québécois	Canada	0.64	0.67
	Scottish National Party	United Kingdom	0.64	0.67
28	Centre Party	Sweden	0.63	0
	UK Independence Party	United Kingdom	0.63	0.33
	Liberal Party	Australia	0.63	0
	Kadima	Israel	0.63	0.5
29	Left Party	Sweden	0.62	0.25
	Meretz	Israel	0.62	0
	Liberals	Denmark	0.62	0
30	Labor Party	Australia	0.61	0.67
	National Party	Australia	0.61	0.33
31	Pirate Party	Germany	0.6	0.5
	Sinn Fein	Ireland	0.6	0
	Christian Democrats	Sweden	0.6	0
	Moderate Party	Sweden	0.6	0
32	New Flemish Alliance	Belgium	0.59	0.67
	National Religious Party	Israel	0.59	1
	Fianna Fáil	Ireland	0.59	0
	Liberal People's Party	Sweden	0.59	0
33	Christian Social Union	Germany	0.58	0
34	Social Democrats	Sweden	0.57	0.25
	Federalists, Democrats, Francophone	Belgium	0.57	0.33
	Palikot's Movement	Poland	0.57	0
35	Reform Movement	Belgium	0.56	0.67
	Reformed Political Party	Netherlands	0.56	0
	TOP 09	Czech Rep.	0.56	n/a
36	Libertarian, Direct, Democratic	Belgium	0.55	0.33
37	Civic Platform	Poland	0.54	0
	Democratic Left Alliance	Poland	0.54	0
	Sweden Democrats	Sweden	0.54	0
	Christian Democratic Union	Germany	0.54	0.25
38	Danish People's Party	Denmark	0.52	0
39	Politics Can Be Different	Hungary	0.51	0
40	Socialist Party	France	0.5	0.5
41	Christian Democratic Union	Czech Rep.	0.48	n/a
	Socialist Party	Portugal	0.48	0.5
	People's Party	Portugal	0.48	0.5
42	Social Democratic Party	Portugal	0.47	0.5
	Left Bloc	Portugal	0.47	0
	Union of the Centre	Italy	0.47	1
43	Law and Justice	Poland	0.45	n/a
44	United Left	Spain	0.44	0
	Social Liberal Party	Denmark	0.44	0
	The Greens	Austria	0.44	0

(continued)

TABLE A7.1 *Continued*

	Party name	Country	AIPD index	PIPD index
	Balad	Israel	0.44	0
	Liberal Alliance	Denmark	0.44	0
45	Agudat Yisrael	Israel	0.42	n/a
	Polish People's Party	Poland	0.42	0
	Yisrael Beiteinu	Israel	0.42	0
46	Freedom Party	Austria	0.41	0
47	United Poland	Poland	0.4	0
	People's Party	Spain	0.4	0
48	Basque Nationalist Party	Spain	0.39	0
	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	Portugal	0.39	0
	Socialist Party	Spain	0.39	0.33
49	The People of Freedom	Italy	0.38	1
	Shas	Israel	0.38	0
	Hadash	Israel	0.38	0
50	Alliance for the Future	Austria	0.37	0
	Communist Party	Portugal	0.37	0
51	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	Spain	0.36	0
52	People's Party	Austria	0.34	0
53	Union for a Popular Movement	France	0.31	0.5
54	Social Democrats	Denmark	0.3	0.33
55	Northern League	Italy	0.26	0.33

NOTES

1. In constructing this PPDB variable, the procedure was the following. As the PPDB includes parties from all over the world, various transnational organizations were considered consecutively. Membership of (1) a Europarty was the obvious first step, as this not only indicates how a party sees its own identity, but also that it went through a screening process (von dem Berge and Poguntke 2013a, 2013b: 323). Subsequently, further steps were taken only if the previous one had not yielded a clear classification. These steps involved checking for membership of (2) an international party federation (as reported in the PPDB); (3) a regional transnational party organization, if one was relevant; and (4) a party group in the European Parliament (as in the PPDB), and/or expert placement by the project partners in the particular country. Supporting sources were the the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2015), the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens et al. 2014) and other academic literature.
2. Classification was difficult for parties in Belgium, Israel and Italy, due to numerous party name changes, re-foundations, dissolutions and electoral alliances. In such cases, a predecessor was only classified as having held government office if the successor party differed only in its name.

3. Inspection of residual plots suggests basic OLS assumptions as normality, linearity and homoscedasticity are met. VIF scores well below five also indicate no presence of multicollinearity. Details of diagnostic tests are available on request.
4. When we added party family dummies to the model (not presented in Table 8.4) this effect vanishes. This seems to be an effect of there being a high correlation between left-right positioning and party family affiliation (Eta squared = 0.71).
5. It might also be expected that AIPD would be a driver of trust in parties. However, since available data on trust in parties pertain to the country-level, we cannot explain this by using party-level AIPD. We have therefore conducted bivariate analysis with party-level AIPD, aggregated at the country level and country-level trust in parties. The analysis, however, found no significant relationship. This was the case despite our running the correlation analyses with both an unweighted variable (the variable presented in Table 8.3) and a weighted variable, in which where each party contributed proportionally to the aggregated country AIPD, based on its membership size.

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Part 2

The Impact of Party Organization

Party Finance and Perceived Party Responsiveness

Marina Costa Lobo and Isabella Razzuoli

INTRODUCTION

To what extent may party organizational characteristics be important for mass attitudes and political behaviour? While there has been much research on the importance of different institutions for political behaviour, rarely have parties been investigated in this context. This is somewhat surprising given that parties remain key interlocutors between individuals and the state. One of the reasons for this lack of research is the difficulty in finding reliable comparative data on party characteristics. That is why the Political Party Database (PPDB) Project is so important, in generating an extensive dataset on the characteristics of parties from a large group of consolidated democracies. Following previous research on the importance of certain party characteristics for electoral behaviour (Lobo 2008, 2014), this chapter explores whether the dependence of political parties on state finances has consequences for citizens' political attitudes and behaviour. The reason for focusing on this particular characteristic lies in the literature on party organizational change. The way in which parties have come to depend on state financing has been one of the most striking transformations of party organization in recent decades, as Chapter 3 of this book confirms. This transformation has purportedly led to a change in the way in which parties relate to society, resulting in a progressive distancing from its members and a deepening of its anchoring in the state (Katz and Mair 1995). While much has been written and said about this development since it was first identified, there have been few attempts to link the trend to citizen attitudes. This is what this chapter seeks to do.

We therefore analyse the implications of party funding structures for voters' attitudes towards political parties. In so doing, we connect the new PPDB material on parties' internal organization with individual attitudes. Drawing on the cartel party literature, we test whether and to what extent

high dependence on state financing affects the voters' perceptions of party responsiveness to citizen preferences. Specifically, given the connection made by Katz and Mair between the cartelization of party systems and the decline in the quality of democracy (Katz and Mair 1995), our first hypothesis is that a higher level of state dependency by parties should be associated with voters perceiving parties to be less responsive. We also test a second, counter-hypothesis which stems from the fact that the state subsidies' allocation tends to be roughly proportional to the number of votes received by each party. It may follow from this that parties which depend on state subsidies tend to pursue a vote-maximizing strategy and have more incentives to be attentive to the preferences and demands of a broader group of voters, the electorate, rather than to please their committed partisans and private financial supporters (i.e., members and donors). If this is the case, then state subsidies would lead to more party responsiveness, rather than less.

The chapter is organized in the following way: in the next section we survey the state of the art, combining different strands of literature which are relevant, namely those covering the cartel party thesis, party financing, and individual attitudes towards party responsiveness. Following that, we present and describe the data which are analysed in the chapter, as well as the hypotheses to be tested and the methods employed (i.e., correlation and regression analysis). In the concluding section, we seek to bring together the various parts of the analysis in order to understand whether parties' increasing financial dependence on the state has positive or negative consequences for this aspect of democracy.

THE FINANCIAL DIMENSION OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS: THE CARTEL THESIS AND ELECTORS' PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY RESPONSIVENESS

In this section we bring together several research strands which have developed in parallel in recent years, dealing with the connected themes of party organization, party financing and party responsiveness. Firstly, we survey the latest theoretical and empirical research concerning the state funding aspect of the cartel party thesis. Then, we will widen the argument in order to connect it to recent debates on the increasing difficulty for contemporary parties to keep in touch with and be responsive to electors. Finally, we explore how the responsiveness of parties and institutions has been investigated from the perspective of individual attitudes and behaviour. This aspect is crucial considering the variables that we employ for measuring the citizens' perceptions of party responsiveness.

The cartel party thesis is perhaps the most influential theory to have emerged in the party literature in the last twenty years, and has been intensively discussed and investigated by party scholars. Katz and Mair's seminal observation was that contemporary parties were increasingly entrenched in the state and detached from society (1995). They particularly stressed how the growing role of the state in financing parties was symptomatic of this process, as it tightened their connection with the state and loosened that with society, since they became less dependent on societal financial sources. The growing distance between parties and society also flows from the increasingly individualized nature of the latter. Such a process may produce systemic consequences insofar as it makes it more difficult for contemporary parties to perform their representative functions, such as the aggregation of citizens' demands (Bartolini and Mair 2001; Schmitter 2001). Although in the restatement of their thesis Katz and Mair (2009) emphasized that the subsidization of parties is not the only or even definitive feature of the cartelization process, the significance of state resources for parties is unquestionable (van Biezen and Kopecký 2007, 2014). The growing legal regulation of parties, following the acceptance of state subsidies by parties (Katz 1996), and the widespread use of party patronage in several countries seems to reinforce this tendency towards a tighter link between parties and the state (van Biezen 2008; van Biezen and Kopecký 2014), to the point that some authors have interpreted this as a transformation of the nature of parties into 'public utilities' (van Biezen 2004).

With regard to financial resources, the availability of direct state subsidies encourages the dependence of parties on the state. For Katz and Mair access to regular and generous state subsidies weakened links to society because they made members' dues and private donations seem dispensable. As they say, 'regarding party finance in particular, the claim is not that state subvention makes it *more difficult* for parties to provide this linkage [...] but rather that it reduces the parties' *need or desire* to do so, and thus is likely to reduce the degree to which parties actually provide linkage, even if their hypothetical capacity to do so were increased by access to additional funds' (2009: 764).¹ Furthermore, subsidies became increasingly vital as other sources seemed insufficient for coping with the rising costs of the day-to-day politics and the professionalization of electoral campaigns that typified contemporary democracies (Farrell and Webb 2000). In short, the structure of party financial resources has changed, becoming concentrated around a single major donor, the state, and the incentive structure for establishing parties' external linkages has changed as well, moving them closer to the state. However, this phenomenon is more nuanced than might be expected, given that the exact degree of state dependence is at one and the same time an individual party variable and a contextual variable related to institutional constraints such as the legal framework of a given country. As has been shown, some countries, and new

democracies in particular, tend to rely extensively on public funding for financing parties and electoral campaigns (van Biezen 2000, 2010). At the same time, variations may be found across parties within the same country, as private sources, individual and corporate, continue to be relevant for some party incomes (Detterbeck 2005; van Biezen and Kopecký 2007; see also Chapter 4 of this volume). In contrast to the argument of Katz and Mair—developed in fact with reference to western democracies—in new democracies the presence of public funding may encourage party institutionalization: in these contexts if state funding is absent voters seem to have weaker incentives to establish linkages with political parties whose existence may be ephemeral due to the lack of financial resources (Birnie 2005: 919).

The loosening of parties' societal ties posited by Katz and Mair (1995) is confirmed in other analyses too (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) and is also apparent in the decline of party membership, documented by various empirical studies in recent years (Mair and van Biezen 2001; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012; and see Chapter 2 of this book). However, the causal mechanism behind this process is still not very clear, given that it may be the decline of party membership that pushes parties to turn to the state, rather than vice versa. Thus, no direct causal link has been found between the introduction of public subsidies and party membership decline (Pierre, Svåsand, and Widfeldt 2000; Bonander 2009); as Scarrow has shown (2015), the trajectory of party membership varies considerably from case to case and better approaches are required that focus on cross-party and cross-national differences.

The changing relationships between parties, state and civil society have been recently explored by Whiteley, who focuses on state regulation (2011, 2014). Drawing on the idea of 'state capture', Whiteley examines the decrease of party membership size and activism in several countries, demonstrating that high state regulation of parties seems to weaken the incentives for individuals to join and to participate in parties. As a self-reinforcing process, parties with fewer volunteers then tend to strengthen their dependence on the state by extracting higher subsidies.

From a purely theoretical perspective the implications of the shift from the mass-party model to the cartel model have been explored by Hopkin (2004). He acknowledges that state funding has affected party organizations in western democracies by pushing them away from the mass model (and its funding system which is typically based on members' dues and small donations) and generating a degree of dependence on the state. However, it is also worth noting that this kind of funding may level the field of the party competition, and may also counteract the influences of both affluent interests and dues-paying members, fostering greater responsiveness towards the electorate (Katz 1996; Hopkin 2004: 639–40). In this way, state funding rewards the parties that are more successful in identifying popular demands. Seen in this light, state funding bolsters the quality of democracy.

From a different perspective, however, state funding may be more negative for democracy (Pierre, Svåsand, and Widfeldt 2000; Nassmacher 2003, 2009; Piccio 2014). While some have explored whether the introduction of public subsidies weakens the parties' incentives to recruit and mobilize members, Nassmacher (2003) has gone so far as to argue that a weakened financial linkage between parties and members affects parties' ability to perform primary functions; he claims that, from the experience of established democracies, parties which are strongly tied to their supporters (both members and external small donors) are more effective in performing these functions than those which lack such links (Nassmacher 2003: 17).

Similarly, as Scarrow and Webb suggest in Chapter 1, parties' reliance on different financial resources may affect their priorities and whether and how they show attentiveness towards their members, sympathizers and electors. This means, in our view, that it is important to address the question of the responsiveness of parties (or at least, citizens' perception of responsiveness), which represents an unexplored and potentially fruitful angle for investigating the crucial argument that parties' are moving away from society and are becoming further entrenched in the state.

Indeed, as Katz and Mair note, the parties' movement towards the state and away from society may provoke mistrust and disaffection on the part of citizens (2009: 760). Mair (2009) further elaborates these themes and reflects on the tension between the demands of responsiveness and responsibility experienced by contemporary parties; he contends that mainstream parties face increasing difficulties in coping with the institutional responsibilities of office, while simultaneously seeking to 'listen to and then respond to the demands of citizens and groups' (2009: 11). In Mair's view, parties' distance from society, and their reliance on smaller and unrepresentative membership organizations, deepens this tension and prevents them from responding properly to citizens' expectations (Mair 2009: 13). The increasingly complex environment of contemporary politics may serve to exacerbate these tensions between the representative and governing functions of parties, and between the conditions that ensure the performance of these roles (Bolleyer 2013).

In this chapter we share Mair's formulation of party responsiveness as the idea that parties should 'listen to and then respond to the demands of citizens and groups' (2009: 11). In the same vein, Bardi, Bartolini, and Trechsel (2014) consider as a minimal understanding of party responsiveness 'the tendency, and indeed the normative claim, that political parties and leaders – for reasons that range anywhere from self-interest to re-election, organizational discipline, ideological commitment – sympathetically respond to the short-term demands of voters, public opinion, interest groups, and the media' (2014: 237). Given that we investigate this aspect from the perspective of electors' attitudes we rely on indicators that help us to measure how electors perceive the responsiveness of those who are in power.

The studies that have focused on citizens' perceptions of the responsiveness of institutions have generally relied on subjective indicators such as external political efficacy (but for a recent critique see Esaiasson, Kölln, and Turper 2015).

While internal efficacy refers to the individual's perception of his or her own capacity to influence the political system, external efficacy measures precisely the perceived responsiveness of institutions (and those who are in power) to citizens' expectations and demands and, therefore, the citizens' beliefs that the political process, should be responsive to their influences (Lane 1959; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Anderson et al. 2005). Further conceptualizations of external efficacy distinguished between 'regime-based' and 'incumbent-based' variants, the former relating to the perceived responsiveness of political institutions as a whole, while the latter relates to that of individual representatives (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990: 298). External efficacy has been investigated in a number of studies focused on the connections between political institutions and citizens' attitudes and behaviour, such as electoral participation and political engagement. For instance, by using individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), Karp and Banducci (2008) analyse the impact of electoral systems on feelings of efficacy. They find that institutional arrangements associated with disproportionality and multipartism affect citizens' attitudes and behaviour; that is, electors with preferences for small parties tend to have a lower sense of efficacy than those who prefer large parties, although these differences are smaller under proportional electoral systems. They also find that the number of parties in government negatively affects electors' feelings of efficacy. The CSES data relating to the external efficacy are also used by Anderson et al. (2005) to assess the perceived responsiveness of the political system by the winners and losers of elections.

In a piece that has direct relevance to our subject in this chapter, Pardos-Prado and Riera (2016) draw on the cartel party thesis to explore whether and how the degree of party system polarization affects internal and external political efficacy. To our knowledge this is one of the first attempts to investigate the attitudinal implications of the cartelization thesis. Using CSES data once again, they show that a higher degree of ideological convergence among parties (i.e., lower polarization) tends to be associated with the belief that 'it does not make any difference who is in power', and that 'voters cannot make any difference in politics'—in short, to lower efficacy (2016: 84). Therefore, their study shows that one of the features of cartelization, parties' ideological proximity to one another, affects citizens' perceptions of the degree of party responsiveness. In this chapter we shift the focus from the party system to the party level. Hitherto, the impact of parties' organizational characteristics on citizens' perceptions of political responsiveness has been overlooked, mostly due to the lack of party data. In the next section we try to

fill this gap by linking the data collected by the PPDB with the CSES individual-level data.

HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODS

Following this review of the literature, our main concern is to investigate whether and how the sources of party funding are related to the perceived responsiveness of parties. Drawing on the cartel party literature, we argue that when parties are highly dependent on state subsidies, the incentives for parties to be closer, and therefore, responsive to, electors tends to decrease. To this end we investigate the effect of parties' financial dependence on the state on electors' perceptions of party responsiveness. This organizational feature of parties, which pertains to the 'resources concentration-diversification' dimension (see Chapter 1), is measured directly by a PPDB variable that records the share of total party income emanating from direct state subsidies. Given our research question, we test the following hypothesis:

H1: Parties which are more dependent on state finance will attract voters who feel that parties are less responsive. On the other hand, parties which are less dependent on state finances will attract voters who feel parties are more responsive.

On the basis of the argument that state funding is allocated according to the degree of the party electoral support we test the following counter-hypothesis:

H2: Parties which are more dependent on state finance will attract voters who feel that parties are more responsive to the electorate at large than to the demands and preference of private and small donors.

In short, the PPDB data enable us to test whether citizens seem to notice a difference in the responsiveness of their preferred parties when these are more dependent on the state for their income. We measure the degree of parties' financial dependence by the share of state subsidies of total national party income, as collected by the PPDB Project in 2011 to 2012. Of course, this is not a perfect measure of what it means to be a cartel party, but given the data that has been collected, it is the best proxy available, and it plainly taps a core aspect of the cartel model.

The attitudinal variables chosen to illustrate citizens/electors' perceptions of party responsiveness are taken from the third wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) cross-national survey (2006–11). Given that the CSES Module 3 covers a number of years, there is no perfect

match between the timing of the data collected by the PPDB and the CSES. However, we assume that the PPDB data on the degree of dependence on the state for public finances are relatively structural and unlikely to change much from one year to the next. Therefore, it is legitimate to match these PPDB party data to voters' data from a post-election survey fielded in a period relatively close to 2011 to 2012.

Given our goals, we are limited to countries covered both by the PPDB and Module 3 of the CSES. Thus, our sample is made up of fourteen countries and seventy-seven parties. Despite the fact that this is a considerable number of countries, it is not sufficient for a multilevel modeling of the relationship which we are trying to test. Therefore, we have opted to code an independent variable at the individual level which distinguishes between respondents who voted for parties with different degrees of dependence on state funding. We classify each of the seventy-seven parties in terms of the percentage of their income derived from state subsidies, using the PPDB data.² This enabled us to create an individual-level variable, on which each voter was assigned a value amounting to the percentage of income emanating from state subsidies which the party he or she voted for received. This is our main independent variable. We then use this variable to test, using an ordinal regression analysis in a comprehensive multivariate model including socio-demographic and political variables, whether electors who voted for parties which are more highly dependent on state resources had more negative perceptions of party responsiveness than those who do not.

In order to measure party responsiveness, we selected the variables derived from the following CSES questions that measure external efficacy:

Some people say that it doesn't make any difference who is in power. Others say that it makes a big difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it doesn't make any difference who is in power and FIVE means that it makes a big difference who is in power), where would you place yourself?

Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a big difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make any difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a big difference), where would you place yourself?

These variables, on ordinal scales running from one to five (1=it doesn't make a difference; 5=it makes a big difference), constitute our dependent variables. In the results section, we present in more detail each of the control variables which were included in the regression model. Before doing that, however, we present descriptive data organized by country on the main variables described earlier in this section, pertaining to parties' financial resources, the electors in each country who vote for these parties, and feelings of external efficacy.




FIGURE 8.1 Average share of state subsidies, by country

Source: PPDB.

Given the partly contextual nature of state financial dependence by political parties we choose to present first the mean level of state funding by country, aggregating for the parties in each polity. This information is already reported in tabular form in Chapter 3 (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2), but for ease of reference we re-present it here in graphical form (Figure 8.1).

Figure 8.1 shows quite large variations in average levels of state funding of parties across the PPDB countries, from 82 per cent in Hungary to 12 per cent in the United Kingdom. In general, parties in the older democracies tend to have lower rates of dependency on public subsidies, whereas parties in the newer democracies (along with the older Scandinavian democracies) have higher levels of state dependency. The countries in which state funding of parties is under 50 per cent on average are the UK, Netherlands, France, Germany, Canada, Denmark, and the Czech Republic.

One of the reasons for these differences is the legal frameworks which regulate party and electoral campaign finances in the different countries, as Figure 8.2 suggests. This clearly shows that, irrespective of the share of the vote they gain, the country in which parties operate has a major influence on their level of public funding. A cursory analysis of party finance legislation confirms that countries with laws that allow state funding of party organizations, parliamentary parties and election campaigns, while constraining business donations, set the stage for higher state dependence (Falguera, Jones, and Ohman 2014). This is exactly what occurs in Portugal, for instance, where the party finance law permits generous state financing and severely constrains private donations. On the other hand, a country such as the United Kingdom constitutes a clear counter-example, as there are few constraints on private donations, but very limited provision for state funding. Yet the legal




FIGURE 8.2 Votes for parties, by share of state subsidies

Note: All figures are percentages of the popular vote.

Sources: PPDB and CSES Module 3.

framework is not everything, as within-country differences remain, and make it sensible to analyse this phenomenon at the party level. Of the fourteen countries for which we report data in Figure 8.2, only six have homogeneous party systems from this perspective. Thus, in Austria, Ireland, Israel, and Norway all parties surveyed depend on the state for over half of the income, while at the opposite end of the spectrum, in Germany and the Netherlands, the state finances less than half of each party's income.³ For all other countries there is a mix, including parties that fall on either side of the 50 per cent mark.

Thus, we know that, despite the national legal context, there is sufficient variation around the mean in the majority of countries to warrant analysis at the level of the party and the individual level. However, due to the obvious importance of the legislation at the country level, all analysis will be country clustered.

We now present data on the two main types of variable which we are investigating: the percentage of state subsidies and the external efficacy measures. First we will present the association of these measures graphically, in terms of country averages, and then at a party/individual level. Figure 8.3 presents a scatterplot of the average percentage of state subsidies received by the mean value of both indicators of external efficacy in each country.





FIGURE 8.3 Scatterplots of percentage of state subsidies by perceptions of external efficacy, by country

Source: PPDB and CSES Module 3.

We note here that despite the large variation in state funding levels, there is limited variance in the countries sampled in terms of external efficacy. In this first look at the data the level of state funding of parties appears to make little difference to the percentage of people in a country feeling that 'who is in power makes a difference' or 'who people vote for makes a difference'. Both measures of external efficacy correlate positively with percentage of state funding, although only the correlation between 'who people vote for makes a difference' and the percentage of state subsidies is significant ($r=0.597$, $p<0.01$). This is the first indication that the relationship between degree of state financing and external efficacy is in fact positively rather than negatively




FIGURE 8.4 Scatterplots of percentage of state subsidies by perceptions of external efficacy, by party

Source: PPDB and CSES Module 3.

correlated. Yet, we must proceed further, since we are dealing here with aggregate, country level measures, and the data may yet reveal different patterns when analysed at the party and individual levels.

Therefore, we next present data which correlates parties' financial dependence on the state with their voters' mean positions on the two external efficacy questions. Figure 8.4 depicts the percentage of income received in state subsidies by each of the seventy-seven parties in our dataset, and the average positioning of their voters on each of the external efficacy measures. At this level, visually it seems to be the case once again that there is relatively little variance from one set of party supporters to another in terms of perceived

external efficacy, regardless of the level of state support for the party. That said, the variation is great enough to generate positive correlations in both cases; that is, the higher the level of state funding a party receives, the greater the likelihood that its voters will feel it *does* make a difference who one votes for, or who is in power. Indeed, the correlations of the two measures of external efficacy are, contrary to the country level findings, both significant ($p < 0.01$), though not particularly strong at, respectively, $r = 0.072$ (for 'who is in power') and $r = 0.064$ (for 'who people vote for').

Thus, for now, the evidence suggests that, contrary to the expectations of H1, but consistent with those of H2, the association between measures of external efficacy and the level of state subsidies is positive, and weakly significant. We turn next to our more comprehensive multivariate model in order to better understand whether voting for a party which depends on the state may have an impact on external efficacy.

A MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF PARTY RESPONSIVENESS

In order to test this, we use an ordered logit regression analysis. Ordinal logistic regression is more appropriate in this instance because our dependent variables are ordinal, rather than continuous interval-level scales. Given the fact that we do not have a sufficient number of cases to perform a multilevel analysis, we opt to approach the issue at the party/vote level. Therefore, we start by coding political parties according to the percentage of state subsidies which they receive. We then create an independent variable (STATEDEPEND) which groups voters according to the level of state dependency of their preferred party.

Our dependent variables measure external efficacy in two different ways, as described in the previous section—that is, using the indicators 'who is in power makes a difference' and 'who people vote for makes a difference'. Since these variables consist of scales running from one (does not make a difference) to five (does make a difference) and it is not certain that the difference from one value to the next on these scales is equivalent, we opt for ordinal rather than a linear regression. In addition, we perform a country cluster analysis in order to account for the importance of the independent variables beyond mere country effects.

Our explanatory model includes the following socio-demographic variables: age (– to +); gender (1=male, 2=female); education (0=from no education to secondary school complete; 1=all those who have more than secondary education); trade union membership (1=trade union member; 2=not a member); and frequency of religious service attendance (0=from no attendance to less than once a month, 1=at least once a month). In addition,

we include the following political variables: party identification (1=has a party identification; 5=has no party identification), and STATEDEPEND (the main independent variable which measures the percentage of state subsidies received by the party the respondent voted for). This last variable is standardized to vary from zero to one, in order to be comparable to the other variables. We expect greater perceptions of political responsiveness to correlate positively with age, male gender, education, being in a trade union, and attending religious services. This is because all these variables are associated with greater social integration, and we expect citizens who feel more integrated to have more positive perceptions of party responsiveness. We also expect party identification to correlate positively with greater perceptions of political responsiveness, on the basis that those who feel a sense of party attachment can be assumed to believe that ‘their’ party can make a difference if given the chance to exert influence over public policy. Finally, as regards those who voted for parties which largely depend on the state (as captured by STATEDEPEND) we have two hypotheses which point in different directions. The descriptive results obtained in the previous section suggest that the second hypothesis which links more public financing of parties with a more positive perception of party responsiveness are more likely. In Table 8.1 we

TABLE 8.1 *A multivariate analysis of external efficacy measures (Ordered Logit Estimation)*

	DV: Who is in power makes a difference	DV: Who people vote for makes a difference		
	Model 1	Model 2 (country clusters)	Model 3	Model 4 (country clusters)
Age (–to+)	–0.00(0.00)	–0.00(0.00)	–0.005*** (0.001)	–0.006*** (0.001)
Gender	–0.01(0.04)	0.018(0.042)	0.037(0.04)	0.035(0.04)
Education	0.115** (0.046)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.08* (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)
Trade union	0.05(0.054)	0.05(0.059)	–0.03(0.05)	0.06(0.06)
Religious attend.	0.136** (0.049)	0.094** (0.056)	0.043(0.046)	0.117** (0.055)
Has a party id	–0.69*** (0.043)	–0.77*** (0.044)	–0.79*** (0.011)	–0.83*** (0.044)
STATEDEPEND	0.179*** (0.021)	0.097** (0.035)	0.166*** (0.02)	0.00(0.034)
Cut 1	–0.60*** (0.096)	–3.97*** (0.52)	–3.03*** (0.1)	–3.20*** (0.60)
Cut 2	–1.8*** (0.09)	–3.18*** (0.52)	–2.15*** (0.09)	–2.32*** (0.60)
Cut 3	–0.75*** (0.09)	–2.09*** (0.52)	–0.994*** (0.09)	–1.2* (0.60)
Cut 4	0.49** (0.09)	0.81(0.52)	–0.32*** (0.09)	–0.21(0.60)
Pseudo- R ²	0.048	0.09	0.055	0.088
N	7836	7836	8342	8342

Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The reference category for education is all those who have more than secondary education; the reference category for religious attendance is all those who go to mass once a month or more often.
** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01.

Source: CSES Module 3.

present the results for two models for each of the dependent variables. For each dependent variable, the first column shows results including all socio-demographic variables and political variables, and the second is essentially the same but with country clustering.

Consider the importance of socio-demographic variables in Models 1 and 3, which are the full models but without the country clustering, for both dependent variables. As expected, we observe positive relationships between education, trade union membership and frequency of religious attendance and the dependent variables. All three indicators signal a greater tendency to believe that 'who is in power makes a difference' and 'who people vote for makes a difference'. Of these variables, the most important in Models 1 and 3 are education and religious attendance, with those who have reached higher levels of education and who attend religious services frequently having more positive perceptions on both dependent variables (although the latter effect is not significant in respect of Model 3). Age and gender do not appear to have significant influences.

Moving on to the political variables, those who have a party identification are more likely to believe that those in power can make a difference and that voting also matters. Indeed, we know that party identification is a major anchor for both political attitudes and voting behaviour, and thus it is unsurprising that this result appears. Considering next our key independent variable STATEDEPEND, which codes voters according to the percentage of state subsidies received by the party they voted for, we see that both in Model 1 and Model 3 these values correlate positively and significantly with the dependent variables.

Once we include the country clustering in Models 2 and 4, in order to control for the fact that the data included in the sample are divided by country, we observe the following results: the model fit improves somewhat, signaling that country differences do indeed matter. Concerning the socio-demographic variables, education and religious attendance remain important. Party identification also remains significant, with those who have a party identification having a greater tendency to consider that who is in power makes a difference or voting matters. As regards STATEDEPEND, although the relationships remain positive with both dependent variables, it is only significant in Model 2, that is, with 'who is in power makes a difference'.

These results therefore point to the following conclusion: the relationship between level of state funding of parties and perceptions of party responsiveness are always positive in the regression analyses undertaken, although they are not always significant, signaling that the relationship is not a particularly strong one, which is in line with what was found in the first part of the analysis using only descriptive data. On no occasion though, did we find a negative relationship between level of state funding enjoyed by parties and their voters' perceptions of party responsiveness. Therefore, we find no evidence that is

consistent with the implications of the cartel party thesis. On the contrary, the data seem to show a positive relationship—albeit not a very strong one—between the level of state funding of parties and feelings of party responsiveness.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have investigated from an innovative angle an important implication of Katz and Mair's cartel thesis: that parties' shift from society and their anchoring in the state has eroded voters' sense of political efficacy. By using the rich and unique database on party organization built by the PPDB Project, we have been able to explore whether and to what extent parties' financial dependence on the state shapes electors' feelings about the responsiveness of parties. To this end, data on party income has been connected to individual-level variables from the third wave of the CSES (2006–11), selecting the most suitable variables for tapping feelings of external political efficacy.

The empirical analysis has proceeded in two steps: firstly, we examined the correlation between the average percentage of their income received in subsidies by parties in each country, and the aggregate mean values of measures of external efficacy; following this, we shifted the investigation to the individual level in order to undertake a multivariate regression analysis. Each party has been coded according to its degree of dependence on the state, and voters have been coded according their preference for a party more or less dependent on the state. The two analyses are consistent in their results and show that the relationship between level of state funding of parties and perceptions of party responsiveness are positive, though not strong.

Contrary to the theoretical expectations derived from the cartel thesis, these findings suggest that electors voting for parties more dependent on the state are not more likely to have low feelings of political efficacy. As such, they seem to be consistent with the views of those who defend the continuing relevance of the party-linkage model and the enduring ability of parties to mobilize their voters (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). From this perspective, the financial anchoring of contemporary parties in the state may be interpreted as a form of organizational adaptation to a new environment whose implications for electors are less worrying than expected, or whose effects parties have been able to counterbalance in other ways. Indeed, as has been argued by proponents of the public financing of political parties, it may be the case that it serves to enhance systemic transparency, and thus also perceptions of party responsiveness. More specifically, these findings are consistent with our counter-hypothesis that parties which resort significantly

to state subsidies are not necessarily less in touch with voters as a consequence of their resource structure. Rather, these parties may be well equipped to respond to the demands of voters at large because they are less conditioned by the demands of private (affluent and small) financial supporters and committed partisans and are more oriented towards the broader electorate, given that their funding depends largely on their electoral results.

It is possible that the argument which sees parties' financial dependence on the state as a simple corollary of their distance from society needs to be more nuanced; perhaps it is not a simple zero-sum game between state and society. Does the anchoring of parties in the state necessarily imply a significant detachment from society? It is true that in their later restatement of the theory Katz and Mair readjust the role of state funding, by introducing other factors into the mechanism of cartelization. However, that may be, empirical investigation is crucial to test the argument, and we have contributed to such investigation here through access to the PPDB.

That said, there is scope for more empirical research; for instance, distinguishing between different types of parties (e.g., by party family or age) might shed new light on the relationships between state funding and citizens' attitudes. Moreover, the financial dimension, which has been at the core of this chapter, may be further expanded by other data associated with the party-state nexus (e.g., patronage), thus offering a more complex picture of the state-party-society relationship and the broader argument about the alleged gap between parties and society.

APPENDIX

TABLE A8.1 *Parties in Analysis*

CSES3 countries	CSES3 parties also included in PPDB
Austria	Social Democratic Party People's Party Freedom Party The Greens Alliance for the Future
Canada	Liberal Party New Democratic Party Bloc Québécois Green Party
Czech Republic	Social Democratic Party Civic Democratic Party TOP 09

(continued)

TABLE A8.1 *Continued*

CSES3 countries	CSES3 parties also included in PPDB
	Communist Party
	Christian Democratic Union
Denmark	Social Democrats
	Danish People's Party
	Social Liberal Party
	Socialist People's Party
	Red-Green Alliance
	Liberal Alliance
	Conservatives
	Liberals
France	Socialist Party
	Union for a Popular Movement
Germany	Christian Democratic Union
	Social Democratic Party
	Free Democratic Party
	The Left
	Alliance '90/The Greens
	Christian Social Union
Ireland	Fine Gael
	Labour Party
	Fianna Fáil
	Sinn Féin
Israel	Kadima
	Likud
	Yisrael Beiteinu
	Labor Party
	Meretz
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
	Labour Party
	Socialist Party
	Christian Democratic Appeal
	Democrats 66
	Christian Union
	Green Left
	Reformed Political Party
	Party for the Animals
Norway	Labour Party
	Progress Party
	Conservative Party
	Socialist Left Party
	Centre Party
	Christian Democratic Party
Poland	Liberal Party
	Civic Platform
	Law and Justice

TABLE A8.1 *Continued*

CSES3 countries	CSES3 parties also included in PPDB
Portugal	Polish People's Party
	Democratic Left Alliance
	Social Democratic Party
	Socialist Party
	People's Party
	Left Bloc
	Communist Party
Spain	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'
	People's Party
	Socialist Party
	United Left
	Basque Nationalist Party
Sweden	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia
	Social Democrats
	Left Party
	Green Party
	Centre Party
	Liberal People's Party
	Christian Democrats
	Moderate Party

NOTES

1. Emphasis in the original.
2. These parties, which are included in Appendix Table A8.1, constitute the most important ones in each of the countries we have included.
3. These differences flow directly from the way in which funding laws operate. In Germany, for instance, the party finance laws require parties to generate at least half of their income themselves.

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Candidate Selection Rules and Democratic Outcomes

The Impact of Parties on Women's Representation

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and Gideon Rahat

INTRODUCTION

Despite considerable gains in recent decades, women remain vastly under-represented in national legislatures around the world. As of 2015, for instance, women accounted for 22 per cent of elected representatives, up from 12 per cent in 1997 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2015).¹ While these gains are impressive, the advances seem to have plateaued in recent years. Notwithstanding these gains, there are a variety of reasons—both normative and practical—why this under-representation should be of concern (see Kunovich and Paxton 2005). For example, increasing women's descriptive representation in the legislature can result in an enhanced focus on issues of relevance to women (Tremblay 1998), it can produce a more civil tone and tenor of debate (Young 2009), and it can challenge existing gender stereotypes (Bashevkin 2009).

In an attempt to explain the under-representation of women, much of the comparative literature has focused on national patterns (differences between countries) and system level variables. As a result, factors such as the electoral system have been characterized as being highly important (see, for example, Matland and Studlar 1996). Adopting this type of approach, however, risks overlooking the significant variation that occurs within countries, as well as the role of political parties, which have previously been described as the 'missing variable' in women and politics research (Verge and de la Fuente 2014: 68; citing Lovenduski 2011). As Caul (1999: 80) correctly notes, 'parties differ in the number of women they nominate, where

they rank women on party lists, and the proportion of women that they send to parliament’.

A focus on countries over parties, however, has largely been due to the availability (or lack thereof) of comparative data concerning the internal structures and rules of parties. As Kunovich and Paxton (2005: 506) write, because such a comparison requires ‘very detailed information about parties’, studies examining party factors typically focus on country specific case studies or limit the analysis to very few countries and/or intra-party variables. The breadth of the Political Party Database, however, provides us with a unique opportunity to explore more closely and comprehensively the role of parties in structuring political representation across 19 democracies. Indeed, this dataset allows for an unprecedented study of the direct impact of internal party rules on representational outcomes.

This chapter therefore diverges from much of the existing literature in two important ways. First, given the diversity found among parties, we take the political party as our primary unit of analysis. Rather than focusing exclusively on cross-national variation, we are primarily interested in cross-party differences. Second, given our emphasis on parties, our primary focus is on the variation in the number of female candidates who are *nominated* (not the number of women elected).² While parties certainly control some aspects of electing women (placing them in winnable districts, for example, or at the top of a party list), they have a much more direct and unmediated role in their initial nomination. We are particularly interested in uncovering which internal party rules and institutional arrangements result in more women being selected as party candidates. While Caul (2001) and Krook (2014) highlight the role that gender quotas have played in increasing women’s numerical representation worldwide, other internal party rules have been the subject of far less study and attention.³

In undertaking this research, we engage with current debates in the literature concerning the trade-off between the democratic ideals of inclusiveness and representativeness. That is, the argument that more inclusive selectorates (comprised of party members) produce unbalanced slates of electoral candidates, especially in terms of gender composition. Our approach also acknowledges, however, that parties do not compete in a vacuum. Therefore, our analysis is not limited to party variables as it also takes into account the environment in which parties compete, controlling for factors such as the electoral system, state mandated electoral gender quotas, and women’s numerical representation in the legislature. By focusing on party variation and internal party rules/structures, this chapter reveals a number of unexpected findings. In particular, we find far less evidence that official party rules make a difference in enhancing representational outcomes than initially expected.

CANDIDATE SELECTION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTIES AS GATEKEEPERS

Candidate selection is not only relevant to the internal dynamics of parties; it also has significant implications for democracy at the level of the political system (Cross 2008; Rahat 2013). The composition of the candidate pool has considerable democratic implications. Lilliefeldt (2012: 194), for example, writes that ‘parties are the main architects of parliamentary representation’. That parties act as crucial gatekeepers to elected office is well established in the literature (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Caul 1999; Norris 2006; Krook 2010). In most countries winning a party nomination is the essential prerequisite for being elected to parliament. The selection of party candidates therefore determines the pool of individuals from which voters will create their legislature. In other words, it shapes and constrains the options voters can choose from.

Due to this monopolization, whom the parties nominate to contest a general election is of considerable importance. Legislatures that reflect the demographic distribution of a given society require that political parties produce a set of candidates that is at least somewhat reflective of the broader electorate. Recent evidence suggests that women perform just as well as men during general elections and are not discriminated against by voters (Smith and Fox 2001; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Tremblay 2007; Lawless and Pearson 2008). Dolan (2004: 50), for instance, has written that ‘levels of bias are low enough to no longer provide significant impediments to women’s chances of election.’ Examining the last two Australian federal elections, Gauja and Cross (2015) found that the percentage of women nominated by parties correlated closely with the percentage of women elected to parliament, owing to the dominance of major parties in the electoral contest. If voters are not biased against women when casting their ballot, and political parties are the principal gatekeepers to legislative office, then increasing women’s representation in the legislature requires more women to contest the general election. This, of course, means more women in the candidate pool. Crotty (1968: 260) explains the importance of candidate selection in the following way:

The party in recruiting candidates determines the personnel and, more symbolically, the groups to be represented among the decision-making elite. Through recruitment, the party indirectly influences the types of policy decisions to be enacted and the interests most likely to be heard. Candidate recruitment then represents one of the key linkages between the electorate and the policy-making process.

Preliminary evidence suggests that different candidate selection methods can produce different representational outcomes, and this is especially salient with

respect to debates concerning the representation of women. In particular, it has been suggested that there is a relationship between the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate and the representativeness of the candidates selected. Examining candidate selection in the Israeli case, Rahat, Hazan, and Katz (2008) argue that potentially competing democratic values (inclusiveness, representation etc.) are unable to be simultaneously maximized within a single political party. The authors find that parties that adopted inclusive selectorates (members) produced a set of candidates that was not representative in terms of gender. While interesting, these findings have yet to be replicated cross-nationally.

Yet, as Childs (2013: 90) notes, there is no real agreement within the gender and politics literature on the single most-important internal party factor that determines levels of women's descriptive representation in parliament. Whilst the method of candidate selection may play a role, the presence of state and party-mandated rules concerning gender in candidate selection may also have an impact, along with the presence of women's organizations and rules regarding the gender composition of party executives. We investigate this possibility in the remainder of the chapter.

HYPOTHESES: CENTRALIZATION, INCLUSIVENESS, AND PARTY RULES

The level of centralization in the candidate selection process has consistently been identified as a key factor in accounting for differences in women's political representation (Matland and Studlar 1996; Caul 1999; Krook 2010; Kenny and Verge 2013; Vandeleene 2014), because the distribution of authority in a party can create incentives for nominating more women or it can create additional barriers. Decentralized selectorates are said to be much less capable of coordinating and controlling the overall results of candidate selection compared to more centralized selectorates (Hazan and Rahat 2010).⁴ It has been suggested, for example, that decentralized selectorates rarely take the time to carefully consider decisions made outside of their own electoral district (Kittilson 2006). Each decision is therefore made in isolation without a broader discussion of the representational outcomes at the aggregate level. Moreover, as Caul (1999: 81) suggests, decentralization creates an environment in which women need to simultaneously pressure each local party individually, rather than having a 'single target for their demands.'

Conversely, where candidate selection is centralized, women have a single focal point and the national leadership is able to directly respond to increasing pressures to substantially increase women's representation (Matland and

Studlar 1996). Moreover, central party elites would be motivated to do so because this would serve to compensate for the alleged democratic deficit produced by using more centralized selection processes. Furthermore, without a decentralized selection process to ‘blame’, central party elites can be held directly accountable for the (un)representativeness of the candidate pool. Central elites therefore have an incentive to produce balanced slates of candidates as a means of pre-empting criticism and meeting the social expectations of the electorate.

The empirical evidence tends to support this view. In a cross-national study, Kittilson (2006) found that higher levels of women’s representation positively correlate with centralized selection authority and party structures. A recent study of candidate selection in Northern Ireland (Matthews 2014) provides an account of the obstacles that national party leaderships have faced in their attempt to increase women’s representation in countries with decentralized candidate selection processes. Evidence from the United Kingdom, Canada and even some Scandinavian countries (Hazan and Rahat 2010) also support this expectation. We therefore propose that:

H1: Women’s representation will be higher in parties with more centralized candidate selection methods.

More recently, the inclusiveness of the selectorate has also been identified as a possible explanatory variable. We propose two competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between the role of party members in candidate selection and the number of women nominated to contest the general election. The first hypothesis predicts a negative relationship. As per the previous discussion, the reason is that selectorates that directly involve party members are less capable of coordinating and controlling the results of candidate selections than are more exclusive selectorates (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008; Hazan and Rahat 2010). When selection authority is given to atomized and anonymous party members without other mechanisms in place (i.e., gender quotas or targets), some degree of communication and coordination in the decision-making process is lost. Meaningful discussions of gender, compromise among competing interests, and consensus building are therefore less likely to occur.

By contrast, the more exclusive selectorates of party elites, or even convention delegates, are better able to respond to increasing pressures to substantially increase women’s representation. Under these circumstances the exclusive nature of the selection means that meaningful deliberation can occur, representational imperatives can be discussed, and imbalances can be addressed. Moreover, exclusive selectorates are likely to be motivated to do so because this would serve to compensate for their alleged democratic deficit in the realm of participation. The trade-off for limiting membership participation may be a more representative candidate pool, a potentially democratically justifiable argument (Pruysers and Cross 2016).

Several studies of candidate selection support the claim that more inclusive selectorates are less capable of ensuring representation in general (see for example, Fell's 2005 study on Taiwan) and promoting women's representation in particular (see Kristjansson 1998 on the Icelandic case and Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008 on the Israeli case). Hazan and Rahat (2010) highlight cases in the Netherlands and Belgium where parties 'fixed' the results of the members' selection or withdrew from involving members in the selection due to their outcomes being unrepresentative in various terms, including women's representation. They also point to the case of Finland, in which parties are obliged by law to conduct primaries yet are allowed to 'fix' the results, as a realization of this problem. Indeed, Finnish parties are able to change one-fourth of the candidates selected by party members, a powerful tool for ensuring the representativeness of the selection process (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 42). According to Narud and Valen (2008), the Norwegian parties' use of exclusive candidate selection methods—which allows party elite within each electoral district to control the process—enabled them to produce more representative candidacies than most parties elsewhere. We therefore propose that:

H2a: Women's representation as candidates will be lower in those parties in which members participate directly in the selection of candidates.

This debate, however, is not fully settled. Writing about the Canadian case, Erickson (1991) finds that women won the party nomination in 54 per cent of the cases where there were both men and women contestants. As a result, Erickson concludes that 'like the larger electorate, local activists who participate in selection ballots show little evidence of resistance to women politicians' (1991: 112).⁵ In a recent study of Icelandic primaries, Indriðason and Kristinsson (2015) found that while exclusive selectorates were more likely to nominate women overall, they were less likely than inclusive selectorates to place women in a winnable position on the party list. Examining the two major Australian parties, Gauja and Cross (2015) found that it was only in the Labor Party, and not the Liberals, that more exclusive and centralized methods of candidate selection produced greater numbers of female candidates.

Furthermore, while the argument concerning the capacity of more exclusive selectorates to respond to pressures for increasing women's representation is a strong one, it can be countered. As Rahat (2013) argues, the empirical meaning of intra-party democracy tends to stress two elements: participation (of party members) and representation (especially, but not exclusively, of women). We should therefore expect parties that adopt more inclusive selectorates to also have a more positive attitude towards women candidates and to also ensure, through various representation correction mechanisms, that they would be highly represented. Indriðason and Kristinsson (2015: 570) propose the following logic:

When candidate selection is not open to the party membership, party lists are likely to be chosen by a more close-knit network of party insiders who, historically, have predominantly been male. Primaries may have an important role in breaking down such barriers and opening up an avenue of mobilization for women to achieve greater representation.

In other words, including party members in the decision-making process can challenge the ‘outgroup’ effect that biases party elites against women (Niven 1998). We therefore propose an alternative hypothesis that:

H2b: Women’s representation as candidates will be higher in those parties in which members participate directly in the selection of candidates.

Although we might expect the method of candidate selection (particularly in terms of the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate and the centralization of the process) to affect the percentage of women candidates selected to contest public office, this interplays closely with quotas and formal rules that exist (either at the level of the party, or the state) to facilitate women’s representation. The most direct of these measures are provisions within party rules that specifically concern gender and candidate selection.

Gender quotas shape and alter the selection process by adding new criteria for parties to consider in their selection process, either as targets and recommendations (soft quotas) or binding requirements (hard quotas).⁶ As Childs (2013: 90) notes, provisions such as quotas are often associated with intra-party conflict, particularly over the principles of fairness and merit as well as concerns over centralization and override of ‘democratic’ processes. Given this tension, while some parties will choose to voluntarily implement these measures, they may also be compelled to do so by state regulation (Dahlerup 2011; Krook and Zetterberg 2014: 3). We therefore need to distinguish between the location of the quota: statutory or legal quotas operate at the system level whereas voluntary or party quotas operate at the party level (Krook 2014). In both instances, however, we would expect to see a positive relationship between the percentage of female candidates selected and the presence of formal rules that address issues of gender in candidate selection processes. Therefore we suggest that:

H3a: Women’s representation as candidates will be higher in parties that have adopted gender quotas, targets or recommendations (hard or soft) for the purpose of candidate selection.

H3b: Women’s representation as candidates will be higher in parties that are subject to state-mandated electoral gender quotas.

Beyond the existence of formal quotas or provisions that address issues of gender in candidate selection directly, Childs (2013: 84) argues that studies of party organization should also consider the presence, nature and roles of

women's organizations within political parties (see for example Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Young 2000; Young and Cross 2003), and the level of women's participation in party structures—including specific mechanisms in place to guarantee women's descriptive representation. Relatively little academic research exists on specific women's structures within parties, and to this end, our hypotheses are tentative.⁷ However, previous studies reveal that such gender-specific organizations are reasonably widespread, with just over one-third of parties in advanced industrial democracies having such groups (Kittilson 2011).

Childs (2013: 87) notes that the literature that does exist on the impact of women's organizations is polarized. On the one hand, women's organizations may engender group identity—creating a site where women can meaningfully participate in party politics and shape party agendas. On the other hand, they have the potential to marginalize female party members away from 'mainstream' party activity (Kittilson 2011). However, if we assume that there is a positive relationship between the presence and role of women's organizations and the diversity of candidates selected to contest public office, we would expect to observe the following:

H4: Women's representation as candidates will be higher in parties with institutionalized women's organizations (that is, those official organizations mentioned in party rules and statutes).

Extending the analysis beyond the mere presence of these organizations to their role and function, and drawing on previous research that suggests that legislative representation is reflective of representation within the higher echelons of parties (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006; Kittilson 2006; Childs 2013: 88), we might also expect a positive effect on gender representation in situations where provisions are made that integrate women into intra-party decision-making arenas more generally (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of intra-party democracy). These mechanisms are seen as effective because they institutionalize women's place in the party organization, creating the opportunity for a formal re-balancing of power between men and women within the organization (Childs 2013: 95). Therefore:

H5: Women's representation as candidates will be higher in parties where women have reserved positions as delegates to the party conference, or are guaranteed seats on the party executive.

Finally, beyond quotas and other rules directly related to gender, parties have a variety of other eligibility rules that may influence the social diversity of the candidate pool. While some parties have few candidacy requirements beyond party membership, others require monetary deposits (upwards of \$1,000 in some Canadian parties) and other parties require prospective candidates to

gather signatures from existing party members as evidence of their grassroots support (Hazan and Rahat 2010). While such requirements may not seem overly onerous, these rules may in fact act as barriers for historically marginalized groups such as women. Erickson (1991), for instance, raises concerns that women are outspent by men during intra-party candidate selection contests and Bashevkin (2010) echoes this concern as it relates to intra-party leadership elections. If the distribution of financial and human resources between men and women is indeed uneven, additional requirements for candidacy, especially monetary, may prevent women from seeking candidacy or winning the party nomination. Our final hypothesis is:

H6: Women's representation as candidates will be higher in parties with minimal candidacy requirements (i.e., no monetary deposit or signature requirement).

DATA: METHODS AND MEASURES

To explore the impact of institutional rules—both party and state—on the representativeness of the slate of candidates that political parties nominate, this chapter draws on data from recent elections in 19 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.⁸ Exploring women's representation in this particular set of countries allows us to include both established and new democracies with different electoral systems, to explore differences across a variety of party families, and to include countries with and without electoral gender quotas in our analysis. While our data do not allow for a longitudinal approach, the cross-sectional nature of the data does allow for the inclusion of a wide range of different political parties.

Dependent Variable

The most common way to examine the representativeness of party outcomes is to consider the number of women elected to parliament (see, for example, Paxton 1997; Caul 1999). Far less research, however, has explored the step prior to election: winning a party nomination. Given that parties act as powerful gatekeepers to the legislature, understanding women's descriptive representation requires an engagement with the candidate selection process. To that end, our dependent variable is the percentage of each party's candidates who were women. As Rahat, Hazan, and Katz (2008: 669) suggest, an

examination of gender serves as the best possible empirical proxy for representation in a general sense because it is a feature of political representation that is relevant for most, if not all, political parties. Thus, while the focus of this analysis is on women, the findings likely have implications for descriptive representation more broadly.

Independent Variables

A number of variables in our analysis allow us to address H1 and H2a/H2b by capturing a party's candidate selection method both in terms of inclusiveness (role of party members) and centralization (the distribution of authority to central, regional, or local party bodies).⁹ Considering the inclusiveness of the selectorate, we differentiate between those parties that allow direct membership participation in the selection of candidates and those that do not. Mediated participation, such as when party members select delegates who then go on to choose candidates, is therefore not considered direct membership participation. In this regard, members do not have to have complete selection authority nor do they have to be the only selectorate. Thus, we have a dichotomous variable in which the primary distinction is whether or not individual party members have a direct and unmediated role in the candidate selection process.

We also categorize the level of centralization for each party in one of three categories: none, some, and full, depending on the authority that is provided to the central party apparatus in the candidate selection process. When the central party alone is responsible, centralization is coded as 'full'. By contrast, when local or constituency party branches have exclusive authority we have a case of 'none'. The 'some' category is therefore reserved for parties that divide authority between central and local party bodies as well as parties that provide regional branches with selection authority.

We also include variables for whether or not a party operates under a statutory electoral gender quota or some type of internal party target/quota, allowing us to investigate H3a/H3b. First, we include a variable for the existence of legal electoral gender quotas that affect the candidate selection process. Included here are statutory or constitutionally mandated minimum quotas, zippered party lists, and other state required mechanisms used to ensure greater gender representation in the candidate pool. We include a similar variable for the party level that captures whether party constitutions or statutes provide specific quotas, targets, or recommendations for gender representation in the process of selecting candidates. Here we do not distinguish between 'soft' quotas (targets and recommendations) and 'hard' quotas (binding requirements). We do this because of the considerable diversity that is found within each of these categories,¹⁰ and because when *followed* both

hard and soft measures can be effective (Krook 2014). As such, we explore differences between those parties that have these types of internal rules and those parties that do not.

Our next variables relate to H4 and H5 and capture the roles of women within political parties. Here we include variables on the presence of women's subgroups (or auxiliary units) and rules for women's representation on the party's national executive as well as attendance to the general party congress. We also explore possible obstacles to candidacy by including variables about party level monetary candidate deposits, signature requirements, and candidate spending limits during the general election (H6). In building on H6 and accounting for the general openness of the selection process we also include a variable for whether or not the party has adopted any kind of target or quota for religious or ethnic minorities.

Finally, we include a number of control variables. Parties of the left have consistently been shown to nominate and elect more women to parliament because of their more egalitarian values (Caul 1999; Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009; Vandeleene 2014). Moreover, leftist parties, especially historically, have been the most likely to adopt internal quotas designed to enhance women's representation. That is, they adopted these earlier and tended to adopt 'hard' and higher quotas (Dahlerup 2007; Krook 2009). As such, we control for party family, distinguishing between Socialist, Green, Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, and far right parties.

While party level factors are important, parties do not operate in a vacuum. As Lilliefeldt (2012) suggests, women's parliamentary representation is a result of both intra-party factors as well as 'external party conditions'. Thus, when examining party level determinants we must also control for a variety of external factors. Perhaps the most important and widely cited of these external factors is the electoral system (Caul 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009), with parties nominating significantly more women under proportional representation (PR). We therefore control for whether the party competes in a PR electoral system.

Following Paxton (1997), we include a proxy control variable for political culture, distinguishing between Scandinavian and other western democracies. Scandinavian countries have been described as having a 'passion for equality' (Paxton 1997: 451) and can be used to isolate the effect of, and to control for, political culture in a general sense. Finally, we also include the number of women elected to the previous parliament as a percentage of the total number of MPs as a control for the level of political gender equality within a country (for a similar approach see Wauters and Pilet 2015).¹¹ As this variable represents the percentage for the entire parliament rather than individual party values, it tells us a great deal about gender equality in the country as a whole and therefore serves as an acceptable proxy.

The results are presented in two stages. In the first section of our empirical analysis, we draw on data from 122 parties in 19 countries, providing an overview of the rules that parties have adopted concerning gender as well as the number of women nominated in recent elections from the 17 countries for which we have data. In the multivariate analysis that follows, the total n drops to eighty-five parties in seventeen countries because of some missing values. Nonetheless, in our final investigation we are able to assess our hypotheses in a large number of parties in a variety of democracies.

RESULTS

Before conducting the multivariate analysis, it is important to explore the diversity in party rules relating to gender as well as the extent to which parties nominate women candidates. Table 9.1 documents the number of parties that have adopted internal party rules relating to the selection of female candidates as well as those parties that have enacted rules to ensure the representation of women at key party functions (delegates to congress) and on internal bodies (party executive and women's subgroups). The data reveal that internal party rules concerning gender are not uncommon, appearing in more than one third of the parties in our population. This is consistent with previous research that has indicated that rules such as internal party quotas are becoming increasingly prevalent (Reiser 2014: 56) and suggests a representational strategy that acknowledges the importance of women as a political group (see Chapter 5 this volume).

Approximately four-in-ten parties examined, for instance, have women's sub-organizations and a similar number have adopted rules to ensure that women are represented on the party's highest executive. For example, of the six members elected to the party executive by members of the Irish Labour Party, three must be women according to party statutes. Likewise, a number of other parties (the Socialists in Spain, the Liberal Party in Norway, the Social Democrats in Austria, along with a variety of others) have enacted internal rules requiring that at least 40 per cent of the party executive be

TABLE 9.1 *Percentage of parties with rules relating to...*

	Yes	No	N
Gender mentioned in candidate selection rules	39	61	116
Women's specific subgroup	41	59	122
Gender representation at party congress	30	70	122
Gender representation on the executive	38	62	120

comprised of women. Furthermore, four in ten parties specifically mention gender in their official candidate selection rules (see also Chapter 5). This, however, varies considerably across the parties in our sample. Some parties, like the Canadian Liberals for example, have soft commitments that require a ‘careful consideration of potential candidates who are female’ while others have more tangible targets of gender parity. Some parties even go as far as to mandate that a considerable percentage of candidates be women (upwards of 40 per cent in some cases).

In addition to internal party rules, political parties from five countries (Belgium, France, Poland, Portugal, and Spain) in our sample operate under statewide legislation that affects the candidate selection process at the party level. Political parties in Poland, for example, must comply with a state mandated gender quota that requires that each gender is represented by at least 35 per cent of the candidates on the list. Portugal’s regulations go further, not only requiring at least 33.3 per cent for each gender, but also mandating that party lists not contain more than two candidates of the same gender placed consecutively. Where these state mandated electoral gender quotas exist, they typically require that between 33 and 40 per cent of candidates are women.

Despite the increasingly widespread adoption of internal party rules relating to gender and women’s representation, we find considerable variation among the countries in our sample in terms of the number of women candidates selected. Unsurprisingly, men continue to be over-represented in the candidate pool as, on average, women account for 34.7 per cent of general election candidates. The mean percentage of women nominated as candidates ranges from nearly 50 per cent in Belgium, Norway, and Spain to a low of less than 20 per cent in Ireland and Israel.¹² It is perhaps unsurprising that two of the countries near the 50 per cent mark have implemented electoral quotas. Figure 9.1 provides a breakdown of the country-level differences using a box plot.¹³

As Figure 9.1 reveals, it is not just across countries that we find significant variation in the number of women nominated. Indeed, there are substantial within-country differences as well. Figures 9.2 and 9.3 provide examples of this within-country variation in Austria and Italy. In Austria, for instance, there is a 34 percentage point gap between the number of women nominated by the Freedom Party (18 per cent) and the Greens (52 per cent). While not as stark, this ranges from 16 to 41 per cent in Italy. While illustrative, Figure 9.1 makes clear that there are relatively large intra-party differences in about two thirds of the countries.

Thus far we have found substantial variation both within and among countries. Consistent with the broader literature, Table 9.2 reveals that parties of the left are more likely to produce balanced slates of candidates than parties on the right of the political spectrum. The Greens in particular nominate significantly more women than the parties on the right.




FIGURE 9.1 Percentage and range of women candidates by country




FIGURE 9.2 Percentage of women candidates by party (Austria)




FIGURE 9.3 Percentage of women candidates by party (Italy)

TABLE 9.2 Mean percentage of women candidates by party family

Party family	Mean % of women candidates nominated	N
Greens	45	13
Social Democrats	38	23
Liberals	37	21
Left Socialists	37	11
Christian Democrats/Conservatives	32	29
Far Right	30	14

Note: Analysis does not include Germany or the Czech Republic. A one-way-ANOVA demonstrates significant differences across party families, $F(5.97) = 2.657, p < 0.05$.

TABLE 9.3 Mean percentage of women candidates by adoption of party rules

	% when adopted	% when not adopted
Gender mentioned in candidate selection rules	38	32
Women’s specific subgroup	34	35
Gender representation at party congress	37	33
Gender representation on the executive	36	34

Note: Does not include Germany or the Czech Republic.

Table 9.3 reports bivariate results regarding the adoption of gender specific rules and the percentage of women those parties nominate. While the effect is not particularly large, in all but one case parties with specific rules relating to women in internal party life nominate more women on average. Parties that mention gender in their selection methods, for example,

nominate an average of 6 per cent more women compared to parties that make no mention of gender in their selection rules. Likewise, the nomination gap between parties that ensure women attend the party congress and those that do not is 4 percentage points.

With this brief overview of the state of both the number of women nominated as well as the diversity in party rules complete, we can explore our explanatory hypotheses. The multivariate analysis proceeds in three steps. In Model 1, we include party level variables (inclusiveness of the selectorate, centralization, rules regarding gender representation on the executive, and so on) in order to assess the relationship between representativeness and internal party organizational rules. In Model 2, we keep the party variables and add the system-level control variables (electoral quotas, electoral system, etc.). Finally, Model 3 once again includes all of the party variables but here we include country dummies rather than the system-level control variables in order to account for country specific effects.¹⁴

In Model 1, where we examine party factors without our system-level controls or country effects, we find a number of variables that are significantly related to the number of women nominated as candidates (see Table 9.4). Consistent with the literature (Caul 1999; Kittilson 2006; Krook 2010; Vandeleeene 2014), we find that centralization is positively associated with women's representation. Those parties that allocate the central party exclusive selection authority nominate considerably more women than those parties that provide selection authority to regional or local branches (or some combination of the two). This appears to confirm the suggestion that central party bodies, when given authority, can 'correct' representational imbalances and ensure higher levels of social diversity in the candidate pool.

Consistent with Rahat, Hazan, and Katz (2008) among others, Table 9.4 also reveals that there is a negative relationship between highly inclusive selectorates and the number of women who are nominated. When party members are offered a direct and unmediated role in the selection of candidates, significantly fewer women are nominated, revealing the potential democratic downfalls of highly inclusive and participatory selectorates. Model 1 therefore appears to confirm our hypotheses concerning both centralization (H1) and inclusiveness (H2a). In other words, the selection process itself appears to be a significant predictor of the number of women nominated.

In terms of H3a, H4, and H5 (rules concerning internal gender quotas and representation guarantees), Table 9.4 provides no supporting evidence. Parties that have established internal women's sub-organizations, guarantee women a place on the party's highest executive, or reserve delegate positions for women at party conferences do not produce more gender balanced slates of candidates compared to those parties that have not institutionalized such rules. Nor do we find any evidence to support our hypothesis (H6) concerning candidacy requirements and additional barriers.

TABLE 9.4 OLS regression with percentage of women candidates as the dependent variable

	Model 1 Party variables	Model 2 Party & system	Model 3 Party & country
Candidate deposit	-0.071 (5.381)	-0.093 (3.834)	-0.041 (3.582)
Signature requirement	-0.076 (3.138)	0.191 (2.894)	0.136 (3.000)
Party target/quota	-0.026 (3.764)	-0.065 (2.665)	-0.099 (2.442)
Women's subgroup	0.049 (3.109)	0.067 (2.220)	0.039 (2.085)
Conference delegates	0.035 (3.011)	0.112 (2.337)	0.001 (2.348)
Percentage women (executive)	0.638 (0.121)***	0.291 (0.094)**	0.441 (0.100)**
Guaranteed position on executive	-0.091 (3.182)	-0.014 (2.316)	0.015 (2.476)
Party target relating to ethnicity	-0.048 (4.587)	0.012 (3.304)	-0.003 (3.363)
Centralization (none)	-0.037 (5.688)	-0.061 (4.728)	-0.111 (6.034)
Centralization (full)	0.179 (3.080)*	0.102 (2.421)	0.115 (2.617)
Member participation (direct)	-0.261 (2.815)**	0.088 (2.644)	0.159 (3.005)
Liberal	0.106 (3.757)	0.070 (2.773)	0.061 (2.544)
Social Democrat	0.066 (4.170)	0.225 (3.071)**	0.211 (3.025)**
Greens	0.233 (4.603)*	0.321 (3.397)***	0.283 (3.139)***
Left Socialists	0.033 (5.162)	0.079 (3.628)	0.115 (3.268)
Far Right	0.041 (4.671)	0.071 (3.442)	-0.023 (3.293)
Electoral quota		0.544 (2.464)***	
PR electoral system		0.117 (3.332)	
Percentage of women MPs		0.386 (0.125)**	
Candidate spending Limit		0.024 (2.926)	
Scandinavian dummy		0.081 (4.438)	
R ²	0.362	0.689	0.775
N	85	85	85

Note: Reference category for centralization is 'some' centralization. Reference category for party family is 'Conservative'. Germany and the Czech Republic are not included due to missing values. Model 3 includes party variables that are found in Model 1 as well as country dummies. Standard error in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

However, we do find evidence to suggest that having women in positions of political authority increases women's representation in the candidate pool. The higher the percentage of women on the party's national executive, the more women are nominated for candidacy. This suggests that it is not the rules reserving seats for women on the executive that are important but the actual number of women on the executive. Token representation in other areas of party life is therefore not enough to make a substantial difference when it comes to the recruitment/nomination of candidates. Finally, we find evidence of the impact of party ideology as well. Consistent with the evidence presented in Table 9.2, Green parties nominate significantly more women than other party families, even when accounting for a variety of internal party rules.

However, we find a slightly different pattern of results when our system-level variables are included in Model 2 or our country dummies in Model 3. In particular, the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the level of centralization in the selection process lose their significance. What this suggests is that broadening the selectorate to include party members does not appear to harm the representativeness of the candidate pool once other environmental factors such as the electoral system are included in the analysis. This is consistent with recent scholarship in the realm of leadership selection, where Wauters and Pilet (2015) report similar findings. Indeed, their study concludes that providing party members with the task of selecting party leaders does not decrease the chances of a woman being selected. As a result, there may not be a trade-off between participation and representation after all.

In fact, none of the party rules seem to make a difference once the system-level control variables or country dummies are added to the analysis. Additional barriers to candidacy (requiring monetary deposits or signatures from party members), for example, do not appear to be obstacles for women. While women tend to fundraise on par with men during general elections (Fox, Lawless, and Feeley 2001), there has been some concern that women would be outspent at the intra-party stage (Erickson 1991), therefore limiting their chances of winning a party nomination. Requiring monetary deposits as a candidacy requirement could therefore act as a significant barrier to those groups that have been traditionally marginalized and deprived of resources. Despite these concerns, monetary deposits for candidacy do not appear to limit the number of women nominated as candidates.

What we find in Model 2 is that five variables, which can be grouped into three categories, are significantly related to the number of women nominated for political candidacy. First, and perhaps unsurprisingly, state-mandated electoral quotas work. Whereas we found no impact for internal party quotas once we controlled for other factors, this shows that parties competing in countries that have adopted statutory or constitutional electoral quotas nominate significantly more women than parties in countries without such legislation. This holds up even when controlling for a variety of internal party factors as well as other system level variables, thus supporting H3b.

Second, two variables, the percentage of women on the party executive and the percentage of women in the national parliament, are significantly related to the outcome. This may suggest that the more women there are in positions of authority, the more women are nominated, although we cannot be sure of the direction of this relationship.¹⁵ Niven (1998) describes an 'outgroup' effect where party elites prefer candidates 'like themselves'. As this elite group has been disproportionately made up of men, this meant that women faced significant bias and obstacles in their quest to secure a party nomination. As more women hold positions of political authority, however, we should expect this outgroup effect to be diminished as a critical mass works to recruit other

women to these positions and shift social attitudes (Dahlerup 1988). This may help to explain why there are more women nominated in parties and countries where there are more women on the political executive and in parliament.¹⁶

Having women in roles of political authority within parties may do more than just challenge the outgroup effect. Cheng and Tavits (2011) find that women are more likely to be nominated in Canadian constituencies where the local party president is a woman. The authors suggest that having a woman in a position of authority can provide female would-be candidates with mentorship, fundraising assistance, and electoral support (see also Cross 2016). We may be finding something similar here, with not only MPs, but also members of the party executive, taking a more active role in recruitment and providing support. In their study of candidate recruitment in Canada, Cross and Young (2013) find that women were more likely than men to report that they were actively recruited by someone else to run for office, rather than being self-starters. Having women in positions of authority at these higher levels of recruitment likely helps parties to encourage female candidates. We may also be witnessing a contagion effect of sorts, where parties respond to the number of women their competitors have elected.

Finally, party ideology continues to exert influence. Both Green and Social Democratic parties nominate significantly more women. In Model 2 only H3b is confirmed: state imposed quotas matter. Interestingly, the adoption of women-friendly party rules does not appear to increase the number of women nominated as candidates nor does the level of inclusiveness or centralization of the selection process itself. These findings are echoed in Model 3 where system level control variables are replaced with country dummies. Here again we find no compelling evidence that the formal rules adopted by parties make a significant difference when considering representational outcomes.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have engaged with the suggestion that political parties are an important ‘missing variable’ in the gender and politics research. Using new comparative data made available through the Political Party Database, we assessed the impact of parties’ candidate selection processes and internal rules concerning gender more broadly on the selection of female candidates. While most analyses focus on the final outcome, the number of women elected to the legislature, we examined the stage prior to the general election: winning the internal party nomination. As gatekeepers, political parties play a crucial role in constraining the choice of candidates from which voters can choose when casting their ballots. As such, increasing women’s representation in the

legislature also means increasing their numbers in the candidate pool. This is especially true given evidence which suggests that voters do not discriminate against women candidates during the general election.

The findings presented in this chapter have important implications for the institutional design of candidate selection mechanisms and how they feed into representative outcomes. On the basis of the comparative evidence assembled here, fears concerning inclusive and/or decentralized selectorates may be overstated. When other factors are taken into account, there may not be a trade-off between the democratic ideals of representation and participation after all. What appears to matter more than ‘who selects’, or even the general rules surrounding the selection, is the affirmative action taken by nation states through statutory electoral quotas to actively promote the place of women within party organizations.

In addition, in some parties, such as the Greens and Social Democrats, affirmative action is inherently linked to party ideology and culture. The ethos of a party is therefore an essential component to understanding why some parties nominate more women than others, even within the same country. More generally however, having women already in positions of political authority—either on the party executive or in parliament—appears to significantly increase the number of women that parties nominate to contest the general election. The latter is likely the result of the breakdown of the out-group effect (Niven 1998) and broader gender stereotypes (Bashevkin 2009; Pruysers and Blais 2016). Furthermore, having women in positions of authority within the party likely also serves as a resource for women aspiring to enter the political arena (Cheng and Tavits 2011), although further research is required to fully understand the mechanism behind this particular finding. Thus, while it is unclear how much party rules influence party outcomes, it is clear that a party’s representational ethos can have an important effect on the quality of representative democracy within nation states.

APPENDIX 1: VARIABLE CODING

Percentage women candidates—Continuous variable derived from B27CANWOMTOT.

Candidate deposit—0 = party does not require a monetary deposit; 1 = party requires a monetary deposit. Derived from B16CANRUL7.

Signature requirement—0 = party does not require signatures to seek candidacy; 1 = party requires signatures. Derived from B15CANRUL6.

Party target/quota—0 = party does not mention gender in candidate selection rules; 1 = party specifically mentions gender in candidate selection rules. Derived from B17CANWOM and B18CANWOMTXT.

Women's subgroup—0 = party does not have a women's subgroup; 1 = party has a women's subgroup. Derived from A49WOMENORG.

Conference delegates—0 = women are not guaranteed to be delegates at party conference; 1 = women are guaranteed to be delegates. Derived from A79CONWOMTXT.

Percentage of women (party executive)—Continuous variable derived from A94EXCWOMNUM.

Guaranteed position on party executive—0 = no guaranteed positions for women on the party executive; 1 = guaranteed position(s) for women on the party executive. Derived from A91EXCWOMTXT.

Party target relating to ethnicity—0 = party does not mention religious or ethnic minorities in candidate selection rules; 1 = party specifically mentions religious or ethnic minorities in candidate selection rules. Derived from B19CANETH and B20CANETHTX.

Centralization—Level of centralization coded as none, some, and full. None = no role for the national level or regional party branches; full = no role for local or regional party branches; some = regional party branch or some combination of the three levels. Derived from B23CANRUL3TXT, B24CANRUL4TXT, and B25CANRUL5TXT.

Member participation—0 = no direct member participation; 1 = direct member participation. Derived from B22CANRUL2TXT.

Party family—Derived from PARTYFAM1.

Electoral quota—0 = no national laws or legal rules regarding gender and the selection of candidates; 1 = national laws or legal rules regarding gender and the selection of candidates. Derived from B3CANLAW1TXT and B4CANLAW2TXT.

PR electoral system—0 = other electoral system; 1 = proportional representation. Data from IDEA (2015). <<http://www.oldsite.idea.int/esd/world.cfm>>.

Percentage of women MPs—Continuous variable for the percentage of legislators who are women (entire parliament). Data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. <<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm>>.

Candidate spending limit—0 = no candidate spending limit during general election; 1 = candidate spending limit during general election. Derived from A24SPENDCAND.

Scandinavian dummy—0 = not Scandinavian; 1 = Scandinavian. Derived from CTRYID.

Country dummies—Dummy variables were created for each country in the analysis. Derived from CTRYID.

NOTES

1. This under-representation extends beyond elected members of the legislature and includes party leaders (Wauters and Pilet 2015), mayors (Tolleson-Rinehart 1991), and cabinet ministers (Krook and O'Brien 2012).
2. While beyond the scope of this chapter, future research might consider possible explanations for the difference between the number of women nominated and the

number ultimately elected. This would provide valuable insight into whether women are 'sacrificial lambs' (Thomas and Bodet 2013), placed in largely unwinnable districts or low list positions.

3. There are, of course, a number of important exceptions. Caul (1999), for example, examines party factors in 12 advanced democracies. More recently, Vandeleene (2014) examines differences among Belgian parties with particular emphasis on internal party rules.
4. It is important to note that decentralization and inclusiveness are conceptually distinct (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Decentralized candidate selection methods, for example, can be very exclusive and do not have to involve party members. While decentralized methods are typically inclusive, it is important not to treat the two synonymously.
5. In a study of the 2015 election, Cross (2016) finds that male candidates were slightly more likely to win these contests in all three major Canadian parties.
6. For a comprehensive overview of electoral and party quotas see Krook (2014).
7. For a more detailed discussion of women's organizations within political parties see Allern and Verge, Chapter 4.
8. Due to missing data, Germany and the Czech Republic are not included in some of the analysis. In these cases, we note their exclusion.
9. See Appendix 1 for details regarding variable coding.
10. As Krook (2014: 1273) notes, reserved seats for women can range from 5 per cent in countries such as Jordan to 33 per cent in Rwanda.
11. Using the United Nation's Gender Inequality Index is a more straightforward method of measuring gender equality more broadly. However, this measure is comprised of some of our independent variables, which is problematic for isolating the effect of each variable individually.
12. In 2012 Ireland adopted new legal requirements whereby public financing is conditional upon having 30 per cent women candidates.
13. Data regarding the number of women candidates nominated come from the following election years: Australia, 2010; Austria, 2008; Belgium, 2014; Canada, 2011; Denmark, 2011; France, 2012; Hungary, 2010; Ireland, 2011; Israel, 2013; Italy, 2012; Netherlands, 2011; Norway, 2013; Poland, 2011; Portugal, 2011; Spain, 2011; Sweden, 2014; United Kingdom, 2010.
14. Given that many of our variables are potentially related to one another (i.e., women's sub groups and women's executive positions) we checked for the possibility of multicollinearity. Three VIF-scores in the final model are slightly above 3, however, all are within the recommended acceptable range (Field 2009: 224). Moreover, all tolerance values are larger than 0.25. Beyond checking for multicollinearity, the other assumptions of regression analysis are met as well. A normal P-P plot of regression standardized residuals, for example, confirmed normality. Likewise, a scatterplot of standardized residuals reveals no problems with linearity and confirms homoscedasticity.
15. More women candidates, for example, may lead to having more women on the executive. It may also be the case that the ethos of the party or its general ideology

- encourages the party to have women at all levels of the party (i.e., as candidates, on the national executive, etc.).
16. For MPs this may also represent somewhat of an incumbency effect. The more women that are already in parliament, the more women candidates there are likely to be seeking reelection. However, since our variable is the percentage of total women in parliament, and not the percentage of women per individual party, we can be somewhat confident that we are capturing something different.

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Rules of Engagement?

Party Membership Costs, New Forms of Party Affiliation, and Partisan Participation

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INTRODUCTION

In many countries, joining a political party is a time-honoured way for citizens to express their political views and become politically engaged. At least since the middle of the twentieth century, most political parties in parliamentary democracies have maintained voluntary organizations as part of their efforts to identify and mobilize their supporters. Yet these organizations have differed widely, with parties making very different choices about how to link with their supporters, and about what rights to give to those who join. Rules about how to join have varied across parties, as well as within single parties over time (Heidar 1994; Scarrow 1996, 2015; van Haute 2011). For instance, parties establish and revise their tables of dues rates, their other conditions for membership, and their formal enrolment procedures. As a result, the terms *party affiliation* and *party member* have always covered a wide variety of relationships between individuals and organizations. Indeed, one observer concluded, '[i]t is less easy to define a member of a political party than of any major organization' (von Beyme 1985: 168). In the twenty-first century these relations continue to evolve, with many parties rapidly changing their membership rules, including experimenting with new forms of affiliation that provide supporters some of the advantages of traditional membership at a lower cost.

This chapter investigates whether these variations in party affiliation rules have political consequences, looking in particular at their effects on partisan participation. We start by exploring the impact of party affiliation rules on the capacity of parties to mobilize their voters as (active) members. Past

scholarship has posited that potential affiliates are sensitive to both the costs and benefits of joining, and therefore that parties' decisions in these areas have consequences, but these demand-side relationships have been impossible to test with studies of single parties or single countries (see Kernell 2015 for a rare exception). The unique data provided by the Political Party Database (PPDB) enable us to chart the nature of party affiliation in contemporary democracies, including the extent to which political parties are offering affiliation options which are alternatives to traditional membership. It also enables us to construct cross-sectional tests of supporters' sensitivities to membership as a political good. In examining contemporary party affiliation from this perspective, this chapter goes beyond the more familiar story of the numerical decline in party membership. As these investigations will show, new forms of party affiliation may allow parties to connect with supporters in different ways, but they are also related to higher levels of activism among those who still connect via the traditional route of party membership. We also provide further evidence that members are sensitive to the political benefits of party membership, confirming self-reported evidence from party membership surveys. These findings suggest that the story of contemporary parties' organizational change is much more complex than a simple tale of membership decline, because the affiliation rules set out by parties affect not only the attractiveness of membership, but also the kinds of supporters who are most likely to enrol.

PARTY MEMBERSHIP AS A POLITICAL CONSUMPTION GOOD

As has been shown in Chapter 2 in this book, the PPDB data reveal that there are strong national-level patterns in party organization, including in party membership numbers. Nevertheless, there are still large inter-party enrolment differences within individual countries. These differences within countries cannot be the result of supply-side factors at the national level, such as political culture, party subsidies, institutional design or proximity of elections. Instead, party-level factors must also matter, probably playing an important role in mediating the impact of cultural change (Katz and Mair 1992; Richardson 1995; Mair and van Biezen 2001; Norris 2002; Whiteley 2011; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012). This suggests that we should adopt demand-side approaches to explain why some parties are more successful than others in recruiting and retaining members (Delwit 2011; Kölln 2014). Demand-side approaches to party membership focus on party efforts, and stress that parties are not powerless in the face of societal changes. They

assume that parties design organizational strategies in which members may play a role; if parties do want members, they adopt specific tactics to attract them. Demand-side explanations are not sufficient to explain cross-party differences, yet they do help to make sense of some important ongoing organizational changes in parties in parliamentary democracies: the fact that many of them have been lowering their membership requirements, increasing the political rights enjoyed by individual members, and/or introducing new affiliation options.

Thus, in recent years many parties have been reducing the costs of acquiring traditional direct membership. Parties have always differed in terms of the procedures for gaining membership. Some have made it easy to acquire; some have set additional barriers, such as requiring sponsorship by an existing member, or requiring prospective members to sign a statement of support for party principles (Scarrow 1996; Detterbeck 2005; Sandri and Pauwels 2011). One commonly used device has been to lower these procedural costs of joining, making it possible to acquire membership through the party webpage, rather than requiring contact to a local party branch (Scarrow 2015). Another cost-reducing device has involved setting minimum membership dues at low levels, that is reducing financial costs of joining (van Haute and Gauja 2015).

Many parties have also increased the political benefits of party membership. They have granted individual party members a direct say in party decisions using all-member ballots. We call these ‘plebiscitary benefits’, to distinguish from an older style of intra-party political rights based on vertical, representative structures. This change has affected the three most important areas of party decision-making, namely party leader selection, candidate nomination and policy decisions. In regard to party leadership selection, few parties offered party members a direct say on this prior to 1990, but the use of ballots has increased markedly since then (Cross and Blais 2012; Pilet and Cross 2014; Cross and Pilet 2015; Scarrow 2015). In a similar vein, candidate selection processes now are often open to individual party members—and even in some cases to the party voters (Pilet, van Haute, and Kelbel 2014). Some, but far fewer, parties have also opened up for party ballots on policy decisions (Scarrow 2015; Gauja 2015). In general, parties have granted individual rank-and-file party members a larger say on important political decisions at the expense of the mid-level party elite. For parties that have implemented such changes, the net effect has been a highly visible increase in the political benefits of party membership (Cross and Katz 2013; Faucher 2015).

Parallel to this trend towards membership empowerment is another trend: parties are introducing alternative affiliation categories for supporters who may shy away from the commitment of full membership. These options include limited-term trial or guest memberships, or opportunities to register for the long-term as a party friend or sympathizer (Katz and Mair 1995; Krouwel 2006; Faucher 2015; Gauja 2015). These alternatives could be

collectively described as various types of ‘membership lite’ (Scarrow 2015). Parties are also taking advantage of new social media, web pages and blogs to connect with supporters in other ways, encouraging them to provide contact information to party outlets, thus enabling the party to send them Facebook updates, Twitter messages, blog posts or the like. The new types of affiliation carry neither the rights nor the obligations of traditional party membership, but they do resemble it in some other crucial ways. Most importantly, self-identified supporters voluntarily connect with a party, and the party is able to use this connection to communicate with, and mobilize, its supporters. Parties may view these alternative affiliations as first steps towards traditional membership, or as destinations in themselves. The spectrum of connected supporters, from traditional members to social media followers, can collectively be described as *party affiliates*.

Our main argument is that such changes in the costs and benefits of party membership and affiliation options are likely to affect how potential affiliates decide to connect with their party, at least to the extent that these decisions follow some economic logic. Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley have made a strong case for this approach in what they call the general incentives model of party membership. Although the general incentives model includes other variables, its core argument is that party membership and activism can be understood as rational decisions, responsive to costs and benefits (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 2002). Both Seyd and Whiteley’s studies and other surveys of party members consistently find members naming collective and selective incentives as their top reasons for joining (including Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Holsteyn, Koole, and Elkind 2000; Young and Cross 2002; Heidar and Saglie 2003; Gallagher and Marsh 2004; Pedersen et al. 2004; Klein 2006; den Ridder, van Holsteyn, and Koole 2015; Heidar 2015; Kosiara-Pedersen 2015; Spier and Klein 2015). Studies have also found that members’ level of activism may be linked to the initial incentives that attracted them to join (Whiteley and Seyd 1998). For instance, those who were seeking political careers (material selective incentives) are most likely to engage in party activities (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Hansen 2002; Young and Cross 2008; Bruter and Harrison 2009). In addition, those who were attracted by opportunities to influence party policy are more likely to participate in parties’ political activities than those whose membership is motivated by altruism (Klein 2006: 57–8).

Despite focusing more on the potential benefits of membership and activism than its costs, such economic approaches suggest that potential affiliates might in fact be sensitive to costs as well as to benefits. This view of party affiliation as a type of consumer good suggests that parties should be able to increase the attractiveness of the product by reducing its costs, and by enhancing its value. To be clear, this ‘economic’ approach does not suggest that membership benefits are exclusively selective or financial in nature. Some of the benefits

realized from membership may be collective (solidary); some of the selective benefits may be about self-worth and purpose (ideology) rather than about economic gain. The economic approach does not make any *a priori* claims about which benefits will be most attractive, or which costs will be most onerous. Instead, its more modest fundamental premise is that individuals do consider both the nature and extent of the costs and benefits when they make membership decisions, and that therefore enrolments may be affected if some costs are significantly reduced, or if benefits are significantly raised.

PARTY AFFILIATION RULES: VARIATIONS AND EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES

The consumer-good perspective on party membership suggests that differences in parties' membership affiliation rules and in their membership privileges are likely to influence partisan participatory behaviours. In this section we lay out our expectations about how these rules may affect parties' capacity to mobilize their voters as (active) members. In our expectations, as in our tests of them, we consider party voters as the most likely potential affiliates, since parties are usually not recruiting beyond their electorate (Hooghe and Kern 2015).

Our hypotheses derive from the assumption that affiliation rules act like a sieve, with narrower openings admitting only those who already are likely to be politically active. This argument is often developed in models of party organizations (Katz and Mair 1995; Krouwel 2006) but it has never been subject to a systematic cross-national empirical test. We expect that individuals' decisions about joining reflect their assessments of the costs and benefits of formal membership. We further expect that these cost assessments are relative, and will be influenced by the relative costs of similar political options.

More specifically, we expect that higher costs of enrolment in a party will deter some potential affiliates who might otherwise decide to join. Higher costs filter out (some of) the less committed. Costs include both procedural barriers to entry, that is, membership criteria and enrolment processes, and financial costs, that is dues paying. If this is a relative effect, it should be evident even if the barriers to entry are rather low in substantive terms. In regard to the financial costs, even at the top end the real cost of party membership is quite low compared with many consumer goods; hence, from an economic standpoint we would not expect to see big differences in market appeal due to real costs. However, it is possible that these prices have a symbolic effect, and that less committed supporters join as the price of membership becomes almost free.

H1: Parties with higher financial and procedural membership costs have lower success in enrolling their voters as members.

We also assume that those (fewer) members willing to pay higher costs to enter a party are more committed, and hence are more disposed to pay the additional opportunity costs of participating in party activities. This party-level factor is often ignored in the explanatory models of party membership and activism that rely heavily on individual-level factors (Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994; Whiteley and Seyd 1998; Gallagher et al. 2002; Whiteley and Seyd 2002). Intentionally or otherwise, parties may spur higher activism levels by making membership more exclusive.

H2: Parties with higher financial and procedural membership costs have higher levels of party member activism.

Comparatively high costs of enrolment are expected to decrease the number of members but increase the level of party member activism. In contrast, relatively high plebiscitary benefits for members are expected to increase both enrolment and activism. To the extent that potential affiliates are particularly attentive to political incentives for membership, efforts to enhance the value may be effective if members are granted influence on political decisions within the party, such as, for example, party leader election and candidate selection. A direct say on important party decisions is a clear benefit of party membership. And indeed, in some cases parties have introduced plebiscitary measures as part of explicit efforts to boost enrolment (Scarrow 1999; Seyd 1999). Hence, we hypothesize that these plebiscitary rights constitute triggers for membership recruitment.

H3: Parties with a higher level of plebiscitary benefits have more success in enrolling their voters as members.

In a similar vein we expect that the more direct say party members have in regard to electing political leaders, selecting candidates and approving election manifestos, the more likely it is that they are active in their party. These decisions are at the core of what parties are expected to do in democracies. Hence, it is likely that party members care about their outcomes. Parties that offer more say to their members in their decision-making processes, that is more plebiscitary rights, should wind up with higher levels of member activism. There are at least three factors at work. First, the new decision processes create more opportunities and more reasons for members to be active, whether by directly participating in a party ballot, by attending a party meeting in the run-up to such a ballot, or by getting involved in other ways as a result of party contacts made during intra-party contests. Second, they should attract a higher proportion of members who join in order to have a political impact,

not just to express passive solidarity. And third, they generally lower the costs of being active, making it easier for individual members to influence meaningful decisions even if they only minimally engage in party activities. Although some recent research suggests that members may be more active in campaigns when less plebiscitary selection methods are used (Kernell 2015), given that our measure of activity encompasses more than campaigning, we expect that parties which offer plebiscitary measures will mobilize a larger share of party members.

H4: Parties with a higher level of plebiscitary benefits have higher levels of party member activism.

We now turn to the expectations of the impact of alternative affiliation options. Parties may provide various types of affiliation to citizens: direct and indirect members, supporters, friends, social media followers, instant members, for example. If parties provide a panoply of options, individuals therefore face a choice of how to affiliate to their preferred party. First, we expect that parties are able to recruit fewer individuals as formal members when other types of affiliation are available. These forms of ‘membership lite’ have lower costs and are hence expected to be more accessible for citizens than formal membership. If party voters are allowed to join as a ‘friend’ or ‘supporter’, they may choose to do so as a sign of support, or to get access to information, or to be active—in other words, they can enjoy many of the benefits of traditional membership at a lower cost. On that basis, parties that offer these alternative affiliation options should recruit fewer formal members than those that do not.

H5: Parties offering alternative affiliation options to party membership have lower success in enrolling their voters as traditional members.

Conversely, we also expect that providing alternative affiliation options will result in a higher level of party member activism. This is because the ‘sieve’ effect is probably a relative, not absolute, effect. In other words, the proliferation of affiliation options makes traditional membership more expensive relative to other options. When cheaper options are available, only the more motivated and committed voters become party members. Providing alternative affiliation options should lead to a traditional membership that is more active (though smaller).

H6: Parties offering alternative affiliation options to party membership have higher levels of party member activism.

We explore the implications of the variations in party affiliation for partisan participation both at the party and the individual levels. Table 10.1 presents the overview of the hypotheses.

TABLE 10.1 *Overview of hypotheses*

	Party membership	Party member activism
Financial and procedural costs increasing	Decreasing (H1)	Increasing (H2)
Plebiscitary benefits increasing	Increasing (H3)	Increasing (H4)
Alternative affiliation options provided	Decreasing (H5)	Increasing (H6)

Before turning to the analyses of these expectations about the connection between party affiliation rules and participatory behaviours, in the following section we introduce the data which enable us to test our hypotheses.

AFFILIATION RULES IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PARTIES

Our main question is whether the relative costs and benefits of party membership affect parties' capacity to mobilize their voters as (active) members. This question is difficult to address when studying a single party or single country, due to lack of variance. Luckily, the PPDB data are ideally suited for this purpose, allowing us to explore the impact of party decisions about membership costs and benefits. The PPDB data will therefore constitute our primary data source for this analysis, covering 122 parties in nineteen countries. Our analysis focuses on the 120 parties that offer traditional individual membership, and for which we have sufficient information on their affiliation rules.¹ For each party, we have selected the most recent case in the database, ranging from 2010 to 2014. Our first look at the PPDB cases shows that party affiliation continues to mean different things in different parties. These parties display a full range of approaches to party affiliation, ranging from parties that focus on high-cost traditional membership to those that whole-heartedly embrace new affiliation alternatives.

We begin our investigation by documenting the differences in how parties define party membership, and in how easy or difficult it is to join them. To assess our first independent variable—the costs of acquiring traditional party membership—we use two measures: financial and procedural costs.

Out of our 120 parties, the vast majority (83 per cent, or 100 parties) set uniform minimum dues rates. Those which do not,² still expect members to pay dues, but leave it to regional or local parties to set the rate. After

TABLE 10.2 *Absolute and relative financial costs of party membership*

	Absolute costs dues (in Euro)	Financial costs (relative measure) dues/average wage (%)
Minimum	1.43	0.01
Maximum	110.50	0.29
Average	28.37	0.08
N	107	107

Source: PPDB 2010–11.

converting all dues to a standard euro rate, we see wide variation in the minimum annual dues rates for membership (Table 10.2),³ ranging from a very affordable €1.43 (Jobbik in Hungary) to €110.5 for the most expensive (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands). To take account of the wide cost-of-living disparities in our countries, we computed a relative measure of 'financial costs' that standardizes these minimum annual dues rates in terms of each country's average annual wage.⁴ This gives a slightly different picture of cost differences, with dues rates ranging from 0.01 per cent of the annual average wage (Belgium: Christian Democratic and Flemish; Canada: Bloc Québécois; Hungary: Jobbik) to 0.29 per cent (Czech Republic: Law and Justice). As an example, a score of 0.03 per cent means that a party's minimum dues level is equivalent to three one hundredths of a per cent of the average annual wage of individuals in that country. We standardize in this way to more correctly represent how dues costs might affect individual membership decisions.

In addition to requiring dues payment, parties have traditionally differed in terms of the procedures for gaining membership. Membership criteria have varied from relatively difficult, such as requiring sponsorship by an existing member and probationary periods, to much less demanding, such as prohibiting simultaneous membership in another party (exclusivity), or requiring applicants to affirm support for party principles (Katz and Mair 1992). In our sample, we find only limited use of the more costly membership hurdles (Table 10.3). Only thirteen parties impose a probationary period,⁵ while eleven parties explicitly require members to be sponsored by an existing member.⁶ Only one party, the Basque National Party, imposes both requirements. Many parties impose only the lower barriers of exclusive membership and stated support for party principles. Furthermore, almost a quarter of the parties enable prospective members to conduct the enrolment process completely online, thus reducing the procedural costs of joining. For supporters wishing to join these parties, enrolment could be a spur-of-the-moment decision completed in minutes. In contrast, membership is much harder to acquire

TABLE 10.3 *Procedural costs of party membership*

	% parties applying procedural costs (N)	N parties
Probationary period	11.1 (13)	117
Sponsorship by member	9.2 (11)	119
Agreement with principles, programme or statutes	69.7 (83)	119
Exclusivity	82.4 (98)	119
Online membership	22.7 (27)	119
Average procedural costs (0–1)	0.43	118

Source: PPDB 2010–11.

TABLE 10.4 *Plebiscitary benefits of party membership*

	% parties granting benefits (N)	N parties
Political leader election	40 (40)	99
Decision on election manifesto	13 (11)	87
Candidate selection	11 (13)	117
Average benefits (0–1)	0.35	105

Source: PPDB 2010–11.

in parties that require formal sponsorship or probationary period vetting, or even in those that require applicants to mail in forms or visit the officers of their local party branch.

For the purpose of the analysis, these requirements were computed in a single additive scale of ‘Procedural costs’, rescaled to range from 0 (no procedural costs) to 1 (maximum procedural costs). Four parties do not apply any procedural costs (Denmark: Red-Green Alliance and Liberal Alliance; Sweden: Green Party and Moderate Party), and one applies all costs (Spain: Basque Nationalist Party). On average, parties score 0.43 on the procedural cost scale.⁷

Potential benefits offered by parties to their members may be of various nature: material, procedural, and political. However, here we focus on the ways in which parties grant party members individual statutory rights to participate in the most important party decisions since these are some of the most eye-catching reasons members are given to join or remain within a party. Table 10.4 shows that 40 per cent of the parties allow party members a vote on the election of the political leader, while only 13 per cent grant members full rights (input and vote) on the formulation of the election manifesto, and 11 per cent grant members full rights (input and vote) in the candidate selection process.

For our analysis, these plebiscitary benefits are computed in a single additive scale combining the three statutory rights, rescaled to 0 (no rights for

members) to 1 (full rights to members). Twenty-one parties do not grant their members any of these rights;⁸ seven parties grant their members all three membership rights.⁹ On average, parties score 0.35 on the Plebiscitary Benefits scale.¹⁰

Lastly, regarding affiliation options, we assess whether parties offer alternatives to formal membership, such as party ‘friend’ or ‘registered sympathizer’. Alternative affiliation is a dichotomous variable coded 0 if the party allows only formal membership, and 1 if the party also offers an alternative affiliation option. There are thirty-nine parties, or just under one third of the 120 parties in our analysis, that recognize some category of ‘membership lite’ (no missing data).

To sum up, in Tables 10.5 and 10.6 we show all our independent variables first by country, then by party family. The analysis of variance statistics at the bottom of Table 10.5 shows a country effect, and are suggestive of

TABLE 10.5 *Average costs and benefits of membership, and alternative affiliation across parties, by country*

Country	Financial costs	Procedural costs	Plebiscitary benefits	Alternative affiliation	N*
Australia	0.13	0.42	0.29	0.25	4
Austria	0.09	0.28	0.00	0.00	5
Belgium	0.04	0.38	0.66	0.45	11
Canada	0.02	0.44	0.50	0.00	5
Czech Republic	0.13	0.56	0.00	0.20	3–5
Denmark	0.09	0.17	0.17	0.00	8
France	0.07	0.30	Missing data	0.50	1–2
Germany	0.17	0.37	0.36	0.86	6–7
Hungary	0.06	0.77	0.17	1.00	3–4
Ireland	0.04	0.64	0.17	0.40	4–5
Israel	0.05	0.49	0.50	0.00	6–10
Italy	0.07	0.46	0.40	1.00	5
Netherlands	0.09	0.41	0.62	0.40	9–10
Norway	0.06	0.46	0.40	0.00	7
Poland	0.19	0.43	Missing data	0.50	6
Portugal	0.08	0.67	0.17	0.17	4–6
Spain	0.18	0.76	0.23	0.80	3–5
Sweden	0.04	0.14	0.17	0.00	7–8
United Kingdom	0.08	0.39	0.46	0.29	7
Total	0.08 (107)	0.43 (118)	0.35 (105)	0.33 (120)	107–120
ANOVA F	6.089	10.417	5.104	5.096	
P	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Eta squared	0.555	0.654	0.565	0.476	

Note: The scale for all measures is 0–1. See appendix for a detailed description of each measure.

* Shown as a range if the number of cases differs for each of the indicators.

Source: PPDB 2010–11.

strong within-country contagion effects in regards to the construction of party membership. This may be due to the fact that parties compete in a closed national market, which gives them strong incentives to align their behaviour, but political culture may also matter. To be clear, we do not see these country effects as evidence of cartel behaviour, because potential party members are probably very brand sensitive (that is, they will not join a particular party merely because it has the lowest costs). Nevertheless, parties appear to be reluctant to set minimum costs that deviate greatly from those of their competitors, and they are more likely to offer plebiscitary benefits if these are offered by other parties in the same country.

In contrast to these cross-country differences, party families show no statistically significant differences in terms of costs and alternative affiliation (Table 10.6).

In sum, at the beginning of the twenty-first century party affiliation looks a bit different than the portraits painted in the middle of the twentieth century. In most parties, membership is individual, maintained by the national party, and associated with dues payment. In contrast, parties vary more in how easy they make it to obtain and retain traditional membership, in the plebiscitary benefits offered to members, and in the extent to which they offer alternative affiliation options. These are the types of differences we would expect if we conceive of parties as strategic actors, and hence ones which alter their affiliation rules according to the number and type of affiliates they wish to attract. The absence of party family differences reinforces this idea, suggesting that party choices in these matters are not strongly determined by their formative period and circumstances, party culture, or ideology.

TABLE 10.6 *Distribution of costs and alternative affiliation by party family*

Party family	Financial costs	Procedural costs	Plebiscitary benefits	Alternative affiliation	N*
Christian Democrats/ Conservatives	0.10	0.44	0.28	0.33	24–30
Social Democrats	0.08	0.43	0.41	0.42	22–24
Liberals	0.09	0.40	0.39	0.29	20–21
Greens	0.06	0.47	0.44	0.36	11–14
Left Socialists	0.07	0.48	0.15	0.18	7–11
Far Right	0.08	0.36	0.26	0.31	11–13
Total	0.08	0.43	0.34	0.33	100–113
ANOVA F	0.753	0.701	2.150	0.420	
P	0.586	0.624	0.66	0.834	
Eta squared	0.037	0.032	0.160	0.019	

Note: The scale for all measures is 0–1. See appendix for a detailed description of each measure.

* Shown as a range if the number of cases varies for each indicator.

Source: PPDB 2010–11.

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY AFFILIATION RULES

How much do these differences matter? In the remainder of this chapter we explore whether these differences in affiliation rules have political consequences, looking for evidence that *how* parties construct affiliation affects *whether and how* individuals choose to affiliate. We assess the impact of membership costs and benefits by looking at two main dimensions of partisan participation: the number of party members, and the level of activism. We investigate these relations looking at both aggregate and individual-level data.

At the aggregate level, our first dependent variable is the relative number of party members (M/V). We use party voters at the previous national legislative election as the denominator (rather than total electorate) to roughly control for the relative political appeal of the various political parties. With the exclusion of three outliers,¹¹ the M/V ratio ranges from 0.19 per cent (Politics Can Be Different in Hungary) to 19.89 per cent (Likud in Israel). On average, the parties included in our analysis display a M/V ratio of 5.17 per cent, meaning that about five out of 100 of their voters are members of the party.

The second dependent variable is the aggregate level of party activism ('Aggregate activism'). We calculate this based on data from national surveys of party members, available via the web page of the project on Members and Activists of Political Parties (MAPP) (van Haute and Gauja 2015).¹² These surveys were collected in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and thus roughly match the PPDB data. This strategy allows us to produce a measure of activism for thirty-three parties. In these surveys, the proportion of self-reported active members ranges from 26 per cent in the Israeli Kadima and Likud to 87 per cent in The Left in Germany, and the average level of declared activism is 61 per cent. This may seem high, but it is mainly due to our very low threshold to be considered as active in the party, namely self-reports of having attended a party meeting or social event within the past year or devoted time to the party, or a self-description as 'active'. Hence, this is a measure of the general level of participation in party activities which may encompass various activities such as campaigning, plebiscitary activities, etc.

For our individual level tests, we measure partisan participation based on data from the European Social Survey 2010/11.¹³ Individual party membership is measured by a dichotomous variable coded 0 if the individual is not a member of a political party, and 1 if (s)he is. Individual party activism is measured by a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the individual has been active in a 'political party or action group' in the last twelve months, and 0 otherwise.¹⁴

In what follows we use both individual and aggregate data to examine whether (and if so, how) party membership rules are related to the number of supporters who enrol and the behaviours of those who do enrol.

Aggregate-level Analyses

We begin by testing our hypotheses concerning the impact of financial costs, procedural costs, and alternative affiliation on aggregate levels of partisan participation. In order to do so, we run two separate sets of linear regression analyses, testing the impact of our independent variables on our two measures of partisan participation: share of a party's members to its voters (M/V ratio), and aggregate activism. Even though the PPDB includes a comparatively high number of parties, we still have quite a small number of cases for this kind of analysis. Therefore, we are unable to control for country or party family effects. Because our cases are not a random sample, to assess whether our hypotheses are supported at the aggregate level we focus on the direction of relationships, not on statistical significance levels (though we include this information for those who are interested).

First, we look at the effect of party affiliation rules on the relative number of members (Model 1 in Table 10.7). The relationship between costs and membership ratio is not clear, with procedural costs being negatively linked to membership ratios, while financial costs are positively related: parties with higher fees or easier membership procedures have higher M/V ratios, meaning they are more successful in enrolling potential affiliates than parties with higher barriers or lower fees (H1 only partly supported, for procedural costs). Furthermore, the effects are relatively weak. However, the relationship between benefits and the membership ratio is stronger and goes in the expected direction: higher plebiscitary benefits are related to higher

TABLE 10.7 *Effects of party affiliation rules on party membership and party activism, aggregate level*

	Model 1 Party membership	Model 2 Party activism
Financial costs	0.051 (7.431)	0.153 (43.875)
Procedural costs	-0.009 (2.296)	-0.038 (18.117)
Benefits	0.229* (1.529)	-0.409* (10.381)
Alternative affiliation	-0.207 (0.991)	0.471** (5.959)
Constant	4.473** (1.264)	65.216*** (7.863)
R ²	0.072	0.475
N	92	32

Note: Beta (std error);

Sign.: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.

Source: PPDB 2010–11.

membership ratios (H3 supported). Thirdly, in line with our expectations about the effects of the existence of less demanding affiliation alternatives, we find that parties with alternative affiliation have lower M/V ratios (H5 supported). When ‘membership lite’ options are available, fewer voters choose formal membership.

In Model 2, Table 10.7 we see some aggregate-level evidence that the costs and benefits of membership may affect the level of intra-party activity of members once they have joined. First, similarly to Model 1, the effect of costs is again unclear: financial costs are positively linked to activism, which means that parties with higher fees have higher average levels of party activism (as expected), but procedural costs are negatively linked, meaning that having more procedural requirements has a small, negative effect on the average level of activism (H2 only partly supported). Second, parties that grant their members more rights (higher benefits) tend to have lower levels of activism (H4 not supported). This is in line with Kernell’s findings on campaign participation and candidate selection methods (2015). Third, parties offering alternative affiliation options have a higher overall level of activism among those who chose traditional membership instead of ‘membership lite’ (H6 supported).

Overall, these aggregate-level results point toward a relationship between party affiliation rules and partisan participation. Do we find similar patterns at the individual level?

Individual-level Analyses

In this section we revisit our hypotheses concerning the impact of party affiliation rules, this time evaluating them in light of individual-level data from the European Social Survey (ESS).¹⁵ Given the dichotomous character of our dependent variables, we run logit regression analyses, testing the impact of our independent variables on party membership and party activism. To account for some other factors that might influence participation, we control for individual resources that are commonly found to be linked with political participation, including age (including a logged age variable, to account for possible age-related patterns of activism), gender (with men expected to be more active in partisan politics), educational level, and income. We also include country dummies (not shown), to account for country-specific patterns of mobilization, and country-specific political events which might affect political participation.¹⁶ Once again, given that our party sample is not a random subset of some larger whole, and given that the number of party members in the sample is relatively small, we are primarily interested in the direction of effects. Moreover, for both reasons we treat these results with some caution.

First, we look at the effect of party affiliation rules on the probability of a self-reported supporter also being a party member. We assign respondents to a party supporter category based on their reported party preference, and then look at whether their probability to also be members is influenced by organizational factors. We include supporters for all the parties for which we have information on costs, benefits, and/or affiliation options. Our questions are whether the decision of supporters to acquire and maintain traditional membership is affected by either the costs and benefits of traditional membership, or by the availability of membership lite options as in the analyses at the aggregate level. Model 1 in Table 10.8 shows that the resource and demographic factors have the expected effects (age, gender, income, education), but we find some support for our hypotheses about responsiveness to affiliation rules. Again, the effect of costs is unclear, with financial costs showing relations with the probability of supporters to join as members that are in the expected direction, but the relation with procedural costs is in the opposite direction of our prediction (H1 partly supported). Second, parties that grant their members more rights

TABLE 10.8 *Effects of party affiliation rules on individual party membership and activism*

	Model 1 Party membership	Model 2 Party activism
Financial costs	-1.070 (1.508)	1.4537 (3.2202)
Procedural costs	0.350 (0.525)	0.5011 (1.0075)
Political benefits	0.168 (0.267)	-0.2165 (0.5616)
Alternative affiliation	-0.154 (0.143)	0.4085 (0.2849)
Gender	0.544*** (0.091)	0.2074 (0.1918)
Income	0.059** (0.019)	0.0682 (0.0383)
Education	0.044*** (0.012)	0.0192 (0.0253)
Age	0.030*** (0.004)	0.0552 (0.0342)
Age*Age	-3.2E-05* (1.5E-05)	-0.0007* (0.0003)
Intercept	-5.192*** (0.378)	-2.1378* (1.0278)
N	10,198	583

Note: Sample based on respondents who expressed support for parties included in PPDB dataset. Sign. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Source: ESS (Round 5)/PPDB 2010–11.

(higher benefits) tend to have a higher probability to turn their supporters into members (H3 supported). However, neither costs nor benefits show statistically significant effects. Third, we find the expected negative relation between alternative affiliation options and traditional membership: if supporters have other options, they are less likely to become traditional members (H5 supported).¹⁷ This matches what we found at the aggregate level.

We turn next to the questions concerning the activity levels of those who do join a party: is the probability of being active in a party affected by the relative costs or benefits of joining? As a reminder, under the sieve model, we expect a higher probability that members will be active as membership costs rise, and if the availability of other affiliation options increases the relative costs of traditional membership. We also expect a positive relationship between political benefits and partisan activity, on the grounds that such benefits attract supporters who are most interested in politics and/or in the success of particular candidates or issues. For this analysis we look only at the activity patterns of self-reported members. Here our sample is much smaller, because the ESS sample does not contain many party members, reflecting the small number of party members found in national populations. As Model 2 in Table 10.8 shows, we see the expected positive relation between alternative affiliation and party member activism (H6 supported) even though this is not statistically significant (though it is when run as the only variable together with the background variables, not shown in Table 10.8). Both individual ESS data and aggregate MAPP data point in the same direction: parties with other affiliation options are likely to have fewer members, but these members tend to be more active. On the other hand, we again see no support for effects of absolute costs or political benefits. The effects for both financial and procedural costs are in the expected direction, but they do not come close to meeting conventional standards for statistical significance (H2 not supported). The relation between member rights and party activism is neither statistically significant nor in the expected direction (H4 not supported). The negative relationships would be in line with Kernell's findings on campaign participation and candidate selection methods (2015), but even making allowances for a small sample size, we do not want to read too much into these relationships.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has advocated adopting a demand-side approach to explaining party memberships, arguing that taking account of party agency and party initiatives will lead to a more rounded understanding of changes in party membership. We have used this approach to try to parse the impact of parties'

recent changes in how they construct party membership. The purpose of this chapter was therefore first to document the diversity of party affiliation rules on the basis of data from 120 parties in the PPDB. We showed that there is substantial diversity among parties in terms of affiliation options. Whereas all but one party offers the traditional party membership, one third also offer a lighter version, such as registered party friends. We also found measurable variation in the minimum costs of party membership, even if in real terms the costs are seldom very high (with basic dues ranging 0.01–0.3 per cent of average income). Given this variation, our second, and more novel, task has been to use cross-party and cross-national data to assess the potential political impact of the trend towards offering cheaper types of affiliation: is there any evidence that demand-side forces (party affiliation rules and options) affect the behaviour of party supporters? To answer this question, we examined individual-level and aggregate data to see if we could find evidence of impact of these membership strategies: a) Are potential members cost-sensitive in regards to the affiliation alternative that they choose? b) Does ‘cheaper’ traditional membership attract a different kind of member?

We found some support for our assumptions about the effects of membership costs and benefits on parties’ membership numbers. At the aggregate level, the relationships are in the expected directions: parties that have higher procedural costs have fewer members; parties that offer more political benefits have more members. Yet our individual level analysis did not provide further support for these patterns. This difference could just reflect the small number of members sampled in the ESS, which makes it difficult to find statistically significant patterns, or it could suggest that the pattern seen in the aggregate data runs in the other directions: that larger parties can afford to charge less, and that more established (larger) parties have been among the first to give their members more benefits. We cannot resolve the causal issue with these data. What we can say is that our data do not lend much support for the idea that parties can halt their membership declines by making it easier to join or by reducing their dues rates (most of which are quite low to begin with).

On the other hand, our aggregate analyses, and to a lesser extent our individual analyses, support the assumptions that prospective party members respond to the availability of cheaper affiliation options. Having multiple options seems to sort out supporters based on the intensity of their partisan engagement. When options such as ‘registered party friend’ are available, fewer party voters enrol as members, but those who still opt for traditional party membership tend to be more active in parties. The availability of alternative memberships may sort out those with more and less interest in engaging in party activities.

This latter finding sheds a more positive light on party experiments with alternative forms of affiliation. Not only do these new options not dilute the rights of party members to the extent that traditional members become less active; those who do opt for traditional membership seem to be more

committed to their party (at least so far). Our data do not allow us to see whether registration in the alternative categories offsets the impact of these options on party membership numbers, nor do we test whether member activity continues to be higher over the long run, or in parties which grant plebiscitary rights to non-members as well as members. Indeed, we do not even know the direction of the causality: it may be that smaller parties are more willing to experiment with these options. In other words, our results provide support for cost-benefit models of party membership, but they are by no means the last word in uncovering these relations. What we can say is that parties which are interested in mobilizing activists—rather than in just counting enrolment numbers—may prefer offering membership lite alternatives rather than offering financially cheap membership. If they do so, they are likely to wind up with a membership base which is more engaged, plus they will have a separate reservoir of registered supporters whom they can try to mobilize using distinct approaches, whether inviting them to get involved in traditional campaign activities or through partisan activism in other outlets, such as new social media.

APPENDIX: EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES

Financial Costs

This measure is based on one indicator included in the PPDB questionnaire: CR10DUESPRICE1: ‘If dues rates are expressed as a price, the minimum annual dues level for full members (expressed in national currency). The minimum does not refer to reduced dues levels for youth, unemployed, etc.’. The rates were converted to euros based on the average annual euro foreign exchange rates for 2011 from the statistical data warehouse of the European Central Bank¹⁸ and expressed as a proportion of the average annual wage in the country for 2011 from the OECD.¹⁹ Data for Sweden (missing in PPDB) were added based on the information available on the party websites.

Procedural Costs

This measure combines five questions included in the PPDB questionnaire: whether online enrolment is possible, whether party statutes require a probationary period, sponsorship from a current member, or agreement with the party’s principles, or whether rules explicitly prohibit members from belonging to another party or political organization (questions A37, A38, A40, A41, and A98 in Module A). These indicators are coded 0 if the party does not apply the requirement, and 1 if it does, with the exception of online membership, which contains three categories (0 if the party offers full online membership, 0.5 if it offers partial online membership, and 1 if the party

does not offer any online membership option). These indicators were used in a single additive scale, rescaled to range from 0 (no procedural costs) to 1 (maximum procedural costs).

Benefits

This measure combines three questions included in the PPDB questionnaire: C47PLVT8 on whether party members get to vote on the election of the political leader (coded 0 if no rights, 1 if voting rights),²⁰ C105MAN6 on whether party members may vote on the party election manifesto (coded 0 if no rights for members, 0.50 if partial rights—input or vote, 1 if full rights—input and vote) and B22CANRUL2TXT on whether party members may vote on candidate selection. This text variable was recoded 0 if no rights for members, 0.50 if partial rights—input or vote, 1 if full rights—input and vote.²¹ These indicators were used in a single additive scale, rescaled to range from 0 (no rights for members) to 1 (full rights for members).

Alternative Affiliation

This measure is based on one indicator included in the PPDB questionnaire: CR7FRIEND: ‘Party statutes recognize a separate level of formal affiliation with reduced obligations and reduced rights (for instance, party ‘friend’ or ‘registered sympathizer’). This does not include members with reduced dues but full rights, such as reduced fees for young people or unemployed’. The variable was coded 0 if the party allows only formal membership, and 1 if the party also offers an alternative affiliation option.

Relative Number of Party Members (M/V)

M/V divides the number of party members as displayed in PPDB (CR12MBRNUM: ‘Number of individual members’) by the number of party voters at the closest election year (retrieved from ParlGov for the closest election year).

Aggregate Activism

This measure combines two data sources: the share of party members having attended a party meeting within a year (using data from national party member surveys from MAPP²²), and the share of party members devoting more than 0 hours to party work on average. In order to retain as many cases as possible in our analyses, we use one or the other measure depending on what is available for the party under study, as the two measures are highly correlated (0.78). In cases for which we have both measures for a single party, party activism is computed as the mean of the two data points.

Individual Party Membership

This is measured by one question in the ESS questionnaire (Round 5, 2010/11): B21: 'Are you a member of any political party? (Official membership or registration with a party is meant)'. The variable was coded 0 if the individual reported not to be a member of a political party, and 1 if the individual reported to be a member of a political party.

Individual Party Activism

This is measured by one question in the ESS questionnaire (Round 5, 2010/11): B14: 'There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last twelve months, have you done any of the following? Worked in a political party or action group'. The variable was coded 0 if the individual responded negatively to this question, and 1 if the individual reported to have worked in a party or a group.

NOTES

1. We therefore exclude the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) since it is not a membership organization (den Ridder, van Holsteyn and Koole 2015: 135), and the Belgian LDD since it has missing data for all the variables in our analysis. This leaves 120 cases for the analysis. Note that we focus on individual membership and do not consider corporate membership applied in two parties (Australian Labor and British Labour).
2. 20 parties do not set uniform minimum dues rates, including all of the Australian parties: The Greens, National Party, Liberal Party, Labor Party; Austria: The Greens, People's Party; Canada: New Democratic Party; Czech Republic: Christian Democratic Union, Civic Democratic Party; Israel: Balad, Shas, Hadash, Agudat Yisrael; Netherlands: Reformed Political Party, Party for Freedom; Portugal: Communist Party; Ecologist Party 'The Greens'; Sweden: Christian Democrats, Moderate Party, Social Democrats.
3. The minimum dues rate is defined as the minimum standard rate for working adults. It does not include reduced rates for the unwaged, youth, seniors, etc.
4. A detailed description of each index is provided in the Appendix.
5. Australia: The Greens; Belgium: Ecolo; Canada: Green Party; Denmark: Danish People's Party; Ireland: Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour Party, Green Party; Italy: Northern League; Netherlands: GreenLeft, Christian Democratic Appeal; Spain: Basque National Party.
6. Hungary: Socialist Party, Hungarian Civic Alliance, Politics Can Be Different; Poland: Polish People's Party, Democratic Left Alliance; Portugal: Communist

Party, Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party; Spain: Basque Nationalist Party, People's Party, Democratic Convergence of Catalonia.

7. The scale was computed for all parties for which less than 20 per cent of the data was missing (N=118). Two parties (Jobbik from Hungary and the Labour Party in the Netherlands) were excluded from the analysis due to more than 20 per cent of missing values on the scale. Three parties were included despite having one missing value on one of the five items (which was replaced by the mean value on the other items).
8. Austria (all parties): Social Democratic Party, People's Party, Freedom Party, The Greens, and Alliance for the Future; Czech Republic: Social Democratic Party, Civic Democratic party, Communist Party; Denmark: Danish People's Party, Social Liberal Party, Liberal Alliance, Liberals; Ireland: Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin; Israel: Yisarel Beiteinu, Shas, Meretz; the Netherlands: Socialist Party; Portugal: Left Bloc, Communist Party, and Ecologist Party 'The Greens'.
9. Ecolo and Green in Belgium, Likud, Labor, and National Religious Party in Israel, and People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and Democrats 66 in the Netherlands.
10. The scale was computed for all parties for which we have information on at least two of the three items (N=105). Fifteen parties were excluded from the analysis due to more than one missing values on the three items of the scale. Twenty-six parties were included despite having one missing value on one of the three items (which was replaced by the mean value on the other items).
11. The Portuguese Communist Party (M/V ratio of 96.6), the National Religious Party in Israel (M/V ratio of 55.81) and the Austrian People's Party (M/V ratio of 53.29).
12. For more information on MAPP, convened by Emilie van Haute, please see <<http://www.projectmapp.eu>>.
13. Round 5 (Wave 2010/11)—this round covers 14 of the 19 countries included in the PPDB data. It includes individual-level information on partisan participation for 88 parties for which we have PPDB information.
14. Given the question wording, it is possible that some members we classify as 'active' were actually active in a non-party political group, meaning that we may over-count the number of active members. Despite this ambiguous wording, we use this variable because it is the only available measure of party activism. We cannot estimate the size of the measurement problem, but given that we look only at the activity of those who are party members, we expect that there are fewer false positives in our sample than in the survey population as a whole.
15. We would like to thank Yeaji Kim for her help with this section.
16. We look only at the fifteen countries for which we have ESS data on party membership, and within these look only at the seventy-seven parties for which we have PPDB data on membership costs and benefits.
17. This relationship shows statistical significance when the model is run without the costs and benefits variables.
18. <<http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu>>.

19. <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV_AN_WAGE>.
20. Data from Pilet, van Haute, and Kelbel (2014) were merged with the PPDB data, which added information for five parties (Czech Republic).
21. Data from Cross and Pilet (2015) and their COSPAL project were merged with the PPDB data, which added information for fifteen parties: Austria (all five parties); Denmark: Social Liberals and Red-Green Alliance; Hungary: Politics Can Be Different; Israel: Yisrael Beiteinu, Shas; Italy: People of Freedom, Democratic Party, Italy of Values, Union of the Centre; Spain: Democratic Convergence of Catalonia.
22. <<http://www.projectmapp.eu>>.

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The Effects of Manifesto Politics on Programmatic Change

Annika Hennl and Simon Tobias Franzmann

INTRODUCTION

The formulation of policies constitutes a core business of political parties in modern democracies. It lies at the heart of a process of interest and preference aggregation and is of considerable importance for the representative and participatory linkages that parties provide. This view is supported by normative accounts of intra-party democracy (Teorell 1999; Allern and Pedersen 2007). It is also encouraged by analytical approaches which relate different structures of policy formulation to political participation (Whiteley and Seyd 2002; Laux 2012; Pettitt 2012) and a party's competitiveness (Aldrich 1983; Strom 1990; Schofield 2005).

Despite its relevance, policy formulation appears to be the poor cousin of comparative studies on intra-party democracy (Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2002: 145). This neglect has two plausible reasons. First, leading typological approaches to party change assume that central party elites have kept a firm grip or even increased their autonomy in order to enhance policy flexibility in the light of individualized electoral markets (Panebianco 1988; Kirchheimer 1990; Katz and Mair 1995; Carty 2004). From this point of view, one might expect very little variance across parties, hence limiting the incentive to invest comprehensively in comparative research.

Second, explanatory approaches to the politics of party policy have so far been constrained by data limitations and a level of conceptual abstraction that hampers causal analysis. Two approaches characterize the field of research. On the one hand, quantitative studies (Meyer 2013; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013; Wagner and Meyer 2014) rely on outdated expert surveys (Janda 1980; Laver and Hunt 1992) and fail to differentiate between the many faces of party policy formulation that materialize in the real world (Gauja 2013a). On the other hand, in-depth case studies generate considerable and fine-tuned insights into the multifaceted manifestations of policy

formulation (Widfeldt 1997; Pettitt 2007; Däubler 2012a, 2012b; Pettitt 2012; Dolezal et al. 2012; Gauja 2013a, 2013b). These studies rebut assumptions of unidirectional organizational change and characterize intra-party policy formulation as an emerging and promising field of research. However, they are neither designed to, nor capable of, generating inference on the causal effects of the politics of party policy.

Against this assessment, this chapter sets out to contribute to the state of the discipline in two respects. First, it deliberately focuses on a limited research question: what is the effect of manifesto politics on programmatic change? This focus allows us to apply a medium level of conceptual abstraction that facilitates rigorous theoretical reasoning and enables us to integrate models of intra-party politics and party competition. Furthermore, our research question is a relevant one from a normative perspective. In times of highly volatile voter markets, programmatic flexibility is a precondition for parties to be responsive towards the electorate. Understanding the causes and constraints of programmatic change is thus an important endeavour.

The second contribution of the chapter is an empirical one. Building upon the novel and up-to-date data set of the Political Party Database (PPDB) Project, it engages in empirical analyses of the patterns and causal effects of manifesto politics. This data set allows us to measure manifesto politics in fine-tuned ways that match theoretical reasoning. Essentially, manifesto politics refers to the process of manifesto writing, including the configuration of different party actors which draft manifesto content or can veto the adoption of the final document. Our analysis generates two main findings. First, there are two patterns of manifesto politics: (i) one where a multitude of party bodies engage in drafting processes but where the power of enactment either rests with the party conference or the executive and the parliamentary party, and (ii) another where the party elite dominates the drafting of manifesto content but shares power of enactment with activists and a party's rank and file.

Second, the power balance between the party elite, on the one hand, and activists and a party's rank and file (members and supporters), on the other, is systematically related to the degree of programmatic change. We measure the latter on the basis of changes in manifesto content over time. In doing so, we neither assume that electoral manifestos are widely read nor that they necessarily bring about different governmental policies. However, the vast majority of parties in established democracies formulate election programs to signal their policy preferences and self-images to voters and competitors. Our analyses show that in cases where activists, ordinary members, or supporters hold the power to draft manifesto content or veto manifesto enactment, the level of programmatic change is lower. By contrast, in cases where party elites do not fear a veto by lower levels of party organization, they opt for vote-seeking strategies and adapt issues flexibly.

The chapter is structured as follows. The second section develops a conceptual approach to study manifesto politics from a comparative perspective and theorizes about its effects on the degree of programmatic change. The third section describes the data set. The fourth section engages in empirical analyses and compares descriptive inference on manifesto politics across parties and countries; it also conducts explanatory analyses that relate manifesto politics to programmatic change. The fifth and final section sums up and highlights avenues for further research.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The formulation of election manifestos constitutes a core business of political parties in modern democracies. Manifestos fulfil different roles (Kavanagh 1981; Ray 2007; Däubler 2012a: 58). To begin with, parties use manifestos to signal their programmatic standpoints to voters and to point out how they differ from their competitors. Manifestos thus structure political competition and allow voters to make an informed choice at the polling station. While the degree to which manifestos are noted by ordinary voters may vary across parties and time (Meyer 2013), research confirms that manifestos structure voting decisions (Rölle 2002). Also, empirical studies find that manifestos have a lasting impact on patterns of coalition formation (Budge and Laver 1992; Debus 2007, 2009), junior ministerial appointments (Greene and Jensen 2016), government policies (Kavanagh 1981), and the allocation of resources to government portfolios under different types of coalition governments (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). At the same time, manifestos are ‘tool[s] for intra-party coordination’ (Däubler 2012a: 51). Different party bodies, but also external actors, may seek to influence manifesto content with varying intentions. The degree to which manifestos are ‘statement[s] of principle’ (Ray 2007: 17) rather than strategic instruments of political competition varies accordingly.

Conceptualizing Manifesto Politics

Despite the theoretical and practical importance of manifestos, surprisingly little is known about the processes of manifesto development and adoption. Rather, the issue is a ‘white spot on the map of party research’ (Dolezal et al. 2012: 870), and related information is ‘scattered, very limited in scope and almost exclusively descriptive’ (Däubler 2012a: 54). We thus build upon case-specific knowledge of processes and actors involved to conceptualize

manifesto politics in a way that fits our explanatory purpose and empirical analyses. In-depth case studies of German (Däubler 2012b), Irish (Däubler 2012a), British (Kavanagh 1981), and Austrian (Dolezal et al. 2012) parties demonstrate that processes of manifesto formulation are rarely regulated by party statutes,¹ vary broadly across cases, and are highly complex as regards the type and number of different party bodies participating and the kind of influence they have.

Despite this complexity, one may analytically distinguish two stages in which manifesto politics play out: first, the development of manifesto content and, second, the (more or less formal) adoption of the related document.

In the first stage, various groups provide the policy content of a draft manifesto. We may depict the most common structure of the development stage in a highly stylized form as follows: the party leader or his or her appointee, an appointed task force, or specific intra-party body is in charge of coordinating the drafting process. Usually, the coordinating body first builds upon previous party documents and publicly stated positions to select the main areas to address (Däubler 2012b: 340; Dolezal et al. 2012: 874). Subsequently, it consults with other groups and coordinates their input. The range and types of actors that are granted input opportunities vary broadly across parties. Further, the quality of input differs. In some cases, input is explicitly consultative; in others, it is binding in character.² Building upon the consultation process, the coordinating body develops a first draft, which is often submitted to the leadership or the executive committee for a final revision. In some cases, however, final amendments to the draft can be proposed by delegates of a more inclusive party body—for example, the national council in case of the Irish Greens or the party conferences of the German parties.

In the second stage of the process, the final draft or manifesto proposal is adopted. In many parties, such enactment takes place by a vote of one or more party bodies like the party executive, a special manifesto committee, the party conference, or individual members.

Taken together, the universe of manifesto politics is shaped by the relative strength of various party bodies in providing input during the development of manifesto content and/or approving or vetoing its adoption. The crucial question then is to what extent different patterns of relevant power distributions have an impact on the degree of programmatic change.

Manifesto Politics and Programmatic Change

Changing party policy is a cumbersome process, as both uncertainty and potential costs of programmatic shifts may lead parties to favour the status quo. Also, a lack of resources and knowledge may hamper the implementation

of new ideas (Meyer 2013: 6). Consequently, change is often portrayed as a reaction towards external shocks which bring into question a party's ability to achieve its primary goals (Harmel and Janda 1994). From this point of view, the external environment is the dominant factor when trying to explain change.

While this perspective is initially plausible, it neglects the fact that party bodies differ systematically in their willingness to challenge the status quo and raise new issues. Hence, it will make a difference *who* has a say in the development or adoption of a party manifesto.

To begin with, there is ample reason to assume that actors pursue different goals when trying to influence the content of election programmes. Analytically, we differentiate two ideal types who differ as regards their vote- or office-seeking intentions versus their policy-seeking ones. On the one hand, vote-seeking (and eventually office-seeking) actors perceive manifestos as adaptive tools and wish to include those issues that match the exogenous preferences of voters. To this end, they act strategically and adapt flexibly to changing voter demands, largely irrespective of their intrinsic preferences. For these actors, programmatic change has electoral benefits, especially when increasing electoral volatility and the rise of new parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2008) demand frequent adaptation to volatile interests rather than stable representation of socially homogeneous core voters (Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002; Mair and Müller 2004).

On the other hand, policy-seeking actors perceive manifesto politics as an opportunity to translate their intrinsic policy preferences into a party programme. Such behaviour is closely linked to a genuine wish to express one's political identity.³ Programmatic change is less valued from this perspective, as political identities rest upon a set of core values and issues that are rather stable over time. If such actors dominate manifesto politics, salience strategies which rest on ownership issues predominate, and programmatic change is less likely. Consequently, the degree to which manifestos are 'statement(s) of principle' (Ray 2007: 17) that revolve around core issues or strategic documents that 'ride the wave' of public concerns (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994: 337) varies depending on the relative weight of the vote-, office- or policy-seeking objectives of those actors that affect manifesto content.

Party organizational literature enables us to develop systematic expectations about the related preferences of various party actors, most importantly the leader, the party executive, the parliamentary party, the party conference, ordinary members, and supporters.⁴ As a matter of course, we do not expect any of these to be exclusively vote- or policy-seeking. However, there is ample reason to assume that actors within each party differ systematically in the relative importance they assign to vote- or policy-seeking objectives. In this regard, the party elite (party leader, party executive, parliamentary party) is presumably *more* vote- and office-oriented than the party activists (party conference) and the rank and file (individual members, supporters).⁵

The party elite is first and foremost concerned with retaining the material benefits and status that holding political office entails (Panebianco 1988; Strøm 1990). Electoral success is a precondition in this regard. It is linked directly to the status of parliamentarians and indirectly to the political power of party executives whose record is frequently judged on the basis of electoral results. In addition, in times of a ‘presidentialisation of politics’ (Poguntke and Webb 2005), party leaders seek a personal mandate and long for success at the polling station. To this end, they strive for the ability to push their party’s programme in a direction that is electorally promising (Poguntke and Webb 2005). In contrast, shaping party policy is a prominent motive for party activists and ordinary members to join and be active (Whiteley and Seyd 2002; Spier et al. 2011). Consequently, they value electoral success less than the party elite.

In line with this preference structure, we assume that the party elite uses venues of influence during both stages of the manifesto process to foster programmatic change, whereas activists, members, and supporters alike will promote the inclusion of traditional core issues during manifesto development and veto large changes at a later stage.⁶ Inclusive processes of manifesto development and adoption are thus *ceteris paribus* less likely to allow for considerable programmatic change. Empirical studies that quantitatively relate very rough measures of leadership/activist influence to salience strategies (Wagner and Meyer 2014) or programmatic change (Meyer 2013) corroborate this line of reasoning.⁷ In a similar vein, comparative case studies on the willingness of socialist parties to introduce neo-liberal policies confirm the constraining influence of activists on policy change (Marx and Schumacher 2013). Our hypotheses thus read as follows:

H1: The greater the relative power over manifesto *development* of activists, members, and supporters compared to the party elite, the lower the degree of programmatic change.

H2: The greater the relative power over manifesto *adoption* of activists, members, and supporters compared to the party elite, the lower the degree of programmatic change.

H1 and H2 rest upon the idea that both activists and a party’s rank and file serve as brakes on programmatic change that is desired by the party elite. However, there is ample reason to assume that the constraining effect of both groups differs as the intensity of their policy objectives and their organizational capacities vary systematically.⁸ On the one hand, many activists are highly engaged precisely because they are driven by policy objectives and believe devoutly in their party’s *raison d’être*. At the same time, they are actively integrated in lower-level organizational units like constituency parties, non-territorial subunits like women’s or youth organizations, or organized party factions. These often have their own resources, giving them

a protected base from which to pursue their own causes, if necessary even against the party elite's wishes. The powerful hold of British Labour Party activists on policies during the late 1970s and the early 1980s is a telling example. In contrast, ordinary party members who are initially driven by policy motives as much as social ones are less embedded in organizational sub-structures. Arguably, they are also more susceptible to elite manipulation (Katz and Mair 1995). While individual members may initially favour the inclusion of identity-related core policies, they may nevertheless be willing to accept the imperative of policy flexibility when persuaded by the leadership. This is even more likely for party supporters who express a certain closeness to the party's cause but refrain from full membership (Scarrow 2015). We thus assume that activists have an even greater incentive than ordinary members to object to programmatic change. Further, we assume that activists mainly use processes of manifesto adoption to do so because these are often characterized by a vote on the final manifesto draft. This allows activists to use their organizational power and rally against the leadership. We thus assume that the inclusion of activists in enactment processes has an *independent* negative effect upon programmatic change.

H3: In cases where activists vote on manifesto *adoption*, the level of programmatic change is lower than in cases where they do not hold veto power.

This effect holds regardless of the overall power balance between the vote-seeking party elite and policy-seeking party bodies during manifesto drafting (H1) and adoption (H2).

It is important to note that we do not assume that the relationship between intra-party politics and programmatic change will materialize in a vacuum. Rather, additional factors like external shocks (see Harmel and Janda 1994) but also structural components at the macro- and party level have an impact on the degree of programmatic change. However, in line with our X-centred research design (Gerring 2001: 137; Ganghof 2005), we do not seek to comprehensively explain programmatic change. Rather, we are primarily interested in detecting the systematic impact of intra-party politics. To this end, we will include only those factors in our model that have an impact on the relationship of interest in an effort to avoid omitted variable bias (Sieberer 2007: 258–62). Five factors seem important as controls.

First, the structure of political competition has an impact on the relationship between intra-party politics and programmatic change. In systems where elite negotiations prevail and competition for votes is less fluid, leadership autonomy is presumably higher and programmatic change lower because there is no need for it under conditions of stable party-voter alignments. The electoral system is an important structural indicator in this regard: proportional representation (PR) electoral systems favour policy-seeking

strategies as they allow parties to occupy ideological niches (Franzmann 2011), such that programmatic change is presumably lower. In addition, the effective number of parties and the disproportionality of electoral outcomes (Gallagher 1991) both have very high correlations with the use of PR electoral systems (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Second, the type of territorial state organization has an impact. Parties in highly decentralized federal states are organized less hierarchically (Thorlakson 2009). At the same time, federalism entails veto points and is associated with lower levels of policy flexibility at the national level (Biela, Hennl, and Kaiser 2012, 2013). Consequently, electoral promises of extensive programmatic change are less credible, which lowers the incentive to invest in programmatic change. Third, economic development has an impact on the relationship of interest. Whereas shrinking growth rates may either put leadership into question or increase the degree of leadership autonomy, economic development increases the expected gains of policy promises that entail extensive countervailing measures.

Fourth, party-level factors are important. Government status seems an important factor. While leaders of governing parties have more authority in intra-party negotiations than those of opposition parties, they may feel less inclined to deviate from formerly successful policies. Finally, party size has an impact on the assumed relationship: whereas large parties are prone to be rather hierarchical (Michels 1949), they are simultaneously better equipped to invest resources in strategic decisions on programmatic change (Meyer 2013: 170–3). As a consequence, uncertainty about shifts in voter preferences is lower, which fosters adaptation strategies and thus programmatic change. We control for these factors in our explanatory analyses. Figure 11.1 summarizes our theoretical framework.




FIGURE 11.1 Theoretical framework: manifesto politics and programmatic change

DATA, DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS, AND OPERATIONALIZATION

The aim of the following empirical analyses is twofold. First, we seek to systematically describe intra-party dynamics of manifesto formulation across a broad range of quite divergent parties. This allows us to test whether case study findings on the two-dimensional nature of manifesto politics indeed hold when we broaden the scope of empirical enquiry. We also wish to compare the influence of the party elite to that of activists and the rank and file across parties. Second, we test for the explanatory reach of our theoretical propositions by bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses.

Data on Manifesto Politics and Descriptive Findings

The PPDB database reports the formal power of different party bodies (party leader or drafting committee, parliamentary party, national executive, party conference, all members, supporters) in the formulation of manifestos. Specifically, it asks whether each of these actors provides formal input during drafting processes, votes on manifesto enactment, engages in both stages, or is not a part of the process. We will now investigate the descriptive findings in detail.

A first look at the raw data confirms the findings of earlier case studies in two respects. First, manifesto politics play out in very different ways across parties. Second, the relative influence of various bodies differs across the two stages of the process.

If we turn to the drafting stage first, variance is high. In some parties, access to this stage is exclusively granted to the parties' grassroots, as either conference delegates (Israeli Hadash and Labour parties in 2012) or individual party members (Belgian New Flemish Alliance in 2012) hold the prerogative to name those issues they deem especially important. In others, setting the manifesto agenda is a highly exclusive endeavour, whereby the party leader or a drafting committee appointed by her or him develops the main issues. Finally, agenda setting may be characterized by the multifaceted input of many intra-party bodies.

A similar picture of variance emerges with regard to the intra-party dynamics shaping manifesto enactment. In some parties, a single body is responsible for adopting the manifesto. In these cases, the sole prerogative to adopt the manifesto may rest with the party leader, as with the Israeli parties Meretz and the National Religious Party in 2012; alternatively, it may be granted to the parliamentary party (Israeli Kadima in 2012) or to all party members (Belgian New Flemish Alliance in 2012). In other cases, veto power is broadly allocated and granted to many groups. An extreme example is the Belgian

TABLE 11.1 *Patterns of manifesto politics: number of empirical cases*

	Party elite			Activists & supporters		
	Leader	Executive	Parliamentary party	Party conference	All members	Non-members
Power over drafting & enactment	31	33	13	24	13	1
Power over enactment	3	3	2	7	3	1
Power over drafting	36	31	24	3	19	13
None	24	26	51	56	54	74
Others	1	1	3	2	5	6
Missing	10	11	12	13	11	10

N=105;

Note: The table reports number of cases in which each actor/group has corresponding powers.

Reform Movement, where four different intra-party groups (party leader, parliamentary party, national executive committee, individual party members) and even party supporters formally voted upon the manifesto in 2012.

Table 11.1 gives a more systematic picture of the relevant variance. The columns within the table separate member and activists from the party elite in accordance with our later operationalization of elite autonomy. The order of the rows represents the order of influence. The highest is having both influence on drafting and enactment, the second only on enactment and the third only on drafting. Table 11.1 shows thirty-six parties where the party leader is able to shape the manifesto draft but is not included in its enactment as a separate actor. Presumably, most party leaders are members of one of the other party bodies that have a vote on enactment. In contrast, any party leader who had the right to enact the manifesto separately was previously able to shape the content of the draft. Our sample includes twenty-four cases where the party leader has no formal influence at all. Concerning the executive, the current sample is roughly split between parties where the party executive has no direct influence (twenty-six) and those where it holds both drafting and enactment power (thirty-three). Seventeen parties enable all party members to vote on the enactment of the manifesto.

In the next step (Table 11.2), we opt for a closer investigation of those thirty-one cases where the leader has the right to shape the draft *and* finally enact the manifesto. Is his or her power balanced by other party institutions? As is evident, in most cases the party executive (twenty-three) and/or the parliamentary party (thirteen) also hold drafting and enactment power and thus constrain the leadership power in both stages of manifesto development. Party conferences and members, in turn, constrain leaders' power only in a minority of cases in both stages (twelve). However, in another eleven parties, activists and supporters join in either during the drafting (seven) or enactment stage (four).

TABLE 11.2 31 unconstrained leaders?

If the leader has input and vote, Who else has . . .	Party elite		Activists & supporters			Non-members
	Executive	Parliamentary party	Party conference	All members	Sum of party conference and members	
Power over drafting & enactment	23	13	7	5	12	1
Power over enactment	0	0	2	2	4	1
Power over drafting	2	1	1	6	7	4
None	5	15	18	15	33	23
Other	1	1	0	3	3	2
Missing	0	1	3	0	3	0

N=31

TABLE 11.3 If the leader has no vote . . . who enacts?

If the leader has no vote	Party elite			Activists & supporters		
	Leader	Executive	Parliamentary party	Party conference	All members	Non-members
Power over drafting & enactment	0	9	0	16	7	0
Power over enactment	0	3	1	2	1	0
Power over drafting	36	27	23	2	12	9
None	24	20	34	38	37	47
Other	0	0	1	2	2	3
Missing	0	1	1	0	1	1

N=60

In cases where the party leader does not vote on the enactment of the manifesto draft (sixty), power to do so rests with the party conference in about a quarter of the parties (sixteen) and/or with the executive (nine) (see Table 11.3).

Taken together, our data show roughly two patterns of manifesto politics. In the first, the party elite (party leader, party executive, parliamentary party) has a strong impact on both stages but shares power to enact the manifesto with activists or members; this pattern is seen in about half of the cases. One can characterize it as a *veto of party members pattern* since the drafting process is elite-centred but party members can veto this draft. The second general pattern could be labelled as an *inclusion of party members in drafting pattern*.

The leader shares the power to shape the manifesto agenda (often with members and/or supporters), while the power to enact the manifesto rests either with the executive or the party conference. This second pattern is obviously subdivided. The final enactment is either elite driven or conference driven. While the first tremendously reduces the rank and file input, the latter subtype preserves the activists' influence. Beyond the two general patterns, however, many specific combinations are found in our data.⁹ It thus seems impossible to create a simple typology but rather advisable to build upon the conceptual distinction between drafting and enactment, on the one hand, and the party elite and rank and file, on the other hand. For the operationalization of our main independent variables, we thus recode the raw data accordingly. We now turn our attention to the operationalization of the dependent variable.

*Operationalization of the Dependent Variable:
Manifesto Change*

For analysing manifesto change, we rely on the data set of the Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013) that uses hand-coded content analysis. The basic unit is a quasi-sentence that represents a particular policy statement. The manifesto data set is constructed to measure the percentage of statements concerning a policy field, so-called 'saliences'. The data set reports selective issue emphasis, expressed in percentage scores. For generating positional data based on this selective issue emphasis, several additional procedures are discussed in the literature (Budge and Laver 1992; Pelizzo 2003; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Dinas and Gemenis 2010; Jahn 2011; Franzmann 2015). One might expect that manifesto change occurs in terms of such a positional change. However, manifesto change should be first expressed by emphasizing different issues or the same issues differently. In some cases, this might be linked to a change in left-right party position, but changing issue emphases might also lead to the same party position as before whenever a 'left' (or right) issue is replaced by another 'left' (or right) issue. This is quite plausible from the perspective of the salience theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 2001), which expects that parties primarily emphasize those issues to which voters assign them competence. Since a party's left-right position is rather stable, they adopt new issues that fit to their overall ideology. Consequently, we expect that programmatic change manifests itself primarily in issue salience rather than in party positions. This assumption is empirically corroborated in the next section. While indicators relying on left-right positions cannot detect programmatic change caused by issue adaption, we rely on the measurement of selective issue emphasis. Referring to salience

theory, we use an indicator that measures the overall programmatic dissimilarity expressed in percentages of identical salience emphasis (Franzmann 2013). Sigelman and Buell (2004) have proposed the same formula to describe programmatic convergence in presidential campaigns. According to Duncan and Duncan's (1955) well-known formula of measuring heterogeneity between the social-structural properties of two groups, the percentage share of each coding category of a manifesto is subtracted from the corresponding percentage share in the subsequent manifesto. This is repeated for each coding category. The absolute value describes the percentage point distance in a particular category. Since all coding categories add up to 100 per cent, the sum of all absolute values of the different coding categories can be a maximum of 200. Dividing by two leads to a number that is easy to interpret; in the extreme case of maximal difference between two manifestos, the value is 100. A value of 50 then indicates that the two manifestos show a 50 per cent overlap in identical issue emphases. The general idea underlying this indicator is to express the amount of percentage points to be redistributed between two party manifestos to become fully equal. This can be quickly illustrated. Let us say that party A emphasized social welfare has in the election 2004 with five per cent and in 2008 with seven per cent. The difference then is two per cent. However, this score is divided by two, expressing that (virtually) taking one per cent from the 2008 manifesto and adding one per cent to the 2004 manifesto leads to an equal emphasis.

Mathematically, the formula reads as follows:

$$D = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n |S_{ai} - S_{bi}|$$

With D: distance, which refers to the saliences that need to be changed in order to equalize selective issue emphasis between two manifestos; i: index for coding category; S: salience score measured in percentage share of a particular manifesto; a, b: index for manifesto a, b. For our purposes, we calculate the difference score D on the basis of the salience change in each category from the previous to the current election.

The general logic can be further illustrated by a small example. Let us assume for reasons of simplicity that a manifesto contains five issues. As Table 11.4 reveals, the particular party changed between 2005 and 2010 the selective emphasis of issue A and issue E. A is deemphasized by ten per cent, E is more emphasized by ten per cent. Hence, within a manifesto ten per cent of saliences are redistributed from issue A to issue E. Programmatic change is then ten per cent. However, summing up issue by issue, the sum of differences is 20 per cent, as reported in the last column in Table 11.4. For calculating the programmatic change, the sum of differences has to be divided by two (see Table 11.4).

TABLE 11.4 Example for calculating programmatic change in salience %

	Issue A	Issue B	Issue C	Issue D	Issue E	SUM
Manifesto in 2005	20%	30%	20%	10%	20%	100%
Manifesto in 2010	10%	30%	20%	10%	30%	100%
Difference	10%	0%	0%	0%	10%	20%
<i>Overall programmatic change: Sum of differences / 2 = 20% / 2 = 10%.</i>						

TABLE 11.5 Operationalization of manifesto politics

			Measurement	N
DRAFTING	<i>Exclusive rank and file input</i>		Dummy indicating whether activists, members, and/or supporters have exclusive input on drafting (1) or not (0)	3
	<i>Balanced input</i>		Dummy indicating whether activists, members, and/or supporters share the power of drafting with the party elite (1) or not (0)	41
	<i>Exclusive elite input</i>		Reference category indicating cases where the party elite has exclusive input on drafting	47
ENACTMENT	<i>Exclusive rank and file vote</i>		Dummy indicating whether activists, members, and/or supporters exclusively vote to enact manifesto (1) or not (0)	17
	<i>Dual vote</i>		Dummy indicating whether activists, members, and/or supporters share the power of adoption with the party elite (1) or not (0)	52
	<i>Exclusive elite vote</i>		Reference category indicating cases where the party elite exclusively votes to enact manifesto	22

N=91 (14 missing due to incomplete information)

Operationalization of the Independent Variables

Our central explanatory variables are the different modes of drafting and enactment. Conceptually, these are two independent dimensions.¹⁰ We have thus first created separate dummies for the two dimensions of drafting and enactment. Building upon this, we construct two sets of dummy variables to operationalize the relative power of the party elite vis-à-vis activists, members, and supporters to influence drafting and enactment (see Table 11.5).¹¹

Additionally, we construct an overall measure of the extent to which elite autonomy is constrained (constraints on elite autonomy, CEA), which merges the relative impact of actors on both dimensions. This index builds upon an ordinal scale of influence (INF) for each party body (see Table 11.6) and relates the influence of the party elite, on the one hand, to that of activists and a party's rank and file, on the other hand. To construct an index that captures the overall balance of power between the party elite and the party's rank and file across both dimensions of manifesto politics (CEA), we conduct four steps. First, we recode all answers to construct an ordinal scale of influence for each party actor (see Table 11.6).

TABLE 11.6 Ordinal scale of influence

INF _i , with i=party body	Type of influence
3	Input & vote
2	Vote
1	Input
0	No influence

Second, we calculate the maximum value for (i) the party elite (the party leadership, the parliamentary party, and the party executive), and (ii) for the party conference, individual members, and party supporters. Three, we subtract both to measure the relative power of each group. Fourth and finally, as the resulting measure runs from -3 (unconstrained elite) to $+3$ (fully constrained elite) we normalize it by adding three and dividing it by six to construct our final index of elite autonomy:

The formula reads:

$$CEA = [(MAX[INF_{\text{conference, members, supporters}}] - MAX[INF_{\text{leadership, parliamentary party, executive}}]) + 3]/6$$

The resulting indicator, CEA, ranges from zero to one and displays the unconstrained power of the party elite [0] to determine manifesto content, at the one end, and the unconstrained power of activists or the rank and file, at the other end [1]. Again, an example illustrates how the indicator works. Imagine a party where the party conference has the right to both draft and vote on the manifesto. Then the left hand side has a maximum score of three. In case one of the party bodies representing the party elite also has both rights to draft and enact, then the right hand side also has the score of three. Consequently, the difference in the first brackets is zero. By adding three and dividing by six the final score is 0.5. This score of 0.5 symbolizes the balance between rank and file and party elite. In case neither conference, members nor supporters have any impact but the party elite has both rights to draft and enact, then the difference within the first brackets reads $0-3=-3$. Adding three leads to the score of zero, representing zero constraint on party elite autonomy.

THE IMPACT OF MANIFESTO POLITICS ON PROGRAMMATIC CHANGE

In an effort to test for the explanatory leverage of our theoretical framework, we conduct two steps. First, we assess the bivariate relationship

between various indicators of manifesto politics and programmatic change. Second, we apply an ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis with robust standard errors.

*Plausibility Tests: Assessing the Relationship between
Manifesto Politics and Programmatic Change*

To begin with, we inspect whether the two dimensions of drafting and enactment are indeed independent from each other. The correlation between the number of actors providing input and those who have the right to vote is 0.39. Concerning the relative power of the party elite compared with the rank and file, the Spearman's coefficient between the drafting and the enactment indicators (see Table 11.7) is 0.55. The intra-party dynamics of drafting and adoption are thus correlated but are far from identical.

TABLE 11.7 *Correlations between manifesto politics and programmatic change*

Spearman's rho and Pearson's r		Programmatic change (salience)	RILE absolute change (position)	FK absolute change (position)
CEA		-0.400**	-0.033	0.013
Exclusive rank and file input (Pearson's r)	Drafting	-0.152	-0.05	-0.053
Balanced input (Pearson's r)		-0.214	-0.143	-0.145
Exclusive elite input (Pearson's r)		0.269**	0.161	0.164
Exclusive rank and file vote (Pearson's r)	Enactment	-0.310***	-0.089	-0.068
Dual vote (Pearson's r)		0.039	-0.076	0.064
Exclusive elite vote (Pearson's r)		0.243**	0.169	-0.01
Party leader	Input	-0.001	0.013	-0.154
	Vote	0.060	0.034	-0.045
National executive committee	Input	-0.253*	-0.055	0.082
	Vote	-0.040	-0.127	-0.008
Parliamentary party	Input	-0.129	-0.018	-0.053
	Vote	-0.004	-0.030	-0.193
Party conference	Input	-0.311**	0.004	-0.054
	Vote	-0.254*	-0.082	0.004
All party members	Input	-0.339**	-0.123	0.006
	Vote	-0.310**	-0.090	-0.015
Non-member party supporters	Input	-0.176	-0.166	-0.125
	Vote	-0.049	0.162	0.179

TABLE 11.7 *Continued*

Spearman's rho and Pearson's r		Programmatic change (salience)	RILE absolute change (position)	FK absolute change (position)
Number of actors providing input	# of Input	-0.320**	-0.073	-0.062
Number of actors having vote	# of Vote	-0.169	-0.068	-0.043
Incumbency		-0.270*	-0.096	-0.048
Party size (membership)		-0.44**	-0.15*	0.04

Table 11.7 displays correlations between indicators of manifesto politics, on the one hand, and the degree of programmatic change, on the other hand. We inspect the indicator of programmatic change based on salience theory and the absolute change of the left–right position. For the latter, we use both the RILE approach (Budge and Laver 1992) and the twelve-step approach of Franzmann and Kaiser (2006). While we see impacts on saliency change, the change of the left–right position is hardly influenced by manifesto politics. At first glance, the results by and large corroborate our argument. The one-dimensional ordinal indicator CEA reveals that the higher the constraints on elite autonomy, the lower the degree of programmatic change. We then inspect the correlation between the separate dummies for drafting and enactment, on the one hand, and programmatic change, on the other hand. If we turn to the stage of manifesto drafting first, bivariate correlations show that programmatic change is significantly higher in those parties where the party elite dominates. During manifesto enactment, the direction of influence is also positive. The negative correlation between an exclusive right of the rank and file and programmatic change is remarkably high. Concerning the position indicators, the direction of the effect is the same, but it is far from being significant.

Results for individual party actors point to a slightly different pattern of intra-party dynamics. While the statistically significant negative effects of the drafting and vote power of all party members are fully in line with our argument, the findings additionally show that drafting opportunities for the national executive and the parliamentary party constrain programmatic change. Inclusive processes of manifesto drafting thus seem to inhibit programmatic change in general and not only in cases where the rank and file participates—a finding that is corroborated by the significant negative correlation between the overall number of actors participating during the drafting stage (number of inputs) and programmatic change.

Regarding the measures for left–right position, no single correlation is significant. Nevertheless, both position indicators reveal that non-member party supporters' input is correlated negatively to the change of the left–right

position, while an existing veto for them increases the left–right position change. Remarkably, the negative impact of the parliamentary party’s vote on the left–right position, measured by the Franzmann–Kaiser method, is almost significant. Parties that are open to non-members seem to be rather flexible in their left–right position, while parties with a strong parliamentary wing seem to stick to their given left–right position.

Taken together, the bivariate findings corroborate the theoretical assumptions of the salience theory and indicate that our main hypotheses are meaningful. We report results for incumbency and party size, which function as party-related controls. Both are negatively correlated with programmatic change.

Explanatory Analyses: Multivariate Regression

Table 11.8 is roughly structured into three parts. Model 0 is a baseline model that includes only the control variables. Models 1a and 1b display the main models that build upon the two dimensions of drafting and enactment. Models 2a and 2b include the one-dimensional indicator CEA instead.¹²

By and large, the findings confirm those parts of our main argument that relate to the stage of manifesto enactment (H2). In parties where activists or the rank and file exclusively vote to enact manifestos or where they share related powers with the party elite, the level of programmatic change is significantly lower than in those parties where the party elite enacts the manifesto autonomously. Additionally, model 1b indicates that a veto by the rank and file has the strongest impact in this regard. Findings for the drafting stage are less clear. Those indicators that refer to the drafting stage of manifesto processes (H1) consistently point in the same direction, but are not significantly related to programmatic change. However, the joint indicator that measures constraints on elite autonomy across both stages (models 2a and 2b) again suggests that H1 and H2 have explanatory power: the higher the constraints on elite autonomy across both stages, the lower the programmatic change and vice versa. This effect remains highly significant even when we include all controls (model 2b). On the contrary, our findings reject H3 (models 1a and 1b). Once we control for the overall balance of power between the party elite and other intra-party actors, granting the party conference a right to veto manifesto enactment does not constrain programmatic change any further. Party conferences often have an ambiguous state being also rather elitists and not only representatives of the rank and file. This might weaken the empirical relationship. Further, the weakness of the findings on the drafting stage may have to do with the fact that input is inherently less clearly regulated than enactment. In total, indicators for manifesto politics explain about 13 to 14 per cent of the variance in programmatic change.

TABLE 11.8 *Manifesto politics and programmatic change*

		Model 0	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b
		Controls only	Drafting, enactment, & conference veto	1a & controls	Constraints on elite autonomy	Constraints on elite autonomy & controls
Drafting	<i>Exclusive rank and file input</i>	—	−6.875 (4.68)	−2.614 (6.22)	—	—
	<i>Balanced input</i>	—	−2.183 (3.62)	−0.738 (4.00)	—	—
Enactment	<i>Exclusive rank and file vote</i>	—	−9.984** (4.52)	−12.024** (5.49)	—	—
	<i>Dual votes</i>	—	−3.912 (3.38)	−7.421* (3.82)	—	—
<i>Conference veto</i>			0.040 (3.52)	−1.511 (3.53)		
<i>Constraints on elite autonomy</i>		—	—	—	−15.901*** (4.30)	−17.415*** (6.11)
Control variables	<i>Party size (membership in thousands)</i>	−0.123* (0.01)	—	−0.027*** (0.01)	—	−0.026*** (0.01)
	<i>Incumbency</i>	−2.779 (3.04)	—	−1.703 (2.96)	—	−1.61 (3.03)
	<i>Effective number of parliamentarian parties</i>	−0.769 (0.87)	—	−1.30 (0.88)	—	−1.247 (0.85)
	<i>Index of federalism</i>	−0.01* (0.01)	—	−0.01 (0.01)	—	−0.01 (0.01)
	<i>GDP change</i>	1.815* (0.99)	—	−0.409 (1.32)	—	−0.99 (1.26)
	Intercept	37.457 (5.23)***	39.723*** (3.03)	48.687*** (7.12)	25.182 (2.57)***	32.560 (5.16)***
R ²		0.2037	13.22	31.22	0.1424	0.3313
N		75	82	75	77	70

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (B), robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01;
data sources: Armingeon et al. (2014), Lijphart (2012), PPDB (2015); for calculating AIC and BIC, models are re-calculated using maximum likelihood.

The controls cover about 20 per cent of the variance and influence programmatic change consistently in the expected direction.¹³ However, almost all of them lose significance in more complex models. Even though incumbency slightly misses significance, its impact is consistently negative. The membership size of the party is an important exception. It explains a large part of the variance in programmatic change and reveals increasing significance in more complex models.

Taken together, although country-specific effects explain the biggest degree of variance in programmatic change, party organization and the ways in which manifestos are drafted and enacted clearly matter.

INTERPRETATION AND CRITICAL EVALUATION

This chapter sets out to increase our knowledge of intra-party dynamics around manifesto politics and their systematic effect on programmatic change. To this end, it has built upon previous findings to conceptualize the two-dimensional nature of manifesto politics, and it has integrated views on party organization with those on party competition to theorize about its systematic effects on programmatic change. Our main argument builds upon the idea that party elites use their impact on manifesto drafting and enactment in an effort to increase programmatic adaption to changing electoral seasons, whereas activists and a party's rank and file seek to constrain it. Employing the novel data set of the PPDB Project, we have provided systematic insights into the empirical nature of manifesto politics. While our findings corroborate our main line of reasoning, they also call for further analyses into the two-dimensional nature of manifesto politics and its substantive effects on patterns of party competition. From this point, two lines of further research are pending. First, additional case studies should give us deeper insights into why and when elite autonomy is important for implementing programmatic change. Second, an extension of the PPDB data set will enable us to consider how gains and losses in vote share have an impact on programmatic change in dependence on manifesto politics. However, both lines of research are beyond the scope of this chapter and rather belong to another PPDB book.

Regarding our own findings, three aspects stand out. First, the power balance between the party elite (party leader, the party executive, and the parliamentary party), on the one hand, and activists and the rank and file, on the other hand, has a systematic impact on the degree of programmatic change. This effect is quite clear for the stage of manifesto adoption, but less so for drafting. The stronger the constraints on elite autonomy to enact party manifestos, the lower the degree of programmatic change. Including

activists or members in drafting processes does not reveal such a clear effect, but an indicator that measures constraints on elite autonomy across both stages of the process is again significantly related to programmatic change. We thus conclude that elites may adopt a programme according to vote- and office-seeking strategies whenever they do not fear a veto by the lower party organization. Whether these short-term changes really improve the long-term electoral success of a party is, however, an open question that can only be answered by a time-series data set.

Second, both bivariate and multivariate findings indicate that activists *and* ordinary members serve as constraints on programmatic change. Furthermore, once we control for the overall balance of power between the party elite and other intra-party actors, activists' veto power does not have a significant additional effect. Thus, party elites who foster organizational reforms that disempower activists but empower ordinary members or supporters do not necessarily gain room for manoeuvre.

Third, party size and incumbency have a negative impact on programmatic change. A large party membership clearly increases programmatic stability. Two explanations seem to fit this empirical pattern. First, parties with a large membership are 'mature' parties in which ideology has been shaped for decades by extensive intra-party negotiations. These parties might have already found their particular programmatic equilibriums. Second, organizational size requires a high degree of coordination and intra-party compromise that works against programmatic innovation even if the current status quo might not be optimal. Finally, the negative impact of incumbency might be caused by the wish to retain a programme that was successful in gaining office. In an age of declining party membership, we can thus expect more programmatic change which is likely to feed into high electoral volatility.

NOTES

1. The British Labour Party is an exception in this regard, as the party statute (Clause V) refers to a specific body that represents elements of the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary party and is responsible for selecting issues from the party program for the manifesto.
2. This is the case for the party conferences of the main parties in the German state of Baden-Württemberg, as delegates have the right to propose amendments to the draft before they finally vote for its enactment (Däubler 2012b). With regard to the Austrian parties, Dolezal et al. (2012: 879) distinguish between actors who have a 'central role in the drafting process' and those who are merely consulted or have a limited influence.

3. This argument is corroborated by Däubler's work on German parties in the *Länder*, where conference delegates are keen on translating their own favorite issues (*Steckenpferde—hobby horses*) into party policy—even in cases where the *Land* level does not have the jurisdiction to shape that policy area (Däubler 2012b: 354).
4. These are the party bodies that are included in the PPDB data set. For an attribution of bodies to the concepts of the party elite, activists, and rank and file, see Figure 11.1. On the functional equivalence of different party bodies, see Poguntke (2000).
5. Quite importantly, this assumption refers to the relative preferences of various bodies within a single party and holds irrespective of the absolute weight of policy concerns that a party shows in a cross-party comparison.
6. This argument is in line with veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002), which tells us that the degree of policy change decreases with an increasing number of veto players but adds that the strength of this effect is dependent upon the policy preferences of the veto players and the location of the status quo.
7. These findings are to be taken with a pinch of salt, as the degree of conceptual abstraction that the underlying raw data displays is very high, and the data used is quite outdated. Our empirical analyses do not feature these restrictions.
8. The mixed evidence on May's law of curvilinearity (Heidar 2006: 306–8) leads us to refrain from a line of reasoning that exclusively builds upon the idea that activists hold more extreme policy positions than ordinary members.
9. This finding is supported by the results of a cluster analysis that is available upon request.
10. Empirically, correlation is also rather low. Table 11.1 to Table 11.3 show that the entire theoretical variance also exists empirically. Hence, multicollinearity is not a problem by including the two separate dimensions into an OLS.
11. The appendix (see PPDB website) provides detailed information on the operationalization.
12. We have also calculated models including the change in votes in elections as well as the length of the manifesto. Neither reveals any significant bivariate or multivariate effect.
13. We have conducted extensive empirical tests to detect the most suitable control variables. The appendix (see PPDB website) informs about the bivariate correlations. Federalism, the effective number of parliamentary parties, and GDP growth cover the heterogeneity of the country sample to a certain extent.

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Party Organization and Party Unity

Conor Little and David M. Farrell

The coordinating role of parties in parliaments is at the heart of the ‘party government’ framework (Katz 1986). Political parties have a crucial role in maintaining a unified voting bloc in parliament. In the most recent book-length treatment of this subject Deschouwer and Depauw (2014: 29) observe that: ‘One of the very important rules of the game for party democracy is the unified action of party members in parliament.’ This is evident from the history of the development of the first wave of parties within parliaments (Duverger 1959; Scarrow 2015); it is also predicted by game theory (Laver and Shepsle 1999).¹

A high level of party unity matters for a number of reasons. It matters most of all for the parties themselves: indiscipline in parliamentary ranks—even if only involving a small number of recalcitrants—reduces a party’s effectiveness in parliament, invites media criticism and can cost votes (Carey 2007; Kam 2009; Tavits 2012b). Dissent ‘ignites a simmering collective action problem in the party (Docherty 1997: 169–70), one that undermines the electoral prospects of loyal MPs [...] and sends a sign of disunity and disorganization to voters’ (Kam 2009: 9). If the party is in government, this can have significant implications for policy outcomes and for governmental stability (Sieberer 2006: 171–2). A small number of dissenters can have a big effect on governments and policy, effectively increasing the majority a government needs to function and influencing coalition formation decisions. While democracy as such is not endangered by the individual acts of MPs voting against their party, frayed party voting unity undermines party-based accountability, which is at the heart of the ‘responsible government’ model of democracy (Katz 1986). Party government over time clearly does depend on the aggregation of positions by parties and the stability provided by this (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999): perennial dissent may compromise a government, as witnessed in the dying days of the John Major government in Britain in the mid-1990s; it may also threaten democratic stability, particularly in new and consolidating democracies (Tavits 2012b; Field 2013).

This chapter examines the role of party organizations in affecting levels of party unity in parliament. We should start by clarifying terms, as there is a tendency to use the terms ‘unity’, ‘cohesion’, and ‘discipline’ interchangeably, something at least one of us has been guilty of in the past (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999). Following Sieberer (2006: 151), our primary interest is in party *unity*, by which we mean ‘the observable degree’ to which MPs in a parliamentary party ‘act in unison’. Unity is produced by two factors: (1) party discipline, which makes MPs vote in a certain way even if they may personally differ on the matter, and (2) party cohesion, which results from MPs sharing the same preference. Another way of expressing this is to talk of party unity as occurring in a sequential process (e.g., Hazan 2003; Andeweg and Thomassen 2011) in which to varying degrees—depending on individual circumstances—cohesion and discipline combine to produce some level of observable and thus measurable party unity.

The *party-based* approach adopted in this chapter sets it apart from much of the existing literature that has tended to focus to date on the impact of *national-level* institutions (and indeed the circumstances in which those institutions were developed: see Field 2013). From existing research we know that parliamentary systems tend to have a greater record in producing high levels of party unity than presidential systems (Huber 1996; Carey 2007, 2009). Electoral system design is also said to have a bearing on party unity. In his ‘competing principals’ framework, Carey uses cross-national evidence to show that voting unity is associated with the absence of intra-party competition (Carey 2007, 2009); though others find differently, suggesting perhaps a degree of uncertainty (or at least curvilinearity) about this relationship (e.g., Depauw and Martin 2009; Farrell et al. 2015).²

These studies have made important contributions to our understanding of how party unity can be influenced by national institutional features. But, of course, this only addresses part of the picture, a point noted by Depauw and Martin (2009: 103; see also Owens 2003: 26–7) who observe that the nearly-exclusive focus on system-level factors precludes an analysis of variation in party voting unity within the same system. Driven by the observation that party unity (and, more fundamentally, that MP behaviour) varies within institutional settings, some attention has been given to the effects of party organization on voting unity (Sieberer 2006; Depauw and Martin 2009; Tavits 2012b). But to date this line of research has faced a number of obstacles, not least over the lack of cross-national data on party organizations, requiring researchers to be inventive in the use of proxy measures. This is shown in Sieberer’s (2006) use of readily available party-level data such as incumbency, party size and the party’s ideological position. He sets out several hypotheses that refer to the power of the parliamentary party group leadership, and uses system-level data as a proxy for this control. Similarly, Coman (2015b) infers leadership strength and party finance from the electoral

system and from system-level data on party financing, respectively. The relationship between concepts and indicators relating to party organizations seems strained at times: for example, Depauw and Martin (2009) argue that a large membership relative to the party's electoral support indicates an inclusive candidate selection process.

Sieberer (2006: 164) observes that testing hypotheses concerning party organizational factors—specifically mechanisms of party discipline—is difficult because ‘no comparative data are available on the sort of sanctions the [parliamentary party group] leadership could use and, even less, the credibility of their use’ and concludes that ‘a more detailed analysis based on better data would be valuable’ (p. 165). Hazan (2003: 8) makes much the same point: ‘comparative knowledge of the tools that allow parties and parliaments to enforce obedience is lacking, which points to an urgent need for future research’. He observes that comparative data are ‘basically non-existent’ (p. 8). In her four-country study Tavits (2012b) too notes the difficulty in gathering basic organizational data such as on the numbers of members and party branches.

Nonetheless, researchers have made a number of findings—albeit several of them contradictory—concerning the effects of party attributes on party unity. First, there is the question of party size. Some studies have found that small parties are generally more unified than large parties, a finding that is attributed to their greater homogeneity (Lafranchi and Lüthi 1999; Raunio 1999), but more recent cross-national studies have found differing trends. For instance, Tavits (2012b; see also Sieberer 2006) finds that, if anything, it is the larger parties that manifest higher levels of unity.

Second, there is the governmental status of the party. Again, expectations and findings tend to vary. Sieberer (2006) highlights these contradictory expectations. On the one hand, the access to patronage, the need to survive votes of confidence and the very importance of unity for governing would lead to an assumption of greater unity (see also Carey 2009). However, against that the need to make unpopular decisions can affect levels of party unity. On the whole, Sieberer (2006: 169) finds that incumbency is associated with less voting unity: ‘the need to take a position on divisive issues and possibly voting for tough compromises with coalition partners should be considered as important strains on party unity in legislative voting.’ In Tavits’ (2012b) study, on the other hand, governing parties are found to be more unified, although the statistical significance of the coefficients associated with incumbency is inconsistent across her models.

Third, and of central interest in this chapter, Tavits has made important findings relating to the extensiveness (or ‘strength’) of a party's organization, delving deeper into party organizations for her data than most other cross-national studies. Her argument is that the stronger and more extensive a party's organization on the ground, the greater is its electoral value to an MP: ‘the stronger the party organization, the more valuable the party is to the

legislator, and the more credible and effective its threat to withdraw electoral benefits if a legislator undermines party unity' (Tavits 2012b: 410). This is supported across three alternative indicators of party strength: membership, the coverage of local branches and the extensiveness of the party's competition in local elections, though she does warn that the generalizability of her results is limited, given her focus on four countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia). Further, the time periods within those countries (beginning in 1994 at the earliest and ending at the latest in 2010) may reflect quite different dynamics to more established democracies as those party systems and their constituent parties became increasingly institutionalized.

Fourth, there is some—albeit limited—evidence that the financial resources available to a party can matter. Tavits (2012b: 423–6) finds a small, marginally significant effect on levels of party unity relating to the size of a party's budget. Her analysis also includes candidate selection mechanisms as a feature, although she finds no relationship between this and party unity (Tavits 2012b: 424). This is at odds with research in Israel that shows how more 'inclusive' candidate selection processes can have significant effects on party unity within the Knesset (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008).

Single-country research, too, points to a number of party attributes that influence party unity: party control of political finance, leadership control of candidate selection and other sanctions, and the division of labour within parties, as well as (and in conjunction with) national-level electoral and parliamentary institutions that influence unity (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011; Field 2013: 366–77).

The common reliance on system-level proxies and the contradictory findings associated with many of these relationships mean that we still know relatively little about the effects of party attributes—especially party organizational attributes—on voting unity. The Political Party Database (PPDB) presents an opportunity to develop these efforts further. In this chapter we use variables from the PPDB to investigate whether party organizational strength, disciplinary mechanisms and the internal distribution of organizational resources affect party cohesion. We start by outlining some problems and possible approaches to these questions.

EXPLAINING VOTING UNITY

Party unity is influenced by cohesiveness (similar preferences) and discipline (rewards and punishment).³ This chapter focuses on MPs' positive incentives to cleave to the party line and the threat of punishment for not so doing. In this respect, we follow in the predominant rational-institutionalist tradition of party

voting unity research (Sieberer 2006; Russell 2014). We do not claim to provide a full account of MPs' voting behaviour, but rather we seek to examine the role of a specific set of factors, with our principal focus on formal, party-level factors.⁴ In this section we set out a number of general and potentially complementary hypotheses that are each associated with several indicators.

Party Strength as an Incentive for Voting Unity

Tavits reasons—and indeed shows—that the greater a party's organizational strength, the greater an electoral asset it is to its MPs, and the more that they will aim to avoid losing that asset (Tavits 2012a, 2012b; also Dudzinska et al. 2014: 34).⁵ Therefore, following Tavits, we hypothesize the following:

H1: The greater is party strength, the greater is party unity.

According to this account, a strong party organization is extensive and active beyond public office. A large party membership, for instance, indicates the number of strong party supporters and is a source of campaign resources, both of which can contribute to getting MPs re-elected. Just how party organizational strength may be measured and how broad the concept is, however, remains a matter to be discussed. Tavits (2012a: 84, 2012b: 412) acknowledges that party organizational strength has been conceptualized in a number of ways and, building on a plurality of existing literature, she opts for a definition that focuses on the 'extensiveness and reach' of party organization.

Party strength, in a form that can be an electoral asset for MPs, may come in other forms. They include the party's monetary resources, which are arguably more important now than heretofore (not least in this modern-day 'capital-intensive' campaign age; Farrell and Webb 2000; see also Chapter 2 by Webb and Keith in this volume). While Tavits (2012b: 424) excludes financial resources from her measure of party strength, arguing that it 'stretches' the concept, she includes it in her analysis and acknowledges that 'the organizational strength of parties may simply reflect their financial situation'. Empirically, she finds that it has an independent causal role in determining voting unity, distinct from her measures of organizational extensiveness.

Party size and the resources with which this is associated within and beyond parliament may also be an asset. Larger parties are more likely to be able to support MPs in marginal seats: the rewards for loyalty can thus be greater. They can provide loyal legislators with safer positions on party lists or safe seats in single-member districts. Of course, party size may influence voting unity in other ways (for instance as an indicator of preference heterogeneity). Accordingly, findings concerning party size are mixed, although some recent cross-national studies indicate that larger party size is associated with higher levels of unity (Sieberer 2006; Tavits 2012b).

Another set of resources available to some parties is the gift of appointments to higher office (Martin 2014). Government parties, in particular, have access to these resources, such as the capacity to appoint ministers, and to patronage resources more generally. They may also have more power to shape the parliamentary agenda. However, as with party size, government membership is not only an indicator of greater resources; it may also raise the stakes of voting unity for the party (notably government survival), leading to greater efforts to mobilize and discipline MPs.

Party Discipline

A strong party organization is not sufficient for voting unity: MPs may be pulled in conflicting directions, on the one hand wanting to make use of the resources offered by their party organization, while on the other wanting to stand on their personal reputation (which may be built on individualistic voting behaviour; Tavits 2012b: 413–14). While Tavits focuses on how the prospective *consequences* of sanctions vary with party organizational strength, she also mentions the *means* by which those sanctions can be applied—via candidate selection mechanisms and, potentially, through expulsion from the party. Control over these mechanisms makes the party leadership's threat to withdraw electoral and other benefits from MPs credible, which leads to the following expectation:

H2: The greater the threat of disciplinary sanctions, the greater is party unity.

Previous studies have placed considerable emphasis on the centralization of candidate selection mechanisms as a disciplinary mechanism, but have come to different findings: Depauw and Martin (2009; also Sieberer 2006) find that it has a strong effect, while Tavits (2012b: 419) finds no significant effects.

MP Strength

MPs are not passive recipients of party benefits (provided by strong parties) and party discipline (administered by parties with the means to do so). Their resources as individual MPs—like parties' resources—matter too, as they can use them to develop their own personal reputation, to initiate rebellions, and to sustain their careers, in some cases on the margins of their parliamentary party. These resources can help MPs to develop their own policy positions independent of the party, which over time may lead to conflict and dissenting votes. Ultimately, MPs' resources and other institutions may contribute to the feasibility (or otherwise) of political life outside the parliamentary party. Thus:

H3: The greater the resources available to individual MPs, the lower is party unity.

Sieberer (2006), too, expects that MPs' resources will be negatively correlated with party unity. He examines MPs' strength in the form of policy-relevant resources (the strength of parliamentary committees, based on their right to rewrite bills and right to compel witnesses), as well as other resources (financial and staff resources, procedural privileges, and the right to initiate bills), but neither are associated with statistically significant differences in voting unity.

PARTY UNITY AND RICE MEASURES

Our primary focus is on party voting unity in parliament, an over-arching indicator of the extent to which parliamentarians work together within a party. A parliamentary vote is arguably 'the ultimate test for the ability of a parliamentary party to act in unison' (Sieberer 2006: 158). While disunity in parliament does not capture all or even most forms of conflict within a parliamentary party (Field 2013), votes in parliament do reflect significant actions carried out by MPs on a regular basis.

The Rice index measures party unity using data on those voting yes and no ($|\%Yes - \%No|$). The dependent variable is calculated for parties over periods of a year or more. Many of the recent studies of voting unity have used the original Rice index, albeit acknowledging its limitations (e.g., Sieberer 2006; Depauw and Martin 2009). These limitations include its systematic overestimation of small parties' voting unity (Desposato 2005) and its failure to take into account non-votes and abstentions (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005). They also include—in common with alternative measures of voting unity—the Rice measure's reliance on roll-call votes. The circumstances in which roll-call votes are used vary between systems and in some prominent instances they are unlikely to be representative of the wider population of votes (Saalfeld 1995; Carrubba et al. 2006). They may, for example, be used strategically to embarrass divided parties; they may or may not include free votes, which would be associated with lower levels of voting unity; or they may be used to discipline a party and therefore may be associated with higher voting unity. Further, the frequency with which they are used also varies widely (see Table 12.1). Where they are very frequent, they are more likely to be on relatively trivial issues and therefore are more likely to be associated with unified voting behaviour.

Some of these shortcomings can be at least partially addressed in the construction of the dependent variable. The impact of more trivial votes on a party's value can be limited by weighting close votes more heavily than unanimous votes (Carey 2007). Desposato's (2005) observation concerning

TABLE 12.1 *Cases and data*

Country	Roll-call vote data	No. of votes	PPDB data (Core module)	No. of parties	Adj. weighted Ricescore		
					Min.	Med.	Max.
Austria	Oct. 2008—Apr. 2011	63	2013	5	98.8	99.5	99.9
Belgium	July 1999—July 2000	454	2011	9	99.5	99.7	99.8
Denmark	June 2006—June 2007	427	2011	7	98.9	99.6	99.7
France	Jan. 2009—Dec. 2009	394	2012	2	95.8	96.8	97.7
Germany	Dec. 2009—June 2013	234	2011	5	96.6	98.4	99.0
Hungary	Jan. 2008—Dec. 2008	2496	2011	2	95.8	97.5	99.2
Ireland	June 2007—Jan. 2011	612	2012	5	99.9	100.0	100.0
Italy	Jan. 2009—Dec. 2009	2906	2011	5	93.6	99.3	99.5
Netherlands	Dec. 2006—Mar. 2009	20	2011	10	95.4	100.0	100.0
Poland	Jan. 2009—Dec. 2009	1922	2012	4	93.1	96.7	97.9
Sweden	Sep. 2007—Aug. 2008	532	2011	7	97.5	100.0	100.0
UK	Jan. 2007—Dec. 2007	238	2011	5	93.6	97.5	98.2

* Throughout the chapter Rice index values are multiplied by 100.

the systematic over-estimation of small parties' unity values can be addressed by adjusting their scores according to the method proposed by Carey (2009). We both weight and adjust the Rice measure to derive an Adjusted Weighted Rice score for each party. We aim to control for other issues (such as the frequency of roll-call votes) in the multivariate analysis. However, we do not take account of non-voting or absences. They have uncertain significance: absences may indicate dissent, but they may also be authorized by the party (Field 2013); their exclusion simply acknowledges the fact that they are not accounted for by existing measures of voting unity (Tavits 2012b).

CASE SELECTION AND DATA

We examine parties' voting unity in twelve parliamentary democracies. Focusing on parliamentary democracies limits the diversity of the institutional contexts in which these parties operate. These systems are also similar in their relative stability, and this stability may be necessary for identifying party organizational effects on voting unity (Sieberer 2006: 159). In other respects, however, these systems provide diverse contexts in which to examine the effects of party attributes on voting unity: they include Westminster (Ireland, UK), continental (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands), Scandinavian (Denmark, Sweden), Southern European (Italy), and

Central European (Hungary, Poland) systems; a mix of established and new democracies; and a couple of semi-presidential systems (France, Poland). In this minimal respect they are more likely than more homogenous sets of countries to be representative of a wider selection of parliamentary democracies (Seawright and Gerring 2008), although we do not include some systems in which particularly low voting unity has been noted (e.g., New Zealand and Finland in the early and mid-1990s; see Sieberer 2006; Depauw and Martin 2009) due to data availability. Further, as the data refer to different time points, some parties do not appear in both data sets and therefore are not included in our analyses. This may bias the selection against those parties that were disintegrating while their roll-call data was being recorded (e.g., Volksunie in Belgium (Fitzmaurice 2004: 149)), perhaps providing a picture that is more stable and unified than was the case on average.

Our country selection is influenced by the availability of relatively recent parliamentary voting data for countries that are included in the PPDB. Emanuel Coman provided voting data for eleven of these countries (Coman 2015a, 2015b). These data include party- (and in many cases parliamentarian-) level data on parliamentary votes that occurred either over the course of a year or over the course of a parliamentary term. In addition, Lars Mäder (2015) provided data for the 17th (2009–13) German *Bundestag*, scraped from its website.

Excluding parties with only one MP, 66 parties appear in both the PPDB and the available roll-call data. In most cases, the dependent variable precedes the party organizational independent variables from the PPDB. To minimize the time between the two measures, we select PPDB data for the earliest year available. Nonetheless, roll call data for the median observation (party) begins in June 2007 and ends in March 2009, while most observations have PPDB data for 2011. This means that the inferences to be made here are necessarily descriptive and exploratory. However, we know from the Katz and Mair (1992) analysis of party organizational change that parties are typically slow to change, so if we assume this to be the case, then the same relationships would hold where party organization data are available for earlier years. Moreover, there is little reason to suspect that the causal relationship runs in the opposite direction, from voting unity to party rules or resources.⁶ Finally, several variables included in the analysis are drawn from other sources and reflect the correct time-order in relation the dependent variable.

Voting unity is high in these parties, on average (see Table 12.1).⁷ Fifteen parties in three countries display perfect voting unity. These include four of the five Irish parties, eight of the ten Dutch parties and three of the seven Swedish parties. The mean Adjusted Weighted Rice score is 98.7 (std. dev. = 1.8). The least unified parties in the data set include Poland's Democratic Left Alliance (93.1), the Italian UDC (93.6), and the Conservatives and the

Labour Party in the UK (93.6 and 94.6, respectively). The distribution of scores displays a strong negative skew and there is considerable variation in voting unity by country, which is statistically significant in a one-way ANOVA test ($F = 5.2$, $p < 0.001$). However, party unity clearly varies by party, not only by country, inviting party-level explanations. In Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK, the range of voting unity scores is particularly large. The case of the Dutch Labour Party (95.8) stands out as a relatively fractious party in a system that displayed high (indeed, frequently perfect) levels of party voting unity during the late 2000s.

To develop the analysis of the relationship between party strength, party disciplinary mechanisms, and MP strength, we select variables that correspond to each of the hypotheses. Many of these are measured at the level of individual parties, but some refer to system-level rules that provide additional information on the relationships between parties and their MPs.

We use a number of indicators of *party strength*. First, we use the Party Strength Index (PSI) developed by Webb and Keith (Chapter 2). The PSI draws on party membership and party income data in the PPDB, bringing together two party resources that Tavits's (2012b) study found were associated with higher party voting unity. However, it also reflects quite a different conceptualization of party strength than that suggested by Tavits. The PSI is an additive index created from the income per registered elector and the members per hundred registered electors (M/E), each of which is standardized before being combined (see Chapter 2 for details). For the cases examined here, PSI values range from the relative weakness of Plaid Cymru in the UK to the exceptional strength of the two main Austrian parties.

We also use size in parliament (the lower house) and incumbency as indicators of party strength in the legislative and governmental arenas, drawing on the *ParlGov* database (Döring and Manow 2015). There is a wide range of party seat shares (from 0.5 per cent to 55 per cent), albeit with most parties holding less than a 12 per cent seat share. More than four in ten of the parties were in government.

The party's capacity to *discipline* its MPs is indicated by two variables. First, using information from the PPDB on candidate selection, we construct a binary variable that indicates whether or not the national party organization has a role in candidate selection. Where it does not (in approximately a quarter of cases), we can assume that it is lacking an important ex post mechanism for disciplining its MPs, as well as an ex ante mechanism for selecting a more cohesive or compliant set of MPs. Secondly, we take into account the parliamentary party group leader's membership ex officio on the party's national executive committee, which indicates a fusion of parliamentary and national leadership that may lay the basis for more unity of purpose within the leadership and coordinated action against dissenting MPs.⁸

TABLE 12.2 *Descriptive statistics*

Variable	Level ^a	N	Min.	Median	Mean	Std. dev.	Max.
Party voting unity: <i>adjusted weighted Rice index * 100</i>	P	66	93.1	99.5	98.7	1.8	100
Party strength							
Party size: % seats, lower house	P	66	0.5	11.8	17.5	14.8	55
In government (=1)	P	66	0	0	0.42	0.5	1
Party Strength Index (<i>membership and finances</i>)	P	64	-1.4	-0.4	0.16	2.0	12.27
Party discipline							
Candidate selection: <i>national party organization has a role (=1)</i>	P	62	0	1	0.76	0.43	1
Leadership: <i>PPG leader is ex officio on national executive (=1)</i>	P	65	0	0	0.49	0.5	1
Expulsion rules: <i>can expel members for political reasons (=1)</i>	P	65	0	1	0.92	0.27	1
MP strength							
Party group threshold: <i>threshold for recognition of legislative party groups, % lower house seats</i>	S	66	0.16	2.4	2.19	1.6	5.1
MP subsidy: <i>MPs receive a subsidy (=1)</i>	S	66	0	0	0.26	0.44	1
MP staff: <i>average number of full-time equivalent staff per MP (ordinal)</i>	P ^b	66	0	Mode = 1–3		NA	≥4
Control variables							
Roll call votes: <i>mean number of roll call votes per month</i>	S	64	0.74	35.6	55.2	80.1	264.8
Government size: <i>% seats held by government parties, lower house</i>	S	66	39.1	53.3	53.2	6.2	62.7
Cohesion: <i>internal dissent on EU issues (0–10)</i>	P	66	0.56	1.95	2.39	1.4	6.7
Electoral system: <i>degree of candidate-orientation</i>	S	66	1.4	2.9	4.37	2.4	10

^a Measurement level: System (S) or Party (P); ^b for the countries covered here, this variable varies between parties only in Sweden.

MP strength is measured through variables that, for the most part, vary at the system level. We assume that MPs who receive a state subsidy directly (which occurs in 26 per cent of the cases here) are ‘stronger’ in relation to their party and, more specifically, are better equipped to bear the consequences of dissenting from the party’s line in parliament. We also measure MPs’ strength as the number of staff that they have available to them. The average number of full-time staff per MP varies from zero (in the Netherlands and in some

Swedish parties) to more than four (in Germany, Denmark, Italy, Poland, and some Swedish parties).⁹ The modal category, covering twenty-eight parties, is between one and three staff per MP. Finally, we assume that an MP's position with regard to their party is strengthened if the barriers to establishing a new parliamentary group with full rights are lower. We code this variable from the text entries in two PPDB variables, deducing the percentage of MPs required to gain full rights in parliament. This threshold varies from a single MP to over 5 per cent of the seats.¹⁰

In aiming to isolate the effects of party resources, party discipline and MP strength, there are a number of other factors that need to be taken into account. The first concerns *ideological diversity* within parties, which may directly influence voting unity. We use an indicator from the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* on the 'degree of dissent on European integration' within the party at a time point prior to the period in which the roll-call votes were recorded.¹¹ While this is clearly a partial view of cohesion, it does provide some control for this potentially important factor.

At the system level, several researchers have suggested that larger *government majorities* ought to be associated with lower voting unity, as the stakes of dissenting voting behaviour become higher as the margin narrows. Tavits (2012b: 424) finds a large and significant effect, yet Sieberer (2006) does not find support for this hypothesis.¹² We measure the *candidate-orientation of the electoral system* using Farrell and McAllister's (2006) index of candidate-orientation.¹³ This is a factor that operates through altering the balance of power between the party's leadership and its candidates and, thus, incentives for MP voting behaviour (Carey 2007).¹⁴ Also at the system level, we control for the *frequency of roll-call votes*, in this case each month (see also Tavits 2012b; Coman 2015b).

ANALYSIS

A preliminary analysis of voting unity by party family shows some inter-family variation, including some differences that are significant at the 0.1 level between the Social Democrats and both the Liberals and the Left Socialists (Figure 12.1). In particular, the lower mean voting unity of parties that are typically larger and located near the centre of the political spectrum is notable, although these differences between party families are not statistically significant in a one-way ANOVA test ($F = 1.68$, $p = 0.15$). They are nonetheless surprising in some respects, as we might expect mainstream Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties to be organizationally strong and to be relatively conventional—and therefore effective—in their disciplinary structures. On the




FIGURE 12.1 Mean voting unity (adjusted weighted Rice scores) by party family with 90% confidence intervals

other hand, the more clearly defined ideologies of the smaller party families may provide a focal point for cohesion that underlies higher voting unity, while managing fewer MPs may be an easier task for party leaderships.

A series of bivariate regressions (see Appendix Table A12.1) shows that the coefficients of four of the seven variables tested (the Party Strength Index, government membership, the parliamentary party group leader being on the national executive, and the level of the threshold for party group recognition) have the expected sign. While they are not statistically significant, this nonetheless provides some preliminary support for each of the three hypotheses, taking into account the small sample size. One result is statistically significant at the conventional 0.05 level and it runs counter to prior expectations: greater seat share is associated with marginally *less* voting unity (coeff. = -0.03). Another is significant at the 0.1 level: parties in systems in which MPs receive subsidies are more unified, on average (coeff. = 0.89). Finally, parties in which the national party organization plays a role in candidate selection are marginally less unified than those in which it does not, although the coefficient is very small (-0.06).

The main analysis takes the form of a series of multivariate OLS regressions. Model 1 includes four control variables. Given the heavily skewed nature of the frequency of the roll-call votes variable and its marginal theoretical significance, we use its natural log in these analyses. This first model, which has an adjusted R^2 value of 0.18, provides a baseline against which subsequent models can be

TABLE 12.3 *Multivariate models*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate
	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
(Intercept)	101.84***	101.82***	101.92***	102.22***	102.03***	102.44***	106.31***
	(2.29)	(2.22)	(2.27)	(2.28)	(2.42)	(2.40)	(3.09)
Ln (Roll call votes)	-0.31**	-0.30**	-0.25*	-0.15	-0.14	-0.13	0.08
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Government size	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Cohesion	-0.50***	-0.40***	-0.40***	-0.43***	-0.44***	-0.40**	-0.44***
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)
Electoral system	0.00	0.03	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Party strength							
Party size		-0.03	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.03*	-0.03**	-0.03**
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
In government		1.05**	0.92**	0.71*	0.69	0.74*	0.65*
		(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.37)
Party Strength Index			0.20*	0.20*	0.20*	0.18*	0.18**
			(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Party discipline							
Candidate selection				0.04	0.06	0.39	0.41
				(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.52)	(0.44)
Leadership					0.11	0.35	0.48
					(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.42)
MP strength							
Party group threshold						0.23	0.62***
						(0.14)	(0.14)
MP subsidy							3.15***
							(0.87)
MP staff (0 staff)							-2.32**
							(0.99)
MP staff (≥ 4 staff)							-2.04***
							(0.60)
N	66	66	64	61	61	61	61
RMSE	1.61	1.54	1.54	1.44	1.45	1.43	1.19
R ²	0.22	0.30	0.33	0.35	0.35	0.39	0.60
Adj. R ²	0.17	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.49

*p ≤0.1; **p ≤0.05; ***p ≤0.01. The reference category for ‘MP staff’ is 1–3 staff per MP.

compared. Models 2 and 3 include variables associated with party strength. The former includes variables that have been tested in previous studies: seat share and incumbency. Models 3 to 7 involve the addition of variables derived from the PPDB. The Party Strength Index is added to Model 3. Models 4 and 5 address H2 by including, respectively, a variable indicating whether the

national party has a role in candidate selection and whether the parliamentary party group leader sits, *ex officio*, on the party executive. Finally, Models 6 and 7 incorporate variables related to MPs' individual strength. Model 6 includes an institutional variable—the threshold that party groups need to meet in order to be recognized in parliament—and Model 7 includes two variables that indicate the nature and extent of resources available to individual MPs.

It seems clear that some of the variables derived from the PPDB add considerable explanatory power to the models, although their impact is very uneven. The introduction of the Party Strength Index is associated with a marginal increase of approximately 0.02 in the adjusted R^2 value. The 'party discipline' variables appear to contribute little. The 'feasibility threshold' variable adds a little again, while the variables relating to MPs' resources are associated with a doubling of the adjusted R^2 in the final model.

H1 finds some support across the models. Incumbency is associated with a relatively large and positive coefficient across models and in all but one model it is significant at the 0.1 or 0.05 levels.¹⁵ Likewise, organizationally stronger parties (measured by the Party Strength Index) are associated with greater voting unity. The coefficients associated with the Party Strength Index are significant at the 0.1 level and at 0.05 in the final model. At the same time, party seat share has, if anything, the opposite effect to that expected: greater seat share is consistently associated with less voting unity.

H2, concerning the effect of mechanisms for party discipline on voting unity, is not supported by the models shown here, although each of the variables related to it is associated with positive (if non-significant) coefficients. Nor do the coefficients associated with the candidate-orientation of the electoral system—a control variable that could be associated with parties having stronger disciplinary powers—add support to this hypothesis.

The coefficients associated with H3 are particularly notable given their size and the extent to which they add to the variance explained. In substantive terms, they provide considerable, if not full support for H3. On the one hand, at the system level, the higher the threshold for the recognition of parliamentary groups, the greater is voting unity, as expected. This becomes statistically significant in Model 7. On the other hand, parties whose MPs are in receipt of a subsidy are considerably more unified (more than three points on the Adjusted Weighted Rice scale).¹⁶

The results in relation to MPs' staff resources provide considerable support for H3. As expected, parties whose MPs have several staff members (≥ 4 staff) are less unified than parties whose MPs have fewer staff (1–3 staff). However, parties whose MPs have zero staff are also less unified than parties whose MPs have few staff (1–3 staff). This latter result, which does not support H3, should however be treated with circumspection: only in the Netherlands and in some Swedish parties do MPs have zero staff, on average, and therefore the result may reflect other country-specific idiosyncrasies. If Model 7 is run using a

dichotomous variable (0–3 staff compared to ≥ 4 staff), the hypothesis is supported (coeff. = 1.3; $p=0.02$; model not shown).

Among the control variables included in each model, the control for cohesion (dissent on EU issues) is consistently associated with negative, sizeable, and statistically significant coefficients, as expected. The expected negative effect of a higher frequency of roll-call votes becomes insignificant as variables are added to the model. A larger government majority is consistently associated with small, negative coefficients and this becomes larger and statistically significant when MP resources are accounted for. Surprisingly, the extent to which the electoral system is candidate-orientated is not significant and the associated coefficients are very small.

Although the small number of observations presents some problems, the main results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. The results of Models 3, 6, and 7 (selected due to their significance for the results and interpretation) remain similar when run with robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity, although the effect of the Party Strength Index in the third and sixth model becomes non-significant and government membership becomes non-significant in the final model. We also re-ran these three models using robust regression with bi-square weighting to account for influential observations, which were revealed in diagnostic tests; again, they returned substantively similar results. Finally, these models were run without Belgian data, given the particularly large lag between the Belgian roll-call data and the PPDB data (see Table 12.1); these remain similar, but the party strength variables each become non-significant in Model 6 and government membership becomes non-significant in Model 7.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The PPDB dataset adds a considerable amount to the analysis of party voting unity. It has allowed us to examine the effects of variables that have not been examined heretofore, and in particular has enabled an examination at a party level of some variables that until now have only been measured at system level. While not all are associated with significant effects on party voting unity, this chapter has nonetheless demonstrated the potential importance of party organizational data to the study of party voting unity and has shed some light on the effects of party organization on this important outcome.

Clearly, voting unity is limited as an indicator of intra-party conflict. Unity (and disunity) may be apparent from party-switching (O'Brien and Shomer 2013) and splits, leadership challenges and other public conflicts. Voting is

only one aspect of unity and unified voting can go side-by-side with disunity in other respects (Field 2013: 361). To take one example, Fianna Fáil, the main governing party in Ireland in the period 2007–11, maintained a voting unity record of 1.0. Nonetheless, during this period, Fianna Fáil suffered multiple defections, internal conflicts and, towards the end of the period, two public leadership challenges. At the same time, Fine Gael (also credited with perfect voting unity) underwent major internal conflict, including a public leadership challenge. An important exercise for the future would be to develop better measures of the dependent variable: voting unity scores can only provide a partial picture.

Much of the analysis in this chapter has sought to add to Tavits's important work on the impact of party organizational strength on party outcomes. But it remains an open question how to measure the influence of party strength on MPs' incentives to act in a unified manner with their parties. Taking a different tack to Tavits we have found some limited evidence that supports the idea that party strength (measured as an index of membership and financial strength) is associated with greater voting unity. Using the organizational data available in the PPDB, this concept may be developed further and perhaps differentiated depending on the arena (electoral, legislative, governmental, internal) in which its effects are being examined. The PPDB data offer an opportunity to do this, although the relevant aspects of party strength will necessarily differ depending on the outcome in question.

Undoubtedly, this chapter has opened up some questions. One of these relates to the behaviour of MPs in receipt of a public subsidy. Contrary to our expectations, they do not use their capacity as individual actors to deviate from their party; their parties are positively more unified than the parties of MPs not in receipt of a subsidy.

The chapter has also highlighted themes that we were unable to explore with the data available to us. One of these relates to measures of aspects of party discipline that are associated with MPs' voting behaviour, either through their operation, or the threat that they may be used. The suggestion that internal democracy is good for voting unity, perhaps grounded in the literature on social psychological explanations, might also be pursued empirically using PPDB data (Panebianco 1988; Maor 1998; Russell 2014). Another is MPs' ideas concerning their own roles and that of party ideology. Both the observed variation by party family and the coefficients associated with prior dissent on EU issues suggest that ideology plays an important role in binding these parties together. We can continue to expect that structures and resources—two of the dimensions highlighted in Chapter 1 and explored in this chapter—will play an important role in legislators' behaviour, and that their investigation will be facilitated by the accumulation of data in the PPDB over time, but this will need to be complemented by other data on MPs and on their parties.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A 12.1 *Bivariate regressions with adjusted weighted Rice scores*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
	Est.	Est.	Est.	Est.	Est.	Est.	Est.
	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
<i>(Intercept)</i>	98.6***	99.3***	98.4***	98.8***	98.6***	98.4***	98.2***
	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.43)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.36)
<i>Party strength</i>							
Party Strength Index	0.13
	(0.11)						
Party size	.	−0.03**
		(0.01)					
In government	.	.	0.7
			(0.43)				
<i>Discipline</i>							
Candidate selection	.	.	.	−0.06	.	.	.
				(0.5)			
Leadership	0.16	.	.
					(0.44)		
<i>MP strength</i>							
MP subsidy	0.89*	.
						(0.49)	
Party group threshold	0.2
							(0.13)
N	64	66	66	62	65	66	66
RMSE	1.77	1.7	1.74	1.67	1.78	1.73	1.74
R ²	0.02	0.08	0.04	0	0	0.05	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.07	0.02	−0.02	−0.01	0.03	0.02

*p =0.1; **p =0.05; ***p =0.01; see Table 12.2 for details of the variables used here.
Note: We ran an *ANOVA* test to examine differences between the categories in the ‘MP staff’ variable and party voting unity. While the differences in mean unity values accorded with expectations, they were not statistically significant (*p* = 0.3).

NOTES

1. The only exceptions to this rule are micro-states like Tuvalu or the Isle of Man that can manage their affairs in a more informal manner (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011).

2. One other institutional feature that Carey (2007, 2009) draws attention to is the distinction between unitary and federal systems, the latter dissipating national party leadership control over their troops.
3. Arguably there are other factors (not considered here) that can also have an impact on party unity, such as agenda control and MPs' socialization (see Hazan 2003; Carey 2007; Kam 2009).
4. One angle we don't pursue in this chapter is the 'sequential approach' most closely associated with Andeweg and Thomassen (2011), and recently applied using PARTIREP data by van Vonna et al. (2014). Our party-centred approach ruled out the use of the PARTIREP data due to the relatively small number of responses per party, on average.
5. On the other hand, Depauw and Martin (2009: 111) find that party membership—specifically the proportion of party voters who claim to be party members—is associated with reduced party unity in a bivariate analysis. However, they note the strong relationship in one country (Finland) and this effect does not remain significant after country dummies have been included.
6. We thank the editors for this observation.
7. In measuring the Rice Score, we exclude votes in which only one member of the party voted yes or no (Carey 2007).
8. A third variable relating to discipline, indicating the party's capacity to expel members for political reasons is included in Table 12.2 for descriptive purposes, but is left out of the other analyses in the chapter due to the lack of variation among the parties in question (92 per cent can expel members for political reasons).
9. This variable is recoded from the PPDB data. This involves merging the top two categories (4–8 staff and >8 staff per MP, which represent five parties and nineteen parties, respectively, in our sample). We merge these categories because the former category is so sparsely populated and only by German parties.
10. In the German data, parliamentary votes by CDU and CSU deputies are recorded as 'CDU/CSU'. We have aggregated the two parties' values for seat share and for the components of the party strength index to capture their joint strength. The parties differ in their rules concerning the leader's position on the executive; in this instance, we have simply used the larger party's rule.
11. The only exception in this regard is Belgium: in this instance, the cohesion data are drawn from the first year for which roll-call data are available (1999).
12. In the case of Hungary, the roll-call data (January 2008—June 2008) covers a period of coalition government and, after the junior coalition partner left in April, single party government. We record the majority from the single-party period because this covers more of the period. In the Netherlands, the data do not take into account the last couple of months of the Balkenende III caretaker government.
13. The electoral systems are coded as follows: Austria, Ordered list, 2.9; Belgium, Ordered list, 2.9; Denmark, Open list, 7.1; Germany, MM with plurality, 3.6; Hungary, MM with runoff, 4.7; Ireland, STV, 10; Israel, Closed list, 1.4; Italy, Closed list, 1.4; Netherlands, Ordered list, 2.9; Norway, Ordered list, 2.9; Poland,

- Open list, 7.1; Portugal, Closed list, 1.4; Spain, Closed list, 1.4; Sweden, Ordered list, 2.9; UK, SMD, plurality, 4.3.
14. The significance of the electoral system might plausibly extend to encompass aspects of party discipline. However, the role of the party in candidate selection is partly accounted for by a separate variable that correlates very weakly with the candidate-orientation of the electoral system ($r = 0.02$, $p = 0.86$).
 15. Results that reach the 0.1 level of statistical significance are highlighted in Table 12.3 and are reported here due to the small number of observations.
 16. The Irish case may offer one possible explanation for the contrary finding relating to the public subsidy. The allocation of state funding of parliamentary parties is determined on the basis of the election result, so that in the event that a parliamentarian leaves or is expelled from the party the funding stays with the party rather than follow the parliamentarian. This is likely to be one of the factors behind the Irish parliament's particularly high voter unity scores (see Farrell et al. 2015).

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Conclusion

The Study of Party Organization

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INTRODUCTION

How do contemporary political parties organize, and why does it matter? Providing answers to these twin questions has been at the centre of the preceding chapters in this book. In this concluding chapter we briefly recap the findings of this volume, then move on to more general questions concerning the types of organizational patterns that researchers should expect to find, and the most fruitful approaches to trying to understand the origins and implications of those patterns.

Chapters in the first section tackled the first of our questions by presenting an overview of patterns of organization in eighteen parliamentary democracies and one semi-presidential one. These chapters investigated organizational practices in multiple areas, including the extent and nature of party resources, the role of members in party decision-making, and the relationship between political parties and organized social interests. They also weighed multiple explanations for the differences that emerged, taking advantage of the diversity of parties in the Political Party Database (PPDB) sample, which covers both long-established and recently-founded parties, and ones from countries with varied extents of experience with electoral politics.

One of the messages of these chapters, and particularly of Chapter 2, is the prominence of national-level patterns. While political scientists have a long history of generalizing about patterns of party organization based on ideology (party family) and era (developmental models), national-level factors seem to hold sway, at least when we constrict our universe to the ‘most similar cases’ of parliamentary democracies. This does not mean that we should give up on the cross-national study of political parties; it

does, however, suggest that political institutions and organizational imitation may be the strongest influences on parties' organizational development. Even so, the differences we find are not just the result of institutions. In terms of the structure/agency theme we raised in Chapter 1, it seems from these findings that there is generally too much variation for any structural model to be convincing. At best, structural imperatives may affect specific organizational features. For instance, the prevalence of state funding across most countries in our sample points to a phenomenon whose roots lie in a widely felt need—driven perhaps by the decline of party memberships, the expense of mass politics in a mass media age, and/or by the spread of increasingly stringent laws that discourage or prohibit large political donations.

More generally, the fact that we find a great deal of organizational variation in the first section of this book underscores the fact that party organizational differences are not primarily associated with party types. In this sense, and as we will show in more detail in this chapter, our cases do not easily conform to the contours of the grand theories of party organizational development. Yet we consider this to be more of an advantage than otherwise, because this type of variation enables us to test mid-range theories. As we hope that our chapters have demonstrated, there are plenty of interesting and relevant questions at this level which can be tackled with the help of appropriate data.

Chapters in the second section of this volume employed the variation displayed by the PPDB parties to model the impact of parties' organizational choices and organizational strengths (and weaknesses). Instead of assuming that party organizations matter, chapters in this section asked whether and how they matter. While our authors uncovered some 'null' findings, they also found widespread evidence of the varied effects of party organization. Among the findings:

- Parties' candidate selection rules and how they structure their internal organizations can affect the extent to which women gain representation on parties' candidate slates (Chapter 9).
- Party membership rules can affect what kinds of supporters enrol and participate in parties (Chapter 10).
- More inclusive manifesto-drafting processes tend to generate more stable party policy goals (Chapters 7 and 11).
- Parties with better resourced organizations tend to have more cohesive legislative delegations (Chapter 12).

Overall, the fundamental messages of the chapters in Part 2 is that even seemingly minor differences between party organizations can have important political consequences.

BROADENING THE STUDY OF PARTIES AS ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS

In the opening chapter of this volume we asserted our scepticism about our field's overuse of ideal type categories and other taxonomical devices, arguing that such labels are most useful if they are stated as clear and falsifiable hypotheses about expected clusters of organizational characteristics. Unfortunately, they are too often accepted as valid historical assessments, without regard for whether they bear much relationship to the reality of party organizational life. We argued that it would be more helpful to reframe ideal types in terms of organizational dimensions, in other words, of key attributes which are more or less evident, rather than in terms of discrete categories. Several of the preceding chapters have demonstrated the utility of this approach by making use of scale and index-based measures of organizational features such as the extent of intra-party democracy (both plebiscitary and assembly-based), the strength of leadership, or the costs of party membership.

In the next section, we attempt to provide more empirical support for our mildly heretical claim about the low research value of most of the traditional ideal type party models. Of course, ideal types are just that—they are not supposed to be a perfect fit for real world practices. No empirical test can invalidate such theoretical constructs. Moreover, we readily acknowledge the difficulty of discussing comparative party organization without invoking the shorthand of 'mass', 'cadre', and 'cartel' party types. These categories identify important aspects of party organizational differences, and they sometimes point to important sequences or patterns of party development (most famous among the early practitioners of this art were Duverger 1954; Neumann 1956; Kirchheimer 1966; and Epstein 1967; see Sartori 2005 for a critique and elaboration of some of the earliest categories). These terms are unavoidably embedded in party scholarship, and we have used and will use these terms ourselves. In any case—and to be fair to this body of literature—we should acknowledge that these classics often acknowledge the limitations of their ideal types. Kirchheimer (1966), for example, takes pains to point out that his ideal typical catch-all party would only fully develop under certain conditions which were not present in all Western democracies. However, these major contributions have all too often been used to generalize across the board about an alleged 'stage' of party development, using an evolutionary shorthand that papers over a slew of untested assumptions about the origins and stability of parties' organizational decisions, and about the relative importance of features which converge compared to those that do not. As a matter of fact, theorizing about party types has frequently been taken for empirical evidence concerning their real life existence.

Nevertheless, to the extent that the ideal types highlight actual constellations of party organization, at least some of these patterns should be evident in our data set (with the extent of expected correspondence depending in part on whether classic models are supposed to be specific to certain eras, or whether they are thought to co-exist). After all, our universe encompasses the established parliamentary democracies whose practices informed the categories defined and made famous by Duverger, Kirchheimer, and Katz and Mair. If their ideal types fit poorly here, they are unlikely to be more useful elsewhere. In fact, as we demonstrate in the next section it would be difficult to deduce any of these ideal types if we were starting from the organizational patterns of contemporary party organizations.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: HOW WELL DO THE PPDB PARTIES MATCH IDEAL TYPES?

In investigating the fit between ideal types and the PPDB parties, we adopt an intentionally minimalist approach, in that we make use of only a limited number of criteria by which to identify empirical examples of the four major ideal types of political parties specified by Katz and Mair (1995) in their seminal account of the cartel model. Their approach in itself overlooks a number of other ideal types that have been proposed over the years (most obviously, perhaps, Panebianco's electoral-professional model), although these generally share much in common with one or the other of Katz and Mair's quartet. Yet, we use this as our starting point because it provides an unusually clear summary of the organizational differences associated with different ideal types. Focusing on a limited number of their criteria should actually make it easier to link cases to data and if anything biases our analysis towards positive findings. So we are deliberately setting the bar quite low.

Table 13.1, adapted directly from Katz and Mair, sets out the major features of these models in terms of three key criteria: the principal source of party funding, intra-party relations between members and elites, and the 'character of membership'. While the PPDB does not carry information pertaining to all aspects of these criteria, it certainly includes a number of pertinent data, especially with regard to party funding and membership-elite relations. Thus, by referencing a few simple criteria we can provide a basic assessment of the empirical prevalence of the clusters of characteristics associated with ideal types. To reiterate, this should be regarded as a low threshold for each ideal type to pass, in that we are not attempting to relate individual parties to the whole range of factors set out by Katz and Mair (or indeed, any of the original progenitors of the various ideal types), but only to a few that are most

TABLE 13.1 *Four political party ideal types*

	Elite	Mass	Catch-all	Cartel
1. Principal source of party's resources	Personal contacts	Members' fees and contributions	Contributions from a wide variety of sources	State subventions
2. Relations between ordinary members and party elite	The 'elite' are the ordinary members	Bottom up (<i>pace</i> Michels); elite accountable to members	Top down; members are organized cheerleaders for elite	Stratarchy; mutual autonomy
3. Character of membership	Small and elitist	Large and homogenous; actively recruited and encapsulated; membership a logical consequence of identity; emphasis on rights and obligations	Membership open to all (heterogeneous) and encouraged; rights emphasized but not obligations; membership marginal to individual's identity	Neither rights nor obligations important (distinction between members and non-members blurred); emphasis on members as individuals rather than organized body; members valued for contribution to legitimizing myth

Source: Adapted from Katz and Mair 1995: 18.

pertinent to parties' organizational characteristics, and that also are most appropriately assessed with the available PPDB data.

Table 13.2 reports the cases in the PPDB dataset that conform broadly with one or other of the ideal types. It does so by reference to criteria from three areas of party organization: the sources of party funding, membership size and the nature of intra-party relations between members and leaders. Taking our cue from Katz and Mair's account of the various models, we designate cadre parties as those where: (1) more than half their funding comes from (usually high-value) donors rather than from members or the state; (2) where the number of members is low (defined as less than the mean membership/electorate ratio in the dataset); and (3) where the level of intra-party democracy is low. As von dem Berge and Poguntke have argued in Chapter 6, intra-party democracy is most often accomplished either through procedures based on deliberation and votes in assemblies (often in party conferences), or through direct balloting of party members. They refer to the first as assembly-based intra party democracy (AIPD) and the latter as plebiscitary intra-party democracy (PIPD). For the cadre party definition, we measure

TABLE 13.2 *Ideal type cases in the PPDB*

	Elite	Mass	Catch-all	Cartel
Criterion 1: Party finance	More than 50% of income from donors	Low state funding plus high membership funding (50%+)	Low state funding (<50%) plus low donor funding (<50%) plus low member funding (<50%)	High state funding (=>50%)
Criterion 2: Membership size	As above plus low membership/electorate ratio (defined as being below the mean of those in PPDB sample)	Not essential to minimal definition	Not essential to minimal definition	Not essential to minimal definition
Criterion 3: Intra-party governance	As above plus low AIPD (defined as below the PPDB mean)	As above plus high AIPD score (defined as above the PPDB mean)	As above plus high leader strength (i.e., above the PPDB mean)	As above plus high leader strength (i.e., above the PPDB mean) plus some elements of PIPD
Parties that fit ideal type	Liberal Alliance (Denmark) Palikot Party (Poland)	Conservatives (Canada) CDA (NL) D66 (NL) Labour Party (NL) GreenLeft (NL)	Federalists, Democrats, Francophone (Belgium) Green Party (Canada) Liberal Party (Canada) New Democratic Party (Canada) Christian Democratic Union (Czech Republic) CDU (Germany) Democratic Convergence Catalunya (Spain)	Reform Movement (Belgium) Democrat Humanist Centre (Belgium) Flemish Interest (Belgium) Socialist Party Alternative (Belgium) Socialist Party (Belgium) Bloc Québécois (Canada) Social Democrats (Denmark) Socialists Party (Hungary) Labour Party (Ireland) Democratic Party (Italy) Progress Party (Norway) Liberal Party (Norway) Socialist Party (Portugal) Social Democratic Party (Portugal) People's Party (Portugal) Socialist Party (Spain) Greens (Sweden)

level of intra-party democracy in terms of AIPD (with a low score defined by being below the mean AIPD score for the dataset).

In this and the examples that follow, some of our measures are relative to other parties within the database. This is admittedly arbitrary. For instance, it could be that a more precise effort in ideal type classifications would define 'low membership' and other cut-off points in terms of the experience of all parties in the twentieth century, or compared to when Duverger was writing. Yet because previous studies have not given clear rubrics for assigning membership in the classic ideal types, we lack good alternatives. Because the main point of this section is to argue for the limits of ideal type categories, rather than to provide the definitive categorization, we think that our measures are close enough to provide a useful picture of the extent to which parties do (and do not) cluster into these ideal type categories. Given that the cadre model is essentially a relic of the pre-democratic era it is no great surprise to find that this particular combination of features is exhibited by only two out of 92 PPDB cases for which we have the full range of relevant data: the Danish Liberal Alliance Party and the Palikot's Movement. Both of these are small and recent creations formed as breakways from larger and older parties. These constitute 2.2 per cent of the valid data.

The next major ideal type is the mass party, which we might expect to be a little more prevalent in so far as it is a creation of the democratic era, albeit one that many observers regard as long since eclipsed. Empirically, we operationalize this as an organization that depends on its members for resources—that is, a party that gets more than half its income from members and less than half from the state. Despite the word 'mass' in its name, according to the Katz and Mair definition, the actual number of members is perhaps not as central to the ideal type as is the role of the members in the party's decision-making processes, so in our view a Mass Party must score highly (i.e., above the PPDB mean) on the index of assembly-based intra-party democracy (AIPD). By this standard, we find just five cases out of 104 for which we have valid data in the PPDB (less than five per cent of the valid data): one Canadian party (the Conservatives) and four Dutch ones (the Christian Democratic Appeal, D66, the Labour Party, and the Green-Left). The era of the mass Party does indeed seem to be past.¹

Next we look for instances of Kirchheimer's catch-all party. In the first place, we define this as the type of organization that relies on varied sources of income, as per Table 13.1. Thus, we look for parties with diversified funding strategies, that do not get a majority of their funds from any of the three sources (members, donors or state) captured by our data. This gives us a pool of twenty-five parties. In setting up a minimal test, we assume that the number of members is not central to defining this organizational type, but member-leader relations are. The catch-all model encompasses far greater emphasis on leadership than in the mass party; it is a more top-down type. At the same

time, in cases where the catch-all organization has evolved from a mass party organization, it is unlikely that established membership rights have been removed. For this reason, we do not include low AIPD as an indicator of the catch-all model, because that might make our test unreasonably demanding. Instead, we seek to capture member-leader relations in a different way, by looking at the strength of the party leader: the key thing is that in catch-all parties leadership rights will be strong and extensive.

Based on these criteria, we operationalize the catch-all party as one where (1) the income is from a variety of sources, and (2) the score on the leadership strength index is above the PPDB mean. This leaves us with seven out of eighty-one valid cases (8.6 per cent of the valid data): Three from Canada (Greens, Liberals, and New Democrats), and one each from Germany (the Christian Democratic Union—Kirchheimer's paradigmatic case of the catch-all party), Belgium (Federalists, Democrats, Francophone), Spain (Democratic Convergence Catalunya) and the Czech Republic (Christian Democratic Union).²

Finally, we seek to identify examples of cartel parties. Given that this is chronologically the most recently identified of the models we expect that this cluster of characteristics should prove most prevalent among our data. On the other hand, the cartel model was silent about emerging groups of challenger parties like the Greens and right-wing populists, which obviously did not conform to any possible organizational trend among mainstream parties—at least not during the first phase of their organizational lives. This sets the cartel model apart from its predecessors which did not need to consider substantial numbers of newly founded parties. Even though this omission should reduce the 'goodness of fit' we still expect the cartel model to do better than its precursors, and it is indeed just about so. The most striking and widely discussed feature of the cartel type is its dependence on state funding, so empirically the first thing to look for is parties which earn a majority of their income in state subventions. Admittedly, Katz and Mair de-emphasized state funding in their re-statement of the cartel thesis (2009), but high state funding still features as one of the likely hallmarks of cartel parties. This criterion alone gives us an initial pool of sixty-nine parties, but of course we demand more of a cartel party than this. The cartel party thesis does not set out guidelines in terms of expected membership size, but it does set expectations about member-leader relations. As Table 13.1 implies, both of these intra-party strata will see their rights and powers increase, at the cost of mid-level elites. On the one hand, cartel parties are likely to devolve decision-making powers to party members. This points us towards the plebiscitary mode of decision-making in which the grassroots are entitled to take part in mass ballots. Thus, we make use of the PIPD index rather than the AIPD index in gauging the 'cartelness' of intra-party power. On the other hand, such changes are said to go hand in hand with increases in the strength of party

leaders. When we combine these criteria such that, at a minimum, a cartel party can be recognized as (1) getting a majority of its money from the state, and registering above average scores on both the (2) leadership and (3) PIPD indices, we are left with a total of nine parties (11.1 per cent of the 81 valid data cases): three Portuguese parties (Social Democrats, Socialists, and the People's Party); three Belgian parties (Reform Movement, Democrat Humanist Centre, Flemish Interest); and one each from Italy (Democratic Party), Spain (Socialist Workers' Party), and Ireland (Labour). It might be argued that, given the relatively low number of parties that register any score at all on the PIPD index, we should include any party with a PIPD score at all (plus a majority of its funding from subsidies and an above average leader strength score). If we do this, it increases the number of parties that fall into the cartel party category to seventeen (21 per cent of the valid data). To those mentioned already we can add the Belgian Socialist Party Alternative, and the Belgian Socialists, Bloc Québécois from Canada, the Danish Social Democrats, Hungarian Socialists, Norwegian Progress and Liberal parties, and the Swedish Greens.

Overall, then, even using quite minimal criteria, only some thirty-one cases fit into one or other of these ideal type categories—just 25.4 per cent of the 122 PPDB parties, or 38.3 per cent of the eighty-one PPDB parties for which there is no missing data on the relevant variables. Many other parties may have more than one feature of the ideal types, but none has even as many of the features as we have set out here—and to repeat, these may be regarded as quite minimal (and therefore relatively 'easy-to-achieve') definitions of the ideal types. While one may quibble about the best exact ways of measuring the ideal types empirically, it seems plain to us that not many actual parties conform very closely to these models. Moreover, where they do, we see evidence once again of national 'contagion' rather than of developmental eras driven by technologies or transnational social changes: the mass party survives to some extent in the Netherlands, the catch-all party clings on in Germany and Canada, and the cartel party is most in evidence in Portugal and Belgium.

DIMENSIONS RATHER THAN IDEAL TYPES?

Our aim here is not to reject these traditional categories altogether, let alone to replace them. Yet we do indeed argue that more attention should be paid to their appropriateness or limits as starting points for systematic empirical comparisons. For one thing, if many actual parties have attributes belonging to multiple ideal types, researchers are likely to disagree on how to classify individual parties, or on which aspects to focus when tracking changes. This

problem cannot be fixed merely by developing better categories or better measures. The fundamental problem may be that classification into a small number of categories obscures the diverse and often changing combinations of parties' organizational features—hence our suggestion in Chapter 1 that researchers should conceive of party organizations in terms of dimensions that may or may not co-vary, rather than assuming that there is a small number of syndromes of organizational symptoms.

In Chapter 1 we introduced three dimensions which arguably provide a useful alternative framework for a comparative study of party organization: structures, resources and representative strategies. We divided each of these into a few additional sub-categories. In most cases the sub-dimensions reflect relationships which the ideal type categories highlight, such as degree of dependence on the state ('state autonomy-dependence'). To be clear, the dimensions we propose do not radically depart from the terrain covered by the ideal type arguments; on the contrary, they seek to distil a rich tradition of theorizing and empirical research about parties' organizational differences. Our dimensional approach differs primarily in that we do not make assumptions about how these dimensions align with each other, or about how strength in various areas affects political practices and outcomes; we consider these to be empirically answerable questions, and ones whose answers are likely to vary under different circumstances. Indeed, one of the advantages of such an approach is that it enables researchers to better identify the institutions and competitive situations that shape party organizational choices.

As we pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, the organizational variation among the parties in the Political Party Database has been crucial for enabling chapter authors to conduct analyses which isolate the impact of various organizational features. In order to investigate the richness of these patterns of variation one can examine relationships between variables across and indeed within the dimensions of organization. We have already illustrated the potential for this elsewhere, by examining the simple bivariate correlations between some of the indicators drawn from across the three dimensions (Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al. 2016). The results of the earlier analysis revealed a number of interesting—and in some cases, unexpected—relationships across the three dimensions of analysis. First, in terms of association between AIPD and the other dimensions, we found an inverse relationship between intra-party democracy and two types of party resources: the more internally democratic parties are, the fewer members they have relative to electors, and the poorer they are. However, they are less dependent on state funding and their leaders are weaker. Conversely, parties with relatively strong leaders tend to be relatively dependent on state funding. Somewhat unexpectedly, these parties also have relatively high levels of membership, which is the opposite of what is to be expected from arguments that link the decline in party membership to parties' growing reliance on state funding.

These correlations point to areas for further investigation. For instance, they suggest different categories of parties that might exist. The first is a group of parties that are in national terms large, rich and heavily dependent on state subsidies; these will also tend to be relatively 'top-down', leader-dominated organizations. By contrast, the second group is the opposite of all these things: it consists of parties that are (in their own national contexts) relatively small, poor, and not so well supported by the state, but which are more internally democratic and less leadership-dominated. While it is certainly too early to draw definite conclusions, the first group reminds us of what Gordon Smith called the 'core parties', namely those which run the system. The latter group is more likely to consist of peripheral (or even challenger) parties in that they are less central to the process of governing. To be sure, we are not suggesting new ideal types here. On the contrary, these two groups are heterogeneous as regards ideology and party history. Yet it seems that their role within the system is related to some central organizational features in ways that have not necessarily been predicted by prior literature. As such, we suggest that it may be fruitful to elaborate and test hypotheses about why and under what circumstances such clustering may occur, and to test whether factors such as incumbency predict whether parties fall in or out of the clusters.

As these basic explorations of the relationships across organizational dimensions imply, it is not enough for researchers to limit themselves to identifying the factors that shape organizational variation. Researchers also need to systematically address some major 'so what?' questions: for instance, what are the consequences of these organizational patterns for the legitimacy of party and political systems? If a country has a preponderance of large, leader-dominated and state-dependent parties, does this lead to higher levels of public dissatisfaction with the parties and/or political systems as a whole? And what of the consequences for public policy: are such countries more or less likely to generate policy outcomes that represent the views of a majority of electors? The contributions in this volume have pointed to some potential answers to these questions, but they cannot fully investigate causal relations because we largely lack time-series data. Yet, they clearly show that party organization does matter: It matters, for example, for the selection of female candidates, for the frequency of manifesto change, for trust in the institutions and the nature of party memberships. Furthermore, the chapters demonstrate the utility of the dimensional thinking as a tool for disaggregating party organization, and for identifying measures that can be used to assess mid-range theories about the impact of parties' organizational variation. In this sense, we hope that the PPDB data and measures not only point the way for politically important lines of future research, but also provide some tools that help researchers who want to tackle these socially relevant research puzzles.

Another key advantage of a dimensional approach to the study of party organizations is that it should facilitate efforts to move the field beyond its

traditional heartland in most-similar-system comparative studies of practices in parliamentary regimes. As the ranks of long-term presidential democracies grow, it seems theoretically indefensible to exclude Latin American, Asian and African regimes from cross-national comparative studies of party organization. Up to now, such exclusion could partly be justified because the traditional ideal type distinctions seemed to make little sense for fledgling parties, or for parties in presidential regimes. Now, however, the obstacles to inclusion seem to be more empirical than theoretical: in the absence of easily comparable data on party organizational practices, scholars have found it difficult to get beyond the 'usual' cases. Developing a common descriptive vocabulary to categorize and compare discrete aspects of party organizational resources and structures should facilitate efforts to gather parallel data in order to assess the impact of different institutional and historical circumstances on how parties organize, and on how their organizational differences matter. In other words, moving away from an approach that is rooted in ideal type models and towards one based on dimensions or organizational practices should make it easier to bridge the gap between studies of political parties in presidential and parliamentary regimes.

Going forward, we intend to maintain and add more cases to our data base, including new and old parties from additional regions of the world, and ones which have developed under different institutional arrangements and competitive circumstances. We encourage researchers to contribute towards the development and use of common coding schemes and indices—not necessarily the ones we propose here, but with the aim of developing tools that travel well. The study of comparative political parties will move forward more quickly in the future if it comes to be characterized more by standard measures than by standard models. Such a shared operational mode should facilitate replication and expansion of studies which cumulatively can make greater and more rapid progress in answering the pressing questions about the impact of parties' organizational efforts on important facets of political life, including political participation, party system stability, and the quality of representation.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Overall, the current volume has convincingly shown that party organization still matters. What is more, this is detectable even when we measure it largely in terms of the 'official story'—something that many party scholars viewed with considerable scepticism when it was first suggested by Katz and Mair. However, the effects of party organization are much harder to detect if we use the familiar party types as tools for the categorization of parties—simply

because only a minority can meaningfully be assigned to the types of cadre, mass, catch-all, or cartel party. These stylized descriptions of political parties do not conform to the multifaceted universe of political parties in the twenty-first century. Yet this is not entirely surprising. While a developmental interpretation of parties regards them largely as a product of their changing socio-political environment, another interpretation, and one that our chapters have seemed to confirm, is that parties are also masters of their own fate in that they are capable of making organizational choices, and of using organization as a tool in the pursuit of their political goals. This is meaningful in two ways. First, parties are influenced by their socio-political environments, but these environments differ and there is always scope for varied strategic choices at the level of the individual party, which makes for diversity of outcome. Second, party organization is a competitive phenomenon. Organizational choices and strategies tend to be imitated by rival parties in the same country, but even then parties vary in the details of what they implement. This party autonomy is one factor that contributes to uncertainty when we try to predict how parties will develop in the future. Thus, in an age of increasing challenges to political parties, it is vital to consistently monitor changes in parties' organizational resources and in their strategies for mobilizing popular support. Doing so will enable us to better understand the consequences of such organizational choices for democracy at large.

NOTES

1. Note that we also tried including the size of the membership in our operationalization of the mass party model to see what effect it would have. Specifically, we added the requirement that a mass party should have an ME ratio above the PPDB average. This had the effect of removing *all* cases from the category.
2. On the basis that Kirchheimer might be read as suggesting that catch-all parties retain relatively high memberships, we tried adding the further requirement that the ME ratio should be above the PPDB mean; once again, this had the effect of removing all cases from the catch-all category.

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Afterword

Richard S. Katz

Systematic empirical analysis has many virtues. Most importantly, it allows for the possibility that hypotheses that appear to be ‘obviously true’ might in fact be false. As Paul Lazarsfeld (1949: 380) showed in his review of *The American Soldier*, even when supported by entirely plausible reasons, the facts may run counter to our expectations.¹ Only slightly less importantly, it is valuable because it forces clarity of thinking, and in some cases the recognition that some refinements of definitions or the making of further distinctions in the theory to be tested are necessary in order to make the operationalization of concepts possible. Random sampling from large populations, or careful and systematic case selection when addressing smaller populations, minimizes the risk of trying to draw ‘universally’ applicable conclusions from an atypical set of cases or the temptation to generalize beyond the range of the data.

Notwithstanding that these virtues have been recognized in political analyses at least since the time of Aristotle’s *Politics* (perhaps with a qualification to reflect that Aristotle did not necessarily subscribe to the modern belief in inductive generalization as the basis of knowledge), they have not characterized most major works on political parties, and certainly on political party organization. Until quite recently, these have fallen into one of two categories. On the one hand, there have been intensive studies of single parties, or of the parties of a single country. Very occasionally, there have been studies of parties in a few countries that have been historically or institutionally linked. Prominent examples include: Moisei Ostrogorsky’s *La Démocratie et l’Organisation des Partis Politiques* [Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties], originally published in 1903 and based on his observations of parties in Great Britain and the United States; Robert Michels’ *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens* [On the Sociology of Political Parties in Modern Democracy: A Study on Oligarchic Tendencies in Political Aggregations] which was published in 1911 based on the German Social Democratic Party; and Robert McKenzie’s *British Political Parties*, first published in

1955, with a revised second edition in 1963. Although based on few cases, these works advanced arguments, or made claims, that were opined to apply far beyond the cases studied. And those hypotheses have been tested in other case studies or parties in other settings—when they have not simply been accepted as having been ‘proven’ by the original work.

On the other hand, there have been more theoretical works, usually advancing a typology of parties and party systems. One aspect of these typologies generally concerned the organizational characteristics of the parties to be found in each category, if indeed those characteristics did not simply define the categories themselves. Perhaps the most central work in this category is Maurice Duverger’s classic *Les Partis Politiques* [*Political Parties*], published in French in 1951 and in English with the subtitle ‘their organization and activity in the modern state’ in 1954. Other prominent works of this type include Giovanni Sartori’s *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (1976) and Angelo Panebianco’s *Modelli di partito: Organizzazione e potere nei partiti politici* [*Political Parties: Organization & Power*] (1982 in Italian and 1988 in English). These works are all heavily salted with examples, but because one cannot escape the apparent inevitability that the typologies were based on prior intimate familiarity with the cases chosen to illustrate them, these cases can offer little additional confirmation of the underlying theoretical structure.

On reflection, it is easy to see why there have not been more large scale studies of party organization. Language has been an obvious impediment. Party documents are rarely, if ever, translated out of the national language, and individual researchers are rarely fluent in more than a few languages. Thus, while studies of parties in the English-speaking world, or of parties in Scandinavia, or of parties in Latin America, are not uncommon, studies that include parties from all three areas—plus Italy or Germany or the Netherlands—are not. Even when language was not a problem, relevant non-textual data (for example, numbers of members or staff, sources and level of income or expenditure) were rarely published, and could only be obtained after numerous personal visits to party offices. Moreover, until the advent of easy international travel and communication (think of the world before cheap flights, e-mail, and Skype™), and before institutions such as the European Consortium for Political Research (founded in 1970) made it an explicit goal to foster not just cross-national communication of results but cross-national collaboration in the framing and execution of research, most party research projects were one-, or at most two-, man or woman affairs.

Serious efforts to assemble the cross-nationally comparable data required for systematic cross-national analysis began in the late 1970s. One pathbreaking work was Kenneth Janda’s *Political Parties: A Cross National Survey* published in 1980, although the work began as early as 1963. Coding material from thousands of primary and secondary sources, Janda developed a

'holonational' (Naroll 1972) database to allow systematic testing of hypotheses—initially in his own work, those derived from Duverger (Janda 1980: xv), but in the form of a machine-readable dataset archived by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research with 111 variables for 158 countries (ICPSR 7534) it has been accessed by countless researchers with widely varying interests; in my own work, for example, the Janda data allowed me to subject the theory that I had developed and tested by looking intensively at parties in Italy, Ireland, and Britain to an extensive test based on forty-nine parties from fourteen countries (Katz 1980).² Another major contribution has been the coding of party manifestos begun by the ECPR's Manifesto Research Group in 1979, and now carried on by the Manifesto Research on Political Representation project (MARPOR) at the Social Science Research Center Berlin. With 'quantitative content analyses of parties' election programmes from more than 50 countries covering all free, democratic elections since 1945' (WZB) these data allow scholars who are merely multilingual (and were not in a position in the 1940s and 1950s to collect what are in many cases ephemeral documents) to analyse party policy pronouncements in a wide range of settings and over a significant period of time.

The study of 'Party Organization and Organizational Adaptation in the Last Third of the Twentieth Century' that Peter Mair and I began with funding from the American National Science Foundation (SES-8818439) in 1988, resulting in the 1992 publication of *Party Organizations: A Data Handbook*, was a somewhat more (than Janda's) geographically limited attempt to develop a cross-nationally comparable dataset specifically documenting what appeared to be important on-going changes in the organization of west European national parties (plus the United States and the nascent parties of the European Community—since 1993, the European Union). The project was designed without any specific hypotheses in mind, and indeed that has proven to be one of its strengths. Although the project is best known as the stimulus for the 'cartel party' thesis (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009), by not focusing on a well-defined, but limited set of issues, we generated a dataset that has been used to address questions far from our own interests.

In many ways, the Katz–Mair party organization project (henceforth, KMPOP) was the precursor of the Political Parties Database (PPDB) project upon which this book is based. Unlike the KMPOP, which opted for data collected over a reasonably long period of time within a limited range of countries, the PPDB team opted for greater breadth but a shorter time frame. Instead of the seventy-nine parties in twelve countries (all but the United States in Western Europe) that the KMPOP considered, the PPDB project covers 122 parties in nineteen countries, excluding Finland and the United States that were in the KMPOP, but adding France, three non-European

parliamentary democracies (Australia, Canada, and Israel), two second-wave European democracies (Portugal and Spain), and three third-wave European democracies that were still part of the Soviet bloc when the KMPOP team began its work in the 1980s (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). They also opted for a single wave rather than time-series data, although future waves are anticipated. And although the variables collected are not identical to those of the KMPOP, there is sufficient overlap that for some purposes the new data can serve as a twenty-years-on addition to the KMPOP time series.

THE OFFICIAL STORY

The PPDB project follows the lead of Janda, the MARPOR project, and KMPOP in relying heavily on party documents, coding what we called in the introduction to the *Data Handbook* 'the official story' (Katz and Mair 1992: 6–8). One obvious advantage of this approach is simply to make the project tractable (as the authors of this volume note in Chapter 1, to 'tell the complete story about power relations . . . would have required us to enlist a far greater number of willing volunteers in a project that is already large, not to mention that expert surveys raise their own set of issues about validity, accuracy and comparability'). Moreover, it is hard to perform an objective test of hypotheses when the data used ultimately are the necessarily subjective judgements of the very people who formulated the hypotheses in the first place.

The official story approach has its own limitations, however. Developing a cross-nationally comparable coding scheme presents many problems. Even when dealing with something as apparently straight-forward as levels of income and expenditure, one is confronted by variation in accounting rules and practices. Parties differ in their definitions of 'membership.' As the continuing debate over constitutional interpretation in the United States (originalism versus pragmatism) illustrates, even a fixed text can mean different things to different people, and can change in meaning over time; the problem of turning differing texts into consistent codes is only multiplied when the texts are in different languages.

While party documents may reflect the vision of a party that it wants to project in the public sphere, or even that its members truly believe reflects its internal ethos, they are not always reliable reflections of reality. As Pelizzo (2003) observed with regard to manifestos, a party manifesto, like all advertising, may deliberately misrepresent the party's positions, perhaps to move public perceptions in a desired direction by overstating changes in the party's true position, perhaps as a symbolic sop to some internal faction, or perhaps

simply to hoodwink the public. Scarrow (2015) has convincingly argued for caution in accepting party membership figures, which may be inflated as part of internal power struggles or as a way to disguise the true sources of illicit funds—or, indeed, may simply be seat-of-the-pants estimates made in the absence of any reliable membership register. Writing about Austria, Müller, Plasser, and Ulram (2004: 155–8) remind us that, as with some provisions of national constitutions, the inclusion of something in a party's statutes is no guarantee that it will actually occur. To the extent that this is true, 'a party's statutes do not describe its organization any more than a political system's constitution does. It is only a pallid trace, fleeting and imprecise, little more than a point of departure for the organizational analysis of a political party' (Panebianco 1988: 35). In recognition of these limitations, the KMPOP team published a volume of 'country chapters', in which those who collected the official story data were invited to reflect on the differences between the official and 'real' stories (Katz and Mair 1994).

In the PPDB project, the official story is in some cases supplemented by the real story, assessing whether certain rules had actually been applied, for example in the last leadership election (see Chapter 6 on the construction of the Intraparty Democracy Indices). Even when the chapters do not have systematic 'real story' data, they often suggest important cautions before taking the official story at face value. For example, although their analysis is limited by the nature of the PPDB to counts of party sub-organizations and yes/no dummy variables for specific types of sub-organizations (women, youth), Allern and Verge in Chapter 5 usefully remind us that the role played by these groups has changed over time. In doing this, they highlight the distinction between the position of such groups in the traditional mass party model, under which the party per se might be seen as the 'political specialist' of a social segment, cooperating with other organizations with other specialisms (whether or not formally represented in the party's governing bodies), and a more contemporary position as internally generated structures designed to facilitate communication with various elements of society seen more as targets to be influenced by campaigns than as core elements of the party family, and perhaps to serve as 'focus groups' allowing the party to better understand the psychology of its 'customers'.

But if the official story is not the whole story, neither is it without value. Apart from the virtues of being relatively accessible and of shedding light on the image of itself that a party wishes to project, party rules can be an important resource in intraparty politics. Adhering to the rules can enhance the legitimacy and security of party leaders; violating the rules can furnish ammunition to challengers. Party members and leaders have repeatedly shown that they perceive the rules to be sufficiently important that they have risked (and sometimes endured) serious internal ruptures in fights over their formulation.

NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

One natural consequence of the ‘most-similar-systems’ or case studies approaches has been to focus attention on factors that can vary within the category of cases. All the parties within a single country face the same regulatory regime, benefit from the same system of financial subventions, have developed in the same historical circumstances, making it impossible empirically to assess the importance of these factors except (when they change) in before and after comparisons. While this is less true in cross-national studies, the problem is only partially mitigated when the cases are limited to a single cultural or language cluster (e.g., the English-speaking democracies).

One important result common to most of the chapters in this volume is to highlight the importance of national differences, which virtually always overwhelm everything else. This is certainly evident in the various comparisons of nation versus party family as a distinguishing characteristic, but it can also be evident when either system-level variables or country dummies are included in explanatory models. Thus, for example, Pruyssers et al. (Chapter 9) find that once these variables are added ‘the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the level of centralization in the selection process lose their significance’. The one exception to the relative unimportance of party family appears to be a significant relationship between traditional connection to the mass party model and the existence of a rich array of sub-organizations (Chapter 5).

As with all ‘proper name’ variables, there is no reason to think that nation *per se* is relevant. The question is what characteristics of nation (that is, what things that parties within a single nation have in common that distinguish them from parties in other nations) underlie the observed cross-national differences. It is only once this is determined that one can appropriately decide whether, and how, to include nation as an explanatory or control variable. Thus the real import of this finding is less that nation is important than it is to highlight the importance of determining what theoretically significant factors are being subsumed under the proper names of nations.

ASSESSING THE PPDB

As has been true of many pioneering works, one of the shortcomings of this book is also one of its strengths. While the PPDB project represents a giant step forward in providing the research community with cross-nationally comparable data, when applied to specific problems in these chapters, the limitations of those data also become apparent. For example, although Conor

Little and David Farrell (Chapter 12) recognize party unity in parliament to be the joint result of shared preferences (cohesiveness) and discipline (the promise or threat of rewards and punishments to enforce unity), limitations of the data only allow examination of rewards, and indeed only allow consideration of the hypothesized potential for rewards rather than rewards actually delivered or withheld. As for cohesion, in the absence of data concerning MPs' preferences, the best available data are the assessments of 'degree of dissent on European integration' from the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey*. Moreover, they are also forced by data limitations to ignore the possibility that subnational (e.g., constituency level) party strength may facilitate disunity. The result is an analysis that in being laudably self-conscious about its own limitations, is also highly suggestive of the directions in which future research might go.

One of the objectives of this volume is to be 'the first major effort to analyse the data collected in the Political Party Database (PPDB)', and simply to introduce the PPDB to the research community. As a result, the chapters here obviously privilege this dataset and the variables contained in it; while various chapters draw on the KMPOP data, the MARPOR data, the European Election Study mass survey data, or the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the PPDB data quite properly (in terms of the book's objectives) remain the primary focus. At the same time, in drawing on these other data collections, these chapters strongly suggest that the greatest contribution of this project is not going to come from the PPDB taken by itself, but rather from the synergies between it and other datasets that address other aspects of what are highly complex, but also intimately interconnected, processes. And these synergies will only become more important as the stock of cross-national databases grows.

Although the expansion of the number and variety of countries and parties under consideration is one of the virtues of the PPDB project, it also presents some problems. Given the diverse set of parties and countries included, the authors have had to confront three problems—beyond those of developing a systematically comparable coding scheme. The first is that of outliers—and the difficult question of whether they are really *sui generis* (and so appropriately excluded from the analysis—and the resulting conclusions) or merely extreme cases (in which case, by increasing the range of the variables in question they may contribute to more reliable explanation). The second is missing data—and the question of whether the missing cases leave a systematic bias in the cases that remain. And the third is how to normalize in order to generate comparable statistics. In assessing the financial resources of parties, for example, is it enough to convert local currencies to euros, or, given that a large proportion of party funds are spent on staff, is it necessary to normalize for differing wage rates as well? How meaningful is it to talk about national averages, or national medians, given that both are likely to be of quite different significance for a country like the UK (for which the PPDB includes

seven parties, only three of which won more than 4 per cent of the vote, meaning that even the median party is in the 'micro' category) than for Hungary (four parties, with three winning at least 16 per cent of the vote, and even the smallest winning over 7 per cent) or France (two parties, both winning almost 30 per cent of the vote in the first round of the election to the National Assembly)? Different authors have addressed these problems in different ways—but it is precisely in giving the research community the capacity to question the decisions made by these authors, and to experiment with alternative formulations, that the PPDB will be making a significant contribution.

IDEAL TYPES AND EVOLUTIONARY MODELS

In both the opening and concluding chapters, the editors of this volume express scepticism about the profession's 'overuse of ideal type categories and other taxonomical devices, arguing that such labels are most useful if they are stated as clear and falsifiable hypotheses about expected clusters of organizational characteristics'. Certainly their complaint that once an ideal type becomes associated with a particular time period (an 'age of the mass party', for example) there has sometimes been an unfortunate tendency to take that gross characterization as a valid historical generalization, and to assume (usually implicitly) both that all parties in 'the age of the mass party' were, in fact, mass parties and that all of the mass parties conformed quite closely to the ideal type, is not without merit. Still, one can question whether their strategy of asking how many of the parties in the PPDB fit the ideal type definitions (even after taking their recognition that 'ideal types are just that—they are not supposed to be a perfect fit for real world practices' into account) is really germane, and also, once the function of ideal types is properly understood, one can also ask whether dimensions and ideal types actually should be seen to be representative of alternative rather than of complementary analytic frames.

One function of an ideal type is to be a theoretical primitive, used to theorize about relationships and processes in the absence of the messy complications of the real world. In physics, the 'perfect vacuum' is an ideal type, perhaps closely approximated in the laboratory, but never realized, even in 'the vacuum' of outer space. In the social sciences, the rational economic man is similarly an ideal type, albeit one that is much less well approximated—ultimately giving rise to the field of behavioural economics. The 'stylized' models of rational choice theory within political science are constructed out of such ideal types. While they can be heuristically useful even if there are no real-world cases that approximate them, these idealizations are useful empirically only to the extent that they are simplifications, but not gross distortions, of reality.

This is not, however, the only way in which ideal types can be useful in empirical research. To think in terms of dimensions is to suggest that there are multiple attributes (variables) that can vary independently of one another. (If they could not vary independently, there would only be a single dimension, although each variable might represent a different metric on that dimension.) These dimensions need not be orthogonal, but so long as they do not coincide, they jointly define a multidimensional space. But because most of the attributes we consider can be measured at best at the interval level (that is, they are without a meaningful absolute zero point), it is a space devoid of landmarks. Another function of ideal types is to provide landmarks through the use of which the dimensions can be understood.

One prominent example of such an ideal type is 'polyarchy' (Dahl 1971). As an ideal type, polyarchy is identified as the 'upper right' corner of a two dimensional space defined by inclusiveness and liberalization; Dahl chose to identify this as polyarchy rather than democracy so as to avoid having to consider '[w]hat other characteristics might be required for a system to be strictly democratic' (1971: 1–2). Alternatively, polyarchy is identified as a category of cases ('polyarchies') that lie in that general part of the space (1971: 7). Cases around the other three corners are identified as 'closed hegemonies' (lower left), 'competitive oligarchies' (upper left) and 'inclusive hegemonies' (lower right). Significantly relative to the count-the-parties-that-fit-the-type analysis of the final chapter here, these four categories collectively occupy only a fraction of the total space—and that is intentional, 'reflect[ing] the historical tendency to classify regimes in terms of extreme types' and Dahl's 'desire to avoid redundant terminology', notwithstanding his observation that 'perhaps the predominant number of national regimes in the world today would fall into the mid-area' (1971: 8).

Both the Dahl model of polyarchy, on the one hand, and the Kirchheimer model of the catch-all party and the Katz–Mair model of the cartel party, on the other hand, are concerned with over-time transitions.³ For Dahl, this is made explicit in the first sentence of the book:

Given a regime in which the opponents of the government cannot openly and legally organize into political parties in order to oppose the government in free and fair elections, what conditions favor or impede a transformation into a regime in which they can? (Dahl 1971: 1)

For Kirchheimer, the phenomenon of interest is the transformation of mass parties into catch-all parties: not, for example, the creation of new non-ideological parties, but the '[d]rastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage' (1966: 190) by already existing mass parties. For Katz and Mair, the phenomenon is the organizational and strategic transformation of mainstream catch-all parties into cartel parties (as well as the earlier transformation of elite parties of the right into catch-all parties, a transformation with

which Kirchheimer is much less concerned). Quite apart from the fact that ideal types are never fully realized, meaning that none of these transformations is hypothesized to be complete, neither are these transformations hypothesized to be instantaneous. In this sense, the question is not whether there are a large number of parties that are reasonably good approximations of one of the ideal types (however ‘reasonably good approximation’ is defined), but rather whether parties are moving closer to one of the ideal types in the ways, and under the conditions, specified by the models. And because this question is one about movement over time, it is not one that can be answered with cross-sectional data.

Another prominent pair of examples of ideal types are ‘majoritarian’ and ‘consensus’ democracy as defined by Lijphart (1999: ch.14) on the basis of ten variables, which are shown by factor analysis to cluster along two dimensions (‘executive-parties’ and ‘federal-unitary’). Unlike Dahl’s two-dimensional space, in which the two dimensions might be presumed to be empirically correlated (i.e., the cases would have a tendency to cluster along the diagonal), Lijphart’s two dimensions are orthogonal by construction. Only nineteen of his thirty-six cases fall into one of the two quadrants that correspond to the dichotomy of majoritarian (at the executives end of executives-parties and the unitary end of federal-unity) and consensus (at the other ends), and only six of the cases (the UK and New Zealand for majoritarian democracy and Austria, India, Switzerland, and Germany for consensus democracy) are far enough from both axes as to plausibly be classified as approximations of the ideal types. Nonetheless the Lijphart dichotomy is widely used, precisely because it helps to make sense of the multidimensional space defined by the ten input variables or two factor analysis generated dimensions.

That said, however, the use of the ideal types as orienting landmarks, does not preclude a return to the underlying dimensions in order to test hypotheses. In trying to assess the impact of majoritarian versus consensus democracy on the ‘quality of democracy’, for example, Lijphart looks only at placement along the executive-parties dimension (1999: 278–9, 296). And that is, of course, amply illustrated by the chapters of this book, which on the one hand frequently take the mass party or the cartel party ideal types as points of reference, but then test hypotheses that relate only to one or two of the dimensions.

THE CARTEL PARTY

Given its connections to the KMPOP, and the fact that the KMPOP data also gave rise to the cartel party thesis, it should come as no surprise that the cartel

party thesis is the source for many of the questions considered in this book. How did the thesis fare?

Perhaps the elements of the cartel thesis that are of most direct relevance to a study of party organization are those concerning the relative positions of what Mair and I (Katz and Mair 1993) called the ‘three faces of party organization’: the party on the ground (POG), the party central office (PCO), and the party in public office (PPO). Our conjecture based on what we saw in our data from the 1960s through the 1980s was that the importance of the POG would continue to decline, with the PPO coming to be the dominant element of the party (see especially Katz and Mair 2002). We saw, and the analyses in this volume confirm, a secular decline in party membership, albeit one that is neither universal nor always completely monotonic. Likewise, both we and the PPDB team report a decline in the relative importance of the membership as a source of party finance, and a pronounced growth in the professional staff available to the PPO. In these respects, the new data provide updated confirmation of the thesis.

The relative power of the POG is also addressed by von dem Berge and Poguntke in their discussion of intra-party democracy. Mair and I suggested a trend toward marginalization of party activists through the use of internal plebiscites—ironically using instruments that appear to be democratic as a means of marginalizing the ‘demos’. The primary objective for von dem Berge and Poguntke is to refine the meaning of ‘intra-party democracy’ (IPD) and to develop indices of their two senses of IPD (assembly-based and plebiscitary). But although they find few cases that would fit the ‘ideal typical case of a cartel party’ (and one should remember that Mair and I always identified the cartel party model as an ideal type that, like other ideal types, should not be expected to be fully realized), they find a distribution of cases that ‘is probably a more realistic empirical manifestation of the trend towards the marginalization of party activists as was predicted by Katz and Mair’.

Assessing the relative importance of the PCO is more complicated, however. The problem is that while the PCO can serve as an independent base of authority within a party, it can also be little more than the agent of the POG (in the mass party model) or of the PPO (as Mair and I suggested it would increasingly become in the cartel party model). To the extent that the PCO is primarily the agent of one of the other faces of the party, the question is not what financial and staff resources are available to the PCO, but rather who controls those resources. As Bardi, Calossi, and Pizzimenti note in their conclusions to Chapter 3, the data available to them cannot resolve this question. In part, this stems from the common overlap of personnel (to take an example from after the PPDB data collection was completed, how does one assess the relative influence of Matteo Renzi as Prime Minister of Italy from that of Matteo Renzi as Secretary of the Democratic Party?), and in part from that fact that even when different individuals occupy the top positions in the

PPO and the PCO, their relative influence is more likely to be reflected in the 'real story' rather than in formal party rules. (On these problems see, for example, Blondel and Cotta 1996.)

The question of finance is also relevant to our suggestion that cartel parties have become increasingly dependent on the state. This is clearly confirmed by van Biezen and Kopecký in Chapter 4. What is more ambiguous is the relationship between state funding and membership. As van Biezen and Kopecký observe, the causal relationship could run either way. The POG could be allowed to wither as state subvention makes it less important as a source of income (although as Scarrow has reminded us, members may have value to the party that extends beyond their check books), or (as Mair and I suggested) parties in their role as law makers may introduce and expand state subventions to compensate for (and perhaps even to reinvigorate) an already declining POG. In either case, we might expect a negative bivariate correlation between change in subsidy and change in membership, whereas van Biezen and Kopecký (Table 4.4) find a negative, but not significant, correlation at the country level and a positive and significant correlation at the level of individual parties. On the other hand, this aspect of the cartel party thesis actually involved three variables: state subventions; the POG (or more accurately, its 'ability or willingness to pay'); and the cost of remaining competitive (Katz and Mair 2009: 758). While the correlations in Table 4.4 certainly do not support a naive reading of the cartel party thesis, until this third factor, *inter alia*, is controlled, no definitive conclusion can be drawn.

The cartel thesis was not confined to questions of internal party organization and power, but also suggested systemic consequences. One such suggestion was that cartelization would lead to lower responsiveness, and that this in turn would create an opening for what we identified as 'anti-party-system parties' (recently exemplified by new populist parties such as the *Alternative für Deutschland* or the *Movimento 5 Stelle*). Full assessment is beyond the capacity or the ambition of this book, but Costa Lobo and Razzuoli (Chapter 8) do address the question of whether party dependence on state funding (as one indicator of 'cartelness') has an impact on 'external efficacy' (the sense that 'who is in power' or 'who people vote for' makes a difference). Although the cartel thesis suggests a negative relationship, they find a weak but significant positive relationship. While this certainly cannot be interpreted as support for the cartel thesis, neither should it be taken as evidence to the contrary without a great deal of caution—for three reasons. First, these measures of efficacy are constructed at, and refer to, the country level, and we already know from earlier chapters that financial dependence is also largely a country level phenomenon; hence there is a significant danger of spurious correlation, and indeed when the multivariate models are estimated based on country clusters, the relationship between efficacy and state dependence is greatly attenuated for the 'who is in power' indicator, and completely

disappears for the 'who people vote for' indicator. Second, and in common with many of the chapters in this volume, the authors are attempting to assess over-time hypotheses with cross-sectional data, which as Hayward Alker (1969) has shown runs cross-level inference risks exactly equivalent to those of the well-known ecological fallacy. The third, and most speculative, reason for caution stems from what, in the context of the cartel party thesis, is a case selection (or alternatively, an omitted variable) bias. The cartel party thesis posits a distinction between parties that are in the cartel and 'collude' with respect to policy, and those that arise in response to the cartel: the anti-party-system parties. But in turn, the presence or absence of such parties may have a significant impact of popular perceptions of what difference elections make. First, the cartel parties collude leading to a belief that elections make little difference; second, anti-party-system parties arise in protest; third, perceptions that elections make a difference increase. Again, however, this is the kind of hypothesis that cannot be tested with cross-sectional data.

A related aspect of the cartel party thesis is, as just indicated, the hypothesis that the policy positions of parties within the cartel would tend to converge. The desire on the part of party leaders to pursue that strategy, which we suggested would likely be opposed by policy-motivated activists, was posited to be a motivation for party leaders to attempt to disempower those activists. While none of the chapters in this volume address that hypothesis directly, the chapter by Hennl and Franzmann is of some relevance. Although they are concerned with the magnitude of change rather than its direction, they find, consistent with the cartel hypothesis, that the less constrained the party elite, the greater the expected magnitude of manifesto change.

Overall then, the judgement must be mixed. While many of the findings reported here are entirely consistent with the cartel party thesis, others are not. Whether this is a result of limitations inherent in these data, misspecification in the analytic strategy, or deficiencies of the thesis itself remains to be determined by future research.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Books can be valuable because of the old questions they answer, but they can equally be valuable because of the new questions they pose and the strategies for answering those questions that they suggest. The chapters in this book do all these things. At least partial answers are provided for questions like whether intraparty democracy is an impediment to the nomination of women ('when other factors are taken into account, there may not be a trade-off between the democratic ideals of representation and participation

after all’); does party dependence on the state for financial resources lead citizens to perceive the parties to be less responsive (apparently not, but a more nuanced approach may be required); does provision of state resources directly to MPs facilitate or encourage party disunity (in fact the parties of MPs in receipt of a public subsidy ‘are positively more unified than the parties of MPs not in receipt of a subsidy’).

As with any research constrained by data limitations, restrictions on the number of words allowed, and editors’ deadlines, none of the chapters here is, or claims to be, the final word on the subjects addressed, and indeed many of them explicitly lay out agendas for additional research. In some cases, these are suggestions for further research with the same data. In other cases, they are suggestions concerning ways to combine the PPDB data with other existing datasets. In still others, the authors identify conceptual problems that need to be solved before more comprehensive analyses can be undertaken. All of these serve to advance the scholarly conversation regarding party organizations.

Underlying these contributions are the data themselves. Even without this book itself, the PPDB can be expected to stimulate wide ranging research efforts: some pursuing the agendas articulated in these pages; some challenging the interpretations and conclusions advanced here; some addressing questions entirely other than those that the PPDB team considered to be central. In simply introducing those data and describing the distribution of parties along the dimensions measured, the book will have far-reaching impact on parties’ research for years to come. All of us engaged in that field owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the PPDB team, first for assembling the data, and second for making them available so promptly to the entire community.

NOTES

1. Examples from Lazarsfeld’s review include:

- ‘Men from rural backgrounds were usually in better spirits during their Army life than soldiers from city backgrounds. (After all, they are more accustomed to hardships.)’
- ‘Southern soldiers were better able to stand the climate in the hot South Sea Islands than Northern soldiers (of course, Southerners are more accustomed to hot weather)’ (1949: 380).

All perfectly obvious (at least to people at the time), but all belied by the data.

2. As an indication of the magnitude of this project, Janda acknowledges the contribution of ninety-five individuals who did the actual processing and coding of documents and over forty-five consultants who reviewed the national reports.

3. This is less true of Duverger's model of the mass party, because although he envisions a kind of 'contagion from the left' that would lead all parties to adopt the mass party form, the original mass parties are presumed to have been created as such, rather than resulting from the metamorphosis of pre-existing parties.

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